preference utilitarianism

main key thinkers

peter singer and rm hare

what does singer argue?

• You should maximise the best interests of those affected, rather than create the most pleasure and least pain.

• Ethical decisions should the best interests (or preferences) of those affected rather than create the most pleasure

• Everybody's interests must be given equal consideration.

• What matters is the satisfaction of an individual persons interests or desires.

• Sacrificing an individual because it benefits the majority becomes more problematic.

how do you come to moral conclusion in preference utilitarianism

• Preference utilitarianism tries to maximise the satisfaction of people’s preferences.

• This requires considerable thought.

• When a person thinks ethically they must weigh up all of the interests of the people involved.

• A person must do their best to take into all the interests into consideration

• This type of deliberation should only take place in certain circumstances.

• Such as when a person is trying to decide by what principles they will live their life by.

what is preference utilitarianism

• view that the morally right course of action is one that maximises our preferences

• preference is an expression of a desired state of affairs

three important features of Hare’s account

• to say that you prefer something means that you would choose it if a certain situation arose

• one’s preferences can incl a combo of short and long term preferences

• one’s preferences aren’t restricted to myself but also incl the preferences of others. some preferences must be impartial and universal → you need to tally your own preferences and weigh them against what you would prefer if you were the other parties affected by that decision. If your preferences only focused on yourself, then you would be an ethical egoist not utilitarian

STRENGTH: accounts for individual autonomy and diverse conceptions of the good

• One of its central strengths lies in its respect for individual autonomy.

• As Peter Singer explains in Practical Ethics (1993), preference utilitarianism is a more refined ethical approach than hedonistic utilitarianism, as it allows moral value to be determined by what individuals themselves value, even if those values are not reducible to pleasure or happiness.

• Singer argues that respecting preferences is a way of treating persons as ends in themselves, rather than imposing an external standard (like "pleasure") upon them.

• By focusing on subjective preferences, this theory better captures the rich variety of human motivations—from artistic creativity and intellectual inquiry to self-sacrifice and spiritual devotion—none of which can be reduced to pleasure. This provides a more inclusive moral framework, which aligns with democratic and liberal political values

COUNTER to individual autonomy

• A significant challenge to this strength comes from the issue of uninformed, irrational, or harmful preferences. Critics argue that not all preferences are worthy of moral consideration, especially when they are misinformed, irrational, or self-destructive

• Amartya Sen, in his work Development as Freedom (1999), critiques any preference-based model of welfare or morality that does not distinguish between adaptive preferences and autonomous ones.

• He argues that people who live under oppressive conditions may internalise unjust norms and develop preferences that reflect their subjugation.

• A woman who "prefers" not to be educated because she has been taught her role is purely domestic may not be expressing a free or rational preference, but one shaped by injustice. Respecting such preferences could perpetuate oppression, not challenge it.

STRENGTH: increases moral scope

• One of the most distinctive strengths of preference utilitarianism is its inclusive moral scope—particularly its ability to incorporate the interests of non-human animals.

• Peter Singer, one of the leading proponents of preference utilitarianism, argued in Animal Liberation (1975) that sentient beings, regardless of species, have preferences that morally matter.

• For Singer, the capacity to suffer or have interests (like avoiding pain, seeking food, or enjoying social bonds) gives a creature moral standing.

• Classical utilitarianism could account for animal suffering in terms of pleasure and pain, but preference utilitarianism goes further by framing moral concern around interest satisfaction. This is important because some animals may not experience complex pleasures, but they can express strong preferences—e.g., a pig preferring freedom of movement or a chimpanzee preferring social interaction.

• allows for avoidance of speciesism

COUNTER to increases moral scope

• faces a profound epistemological challenge: How can we reliably identify and compare non-human preferences? Critics argue that without linguistic expression or complex cognition, the notion of “preferences” may be anthropocentric projections onto animal behaviour.

• Philosopher Roger Scruton, in Animal Rights and Wrongs (1996), argues that attributing preferences to animals—especially complex or long-term ones—relies heavily on human interpretation. He suggests that, outside of basic instinctual drives (e.g., hunger, fear), it is difficult to determine whether animals truly form preferences in the same sense that humans do. Thus, trying to integrate non-human preferences into moral calculus risks turning ethical decision-making into speculation.