Advanced Network Security

0.0(0)
studied byStudied by 0 people
learnLearn
examPractice Test
spaced repetitionSpaced Repetition
heart puzzleMatch
flashcardsFlashcards
Card Sorting

1/63

encourage image

There's no tags or description

Looks like no tags are added yet.

Study Analytics
Name
Mastery
Learn
Test
Matching
Spaced

No study sessions yet.

64 Terms

1
New cards
<p><strong>RSS-based Key Exchange</strong></p><p><strong>SITUATION:</strong></p><ul><li><p><code>A</code> and <code>B</code> use <code>PT_A = [12, … , 21]</code> and <code>PT_B = [12, … 22]</code>, and have <code>-8 p.u.</code> of mutual attenuation</p></li><li><p>Single-antenna static eavesdropper <code>ε</code>, with <code>-3 p.u</code>. to <code>A</code> and <code>-7 p.u.</code> to <code>B</code> </p></li><li><p>Assume packets do not carry a Source ID (anonymous)</p></li><li><p><code>ε</code> can identify the source based on the received power </p><ul><li><p><code>[5-9]</code> is <code>B</code>, <code>[16-18]</code> is <code>A</code>… but when <code>[9-16]</code>, who is transmitting?</p></li><li><p><code>ε</code> can only place a threshold in the middle <code>(12.5)</code> and decide <code>A</code> if <code>[9-12.5]</code> and B if <code>[12.5-16]</code></p></li></ul></li></ul><p></p><p><strong>ALGORITHM:</strong></p><ul><li><p>Assume <code>A</code> has a secret <code>KA = [1, 0, 1]</code> and <code>B</code> has a secret <code>KB = [0, 1, 0]</code></p></li><li><p>When <code>B</code> is transmitting a bit, we take it as it is; when A is transmitting, we complement it (<code>0-&gt;1, 1-&gt;0</code>)</p><ul><li><p><code>ε</code> knows about this (the algorithm is always public)</p></li></ul></li><li><p>At each slot, <code>A</code> and <code>B</code> extract random delay and TX power, and wait for such delay. The first one whose delay expires, transmit</p></li></ul><p></p><p><strong>QUESTION:</strong></p><p><strong>1: Compute the key</strong></p><p><strong>2: Compute the adversary’s guessed key.</strong></p><p></p>

RSS-based Key Exchange

SITUATION:

  • A and B use PT_A = [12, … , 21] and PT_B = [12, … 22], and have -8 p.u. of mutual attenuation

  • Single-antenna static eavesdropper ε, with -3 p.u. to A and -7 p.u. to B

  • Assume packets do not carry a Source ID (anonymous)

  • ε can identify the source based on the received power

    • [5-9] is B, [16-18] is A… but when [9-16], who is transmitting?

    • ε can only place a threshold in the middle (12.5) and decide A if [9-12.5] and B if [12.5-16]

ALGORITHM:

  • Assume A has a secret KA = [1, 0, 1] and B has a secret KB = [0, 1, 0]

  • When B is transmitting a bit, we take it as it is; when A is transmitting, we complement it (0->1, 1->0)

    • ε knows about this (the algorithm is always public)

  • At each slot, A and B extract random delay and TX power, and wait for such delay. The first one whose delay expires, transmit

QUESTION:

1: Compute the key

2: Compute the adversary’s guessed key.

1: Compute the key


K_AB = [0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0]

Slot-by-slot reasoning:

  • Slot 1 – B transmits → take K_B[1] = 0K_AB[1] = 0

  • Slot 2 – B transmits → take K_B[2] = 1K_AB[2] = 1

  • Slot 3 – A transmits → use K_A[1] = 1 → complement → K_AB[3] = 0

  • Slot 4 – A transmits → use K_A[2] = 0 → complement → K_AB[4] = 1

  • Slot 5 – B transmits → take K_B[3] = 0K_AB[5] = 0

  • Slot 6 – A transmits → use K_A[3] = 1 → complement → K_AB[6] = 0

2: Compute the adversary’s guessed key.

K = [1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1]
Correct guesses: 4 out of 6

  • Slot 1: RSS = 14 → inferred A → B sent 0 → guessed 1

  • Slot 2: RSS = 13 → inferred A → B sent 1 → guessed 0

  • Slot 3: RSS = 10 → inferred B → A sent 1 → guessed 1

  • Slot 4: RSS = 17 → inferred A → A sent 0 → guessed 1

  • Slot 5: RSS = 7 → inferred B → B sent 0 → guessed 0

  • Slot 6: RSS = 11 → inferred B → A sent 1 → guessed 1

2
New cards
<p><strong>RPL</strong></p><p><strong>Identify the attacks and mention a mitigation for each attack</strong></p>

RPL

Identify the attacks and mention a mitigation for each attack

  • Sybil Attack

    • Issue: Node 11 isn't in the node list but appears in the topology. Node 6 appears twice.

    • Cause: Node 11 is likely impersonating Node 6 (multiple fake identities).

    • Mitigation: Enforce unique Node IDs and track identities using authentication.

  • Black Hole Attack

    • Issue: Node 1 accepts messages (e.g., from Node 3) but doesn't forward them to the root.

    • Cause: Node 1 is silently dropping traffic.

    • Mitigation: Use IDS or acknowledgment-based checks to detect non-forwarding nodes.

  • Increased Rank Attack

    • Issue: Node 4 has an unusually high rank (32) compared to its parent (1).

    • Cause: Node 4 advertises a fake high rank to disrupt routing.

    • Mitigation: Verify ranks using ACKs and limit drastic rank changes.

3
New cards

Security Planning


You are working with a constrained IoT device that needs to transmit a 655-byte message over a wireless IEEE 802.15.4 network. Your objective is to determine how many MAC-layer frames are needed to send the complete message while ensuring confidentiality and authenticity at the MAC layer.

Tasks:

  • Select the appropriate Auxiliary Security Header configuration

    • Choose the settings that provide the required security (authenticity + confidentiality) with minimal overhead.

  • Calculate the header sizes

    • Include all relevant fields from the MAC and security headers.

    • Use the parameters and addressing schemes listed below.

  • Determine the number of MAC-layer frames required

    • Account for maximum payload per frame after subtracting header overhead.

    • Divide the total message size accordingly.

  • COAP

  • UDP

  • RPL

  • IEEE 802.15.4 MAC

  • IEEE 802.15.4 PHY

  • Identify header sizes for each layer

    • COAP: 7 bytes

    • UDP: 8 bytes

    • RPL: 4 bytes

    • IEEE 802.15.4 (with security): 43 bytes

    • PHY: 1 byte

  • Break down the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC header

    • Base: 25 bytes

    • Auxiliary Security Header (auxhd):

      • Security Control: 1 byte

      • Frame Counter: 4 bytes

      • Key ID field: 4 bytes

      • MIC (authentication tag): 9 bytes

    • Total MAC layer header: 25 + 18 = 43 bytes

  • Calculate remaining payload space per frame (K)

    • MTU = 127 bytes

    • K = 127 – (7 + 8 + 4 + 43 + 1) = 65 bytes available for the message

  • Compute the number of frames (M)

    • Message size N = 655 bytes

    • M = ceil(655 / 65) = 11 frames

4
New cards

Which of these is not a security service defined by the ITU-T X.800 recommendation?

  • Authentication

  • Key Agreement

  • Authorization

  • Confidentiality

Key Agreement

5
New cards

Which of these is a security algorithm?

  • DTLS

  • SHA

  • IKE

  • SKKE

SHA

6
New cards

Which of these is not an attacker model?

  • Dolev-Yao

  • Man in the Middle

  • Canetti-Krawczyk

  • Honest-but-Curios

Man in the Middle

7
New cards

Which of these modes of operation of AES is inherently prone to cryptanalysis?

  • AES-OFB

  • AES-CTR

  • AES-ECB

  • AES-CBC

AES-ECB

8
New cards

Which one of these features is unique to the Industrial IoT application?

  • Data in Industrial IoT applications are typically more private than other IoT domains

  • IoT devices in Industrial IoT domains communicate with other IoT devices, not managed by the same system administrator

  • Constrained devices were already deployed in industrial domains, but not directly connected to the Internet

  • Wireless connectivity is prevalent, making it the prevalent vector to launch attacks

Constrained devices were already deployed in industrial domains, but not directly connected to the Internet

9
New cards

Which of these tiers of the IoT layered architecture is responsible for connecting the IoT devices to the Internet?

  • Device Tier

  • Gateway Tier

  • Cloud Tier

  • User Tier

Gateway Tier

10
New cards

Which of these attacks is NOT a Physical-Layer (PHY) attack?

  • Jamming

  • Energy Depletion

  • Side-Channel

  • Denial of Sleep

Denial of Sleep

11
New cards

Which of these statements about the adaption of IT security solutions to the IoT domain is true?

  • The security of IT-security approaches is not generally not that high, so they are feasible for IoT scenarios

  • All the cryptographic security testing done previously for IT networks should be verified again when including security solutions in the IoT domain

  • The Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS) is an example of a protocol that can be applied in a straightforward way from the IT to the IoT domain

  • When applied in the IoT domain, IT security approaches might lead to high energy consumption

When applied in the IoT domain, IT security approaches might lead to high energy consumption

12
New cards

Which of these conditions are likely to indicate that the communication channel is under jamming?

  • Low BER, low SNR

  • High BER, low SNR

  • Low BER, High SNR

  • High BER, High SNR

High BER, low SNR

13
New cards

Which of the following jamming techniques is more suitable to be selected by an attacker that does not want to be detected?

  • Deceptive Jamming

  • Constant Jamming

  • Noise Jamming

  • Sweep Jamming

Deceptive Jamming

14
New cards

Which of these jamming-related solutions would likely require the change of the hardware of a device?

  • Use of Time Synchronized Channel Hopping

  • Use of alternated transmission and silence

  • Use of Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum

  • Use of Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)

Use of Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum

15
New cards

Which of these jamming techniques is more energy efficient for an attacker?

  • Proactive Jamming

  • Deceptive Jamming

  • Reactive Jamming

  • Barrage Jamming

Reactive Jamming

16
New cards

Which of these security functions is not provided by the IEEE 802.15.4 standard?

  • Protection against replay attacks

  • Data Confidentiality

  • Key Management

  • Data Authenticity

Key Management

17
New cards

Which of the following statements about link-layer security in IEEE 802.15.4 is true?

  • The IEEE 802.15.4 MAC payload can be authenticated, but the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC header cannot

  • The IEEE 802.15.4 MAC header can be encrypted but not authenticated

  • The IEEE 802.15.4 MAC Header cannot be encrypted

  • The IEEE 802.15.4 MAC payload cannot be authenticated

The IEEE 802.15.4 MAC Header cannot be encrypted

18
New cards

Which of these features is not provided by a Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM)?

  • Reduced memory size of the security solution

  • Increased code reuse for the security solution

  • Reduced Execution time for the security solution

  • Increased hardware independence of the security solution

Increased hardware independence of the security solution

19
New cards

Which of these keys is used in Zigbee IP to make the key establishment protocol confidential?

  • Master Key

  • Network Key

  • Link key

  • Pairwise Temporal Key

Master Key

20
New cards

Which of the following statements regarding Bluetooth keys is true?

  • The Application Key is used to securely broadcast packets in the network.

  • The Device Key is used to communicate securely with another device at the link layer.

  • The Link Key is used to derive the Device Key.

  • The Session Key, derived from the Network Key, is used to communicate securely with any other device in the network.

The Device Key is used to communicate securely with another device at the link layer

21
New cards

Which of these statements regarding the “Exchanging Public Keys” phase of the Bluetooth Secure Join is true?

  • Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) is always used to generate the link key

  • It is based on the use of the FIPS P-160 elliptic curve

  • The new device always delivers its public key via the Bluetooth connection, even if an Out-Of-Band (OOB) channel is available

  • The availability of an Out-Of-Band channel is discovered through a bogus packet sent by the Provisioner to the new joining device.

Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) is always used to generate the link key

22
New cards

Which of these security services is provided by the CCMP protocol in IEEE 802.11i?

  • Access Control

  • Peer Entity Authentication

  • Key Generation

  • Data Integrity

Data Integrity

23
New cards

Which protocol is used to carry authentication messages between the supplicant and the Access Point in IEEE 802.11 networks?

  • IEEE 802.11i

  • IEEE 802.11X

  • EAP over LAN (EAPoL)

  • RADIUS

EAP over LAN (EAPoL)

24
New cards

Which of these protocols is used by WPA2 for data confidentiality?

  • CCMP

  • AES-CCM*

  • AES-CCM

  • TKIP

CCMP

25
New cards

Which protocol is replaced by the Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) in WP3?

  • TKIP

  • CCMP

  • 4-ways handshake

  • EAP exchange

4-ways handshake

26
New cards

Which of these registers in the GSM standard allows verifying the status of a Mobile Terminal?

  • Authentication Center

  • Home Location Register

  • Equipment Identity Register

  • Visitor Location Register

Equipment Identity Register

27
New cards

Which cryptographic algorithm is used by GSM to protect against eavesdropping on the communication channel?

  • A3

  • A5

  • A8

  • A9

A5

28
New cards

Which of these features enables authentication of the NodeB toward the 3G-USIM in 3G?

  • Delivery of AUTHN vector from the MT to the VLR

  • Delivery of AV from the AuC to the VLR

  • Delivery of RES from the MT to the VLR

  • Delivery of AUTHN vector from the VLR to the MT

Delivery of AUTHN vector from the VLR to the MT

29
New cards

Why is 3G preferred over GSM/2G in IoT today?

  • Support for data

  • Data Confidentiality

  • Mutual Trust

  • Use of standardized security algorithms

Support for data

30
New cards

Which of these attacks at the network layer of the IoT requires at least two nodes to cooperate?

  • Sinkhole

  • Blackhole

  • Wormhole

  • Hello Flood

Wormhole

31
New cards

Which of these cryptography algorithms is used in RPL for protecting against eavesdropping at the network layer?

  • RSA-SHA384

  • AES-CTR

  • AES-CBC

  • RSA-SHA256

AES-CTR

32
New cards

Neighbor attacks of RPL manipulate a single parameter of the RPL messages. Which one?

  • Rank

  • RPLInstanceID

  • DODAG-ID

  • Objective Function

Rank

33
New cards

When an IoT network uses RPL in Storing Mode, which element of the routing protocol can be abused to generate an attack?

  • DIO messages

  • Routing Table

  • Rank

  • DODAG-ID

Routing Table

34
New cards

Which of these security algorithms is recommended for use by CoAP?

  • RSA

  • RC4

  • AES

  • ECDH

ECDH

35
New cards

How DTLS allows for message reordering?

  • Counter in DTLS Record Header

  • Sequence Numbers in DTLS Record Header

  • Frame Counter in DTLS Record Header

  • It relies on message reordering features provided by TCP

Sequence Numbers in DTLS Record Header

36
New cards

Why DTLS is more exposed to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks than TLS?

  • DTLS adds acknowledgement messages that allow for better loss recovery, while TLS acks messages with other messages

  • TLS allows for reordering of messages, while DTLS requires correct order

  • DTLS allows for reception of messages out of sequence, and it does not immediately close the connection at the first error

  • DTLS adds HelloRetryRequest messages, which pave the way to DoS attacks

DTLS allows for reception of messages out of sequence, and it does not immediately close the connection at the first error

37
New cards

Which security protocol is referred to by MQTT regarding data integrity?

  • IPSec

  • TLS

  • DTLS

  • OSCOAP

TLS

38
New cards

Which of these information can be always extracted from communication packets through network traffic analysis?

  • Routing-layer headers

  • Packets Interarrival Times

  • Used encryption algorithms at the Application-layer

  • Transport-layer protocol used

Packets Interarrival Times

39
New cards

Which of these countermeasures can be used to mitigate the amount of information leaked through network traffic analysis?

  • Encrypt all traffic through an encryption algorithm

  • Enclose your transmitter into a Faraday cage

  • Always consume the same amount of energy per task

  • Transmit packets at regular intervals

Transmit packets at regular intervals

40
New cards

In event-triggered communications, which of the following countermeasures is not applicable to protect against side-channels?

  • Anticipate the transmission of a packet reporting an event by a small time

  • Encrypt all packets

  • Make packets all of the same size

  • Delay the transmission of a packet reporting an event by a small time

Anticipate the transmission of a packet reporting an event by a small time

41
New cards

Which of the following “features” is not applicable as a side channel to identify a drone?

  • Keystroke emanations

  • Unintentional Electro-Magnetic (EM) emissions

  • Energy consumption

  • Acoustic emanations

Keystroke emanations

42
New cards

Which of the following is a motivation for the ease of jamming GNSS signals?

  • Use of Binary-Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) modulation

  • Low Received Signal Strength (RSS) at the receiver

  • Low bit-rate

  • Use of globally available time and position information

Low Received Signal Strength (RSS) at the receiver

43
New cards

Why cryptographic solutions are not applicable for civil GNSS applications?

  • Hardware modification of satellites is largely impractical

  • The hardware of GNSS satellites cannot support cryptography operations

  • Cryptography solutions cannot be applied when the distance between the transmitter and the receiver is too large

  • Hardware modification of all civil GNSS receivers is impractical

Hardware modification of all civil GNSS receivers is impractical

44
New cards

Which of the following information cannot be useful to cross-check the authenticity of GNSS frames?

  • Messages broadcasted by Cellular Base Stations

  • Time to receive the signal

  • Readings from local Magnetometers

  • Received Power Level from the Satellites

Readings from local Magnetometers

45
New cards

Which of the following is not an element making the addition of security to ADS-B challenging?

  • Specific frequency used for wireless communication

  • Reliability of the communication link

  • Cost considerations

  • Broadcast scenario

Specific frequency used for wireless communication

46
New cards

Which of the following is not a reason why Public Key Cryptography (PKI) solutions cannot be adopted to secure ADS-B messages?

  • Not enough space in the payload for secure signatures

  • Need to elect/select a Trusted Third Party (TTP)

  • Time to execute cryptography operations

  • Message fragmentation would be required, that hardly couples with network reliability issues

Time to execute cryptography operations

47
New cards
48
New cards
49
New cards
50
New cards
51
New cards
52
New cards
53
New cards
54
New cards
55
New cards
56
New cards
57
New cards
58
New cards
59
New cards
60
New cards
61
New cards
62
New cards
63
New cards
64
New cards