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Nash’s existence theorem
Any n-player normal-form game with finite strategy sets Si for all players has a (Nash) equilibrium in mixed strategies
This existence theorem builds upon what is called a fixed-point theorem in Mathematics, the most simple of which is Brouwers
Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem
If f (x) is a continuous function from the domain [0, 1] to itself then there exists at least one value x* ∈ [0, 1] for which f (x*) = x*
Basically, in a continuous function, there has to be some value where the input value is equal to the output value
Nash shows that the collection of Best Response Correspondences satisfies something like continuity, meaning there must be a Nash equilibrium at some point in the set of strategies
![<ul><li><p>If f (x) is a continuous function from the domain [0, 1] to itself then there exists at least one value x* ∈ [0, 1] for which f (x*) = x*</p></li><li><p>Basically, in a continuous function, there has to be some value where the input value is equal to the output value</p></li><li><p>Nash shows that the collection of Best Response Correspondences satisfies something like continuity, meaning there must be a Nash equilibrium at some point in the set of strategies</p></li></ul><p></p>](https://knowt-user-attachments.s3.amazonaws.com/4076ce50-f121-4c78-9856-14695680efac.png)
The collection of best response correspondences
The collection of best-response correspondences, BR ≡ BR1 × BR2 × ... × BRn, maps △S = △S1 × ... × △Sn, the set of profiles of mixed strategies, onto itself
That is, BR : △S →→ △S takes every element σ ∈ △S and converts it into a subset BR(σ′ ) ⊂ △S
How to derive NE’s from Best Responce Correspondences
A mixed-strategy profile σ* ∈ △S is a Nash equilibrium iff is a fixed point of the collection of best-response correspondences, σ* ∈ BR(σ*)
More simply, a strategy is a Nash equilibrium when the Best Response graphs of different players intersect
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem
Required for finding NE because Brouwer’s theorem isn’t strong enough — it concerns functions but our Best Response Correspondences might not be functions
Let C : X ⇒ X, with X being a non-empty, compact, convex subset of Rn, C(x) is non empty and convex for all x, and it has a closed graph
Then, C has a fixed point
This theorem guarantees that the correspondence will cross the 450 line
What is a convex set?
A set is convex if the point in question lies on the straight line segment inbetween two points A and B
What is a closed set?
A set is closed if it contains its boundary points
In an infinite sequence, if all numbers in the sequence converge to another number and that number is included in the set, then the set is closed
A closed graph is one whose graph is a closed set
What is a compact set?
A set is compact if it is both closed and bounded
Closed means it includes all its boundary points, and a bounded set is one whose elements don’t extend infinitely in any direction
Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan Existence Theorem
This extends our definition to the case of infinite games
Let G be an infinite game
If each strategy set Si is compact and convex and payoff functions ui(si ,s−i) are continuous in all inputs and concave in si, then there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
This added concavity assumption also means that the Nash Equilibrium identified will be a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium
This assumption is needed because it ensures a maximum (for maximising payoffs), doesn’t allow for local maxima traps and is continuous and all the other assumptions needed