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What is a necessary condition
P is a necessary condition for Q just in case if Q is true then P must be true
A thing that has to hold for something else in relation to it to hold
Example: having color is a necessary condition for being red
P is a sufficient condition for Q just in case if P is true, then Q must be true P->Q [arrow of entailment- shows how sufficiency flows]
What does P→ Q mean
means that Q is a necessary condition for P
When one variable is a sufficient condition for another, it is also a necessary condition
What does P just in case Q mean
This means that P is necessary and sufficient for Q- an equivalence between Q and P
Either both are true or are both false
What is Spatiotemporal continuity
A at t1 is the same person as B at t2 just in case there is a continuous spatiotemporal path connecting A at t1 and B at t2
Slow and continuous changes- no discontinuity between changes
Continuous trajectory through space-time
It is certainly true for the most part
(i) if two people are identical then they may be connected by a continuous spatiotemporal path
(ii) if two people may be connected by a continuous spatiotemporal path, then they are the same person
What is a problem with the original definition of spatiotemporal continuity
Suppose after you die you are cremated
There is a continuous spatiotemporal path connecting you and a certain pile of ash
But the as is not the same person as you! It is not even a person!
What is the revised definition of Spatiotemporal continuity
A at t1 is the same person as B at t2 just in case there is a continuous spatiotemporal path of persons connecting A at t1 and B at t2
What is the thought experiment of the Prince and the Cobbler
Locke imagined that there was a prince who longed to know what it was like to be a cobbler
Suppose the prince had a resident scientist who was able to switch psychological profiles of the prince and a particular cobbler
The prince and the cobbler each go into pods and go to sleep
After they wake, the body of the cobbler wakes up with all of the memories, beliefs, desires etc. that the prince had prior to waking
And same goes for the body of the prince
Question: Who is Who?
what is a valid argument
Valid arguments are arguments that are impossible for the conclusion to be false if all the premises are true
what is a sound argument
a sound argument is a valid argument with all true premises, ensuring that the conclusion is also true. →arguments that are valid and if all the premises are true
what is psychological continuity
A at t1 is the same person as B at t2 just in case they are psychologically continuous
A path connecting the two such that there are only very small changes in the psychological states of nearby members on the path, and such that the psychological states of the later members are caused by those of earlier members
How is duplication a problem for the spatiotemporal continuity account
Thought Experiment- evil scientist creates a procedure whereby each of our cells duplicates and in so doing a person undergoes a fission process- something like an amoeba
This procedure results in two identical duplicates
According to the spatiotemporal continuity account we have P0 is the same person as P1, and P0 is the same person as P2
But then we get the absurd conclusion that P1 is the same person as P2
Spatiotemporal continuity theory would say that there's only one person but that can’t be true
What are the general problems with Duplication
(1) say that P0 is the same person as exactly one of P1 and P2
Objections- we have to postulate an unprincipled asymmetry
It would seem to be a mystery of what makes P1 and not P2 the same person as P0
(2) Say that P0 is the same person as both P1 and P2
Objections- It's clear that you can’t have a single person being multiply located (same body can’t be in two different places at the same time)
(3) Say that P0 is not the same person as either P1 or P2
Objections- in cases of duplication, i.e: fission
(i) you care what happens to the future persons that are the result of your duplication
(ii) the person who result (resulting person) can act on your earlier intentions
(iii) they may be reasonably be held accountable for your previous actions
Explanation for personal identity remaining throughout the duplication process- it is you who still remains
They bear certain relations to your previous self
What is Parfit’s view of personal identity
the sorts of facts that the psychological continuity view claimed constituted identity
According to him- what makes it the case that its rational for some person P0 to care about some person P1 is just that P1 and is psychologically continuous with P0
P1 has certain states that are very similar to the psychological states of P0 and that they have them because P0 had such states
According to the psychological continuity account these relations constitute identity of persons across time
And they play a certain role- we care about persons who stand in these relations to us, we are responsible for their actions, etc- because they constitute identity
Parifit thinks we should hold onto the idea that these relations play these roles
We should however, give up on the idea that these relations play these roles because they constitute identity
For the duplication cases show us that these relations can’t constitute identity
According to Parfit what does identity have that psychological continuity lacks
In particular- identity is one-to-one
P0 can be identical to at most one person at some later time T1
Relationship can’t be born from one thing to two distinct things
Identity cannot bear to more than one thing
But we have seen that the same is not true of psychological continuity
P0 is psychologically continuous with two individuals, P1 and P2 at T2
what is Parfits overall claim
when we talk about survival and personal identity what we are talking about is there being some individual who stands in a certain relation of psychological continuity to you presently are
These individuals are not (or need not be) literally the same person as you
But that doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t treat them in a way in which we characteristically treat people who are thought of as being the same person as another at a later time
Objections: talk of psychological continuity presupposes identity
For example, you may think that someone can only have a memory of something that happened to them
You might think that you can only act on a previous intention that was an intention of yours
Response: perhaps this is how we can use the terms memory and intention
But there are new terms that we can use to unproblematically pick out the psychological states that do matter to personal identity
Q- means we are not presupposing personal identity across states
Q- memory- a psychological state of recollection that doesn’t require that one be identical to the person to whom the event occurred
A similar definition may be offered for a q- intention
And so on for other psychological states
According to Parfit, it is continuity with respect to these states that matters
More precisely it is connectedness with respect to these states that matters
We sat that two agents P0 and P1 are psychologically connected just in case there is large overlap in their psychological states and P1 has their states because of the states of P0
