Apportionment - Discrete Math

Plurality

Most # of hands up - wms

Plurality Majority

Over 50% of votes

Plurality with Elimination

Least # of votes; eliminate and shift everyone up

Condact/Parrise

Each candidate goes head to head and most votes win

Borda Count

Assigned point values and total their counts (7,5,3,2,1)

Approval Voting

Voting many times: greater attendance, flexibility, divide strong vs minority, decrease negative campaigning, practical

Preference Schedule

Way to organize all ballots

Preference Ballot

Ticket to list order

Instant Runoff

2 highest vote winners go ahead to head

Sequential Runoff

Eliminate last place candidate and redistribute votes until one has a majority.

Arrow’s Freedom from Irrelevant Choices

If 1 candidate is removed it should not change your voting order

Arrow’s Uniqueness of Group Ranking (transitive)

If you prefer A over B and B over C then you should prefer A over C

Arrow’s Nondictatorship

1 persons preference should not be considered the whole groups preference

Arrow’s Individual Sovereignty

Your opinion to order/choose anyway you want including ties

Arrow’s Unanimity

If everyone's preference is the same then the groups should be the same as well

Hamilton TRUNK

Give out the Lower Quote then round whose closes to next # (decimals)

Jefferson’s JAR

Population/Trunk +1 → closest to IR rounds up

Dummy

Group with 0 Power Index

Dictator

Group will all power index

Power Index Format

[ # to pass the vote. # of votes each group has] = [Actual Power Index]

Initial Ratio

Top Population/# of items being given

Webster

Population/AM (.5 version)

Round Quota; closest to IR

Hill

Population/(square root of LQ•UQ)

Tranc Quota; closest to IR