United Nations

UN general assembly

• one country, one vote

• manages membership and operations

• resolutions have symbolic significance but are not binding, no enforcement

general assembly reform?

• votes weighted by population?

• votes weighted by gdp?

• votes weighted by contribution to he UN budget?

UN general assembly

• one country, one vote

• manages membership and operations

• resolutions have symbolic significance but are not binding, no enforcement

general assembly reform?

• votes weighted by population?

• votes weighted by gdp?

• votes weighted by contribution to he UN budget?

votes weighted by contribution to the UN budget?

1. leads to up-bidding (oligarchy)

2. or down-bidding (bankruptcy)

security council basics

• 2 tiers of membership

• decision making

• passing resolutions

two tiers of membership

1. permanent 5 (US, UK, France, Russia, China)

2. non-permanent 10

permanent 5 (US, UK, France, Russia, China)

• UN GA voted to take China’ seat from ROC and give it to CCP in 1971

• USSR designated Russia as its successor in 1991; no objection from UN GA

non-permanent 10

• two yr terms, staggered so that half change each year

• elected from regional voting blocs

security council; to pass a reolution

• 9 affirmative votes and no vetoes

• vote of “no” from a permanent member is a veto

• could also vote to abstain

security council; decision making

• permanent member often negotiate outside the Council, then present agreements as a flat

• council discussions are more theater than deliberation

Chapter V: Article 24

“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”

Chapter V: Article 25

“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”

FDR intended to have..

4 permanent members (League of Nations was too utopian; did not take power into account) - De Gaulle insisted on France’s inclusion

“four policeman”

FDR expected the permanent members to enforce order in its sphere of influence

China weakness impact on “four policeman”

US assumed responsibility for the Asia Pacific

“conert of power”

management of conflict between great powers; promote restraint, not governance

Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of disputes

• article 33 and 66

• legal basis for peacekeeping

• not binding on member states, requires consent

Article 33

“The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means [negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice].”

Article 36

“The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.”

Chapter VII: action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression

• article 41 and 42

• rarely involved during the Cold War

• most often involves sanctions, but occasionally used to authorize forces

Article 39

“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

Article 41

“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”

Article 42

“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”

Controversy: policing v. lawmaking

• UN SC res. 1373

• UN SC res. 1540

• “They are acts of international legislation that establish new binding rules of international law rather than commands relating to a particular situation”

UN SC res. 1373

requires all states to suppress terrorist financing

UN SC res. 1540

requires all states to adopt export controls for WMD

unsurp requirement of consent for

treaty making; but implementation still depends on member states

Security Council reform?

• Japan, India, Brazil, and Germany want permanent status

• small countries want more non-permanent members

• permanent members want status quo

Security council reform issues

harder to reform general assembly but current greater demand to reform security council

peacekeeping types

1. observation mission: unarmed

2. traditional peacekeeping (interposition): lightly armed

3. multidimensional peacekeeping: lightly armed + civilian expert

4. peace enforcement/peace building: heavily armed

multidimensional peacekeeping: lightly armed + civilian expert

developed post-Cold War; to deal with more internal conflicts

peace enforcement/peacebuilding: heavily armed

post-1999; designed to deal with problem of Civil War, not true peacekeepingn

more peacekeepers from poor countries than

rich because the labor is cheaper

country with most peacekeepers

Ethiopia

principal-agent relationship: standard in IR

• states are principals

• IO is agent

principal-agent relationship: UN chapter V, article 24-25

• GA is principal

• SC is agent

principal-agent relationship: Thompson (different approach)

• IO (SC) is principal

• State (US) is agent

Thompson’s model of screening

• UN SC has no military, so it must delegate enforcement of resolutions to individual agents

• agents are on of 2 types

• determine agents type by sending costly signal; screens out people that won’t pay the costs

In 2003, Iraq may be

violating UN SC resolutions from 1991

agent (enforcers) are one of two types

1. law-abiding

2. exceeding

US volunteers to enforce resolutions

How can the principal determine agents’ type?

ask the agent to send a costly signal: subject its action to multilateral restraints

before authorizing actions

UN SC requires evidence of violations but US invades anyway

costly signals help to

“screen out” law-exceeding types, that won’t pay cost of restraint

implications of Iraq - conventional wisdom

UN SC failed to prevent US invasion of Iraq, there UN SC is useless

Thompson: UN SC revelaed that US was a law-exceeder (after Iraq)

1. US was revealed to be untrustworthy

2. US lost support/allies, which raised the costs of the invasion and subsequent occupation

3. US might be constrained from law-exceeding action in similar situations in the future

forum shopping

• US has wide, heterogeneous membership: thus, resolutions send a strong signal to support the enforcers

• regional organizations have a narrower, more homogenous membership; thus, their resolutions send a weaker signal

• enforcers will forum shop

enforcers will forum shop

find an IO that achieves the right balance of sufficiently few constraints but provides some multilateral cover (support us and give us something that helps)

Thompson v. constructivism

Constructivist: US tries to get UN support against Iraq because legitimacy matters

Thompson (rational choice institutionalism): US seeks UN support to attract allies, allies care about Un Decisions because they lack information about US motives/types