Jaguan Kim's Chapter Four: Psychoneural Identity Theory

This flashcard set covers the key theories, philosophers, and arguments for and against the psychoneural identity theory discussed in the lecture on Jaguan Kim's textbook.

Psychoneural Identity Theory

The view that mental states are just physical states and mental processes are just brain processes.

Mind-Brain Correlation Thesis

For each type $m$ of mental event that occurs to an organism $o$, there exist brain state of kind $b$ such that $m$ occurs to $o$ at time $t$ if and only if $b$ occurs to $o$ at $t$.

Causal Interactionism

A view associated with Cartesian substance dualism where mental and physical substances interact and cause effects in each other.

Pre-established Harmony

Leibniz's view that God lined up mental and physical substances at the beginning of time to run in harmony without direct causal interaction.

Occasionalism

The view held by Nicholas Malabranche that God constantly intervenes at every moment to ensure the mind and brain remain correlated.

Double Aspect Theory

Spinoza's view that mentality and physicality are two ways of describing the same underlying phenomena, like temperature and pressure are aspects of molecular kinetic energy.

Epiphenomenalism

The view that mental events are side effects of brain processes and have no causal powers of their own.

Emergentism

The view that the correlation between mental and neurophysiological phenomena are 'brute facts' that must be accepted and are not subject to further explanation.

Occam’s Razor

A principle of simplicity or parsimony stating that entities or types of entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity.

J.J.C. Smart

The philosopher who argued for the identity theory using the principle of simplicity and a meta-induction on the success of physical science.

Argument from Simplicity

Smart's argument that given competing theories that explain the same data, the mind-brain identity theory is preferable because it has the fewest ontological commitments.

Causal Closure of the Physical Domain

The principle that if any physical event is caused, it has a sufficient physical cause, ruling out non-physical interventions in the physical world.

Causal Overdetermination

A situation where an effect has more than one sufficient cause; Kim argues that if brain states are sufficient causes, mental causes would be redundant.

Epistemological Objection

An argument against identity theory based on the idea that we have direct, first-personal access to mental states but only third-personal, mediated access to brain states.

Modes of Presentation

A defense against the epistemological objection stating that one thing (like a pain/brain state) can be experienced in two different ways, such as first-personally or third-personally.

Modal Argument

An objection stating that if pain and c-fiber firing were identical, they would have to be identical in every possible world, yet we can conceive of a scenario where they occur separately.

Multiple Realizability Argument

The idea that the same mental state (like pain) can be realized by different physical structures, such as in humans, octopuses, or extraterrestrials.

Jaguan Kim's Argument from Mental Causation

The argument that since mental events have physical effects and the physical world is causally closed, mental events must be physical.

Ned Block and Robert Stolnecker

Thinkers who supported the explanatory argument by suggesting that identity statements are useful for deriving causal laws in psychology from neurophysiology.

Reification of Water to $H_2O$

An example of a synthetic or empirical identity; it is an identity fact known through experience rather than through the definition of terms.