Berkley's idealism

WHat angle are we taking for essay

• his theory falls without god

What two things was berkeley?

• idealist: defended the claim that all that exists are minds and things that depend on minds (ideas)

• immaterialist: defended claim that matter does not exist

immediate objects of perception for each theory

direct realist: mind independent objects

indirect realist: mind dependent objects representing mind independent objects

idealist: mind dependent - there are no mind independent objects

what is Berkeley’s basic argument

if what we immediately percieve is mind-dependent then

• there is no such thing as mind-dependent matter

• there is no such thing as an unpercieved object (to be is to be percieved)

• so he disagrees with realists

• OBJECTS DO EXIST, JUST MIND DEPENDENTLY

What are two of berkeley’s arguments for his idealism

• argument against the primary/secondary quality distinction

• master argument

1 of attack on primary/secondary quality distinction: argument that secondary qualities are mind dependent (agreeing with locke)

• locke said that only secondary qualities are mind dependent - for berkeley both are

argument that secondary qualities are mind dependent

• we will perceive the temperature of some water to be different if we first touch it with our cold left hand and then our warm right hand

• the water can’t be both warm and cold at the same time

• thus the temperature (as percieved by the senses) depends on the perciever

2 of attack on primary/secondary distinction: primary qualities are also mind dependent

• locke claims that primary qualities such as size are mind-independent

• but berekely applies the argument from perceptual variation to primary qualities as well to show they are mind dependent

• but a mite might perceive a grain of sand to be large and a human would perceive it to be small

• it would be absurd to say it is both large and small

• therefore it would make more sense to say that the size of an object is mind-dependent

• as well as that, berkeley argues that ‘figure and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable’ - ie. he cannot conceive of primary qualities apart from secondary qualities so he has no reason to believe that one is mind independent and the other is not eg. movement is only detectable on the basis of a secondary quality (color) - all primary qualities are only identifiable on the basis of secondary qualities

3 attack on the primary/secondary distinction: conclusion

• using the arguments against realism for both primary and secondary qualities

• because everything we perceive is either a primary or a secondary quality, and because both types of qualities are mind-dependent,

• all the objects of perception are mind-dependent

• note that at this point, this does not rule out the possibility of unperceived mind-independent objects but dw this comes later

objection to attack on primary/secondary distinction: berkeley is misrepresenting Locke’s distinction

• for Locke, secondary qualities are properties of objects to induce sensations in us - they are not completely mind-independent

• so even if berkeley has managed to show that primary qualities have some similarities to secondary qualities, he has not been able to refute Locke’s view that secondary qualities are similar to primary qualities in that they are mind-independent

• Berkeley treats secondary qualities as more mind independent than Locke would say

What is the master argument intended to show?

• no object can exist ‘unthought of or without the mind’

• whole debate around idealism hinges on this

Explain the master argument (four points and conclusion)

1. you cannot see something which is at the same time unseen

2. you cannot conceive of something which is at the same time unconceived - ie you cant think of smth without thinking

3. what is conceived is in the mind

4. it is impossible to conceive of something existing independently of the mind

5. therefore no object exists independently of the mind

problem with the master argument

• conflates thinking of something and its existence

• whilst thinking of a tree depends on the mind, it is surely possible for a tree to exist independently of the mind

• the tree is an unthought of object which can, but does not have to be, thought of

• just because a thought about the tree is mind-dependent, it does not follow that the existence of the tree is mind-dependent

What’s Berkeley’s likeness principle?

• mind dependent ideas cannot resemble or represent mind-independent object

• something that is sensed cannot resemble a physical object because what is sensed is ‘perpetually fleeting and variable’ (ie. when we look at something from a different angle it appears to change shape) whereas a physical object is ‘fixed and constant’

• moreover a quality like hardness or colour has to be sensed to exist otherwise we would have to say it can exist without being sensed, which would mean there can be invisible colour or intangible hardness

• attacks indirect realism by undermining the theory’s representational claim

berkeley’s view on the nature of material objects

Locke: substance supports or upholds the qualities we perceive

we do not know what substance is except for the supporting role it plays

berkeley argues that all we perceive are qualities - we do not perceive a material substance independently of these qualities

therefore we have no notion of substance independently of such qualities - not clear then that an idea of substance is even conceivable

this whole idea of substance is so confused according to B so he rejects it

uses this to argue that immaterialism is far less sceptical than a theory that argues for material substance

berkeley’s view on the existence of material objects

• we experience primary/secondary qualities but this experience does not verify that there are mind independent objects

• we have no reason to believe that our experience accurately represents a world beyond our experience because we have no access to it

• all that we expereince are ideas

• supports idealism rather than realism

what are physical objects to Berkeley?

• bundles of ideas. when we experience ideas we are experiencing the world

the cause of our ideas and role of god… how does he get to role of god?

• B troubled by questions such as why do we perceive what we do? does an object not exist when it is not being perceived?

• there must be a cause of our ideas: one of three things…

• against ideas: do not cause anything because they have no causal power

• against mind: if my mind was the cause then i shld be able to cause what i perceive. i cannot

• therefore the cause must be another mind

• the complexity and systematicity of our perceptions are such that only the mind of God could be the cause

• things are being permanently perceived by the infinite mind of god

• when i perceive something, god is willing me to perceive it

what are the three issues with berkeley’s idealism?

• does not give an adequate account of illusions and hallucinations

• leads to solipsism

• problems with the role played by God

objection that Berkeley’s idealism does not give an adequate account of illusions and hallucinations

• cannot explain hallucinations and illusions because he lacks a distinction between appearance and reality

• Illusions: idealism cannot say that we misperceive the straight stick in water when we see it as bent how we perceive and object’s nature is how it is and it is perceived as bent - same problem for hallucinations

berkeley’s response to illusions/hallucination objection

• when we describe a stick as crooked what we mean is that it looks crooked under normal conditions. since a stick being in water does not represent a set of normal conditions, it is incorrect to say ‘the stick is bent’. we should instead say ‘it looks bent’

• When we are having a hallucination we know we are because it is dimmer and poorly connected to our other experiences compared to veridical perception

why the hallucinations objection is ultimately unconvincing

• what makes a hallucination different from a veridical perception is a matter not of degree but of kind. ie. Berkeley is not getting to what really concerns us about what makes hallucinations different - they are wholly different. in a veridical perception, something exists outside the mind; in a hallucination, nothing exists outside the mind

Define solipsism

• the belief that only oneself and one’s experience exists - all that exists is one’s mind

• extreme consequence of believing that knowledge must be founded on inner, personal states of experience

• so all they believe that exists is one’s own mind - no physical objects and no other minds

• because this is so antithetical to our ordinary experience of the world, many philosophers think something has gone wrongwith a theory if it leads to solipsism

why might Berkeley’s argument be said to lead to solipsism

1. i know i have a mind because i have ideas

2. i do not perceive other minds indepnedently of my ideas of other minds

3. therefore i have no reason to believe that anything (incl other human minds) exists except my mind and its ideas

counter to solipsism objection

• unfair to Berkeley?

• he claims there are no material things - does not mean that God and other minds do not exist independently of my mind, but that they are immaterial

• reasonable to conclude that Berkeley thinks that God and other mindsmist exist because of the complexity and regularity of our perceptions

• as a christian, he would surely believe that God has an existence not dependent upon his mind -

• this is enough to protect him from the solipsism criticism but maybe not enough to prove that there are other human minds

objection: how can what I percieve be part of God’s mind when…

1. god does not have the sort of experiences I do - does not feel pain or have other sensations because he does not have a physical body

2. the objects I perceive come into and go out of existence but god’s mind is eternal and unchanging

Berkeley response to first god objection

• god knows what it is to feel pain but does not feel pain (understands rather than experiences pain) - BUT PUSH PACK AND ASKS WHAT THAT MEANS - SEEMS FAIR ENOUGH BUT IRL HOW CAN U UNDERSTAND PAIN WITHOUT FEELING IT

Objection that role of God doesn’t make sense here

• ‘to be is to be percieved’ principle can be inferred to apply to God’s existence as well

• but this means that his existence must depend on his being perceived by himself

• but how does the existence of x depend on x’s perception of x’s existence?

• especially for an omnipotent being like God, but in general as well, perception is not a condition of the percipient’s existence

• alternatively, if the ‘to be is to be perceived’ principle does not apply to God’s existence, the God’s existence is the only one that does not depend on God’s perception

• but how can god exist as a mind unless he is being perceived by God?

• his existenxe cannot depend on the mind of any other being because he is God whose existence is independent of all other beings