Metaphysics of Mind Key Terms

Analytic

A proposition is analytic if it is true by definition. This means you can work out that it is true just by analysing the meanings of the words involved. For example, 'All sisters are female'. Analytic propositions are contrasted with synthetic ones for which understanding the meanings of the words involved is not sufficient to determine whether they are true. Knowledge of such propositions therefore requires some knowledge of the way the world is as well. For example, 'All sisters are jealous of their siblings'.

Analytic reduction

To reduce one phenomenon to another is to explain one in terms of the other. An analytic reduction is concerned with the meaning of the language we use to talk about phenomena and claims that all that is said about one phenomenon can be translated into talk about another without loss of meaning.

A priori

A priori knowledge is knowledge which can be known without the need for sense experience. By contrast, a posteriori knowledge can only be established by reference to experience. For example, we can know that no bachelors are married without conducting a survey of bachelors' marital status and so this knowledge is a priori, but we could not work out what percentage of bachelors are left handed except by some sort of empirical investigation and so this knowledge is a posteriori.

Automaton (plural automata)

A mechanism that operates and/or moves automatically, usually resembling a human being. The term is often used to refer to the idea of a being which acts without conscious awareness and so can be used as a synonym for a philosophical zombie. But automata may be conscious, as in Huxley's phrase 'conscious automata', used to refer to animals and humans whose actions are not controlled by conscious volitions (see epiphenomenalism). The term is also used to refer to a mechanism the operations of which may be described in a machine table.

Behaviourism

Here used as short for philosophical behaviourism

Cartesian dualism

'Cartesian' is the adjective deriving from Descartes' name, so it describes any doctrine expounded by Descartes. 'Cartesian dualism' refers to Descartes' version of mind-body dualism and to versions of substance dualism inspired by Descartes.

Chauvinism

Chauvinism is the ungrounded belief in the superiority of one's own nationality, sex or race. In philosophy of mind it is used to refer to the implication one can draw from certain theories that members of other species (either real or imaginary) could not possess certain types of mental state. This implication is usually taken to represent a problem for such theories. The opposed tendency of allowing too wide a range of beings to count as minded is termed liberalism, and is also considered problematic.

Compatibilism

Compatibilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism. In other words, there is no contradiction in the idea of an action which is completely causally determined and yet still free.

Consciousness

All that you are directly aware of, including thoughts, emotions and sensations. The contents of the mind.

Contingent

A state of affairs is contingent if it happens to be the case, but could have been otherwise. A contingent proposition is one that could be either true or false.

Contingent identity

Two things are identical if they are really just one thing. Angela Merkel and the Chancellor of Germany are the same thing in this sense. A contingent identity is one where two things happen to be the same, but might not have been. In other words, there is a possible world in which the two are not the same. For example, it is possible for Angela Merkel not to have become Chancellor so this identity is contingent. Mind-brain identity theorists hold that a contingent identity holds between mental states and brain states, so that while they happen to be the same, it is still conceivable that they might have been something else, meaning that there is a possible world in which the mind is some other organ, say, the heart. Such identities cannot be discovered by investigation of the meanings of the terms involved and so can only be established by empirical investigation.

Qualism

In philosophy of mind, mind-body dualism "or more simply 'dualism) is the view that the mina and body are not identical (that is, they are dual meaning that the mental cannot be reduced to the physical. Dualism is contrasted with monism

Eliminativism or eliminative materialism

The view that folk-psychological concepts, such as belief, desire and sensation, do not pick out real entities. Our language of the mind is therefore fundamentally misleading and so should be replaced by terminology forged by a mature neuroscience.

Empirical

From experience or observation.

Empiricism/empiricist

The philosophical tendency to regard experience as the sole or most important source of our concepts and knowledge.

Epiphenomenalism

The view that mental states such as sensations and beliefs are caused by states of the brain, but that there is no reciprocal influence of mental states on the brain and body or on other mental states. Thus mental states are by-products of the physical processes that go on in the body which govern our actions.

Experimenting with ideas

The 'thought experiment is a philosophical technique employed to explore our intuitions about conceptual possibilities and implications. Because they are concerned with what is possible, rather than what is actually the case in the real world, they are conducted in the imagination. There is some controversy about how useful explorations of our intuitions are in establishing what is and is not genuinely possible.

Folk psychology

Folk psychology is the theory of mind (or psychology) held by ordinary people (folk). It is claimed that our everyday picture of the mind as a private world of sensations, emotions, beliefs and so on, constitutes a theoretical framework which we use to explain and predict behaviour. The idea can be used to try to solve the problem of other minds, since if the theory that others possess minds is the best explanation of human behaviour then it is rational to believe in them. But, theories can also be refuted, and eliminativists claim that folk psychology will be superseded by the neuroscience of the future.

Functional state

A state which is defined in terms Of its causal role rather than in terms of what it is made of. Functionalism claims that mental states are functional states of the brain, and so that it is the causal relationship to sensory inputs, other mental states and to behaviour which determines the nature of any mental state.

Hypothetical propositions

An 'if... then... proposition, for example 'If you were offered a cup of tea, then you would accept." In Ryle's philosophical behaviourism, certain mental states are regarded as dispositions to act in various ways and dispositions can be translated into hypotheticals of this kind which detail what a person would do if certain circumstances were realised.

Idealism

Idealism is an anti-realist theory of perception. It is the view that matter does not exist independently of the mind and that all that exists are minds and their ideas. Physical objects are no more than collections of sensations appearing in minds.

Intentionality

The quality of certain mental states which directs them beyond themselves and to things in the world. It's what makes mental states such as beliefs, desires and fears about something. For example, my belief that it is raining is about the rain, and my fear of heights is about heights.

Interactionism

The common sense view that mind and body are in causal interaction, so that mental events such as acts of will or decisions, can cause actions and that events in the body. such as changes brought about by the impact of the environment on our sense organs, can cause mental events such as sensations.

Intersubjective

The relationship between distinct subjects of experience. The awareness one person has of other persons and other persons' consciousnesses.

Introspection

The process of looking into your own mind. The direct awareness each of us has of his or her own mental states.

Irreducible

If some higher level phenomenon, such as consciousness, cannot be fully explained in terms of a lower level phenomenon, such as the operations of the brain, then the first is said to be irreducible to the second. The irreducibility of consciousness is the central tenet of dualism.

Leibniz's Law

Also known as the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, the law states that no two objects can share all their properties; so that if what appear to be two objects turn out to have all the same properties, then they must be one object.

Liberalism

The tendency of a theory of mind to count as minded systems we would be reluctant to think of as conscious, such as computers or even simpler mechanisms.

Logical positivism

The twentieth-century school of thought that emphasised the necessity of an empirical basis for knowledge and rejected as meaningless 'metaphysical' claims which have no grounding in experience. Logical positivists, such as Ayer, held that all meaningful propositions must either be statements of logic or mathematics and so purely analytic, or confirmable by empirical means (that is 'verifiable').

Machine state functionalism

tThe view that minded human beings are to be understood as a complex system of inputs and outputs, the inputs being sensory and the outputs behavioural. Mental states are the internal states that can be specified by a machine table. The mind is the software that 'runs' on the hardware of the brain.

Machine table

A representation of the set of instructions for a machine which details how it responds to different inputs.

Materialism

A synonym for physicalism. The view that the mind is ultimately material in nature and so is not distinct from the physical body.

Meaning and reference

Frege (in 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung', 1892) distinguished the reference (Bedeutung) of a term from its meaning (Sinn). The reference is the thing in the world that the term refers to; the meaning is the way the term presents the reference to the mind. It is possible for a term to have the same reference but different meanings. For example, the expression 'half-blood prince' has a different meaning to 'Severus Snape and yet they refer to the same person. It is because expressions can have different meanings but the same reference that it is possible for someone not to realise that two terms refer to the same objects. According to the identity theory, the terms we use to talk about mental states have different meanings from the terms we use to talk about brain states, but they nonetheless refer to the same things.

Monism

In philosophy of mind, the view that humans are composed of just one type of

Substance.

Multiply realisable

Mental states are multiply realisable if the same type of mental state may be instantiated in different types of brain state. This means that a mental state, such as pain, can occur in different creatures with very different types of brain.

Neuroscience

The science of the brain.

Nomological danglers

Concerns the formulation of a system of laws or scientific theories used to explain natural phenomena. A phenomenon which cannot be explained by reference to such a theory or system of laws. Smart uses the term in the Anthology article 'Sensations and brain processes' to refer to the irreducible mental properties posited by dualists and argues that they should be rejected because they don't fit in with the established laws of physics.

Numerical and qualitative identity

It is possible to distinguish two senses of the same. Things are qualitatively the same if they share properties. Since different copies of this book share many properties they can be termed qualitatively identical. But one copy is still a different thing from another. They are not literally one and the same object and so are not numerically identical. Numerical identity is the sameness a thing has with itself and nothing else, so the copy you are holding is qualitatively identical with other copies, but can only be numerically identical with itself.

Ockham's razor

The principle that when constructing hypotheses we should avoid multiplying entities beyond necessity. So if two competing theories both explain some phenomenon equally well, it is reasonable to prefer the one that is simpler or makes fewer assumptions. Physicalists sometimes invoke this principle against dualism, arguing that the ontological commitment to two substances is unnecessary.

Ontological

To do with being or real existence. An ontological category is a type of being or thing, such as minds or physical substance. An ontological commitment is a commitment to the existence of some type of thing, that is the belief on ontological commitment to Dualists have an ontological commitment to minds as a distinct type of being from matter.

Ontological reduction

An explanation of one kind of phenomenon in terms of something more fundamental, as when chemists ref is water is H,O, or the identity theory tries to explain the mind in terms of the brain. If one phenomena can be ontologically reduced to another this means they are ultimately the same things under different descriptions. But it doesn't mean that the terms used to refer to them have the same meanings and so doesn't mean that the one can be analytically reduced to the other (see analytic reduction).

Ontology

An account of what exists. phenomenal Concerning the way things appear. The character of what one is directly aware of in the mind.

Phenomenon (plural phenomena)

From the Greek for 'appearance', a phenomenon is anything that appears or is shown. Here the term is mostly used to refer to what appears within the mind; or that which is revealed in conscious experience. The term may also be used more generally to refer to the aspects of things that show themselves or are apparent, but which need to be explained in terms of some theory.

Phenomenology of the mental

The phenomenology of the mental refers to those properties of mental life of which we are consciously aware, including most notably, qualia. Phenomenology may also be used to refer to the science which studies the phenomena of consciousness.

Philosophical behaviourism

A theory about the meaning of our language of the mind. It claims that our talk of mental states does not involve reference to others' internal states. Rather it is a way of talking about People's behaviour and their dispositions to behave in various ways.

Physicalism (or materialism)

The view that everything in the universe is physical. In the Philosophy of mind this means that mental states must ultimately be reducible to the physical and so mentality doesn't constitute a distinct type of phenomenon.

Property

A property is something that depends on something else for its existence (see substance and property)

Property dualism

Unlike substance dualism, property dualism claims that humans are composed of just one kind of substance: matter. However, what makes it a dualist theory is the claim that we possess both mental and physical properties. Mental states are dependent on the physical, so that the mind cannot exist without the body, but at the same time mental states cannot be reduced to physical states.

Propositional knowledge and acquaintance knowledge

Propositional knowledge is knowledge of facts or knowledge that something is the case. Acquaintance knowledge is the knowledge you obtain by encountering or experiencing something. The distinction is employed in an objection to Jackson's knowledge argument, 'Mary gains no new propositional knowledge'.

Qualia (singular quale)

The subjective feel, or phenomenal quality of certain conscious experiences, for example what it is like to smell petrol, the way an apple tastes, or how a cat's fur feels. An important problem for physicalism concerns whether the subjective nature of such experiences can be accounted for in objective physical terms.

Reducible

If some higher level phenomenon, such as consciousness, can be fully explained in terms of a lower level phenomenon, such as the operations of the brain, then the first is said to be reducible to the second. Type identity theory says that the phenomena of consciousness can be reduced to the physical properties of the brain. Property dualism denies this, saying that a complete description of the physical properties of the brain cannot account for at least some mental phenomena (such as qualia).

Reduction

To reduce one type of thing to another is to explain the first in terms of the second. See ontological reduction and analytic reduction.

Semantics/syntax

Concerns the meanings of words and sentences. Syntax concerns the rules governing correct linguistic usage. Searle employs the distinction in his Chinese room argument, claiming that a computer may be programmed to follow syntactic rules, and could conceivably pass the Turing test, but it could not understand the semantics of natural language.

Solipsism

The view that nothing beyond my own mind, including the external world and other minds, can be known to exist.

Subject of experience

That which is conscious; the self or I.

Substance and property

A substance is a basic kind of stuff or thing, something which doesn't depend on anything else to exist. A property, by contrast, cannot exist on its own, but depends on a substance.While substance dualism claims that there are two substances and so two fundamental types of thing in the world, physicalists claim there is just one - matter. Property dualists agree with physicalists that matter is the only substance, but argue that when it is organised properly into persons with brains it also has irreducible mental properties.

Substance dualism

The view that humans are composed of two types of substance: mind and matter.

Super-spartans

In the Anthology extract "Psychological predicates' (1967), Putnam develops a thought experiment as a refutation of philosophical behaviourism involving people who are able to suppress all outward signs of pain. He terms them super-spartans after the Spartans of ancient Greece, who were famed for their stoicism.

Supervenience

The nature of the dependence relationship often said to hold between mind and brain. Mental states would supervene on brain states if there can be no difference in the mental without a difference in the brain. But at the same time a difference in the brain need not produce a difference in the mind.

Turing test

A test suggested by Alan Turing in his paper 'Computing, machinery and intelligence' (1950) for determining whether a computer could be considered able to think. If a machine's linguistic competence when engaged in conversation cannot be distinguished from that of a human being then it would pass the test.

Type and token

A type is a general class or kind of thing: a token is a particular instance of a type. For example, there are four tokens of the word a in the previous sentence and each is a token of the same type. Type and token identity The mind-brain identity theory claims that mental states are the same things as brain states. If mental states are type identical with brain states, then each token of a type of mental state is the same as different tokens of the same type of brain state. So pain in me and pain in you will be the same type of neurological event, say C-fibres firing. But if mental states are token identical with brain states, then each token of a given type of mental state may be identical with tokens of different types of brain state. So pain in me may be a different type of brain event than in you, or a dog or a Martian.

Verificationism

Verificationism is a claim associated with logical positivism that a proposition is only meaningful if it is either verifiable by experience or is analytic. The idea that meaningful utterances must tell us about the world by making some difference to our experience may be used to question whether it is meaningful to speak of other minds as necessarily private, of the possibility of spectrum inversion, or of mental states with no behavioural manifestation. For claims about mental states which cannot be identified would be empty of factual significance and so meaningless. The principle may also be used to argue that the idea of philosophical zombies is incoherent, since no empirical test could be devised to distinguish them from ordinary people. Considerations inspired by verificationism may lead to philosophical behaviourism and the idea that to speak meaningfully about minds, we must be referring to what can be observed, namely behaviour.

Volition

An act of will which leads to a bodily movement. The mental state which initiates freely chosen actions.

Will

The mental power or faculty which enables us to perform acts of volition.

Zombie or philosophical zombie

A hypothetical being which is physically indistinguishable from a regular human being, but which has no consciousness or subjective awareness. The idea is discussed by Chalmers in Anthology extract 2.6.