negative and ideal utilitarianism

negative utilitarianism definition

the idea that suffering is bad, and happiness is neutral. the goal is to minimise total suffering

karl popper and negative utilitarianism

holds the idea that the principal aim of politics should be to reduce suffering rather than increase happiness

STRENGTH: ethical priority of suffering (NU)

• moral urgency to prevent extreme suffering—such as torture, starvation, or terminal illness—is stronger and more universally compelling than the obligation to increase mild pleasures.

• In many real-world cases, this approach offers a more compassionate and urgent moral framework

• Philosophers such as David Pearce support NU’s intuition by arguing that suffering has an asymmetrical moral weight, claiming that a world without suffering, even if emotionally neutral, is morally preferable to a world with a mix of happiness and intense suffering

COUNTER to ethical priority of suffering (NU)

• most persistent criticisms of negative utilitarianism is the so-called “world destruction” objection, originally raised by R. Ninian Smart in the 1950s.

• If the sole moral imperative is to eliminate suffering, then the quickest way to achieve this may be to eliminate all sentient beings—as death implies the cessation of suffering.

• This leads to the absurd implication that the morally ideal world is one where no one exists to suffer, even if this also eliminates all happiness.

• smart argued that this consequence makes NU unacceptable because it devalues human life and happiness, ignoring the richness and meaning that can exist even alongside suffering.

• It also neglects the preferences of individuals who would choose life, despite its hardships.

ideal utilitarianism

there are certain things that are intrinsically valuable (ideals) which we should promote through our actions. All of our actions should strive to have these ideals (e.g. justice, love) as their consequences

ideal utilitarianism and G.E Moore

• accepted the consequentialist approach of classical utilitarianism but rejected its hedonism; argued we should value ideals above pleasure and seek to act in a way that these ideals would be maximised.

• argues that beauty as an ideal is something objective and intrinsic to nature.

• even if these worlds remained forever unperceived by beings capable of appreciating or striving to produce the more beautiful example, that this would would still be inherently more valuable than its ugly alternative

weaknesses of ideal utilitarianism

• others may have competing intuitions telling them whether an object is beautiful or ugly becomes irrelevant if no-one sensitive to beauty is ever going to see it

• assumes beauty is something objective

WEAKNESS OF NU: iraneaus (+SL)

some pain and suffering is for the greater good

HOWEVER: Kant would argue no

STRENGTH: real world applicability to global ethics and policy (NU_

Negative utilitarianism has practical strength in guiding real-world moral and political decision-making, especially in domains such as public health, humanitarian aid, and animal welfare. Because it emphasizes reducing the worst forms of harm, it provides clear moral direction in contexts where resource allocation must prioritize outcomes with the greatest negative impact.

For example, the Effective Altruism (EA) movement—though not explicitly committed to NU—draws on similar logic by focusing on interventions that prevent the most suffering per unit of cost, such as distributing anti-malarial nets or funding deworming initiatives. Philosopher Toby Ord, co-founder of EA, notes in The Precipice (2020) that existential risks, which could cause massive suffering, deserve moral priority—reflecting NU-style reasoning.

COUNTER TO NU real world applicability: neglect of positive values

Critics argue that NU creates an asymmetry in which suffering is infinitely morally important, but happiness is morally irrelevant unless it prevents suffering. This leads to skewed priorities, where policies that bring widespread joy (e.g., art, education, freedom) may be underappreciated or even rejected in favour of strict harm-reduction.

Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons (1984) challenges such asymmetry by arguing that any ethical theory must account for both negative and positive experiences. If two worlds contain equal amounts of suffering, but one also includes immense happiness, NU fails to distinguish between them—an intuitively mistaken conclusion. This risks flattening moral landscapes to a single metric: pain.