3. Existence of Nash Equilibria

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9 Terms

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Nash’s existence theorem

  • Any n-player normal-form game with finite strategy sets Si for all players has a (Nash) equilibrium in mixed strategies

  • This existence theorem builds upon what is called a fixed-point theorem in Mathematics, the most simple of which is Brouwers

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Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem

  • If f (x) is a continuous function from the domain [0, 1] to itself then there exists at least one value x* ∈ [0, 1] for which f (x*) = x*

  • Basically, in a continuous function, there has to be some value where the input value is equal to the output value

  • Nash shows that the collection of Best Response Correspondences satisfies something like continuity, meaning there must be a Nash equilibrium at some point in the set of strategies

<ul><li><p>If f (x) is a continuous function from the domain [0, 1] to itself then there exists at least one value x* ∈ [0, 1] for which f (x*) = x*</p></li><li><p>Basically, in a continuous function, there has to be some value where the input value is equal to the output value</p></li><li><p>Nash shows that the collection of Best Response Correspondences satisfies something like continuity, meaning there must be a Nash equilibrium at some point in the set of strategies</p></li></ul><p></p>
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The collection of best response correspondences

  • The collection of best-response correspondences, BR ≡ BR1 × BR2 × ... × BRn, maps △S = △S1 × ... × △Sn, the set of profiles of mixed strategies, onto itself

  • That is, BR : △S →→ △S takes every element σ ∈ △S and converts it into a subset BR(σ′ ) ⊂ △S

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How to derive NE’s from Best Responce Correspondences

  • A mixed-strategy profile σ* ∈ △S is a Nash equilibrium iff is a fixed point of the collection of best-response correspondences, σ* ∈ BR(σ*)

  • More simply, a strategy is a Nash equilibrium when the Best Response graphs of different players intersect

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Kakutani’s fixed point theorem

  • Required for finding NE because Brouwer’s theorem isn’t strong enough — it concerns functions but our Best Response Correspondences might not be functions

  • Let C : X ⇒ X, with X being a non-empty, compact, convex subset of Rn, C(x) is non empty and convex for all x, and it has a closed graph

  • Then, C has a fixed point

  • This theorem guarantees that the correspondence will cross the 450 line

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What is a convex set?

  • A set is convex if the point in question lies on the straight line segment inbetween two points A and B

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What is a closed set?

  • A set is closed if it contains its boundary points

  • In an infinite sequence, if all numbers in the sequence converge to another number and that number is included in the set, then the set is closed

  • A closed graph is one whose graph is a closed set

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What is a compact set?

  • A set is compact if it is both closed and bounded

  • Closed means it includes all its boundary points, and a bounded set is one whose elements don’t extend infinitely in any direction

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Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan Existence Theorem

  • This extends our definition to the case of infinite games

  • Let G be an infinite game

  • If each strategy set Si is compact and convex and payoff functions ui(si ,s−i) are continuous in all inputs and concave in si, then there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium

  • This added concavity assumption also means that the Nash Equilibrium identified will be a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium

    • This assumption is needed because it ensures a maximum (for maximising payoffs), doesn’t allow for local maxima traps and is continuous and all the other assumptions needed