People v. Fromholz Federal Cases & Relevant Quotes

P | United States v. Gardner, 887 F.3d 780 (6th Cir. 2018). B.H. unlocked the phone, defendant outside the motel room

Officers searched a cell phone belonging to the defendant with the consent of the defendant’s girlfriend while the defendant was not present as the girlfriend, B.H., claimed that the phone was hers and gave officers a passcode; at the same time, another group of officers asked the defendant if he had a phone and he said he did but officers never found a black phone belonging to him. The defendant’s girlfriend did have apparent authtority to consent to the search of the defendant’s cell phone because a reasonable officers could have believed that B.H had authority to consent to the search of the phone based on the facts available to the officers at the time of the search because B.H knew the phone’s passcode, officers had observed her calling someone on the same phone throughout the day, and gave the phone to the officers. Defendant’s arguments do not hold up b/c further inquiry about the defendant not having a phone would not have confirmed that the phone in the motel room was his, and the claim that B.H. told officers that the phone belonged to her boyfriend would not have overcame the reasonable appearance of joint access or control of the phone.

Quotes:

	Finally, B.H. knew the phone's passcode and
	gave the phone to the officers. As a result, "any reasonable officer
	would have thought B.H controlled the phone.'

D | United States v. Griswold, No. 09-CR-6174, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153943 (W.D.N.Y. June 2, 2011). mom, password and bedroom are indications of interest in privacy and ambiguity

The defendant’s mother Williamee consented to the search of her son’s laptop computer in his personal bedroom; the laptop was password-protected, so the officer used a foresnic tool to bypass the password required. Williamee did not have actual authority to consent to the search of her son’s laptop because it was a closed container that was locked by the defendant’s use of a password to expressed an intent to restrict third-party access;  Williamee did not have apparent authority because there was a difference in ownership between the home computer and her son’s personal laptop, location of laptop in the bedroom suggests an interest in privacy, the password was bypassed by officiers instead of entered normally, and officers made no inquiry about Williamee’s relationship to her son’s laptop to determine the extent of mutual use or joint control before commencing their search although the laptop being password-protected made it unreasonable for them to continue the search without inquiring further Williamee’s authority to cosnsent.

Quotes:

“In general, ‘where an officer is presented with ambiguous facts related to authority, he or she has a duty to investigate further before relying on the consent.’ At the very least, the court found that upon discovering the defendant's laptop was password-protected, it was unreasonable for the officers to proceed with the search without inquiring further into Williamee's authority to consent.”

“reasonable officers should have considered the location of the laptop as a "portable laptop computer kept in a bedroom belonging to an adult suggests a greater privacy interest" than "a desktop computer located in a common area that is readily accessible to a number of different users."

"when a third party expressed no joint ownership or other interest in the place to be searched and has affirmatively told the officers that the object of the requested search actually belongs to another [person], an officer is expected to inquire further about the facts surrounding who the laptop belonged.”

P | United States v. Cole, No. 8-CR-93-JAW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57437 (D. Me. July 24, 2008). Presby and the defendant are sharers, mutual use and seeming joint access/control

Defendant’s partner, Presby, consented to search the computer in their shared home that he and his partner shared access to and were aware of one another’s passwords on, Presby showed no hesitancy when he entered the password to access the defendant’s user profile. Presby had actual authority because the existence of password protection did not create ambiguity as to if Presby had authority since he was able to enter the password easily, besides this Presby also had primary ownership of the computer and could access the defendant’s account, and Presby had authority to consent to the search of image files on the defendant’s account since they shared a mutually agreed upon ideal of sharing; Presby had apparent authority because Presby claimed he was the owner of the computer, accessed the defendant’s desktop account w/o difficulty; the conflicting information that the defendant had a new password that they though Presby did not know was not present at the time, so it does not challenge the apparent authority.

Quotes:

The "mere existence of password protection" on the separate user profiles on the computer did not "give rise to ambiguity as to whether Presby had authority to consent to a search of [the defendant's] files, where Presby was able to promptly enter the password to enable access to the files."

Presby maintained primary ownership of the computer and had "ready access" to the defendant's desktop user account, "notwithstanding/despite the password protection that may have restricted access to [the defendant's] account by someone other than Presby or [the defendant]." Furthermore, the court stated, Presby had actual authority to consent to a "perusal of the image files stored in the folders associated with [the defendant's] online account" due to the “what's mine is yours ethos" between Presby and the defendant, which created the assumption that Presby would not "have considered himself to be transgressing trust by viewing image files located in one of [the defendant's] folders."

United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953 (6th Cir. 2008). Girlfriend has mens clothes in her bag, ambiguous drag on authority

The defendant’s girlfriend, Crist, consented to the search of a hotel room she shared with the defendant and the bags she owned, but men’s clothing were found in a bag instead of her affects, and Crist’s claim that the defendant used one of her bags was found false. Crist did not have apparent authority to consent to the search of the defendant’s luggage because of ambiguity and the officers lack of decisions to solve the ambiguity before continuing the search; Crist had apparent authority at first, but ambiguity was introduced when items that were not hers were found in her bag and the officers did not reestablish her authority.

Quotes:

"apparent authority cannot exist if there is ambiguity as to the asserted authority and the searching officers do not take steps to resolve the ambiguity."

&

"when a situation starts as unambiguous but subsequent discoveries create ambiguity, any apparent authority evaporates.”

United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711 (10th Cir. 2007). dad is chill, password protection unnoticed

Defendant’s father Bailey Andrus/Dr. Andrus gave the police consent to search his son’s personal laptop in his bedroom, and police used software to see the computer’s hard drive without knowing that the computer was password-protected until taking it back to the station. Dr. Andrus did have apparent authority to consent to the search of the defendant’s personal computer because a lock on the data within a computer was not apparent from the visual inspection and Dr. Andrus had apparent unlimited access to the bedroom and did not do anything to indicate his lack of ownership over the computer, so officers did not find the situation ambiguous. Offices were unaware of Dr. Andrus lack of ownership, the password protection, and found the laptop in plain view.

Relevant Quotes:

“…law enforcement officers often must look at the surrounding circumstances of a search, considering whether there is reason to suspect that a computer is password-protected or whether there are other indicators of an intent to restrict access.“

Furthermore, Dr. Andrus “did not say or do anything to indicate his lack of ownership or control over the computer when [the officer] asked for his consent to conduct o computer search.”

computers are people's "most private spaces...[where] intimate information is commonly stored." thus "computers should fall into the same category as suitcases, footlockers, or other personal items that command a high degree of privacy."

The court explains further that "a subjective expectation of privacy traditionally focuses on whether the subject suitcase, footlocker, or other container is physically locked."

United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551 (4th Cir. 2007). Gamer wife, no indication from the circumstances that the files were password-protected

The defendant’s wife consented for police to search the home computer and the officers then made a copy of the contents on the computer’s hard drive. The defendant’s wife, Michelle, did not have actual authority to consent to the search of the defendant’s files because they were password-locked and she did not know the password to them, but she did have apparent authority to consent because she informed the officers that she was not computer-savvy and she did used the computer (leased under her name) to play games and the computer was already on in the living room and there was no indication from the circumstances that the files were password-protected, so they reasonably believed she had consent to search.

Quotes:

Authority to consent depended on “the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the search."

Password-protected files can be analogized to a "locked box" within an area of common authority, a "discrete enclosed space" from which the defendant "affirmatively intended to exclude others."

United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2005). Howard and girls, bag unowned by them

The defendant stored his personal belongings at his friend Riley Howard’s house, but neither Howard nor his girlfriend knew what the defendant stored in his possessions and had never looked inside of them; while the defendant was arrested outside of the Howard apartment by police officers and Howard along with his girlfriend and a few females were present inside the Howard apartment, the police found a bag that would later be found to have belonged exclusively to the defendant, but the officers opened the closed luggage bag and found a firearm that would led them to charge the defendant with possesion of a firearm. Howard did not possess actual authority to consent to the search of the defendant’s luggage bag since a resident’s consent to search home does not extend to consent to search a closed object within the home and the defendant never gave Howard permission to open the luggage bag; Howard did not have apparent authority because there was ambiguity about the ownership of the luggage bag and Howard’s common authority to consent to the search of it due to multiple people being in the residency and the bag belonging to the defendant, so since the ambiguity was not solved with further inquiry, the officers did not display a good faith basis and their search was unlawful.

Quotes:

Because Howard was in the next room when the police found the defendant's luggage, and the defendant was being detained outside the apartment, "it would not have been burdensome for the officers to have asked Howard whether the luggage belonged to him (or to either of the women who were present in the apartment) prior to opening the bag."

United States v. Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). hotel he was sharing with his “cousins”

The defendant’s friend Nitokatalisi Fonua consented to an officer searching a hotel he was sharing with his “cousins” and gave the officer the key in which the officer found a firearm and charged the defendant with possession of a firearm. Nick possessed actual authority and apparent authority to consent to a search of the hotel because he stayed there overnight, had his possessions there and carried a key to the room, which makes his statement that the room is not his unambiguous with all circumstances considered.

Quotes:

Nick had made a statement to the officer that "the room was not his.” If viewed in a vacuum, that statement "would obviously be ambiguous" as to Nick's apparent authority to consent to the search of the room and appear to create an obligation for the officers to inquire further into Nick's authority to consent before taking further action, but totality of the circumstances upheld his apparent authority

United States v. Aaron, 33 F. App'x 180 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished). no password, no expressed intent to restrict third-party access

Mayes, the defendant’s girlfriend, voluntarily consented to a search of the defendant’s new computer which had software she did not know how to use and lacked a password. Mayes had actual authority to consent to the search of the defendant’s computer because the defendant never explicitly told Mayes that she was not permitted to use the new computer and the computer lacked a password, failing to express an intent to restrict Mayes’s access to the new computer.

Quotes:

Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001). joint access to the hard drive, no access to the defendant’s password-protected files

The defendant’s cohabitant Conrad shared a computer with the defendant but maintained separate password-protected files on the computer’s hard drive; officers searched the computer and looked at the defendant’s personal password-protected files. Conrad did not have actual authority although they had joint access to the hard drive, for Conrad did not have access to the defendant’s password-protected files; Conrad had authority to consent to the computer’s search but not a search of the password-protected files.

Subargument Connection: The expectation of privacy was not clear because Mitchell apparently knew Fromholz’s password and there were no signs of respective use such as distinct folders or administration accounts.

Quotes:

People v. Fromholz

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