Criminal Law

In Re Winship

the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause requires the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for juvenile delinquency adjudications where the alleged act would be a crime if committed by an adult, aligning juvenile courts with adult criminal courts on this fundamental burden of proof. 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt for juvenile acts that would be crimes for adults

Patterson v. New York

the Supreme Court held that a state can require a defendant to prove an affirmative defense, like "extreme emotional disturbance," by a preponderance of the evidence without violating due process, as long as the prosecution still proves all elements of the crime (like intent) beyond a reasonable doubt. This means states can shift the burden for mitigating factors, allowing them to reduce murder to manslaughter if the defendant proves the disturbance, but don't have to prove the absence of such disturbance. 

states can require a defendant to show a preponderance of the evidence for affirmative defenses.

Regina v. Dudley & Stephens

the court established that necessity is not a defense to murder, ruling that intentionally killing an innocent person to save your own life, even under extreme duress like starvation, constitutes murder, not justifiable homicide, upholding the principle that the sanctity of human life is paramount. 

United States v. Deegan

the court established that federal appeals courts should presume the reasonableness of sentences within advisory federal sentencing guidelines and that judges cannot consider more lenient sentences from analogous state cases when determining a federal sentence.

Federal sentencing guidelines prevail over past state sentences in federal appeals cases

United States v Madoff

Here's a breakdown of key rules/holdings from cases related to Madoff:

• Victims' Rights: The case reinforced victims' rights under federal law to fair treatment, restitution, and involvement in proceedings, as detailed by the Department of Justice.

• In Pari Delicto: Courts ruled the trustee couldn't sue certain defendants (like banks) on behalf of victims due to the doctrine of in pari delicto, meaning the victims themselves (or Madoff) were also partly at fault for ignoring red flags, according to Justia Law.

• Forfeiture & Recovery: Courts upheld massive forfeiture orders against Madoff and related parties (like $19 billion) and directed the return of "fictitious profits" to the SIPA trustee for victims, as shown in this court document.

• Sentencing: Madoff received a maximum sentence for his fraud, with courts rejecting defense arguments for leniency, notes the Department of Justice. 

Consecutive maximum sentences for each charge

Martin v State

a person cannot be convicted of public intoxication if they were involuntarily brought to the public place by law enforcement, as criminal liability for such offenses requires the accused to have voluntarily put themselves in that state and location. 

• Key Principle: A voluntary act (actus reus) is necessary for public drunkenness, meaning you can't be punished for being forced into public while drunk.

• Application: If police find you drunk at home and carry you to a public street, you haven't committed the crime of public intoxication because your presence in public wasn't voluntary. 

Public intoxication requires voluntary intoxication and voluntarily being in public

People v. Newton

involuntary unconsciousness (like from a gunshot wound) is a complete defense to homicide, and a trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on this defense if evidence supports it, even if not requested, because failing to do so is prejudicial error. 

• Core Principle: An act must be voluntary for criminal liability; an involuntarily unconscious act isn't punishable.

• Court's Duty: The judge must tell the jury about this defense if evidence points to it, protecting the defendant's constitutional right to have all issues decided by the jury.

Jones v. United States

a person can be criminally liable for manslaughter by omission (failure to act) if a legal duty to care for another exists due to a statute, status relationship (like parent/child), contract, or voluntary assumption of care that isolates the helpless person, making the failure to act the direct cause of death, as Jones failed to provide care for the infant in her custody. 

criminal liability for involuntary manslaughter when a legal duty to care exists and you fail to act

Pope v. State

failing to report a felony, even with knowledge, isn't a crime (abolishing common law misprision of felony) and that a person without legal duty of supervision isn't criminally liable for child abuse just for failing to intervene during abuse they witnessed, distinguishing moral duties from legal ones. 

failure to report a felony is not a crime

Regina v. Cunningham

established that "malice" in criminal statutes means either intending the specific harm done or acting with subjective recklessness—foreseeing the specific risk of that harm and proceeding anyway—not merely acting wickedly or with general ill will. The court quashed the conviction because the jury wasn't properly instructed to consider if the defendant actually foresaw the risk of injury, which is key to "Cunningham recklessness". 

Malice requires intent or subjective recklessness

Elonis v. United States

a conviction for making threats under federal law requires the prosecution to prove the defendant had a subjective intent to threaten, not just that a "reasonable person" would perceive the communication as threatening, reversing Elonis's conviction because the jury was instructed only on the lower, objective standard. 

making threats requires subjective intent to threaten

United States v. Jewell

a defendant can be found to have acted "knowingly" if they were aware of a high probability of a fact's existence but deliberately avoided confirming it, meaning willful ignorance or deliberate avoidance of knowledge is equivalent to actual knowledge for criminal culpability, often called the "ostrich instruction". 

willful ignorance is proof of acting “knowingly”

Regina v. Prince 1875 UK

BAD LAW as of B v. Director of Prosecutions

the English court established that a defendant's reasonable, good-faith mistake about a victim's age is not a defense to a statutory crime, like taking a girl under 16, if the statute doesn't require a specific mens rea (guilty mind) for that element, holding that the law's intent to protect minors overrides the defendant's mistaken belief. 

mistaking a minor girl’s age is not a defense to statutory grape

People v. Olsen 1984 California

the California Supreme Court ruled that a defendant's good faith, reasonable mistake about a victim's age is not a defense to a charge of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14, as the offense is a strict liability crime with respect to the victim's age

mistaking a minor victim’s age is not a defense to lewd conduct

B v. Director of Public Prosecutions (2000 UK)

Overturns Regina v. Prince

a defendant's honest, even if unreasonable, belief that a child was over the age of 14 can serve as a valid defense to a charge of inciting a child under that age to commit an act of gross indecency, reinforcing the common law presumption that a "guilty mind" (mens rea) is a necessary element of a criminal offense unless explicitly excluded by Parliament. 

lack of mens rea about a child being a minor is a valid defense

Morissette v. United States

when a federal statute (like one for stealing government property) is silent on intent but codifies a common-law crime, it's presumed to require a "mental state" (mens rea) for conviction, meaning Congress doesn't eliminate criminal intent simply by omitting the word "knowingly," thus protecting individuals from being punished for innocent mistakes

Laws don’t eliminate the mens rea requirement by omitting the word “knowingly”

United States v. Staples

the Supreme Court ruled that for a conviction of possessing an unregistered machine gun, the government must prove the defendant knew the firearm had features making it automatic, not just that they possessed a dangerous device, establishing that a mens rea (mental state) requirement of knowledge of the weapon's specific illegal features should be read into such statutes unless Congress clearly states otherwise, especially for serious offenses

Prosecution must prove mens rea of the specific illegal features of an illegal firearm

State v. Guminga

an individual cannot be held criminally liable for a crime punishable by imprisonment for an act they did not commit, have knowledge of, or consent to, effectively prohibiting vicarious criminal liability that carries potential jail time. 

Prohibits vicarious criminal liability for crimes punishable by imprisonment when the superior did not know of the act

People v. Marrero

a mistake of law is generally not a defense, unless the defendant's mistaken belief that their conduct was legal was based on an official interpretation or statement of the law from an authorized body (like a statute or official guidance), not a personal misunderstanding. 

only mistakes based on official interpretations of the law are valid

Cheek v. United States

the Supreme Court ruled that a genuine, good-faith misunderstanding of complex tax law (even if unreasonable) negates the "willfulness" needed for criminal tax evasion, but an abstract belief that the law is invalid isn't a valid defense, requiring the government to prove a voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty. 

Government must prove a voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty

Lambert v. California

the Supreme Court ruled that prosecuting someone for failing to register as a convicted felon violates due process unless the prosecution proves the person had actual knowledge or a probability of knowing about the registration requirement, establishing an exception to "ignorance of the law is no excuse" for passive registration offenses. 

a pure omission is all right if the state can’t prove that a defendant knew of a legal duty.

Commonwealth v. Mochan

conduct openly outraging public decency and injuring public morals is a punishable common law misdemeanor, allowing courts to criminalize new behaviors not yet covered by statute, like harassing phone calls, by adapting broad common law principles to modern societal harms. 

Can criminalize actions that speak for themselves when there’s no statute yet on point.

McBoyle v. United States

the Supreme Court established that criminal statutes must use clear, common language to give fair warning, holding that the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act's term "motor vehicle" didn't cover airplanes because "vehicle" in ordinary speech implies land transport, and courts can't expand criminal statutes beyond their plain, unambiguous meaning to include things Congress didn't explicitly mention, even if a similar policy might apply. 

Criminal statutes must use precise language and terms cannot be extrapolated.

Yates v. United States

under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, "tangible object" means items like records or documents, not physical things like fish, requiring that criminal statutes with ambiguous terms like "tangible object" must be interpreted narrowly in context to give fair notice of what conduct is criminalized. 

Must use narrow interpretations of terms in statutes.

Keeler v Superior Court

the California Supreme Court ruled that California's murder statute, which defined murder as the killing of a "human being," did not apply to a viable fetus, as common law and the legislature's intent required a live birth, thus preventing prosecution for murder and highlighting the need for legislative action to criminalize killing a fetus. 

Killing a “human being” did not apply to a fetus under the statute in question

Rogers v Tennessee

the Supreme Court ruled that a state court can retroactively abolish a common-law criminal rule (like the "year and a day" rule for murder) and apply it to a past case without violating due process, as long as the change wasn't "unexpected and indefensible" given the law's prior evolution and the trend among other states. 

retroactive judicial changes to common law do not violate due process if they are foreseeable. 

Chicago v. Morales

the Supreme Court ruled that Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance was unconstitutional, violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause because it was impermissibly vague, failing to provide clear notice of what conduct was prohibited and giving police excessive discretion to decide who was "loitering" with no "apparent purpose". 

An anti-gang loitering law was too vague and didn’t tell people what was specifically unacceptable.

People v. Acosta

a person attempts a crime like drug possession if they take steps "dangerously near" completion, such as arranging a delivery and letting a courier in, even if they later reject the drugs for perceived poor quality, showing intent to possess. A defendant's actions near the goal (ordering, receiving, inspecting drugs) prove the intent to possess, and rejecting them doesn't negate the attempt. 

a person attempts a crime like drug possession if they take steps "dangerously near" completion

People v. Arzon

a defendant is criminally liable for a death if their act is a "sufficiently direct cause," forging an indispensable link in the chain of events, and the resulting harm (like a firefighter's death from smoke) was a foreseeable consequence, even if another force (a second fire) also contributed.

Your dangerous act creates the risky situation, you’re responsible for the foreseeable deaths

People v. Campbell

simply encouraging someone to commit suicide or providing them with the means (like a gun) does not constitute murder, as the ultimate act of self-destruction is considered the person's own act, not the defendant's homicide, unless the defendant actively performed the killing action. 

simply encouraging someone to commit suicide or providing them with the means (like a gun) does not constitute murder

People v. Kevorkian

the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that while there's no constitutional right to assisted suicide and states can ban it, merely providing the means isn't murder; however, actively administering the lethal agent, as Kevorkian did in a later case, is murder, establishing a legal distinction between enabling and directly causing death, and upholding a statute against assisted suicide. 

Actively administering a lethal agent in assisted suicide is murder.

Commonwealth v. Root 1961 PA

for involuntary manslaughter, a defendant's reckless conduct must be a direct cause of death, not just a contributing or proximate cause, meaning the deceased's own intervening act of swerving into oncoming traffic broke the chain of causation, absolving the defendant, as the tort concept of proximate cause isn't sufficient for criminal liability. 

for involuntary manslaughter, a defendant's reckless conduct must be a direct cause of death,

State v. McFadden 1982 Iowa

a defendant can be guilty of involuntary manslaughter if their reckless conduct (like drag racing) is a proximate cause, not necessarily a direct cause, of a death, even if their car didn't physically touch the victim, affirming that civil causation standards apply to criminal homicide where recklessness leads to death. 

Proximate cause foreseeability IS applicable for involuntary manslaughter, unlike in ROOT.

Commonwealth v. Atencio

individuals are criminally liable for manslaughter if they mutually encourage and participate in a dangerous, reckless activity, like Russian roulette, that leads to another participant's death, even if the deceased pulled the fatal trigger, because their shared conduct is a direct cause, not just a condition, of the death. 

Criminal liability for involuntary manslaughter if you encourage fatal activity like playing Russian roulette together

Smallwood v. State

an intent to kill cannot be inferred solely from the act of an HIV-positive individual engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse because death is not a "natural and probable consequence" (or highly probable result) of a single exposure to the virus, unlike using a deadly weapon aimed at a vital body part. 

Carrying HIV and having unprotected sex with someone once does not confer intent to to kill.

People v. Rizzo

an act is a criminal attempt only when it comes "dangerously near" the accomplishment of the crime, meaning mere preparation, like searching for an opportunity, isn't enough; the action must be directly connected to the crime's completion, not just a remote step towards it, otherwise, it's just planning, not attempting. 

an act is a criminal attempt only when it comes "dangerously near" the accomplishment of the crime.

McQuirter v. State

a jury could consider racial stereotypes and social conditions based on racial differences to infer a Black man's intent to commit assault with intent to rape a white woman, allowing conviction on ambiguous actions, a ruling infamous for its overt racial bias in criminal law. The rule essentially allowed the court to view a Black man's proximity to a white woman as inherently criminal and sexual due to racist assumptions, rather than concrete actions, making intent a jury question colored by systemic racism. 

allowed the court to view a Black man's proximity to a white woman as inherently criminal and sexual due to racist assumptions,

United States v. Jackson

the Second Circuit held that an "attempt" requires not just intent but also a "substantial step" toward the crime, defined as conduct strongly corroborating the firmness of the criminal intent, moving beyond mere preparation to actions like casing a bank with others, establishing a key precedent for attempt liability. 

an attempt requires a “substantial step” toward the crime

State v Davis

mere solicitation (asking someone to commit a crime) isn't enough for an attempt conviction; the defendant must also take a significant overt act moving directly toward the crime's completion, distinguishing it from mere planning or asking. 

an attempt requires a “significant overt act” toward the crime’s completion

People v. Jaffe 1906 (Legal Impossibility Rule)

a person cannot be convicted of attempting a crime if, even with criminal intent, the completed act would not have been a crime due to factual circumstances unknown to the defendant (a legal impossibility defense), meaning you can't attempt to steal something that isn't actually stolen, even if you think it is. 

• In simple terms: If the actual crime couldn't have happened (like buying back your own recovered property thinking it's still stolen), there's no attempt conviction, despite the person's belief they were committing a crime. 

If the crime couldn’t have happened, there’s no attempt.

People v. Dlugash 1977 (Legal Impossibility Rule)

a person can be convicted of attempted murder if they intended to kill, even if the victim was already dead, because "impossibility" (legal or factual) isn't a defense to attempt if the crime would have been successful under the defendant's mistaken beliefs, focusing on the defendant's mens rea (guilty mind) over the actual outcome. 

(overturns Jaffe) Can be guilty of attempted murder even if the victim was already dead because of men’s rea

Hicks v. United States

to convict someone for aiding and abetting a crime, the prosecution must prove the defendant acted with the specific intent to assist, encourage, or facilitate the principal's criminal act, not just that they were present or said something ambiguous, but that their words or actions were meant to help the crime happen. 

Aiding and abetting requires specific intent to assist, encourage, or facilitate the crime

State v. Gladstone

merely directing a buyer to another seller, without sharing in the criminal intent or associating with the venture, does not constitute aiding and abetting a crime; there must be a "community of unlawful purpose" or a "purposive attitude" to make the venture succeed. 

aiding and abetting requires a “community of unlawful purpose” or a “purposive attitude.”

Rosemond v. United States

the Supreme Court ruled that to convict someone for aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a drug crime, the government must prove the defendant actively participated in the drug crime with advance knowledge that a gun would be used or carried, giving them a realistic chance to withdraw. Mere knowledge that a gun was present after the crime began, or learning about it too late to quit, is not enough for this specific, enhanced charge, requiring proof of intent for the entire armed offense, not just the underlying drug deal. 

Aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a drug crime requires advance knowledge that a gun would be used or carried.

State v. McVay

a person can be an accessory before the fact to involuntary manslaughter by intentionally counseling or procuring someone to commit a criminally negligent act that results in an unintentional death, even if the defendant wasn't present during the negligent act or death. The rule clarifies that while common manslaughter involves no conscious intent to kill, an accessory can exist if they intentionally set in motion the negligent chain of events that leads to the death. 

Accessory before the fact to involuntary manslaughter by encouraging criminal negligence that causes unintentional death.

Commonwealth v. Roebuck

an accomplice can be convicted of third-degree murder if their mental state (recklessness, or "malice") matches the culpability required for the principal actor, even if the principal committed an unintentional killing, meaning one can be guilty of intentionally aiding a reckless act. 

One can be guilty of intentionally aiding a reckless act.

People v. Russell

multiple people can be guilty of murder if they engage in mutual combat and create a lethal zone, even if it's unclear who fired the fatal shot, as each participant intentionally aids the others in the deadly encounter, making them all responsible for the depraved indifference murder. 

Criminal liability for depraved indifference murder if all parties engage in mutual gun fight.

People v. Luparello

an accomplice is liable for crimes beyond the intended scope if they are a "natural and probable consequence" of the agreed-upon crime, but not for entirely different crimes involving conduct outside the "conscious objectives" of the accomplice, meaning liability extends to foreseeable, but not wholly foreign, acts. 

Accomplice liability extends to foreseeable, but not wholly foreign acts.

Wilcox v. Jeffrey

mere presence at an illegal act, combined with knowledge of the illegality and actions that show support (like paying to attend and later praising it), can constitute "aiding and abetting," even without direct communication or applause, proving encouragement through participation

Proof of Aiding and abetting by encouragement through participation.

State v. Hayes

a person cannot be convicted of a crime based on accomplice liability if the alleged accomplice lacked the necessary criminal intent and was merely feigning participation to entrap the defendant. The defendant is only guilty of the overt acts and the specific intent that can be imputed to them directly. 

Accomplices can only be guilty of the overt acts and the specific intent that can be directly imputed to them.

Pinkerton v. United States

a conspirator can be convicted of substantive crimes committed by co-conspirators if those crimes were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and were reasonably foreseeable, even if the defendant didn't directly participate in them. This establishes liability for all members of a continuing criminal agreement for actions taken by others in the group to achieve their common goals. 

United States v Alvarez

co-conspirators aren't automatically liable for a co-conspirator's unintended, unforeseeable violent acts, distinguishing this from the broader Pinkerton rule, meaning members with minor roles aren't responsible for unexpected, escalating violence unless it was part of the original agreement or reasonably foreseeable. 

United States v. Apple Inc.

Apple must face antitrust scrutiny for allegedly using its iPhone monopoly to stifle competition by blocking developer innovations like super-apps, cloud gaming, and third-party payments, despite previous rulings in the e-book case (2015) finding Apple illegally conspired with publishers to fix e-book prices, not that its platform itself was inherently anti-competitive, creating a complex antitrust precedent. 

People v. Lauria

a supplier of goods/services is only liable for conspiracy if they possess the intent to further the criminal enterprise, not just knowledge of its illegal use, with intent often inferred from factors like charging higher prices, disproportionate volume, or a special interest in the crime, which were absent in Lauria's case. 

Kotteakos v United States

a non-constitutional error requires reversal only if it had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," meaning convictions aren't overturned for minor technicalities, but rather if the error likely changed the outcome, as seen in conspiracy cases where a "hub-and-spoke" setup (one person connecting many others) isn't a single large conspiracy unless the spokes connect too. 

The Two Key Rules from Kotteakos

1. Harmless Error Rule: An error is harmless unless it had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict".

2. Conspiracy Rule: A "hub-and-spoke" arrangement (one central person connecting many others) isn't a single conspiracy; a "rim" must connect the spokes, meaning co-conspirators must also be linked to each other, not just the hub, to form one large conspiracy. 

United States v. Bruno

a single conspiracy can exist even if not all co-conspirators know each other, as long as each participant understands their role and foresees the larger criminal enterprise, like a chain of smugglers, middlemen, and retailers working for a common illicit goal. 

United States v. McDermott

a defendant must agree to the full scope of the conspiracy; you can't be convicted of a conspiracy with people you didn't know were involved.

for a single conspiracy conviction, the government must prove each member agreed to the collective venture's essential goal, even if details differed, meaning an indirect link (like McDermott to Gannon, and Gannon to Pomponio) is insufficient without proof of McDermott's awareness and agreement to the larger scheme involving Pomponio. 

Commonwealth v Carroll

establishes that premeditation for first-degree murder can occur instantaneously, meaning the time between forming the intent to kill and the actual killing is irrelevant if the act was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, even if occurring in a brief moment. 

State v Guthrie

first-degree murder requires a period, however brief, for the defendant to form and reflect on the intent to kill, distinguishing it from impulsive acts; an instruction saying intent need only exist "for an instant" is erroneous because it erases the line between first and second-degree murder, which are defined by premeditation versus spontaneity. 

Girouard v State

words alone, however insulting, are generally not adequate provocation to mitigate a murder charge to manslaughter; the provocation must involve a physical act or threat of bodily harm that would inflame a reasonable person's passions, not just the defendant's, to justify reducing the crime. 

Maher v People

for a killing to be reduced from murder to manslaughter, the provocation must be so severe that it would cause an ordinary, reasonable person to lose control, and the killing must occur in that "heat of passion" before a reasonable time for cooling off, rather than from malice or wickedness. 

People v Casassa

the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance requires both a subjective finding that the defendant was under such a disturbance and an objective assessment that the explanation or excuse for that disturbance was reasonable from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation. 

Commonwealth v Welansky

a person can be guilty of manslaughter through wanton or reckless conduct (a high degree of negligence) by creating a grave risk of harm, even without intending death, by knowingly allowing dangerous conditions (like overcrowding, blocked exits) to persist, meaning death resulting from that disregard, regardless of the fire's specific cause, constitutes criminal negligence/recklessness. 

People v Hall

recklessness in manslaughter requires the defendant to be subjectively aware of a substantial risk, not just that a reasonable person would have perceived it, meaning a skier going too fast for conditions but not actually aware of a death risk isn't necessarily reckless manslaughter. 

State v Williams

a parent's simple or ordinary negligence in failing to provide necessary medical care for a dependent child, resulting in the child's death, is sufficient for a statutory manslaughter conviction, overriding defenses like ignorance or good intentions if a reasonable person would have known the danger. 

Commonwealth v Malone

malice for second-degree murder can be inferred from an intentional act of gross recklessness, showing a "wicked disposition" and callous disregard for human life, even if death wasn't specifically intended, as seen in the Russian Roulette scenario. This means a killing resulting from extreme, wanton indifference to likely fatal consequences can be murder, not just manslaughter

United States v. Fleming

a drunk driver causing a fatal crash can be convicted of second-degree murder because their extreme, reckless conduct (like driving 70-100 mph in the wrong lane) demonstrates the "malice aforethought" required for murder, even without intent to kill, by showing a conscious disregard for a high risk of death or serious harm. 

People v Serne

a killing during a felony can be murder if the act causing death, done in furtherance of the felony, was known by the defendant to be dangerous to life and likely to cause death, essentially defining the felony-murder rule as applying when a dangerous act in committing a felony results in death, even without intent to kill. 

People v. Phillips

the California Supreme Court limited the felony-murder rule, holding it only applies when the underlying felony is "inherently dangerous to human life," and grand theft, in the abstract, is not such a felony, even if a death occurred during its commission. This established a key legal principle: to use the felony-murder rule, the crime itself must inherently risk life, not just the specific circumstances of the case.

Hines v. State

possessing a firearm as a convicted felon can serve as the inherently dangerous felony predicate for a felony murder conviction if the specific act creates a foreseeable risk of death, and Georgia courts won't overturn inconsistent jury verdicts between felony murder and acquittal on other related charges. 

People v Burton

a defendant's diminished mental capacity can prevent a finding of first-degree murder, requiring instructions to acquit first-degree if capacity was too low for premeditation or malice, but still allowing conviction for lesser degrees like second-degree murder or manslaughter if malice or intent to kill was present, but not premeditation. 

People v Chun

an underlying felony cannot be the basis for a second-degree felony murder instruction if it's an integral part of the homicide, meaning assaultive crimes that directly cause a death (like shooting at someone) merge with the homicide and can't be used to create a murder charge under the felony murder rule, though the jury should decide if the felony was independent. 

State v Canola

the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that a felon is not guilty of felony murder for the killing of a co-felon by a resisting victim, adopting the "agency theory" which limits liability to deaths caused by the felon or an accomplice, not a third party resisting the crime, thereby rejecting the broader proximate cause theory. 

Gregg v Georgia

the death penalty is not inherently cruel and unusual punishment, but its application must be guided by specific standards, like a two-stage (bifurcated) trial, to prevent arbitrary sentencing and ensure careful consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors for severe crimes.

Atkins v Virginia

the Supreme Court ruled that executing individuals with intellectual disabilities (formerly "mental retardation") violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, establishing a constitutional prohibition against such executions, though states retain the authority to define the criteria for intellectual disability. 

McCleskey v Kemp

he Supreme Court ruled that statistical evidence of racial disparities in capital sentencing, like studies showing killers of white victims are more likely to get death, is not enough to prove an Equal Protection violation; a defendant must show deliberate, particularized discrimination by the state actor in their specific case. 

State v Rusk

the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that if a victim submits to sexual intercourse due to a reasonable fear of immediate bodily harm caused by the defendant's actions, this can fulfill the force requirement for a rape conviction

State v DePetrillo

the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that a trial court erred by not considering psychological pressure (like an officer's authority) as a form of coercion, even without explicit threats, when evaluating a victim's vulnerability, thereby affirming that a victim's coerced consent (e.g., sexual assault) can occur through perceived authority or implied force, not just direct violence. 

State in the Interest of MTS

any act of sexual penetration without the victim's affirmative and freely given permission constitutes sexual assault, satisfying the "physical force" element without requiring force beyond that inherent in the act itself. 

State v McFadden (sexual assault)

the appellate court ruled that a defendant in a sexual assault case is entitled to a jury instruction on a mistake-of-fact defense regarding consent if there is credible evidence that the defendant reasonably believed the victim consented, even if that consent was only implied rather than explicit. 

People v Evans

fraud or seduction, unaccompanied by force or the threat of force, is insufficient under the statute to support a charge of rape. The court held that the victim's lack of consent due to being deceived, without physical force, did not meet the statutory definition of rape at the time. 

Commonwealth v. Sherry

a rape victim isn't required to use physical force to resist, and a defendant's mistaken belief in consent isn't a defense, emphasizing that the victim's genuine lack of consent, demonstrated by any real resistance or inability to resist due to force, is sufficient for a rape conviction. 

Commonwealth v Fischer

a defendant in a rape case cannot use a "mistake of fact" defense regarding the victim's consent, even in acquaintance rape cases. 

United States v Peterson

one cannot claim self-defense for killing if they were the aggressor or provoked the conflict, but they can regain this right by withdrawing in good faith and communicating that withdrawal, though the necessity for deadly force must be imminent and reasonable, not self-created. 

People v. Goetz

established a hybrid justification standard for self-defense, requiring the defendant to have both subjectively believed deadly force was necessary and that this belief was objectively reasonable given the "circumstances" (including their own background and experiences). This means the jury must consider both what the defendant thought and whether a reasonable person in their situation would have thought the same.

State v Kelly

expert testimony on battered-woman's syndrome is admissible to help a defendant prove her belief in the necessity of using deadly force (self-defense) was reasonable, requiring reliability and relevance to the honestly held belief of imminent harm. 

State v Norman

North Carolina's Supreme Court held that self-defense justification requires a reasonable belief of imminent death or great bodily harm, rejecting battered spouse syndrome as a basis for homicide if the threat isn't immediate, emphasizing that the necessity for lethal force must be a real or apparent, immediate danger, not just a general fear from past abuse. 

State v Abbott

a person using deadly force in self-defense must retreat only if they can do so with complete safety, meaning the duty to retreat ends when the danger becomes imminent and escape isn't safe, allowing for force against an aggressor if necessary to protect oneself from serious harm. 

Key takeaway: You only have to retreat if you can do so safely; if not, you can stand your ground and use force, even deadly force, to defend yourself from an attacker, as seen in the context of Abbott defending himself with a hatchet from aggressive neighbors. 

People v Ceballos

a property owner cannot use a deadly mechanical device (like a spring gun) to protect property if the intrusion isn't serious enough to justify deadly force if the owner were present, meaning such traps are illegal because they lack human discretion and can cause excessive harm, holding that one can only use the force they could personally use, and not a lethal trap for a mere trespasser.