Tort Law

Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 QB 426

• C sued D claiming that D had shot and injured him

• Statement of claim did not state whether it was intentional or negligent

• D said no cause of action because C had not alleged intention or negligence

• The High Court held that the claim disclosed no cause of action: C had to choose one, plead specific facts, and prove them

Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232

• C was sunbathing in a car park when D accidentally reversed over her legs, causing injury

• C did not immediately claim in negligence, and by the time she sued the limitation period for negligence had expired (3 years)

• She instead brought a claim in trespass to the person (6 years time barred)

• The court held that trespass to the person only applies to intentional acts; negligent acts must be brought in negligence, so C’s claim was time-barred

Tuberville v Savage (1669) 1 Mod 3; 86 ER 684

• D put his hand on his sword and said to C, “If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language”

• C claimed this constituted an assault by placing him in apprehension of immediate violence

• The issue was whether words showing a conditional intention could amount to an assault

• The Court held there was no assault: there was no present intention or imminent threat of violence, since D’s words made clear he would not act at that time

Stephens v Myers (1830) 4 Car & P 349; 172 ER 735

• At a church meeting, D advanced on the chairman, stating that he would “rather pull the chairman out of the chair, than be turned out of the room,” while shaking his fist

• D was stopped by other members before he could reach the chairman

• The issue was whether advancing in a threatening attitude, so that a blow would almost immediately have reached the chairman if not prevented, amounted to assault

• The Court held there was an assault: if D was advancing with intent so that, within a second or two, he would have reached the chairman, this amounted to assault in law, even though he was stopped before striking

Thomas v National Union of Mineworkers (South Wales Area) [1986] Ch 20

• C, a miner, continued working during NUM strikes and was bussed to the mines through picket lines of striking miners

• Striking miners shouted threats and made violent gestures towards C and others on the bus, but police and the bus itself stood between them

• The issue was whether threats without the present ability to carry them out could amount to assault

• The Court held there was no assault, as imminent capability is required

R v Ireland [1998] AC 147, Lord Steyn pgs 161–162; Lord Hope

• D made repeated silent telephone calls to three women over several months, causing them to suffer psychiatric injury

• The issue was whether silence could amount to an assault

• The Court held that silence may constitute an assault if it causes apprehension of immediate unlawful violence

Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC 786 (QB)

• British soldiers on UN peacekeeping duty in Kosovo fired at a car, killing two men and injuring others

• Claim brought in trespass to the person (battery and assault)

• Issue: whether the soldiers’ actions could amount to assault or battery, and whether self-defence or combat immunity excused liability

• Court held there was battery, as unlawful force was inflicted, but no assault, as there was no intention to cause the claimants to apprehend immediate violence

• Self-defence failed (no reasonable belief in imminent threat), and combat immunity was inapplicable (not “battle conditions”)

Mbasogo and another v Logo Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1370, [70]–[82]

• C, President of Equatorial Guinea, sued D in relation to an alleged coup involving mercenaries and an intended armed assault

• Coup failed: soldiers and equipment were arrested abroad before any action began; only an unarmed advance group had entered Equatorial Guinea

• Issue: whether allegations of conspiracy and threats could amount to the tort of assault where D had no present capacity to carry out the threats

• Court held no assault: the tort requires an overt act causing apprehension of immediate unlawful force, and here there was neither imminence nor capability

Rex (RN) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2024] 1 WLR 814

• 12 year old boy was threatened with letters of sexual violence

• The question was whether it amounted to assault since the letters were read at a later time then when it was written

• The court ruled on a broader interpretation of immediacy and that it was apprehension of violence at the time the letters were read and need not be specific in form of violence or time of violence occurring

Scott v Shepherd [1773] 2 Black W 892, 96 ER 525

• D threw a lit squib into a crowded marketplace

• Two other people threw the squib on to protect themselves

• The squib exploded near C, injuring his face and causing loss of an eye

• D argued on appeal that the injury was not his direct act and the chain of causation was broken

• The court held D was liable; the intervening acts were foreseeable and part of his original act, so the injury was directly caused by him

*Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172

• Clarifies the meaning of battery as a touching of another with hostile intent or in other words any intentional touching outside of the scope of what normally acceptable.

• A police officer grabbed a woman’s arm to stop her, without legal authority to detain her

• Under the Street Offences Act 1959, he had no power to arrest her

• The grabbing constituted an unlawful touching (battery) outside the scope of lawful duty

Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237

• Battery only requires the defendant to intend to make contact with the claimant. Intention to cause injury is unnecessary

• Two 13-year-old boys were in the same class; D jumped on C, causing serious injury

• C sued for trespass to the person (battery), claiming D acted deliberatelyD argued it was accidental horseplay, not intended to harm

• The Court of Appeal held battery only requires intent to make contact; intention to injure is unnecessary, but the contact must be ‘hostile’ in the legal sense

Kaye v Robertson [1990] 3 WLUK 232, [3]

• C was photographed and had personal details published without consent while recovering in hospital

• C objected, but a tabloid newspaper published the photos and details anyway

• The camera flash was the battery

• Not ruled as battery

*F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1990] 2 AC 1

• F, a 36-year-old woman with limited mental capacity, was at risk of pregnancy due to a sexual relationship while in permanent care

• Hospital staff and F’s mother sought to sterilise her despite her inability to consent

• The court considered whether performing a medical procedure without consent could amount to trespass to the person (battery)

• The House of Lords held it was lawful trespass if the procedure was in the patient’s best interests and performed with proper skill and care (Bolam test)

McMillan v Crown Prosecution Service [2008] EWHC 1457

• D (police constable) saw C was drunk and shouting outside her daughter's house in the early morning.

• D took hold of C's arm to lead her from the private garden to a public footpath, mainly to ensure her safety due to the steep steps.

• C continued shouting and swearing on the public footpath, where D ultimately arrested her for being drunk and disorderly.

• C argued on appeal that D’s physical contact amounted to battery, and her protest was a response to this rather than disorderly behaviour.

• The court found D acted within generally acceptable standard; his contact was reasonable and for safety

Marland v Director of Public Prosecutions [2023] EWHC 1046 (Admin)

• D was convicted of battery after grabbing his partner's shoulders and physically moving her toward his car against her will, causing her to fall.

• He argued on appeal that his actions were justified by implied consent (for her safety), and that the magistrates failed to properly engage with this defence or the necessary intent for battery.

• The High Court found that the magistrates had considered the doctrine of implied consent but correctly determined it did not apply because D knew there was no consent and his conduct was not reasonable.

Breslin v McKevitt [2011] NICA 33

• D A and D B were held liable for trespass to the person (battery) after planting a bomb in a stolen vehicle that exploded

• D C and D D successfully appealed, with a retrial for D C because the trial judge did not fully analyse key evidence linking them to the battery.

• The court confirmed that recklessness alone was enough for civil liability in battery; intentional harm was not required

Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742

• B claimed false imprisonment after being prevented by D (police) from moving in one direction on a public road closed for a boat race, while other directions remained open.

•  Issue: Whether being blocked from one path, but free to move in other directions, counts as false imprisonment.

• Held: Partial obstruction does not amount to imprisonment; a “prison” requires a defined boundary that the person cannot lawfully leave.

Robinson v The Balmain New Ferry Company Ltd [1910] AC 295

• C (Robinson) attempted to leave the ferry wharf without paying the second penny; D (Balmain New Ferry Co.) forcibly prevented him from leaving.

• Issue: Whether preventing C from leaving without paying amounted to false imprisonment.

• Held: No false imprisonment. By entering the ferry, C agreed to pay a penny on both entry and exit; D was entitled to enforce this reasonable contractual condition.

• Even total obstruction does not constitute false imprisonment if a lawful, reasonable condition is imposed; this narrows the law from Bird v Jones, which required total obstruction.

Herd v Weardale Steel Coal & Coke Co Ltd [1915] AC 67

• C claimed false imprisonment after being detained in a coal mine until 1:30 pm when he requested an early lift to the surface, having arrived at work at 9:30 am.

• Issue: Whether preventing C from leaving the mine before the end of his shift amounted to false imprisonment.

• Decision: No false imprisonment. D was entitled to refuse early exit because C had voluntarily placed himself in the position (volenti non fit injuria) and had breached his employment contract by refusing to work.

Davidson v Chief Constable of North Wales [1994] 2 All ER 597

• C was arrested and held for two hours after a store detective wrongly suspected him of theft and informed the police.

• Issue: Whether giving information to a third party, knowing they might detain C, can amount to false imprisonment.

• Decision: No false imprisonment. D (employer of the store detective) not liable because the police acted independently, not as agents of D.

*Iqbal v Prisoner Officers Association [2009] EWCA Civ 1312

• C claimed false imprisonment after being confined to his cell all day due to a strike by prison guards (D).

• Issue: Whether negligent or indirect actions are sufficient to establish the intention required for false imprisonment.

• Decision: Appeal dismissed.

• Reasoning: False imprisonment requires both a positive act and intent to restrict liberty; negligence alone is insufficient, and lawful authority cannot give rise to the tort.

*Lumba v Secretary of State of the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 245

 

• Cs were foreign nationals detained under immigration powers after serving prison sentences; D (Secretary of State) applied an unpublished policy that differed from the public guidance.

• Issue: Whether detention under an unpublished policy constitutes false imprisonment.

• Decision: Supreme Court held detention unlawful and amounted to false imprisonment, because the policy was not public or challengeable.

Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432

• C underwent a surgery with risks and was warned about the risk

• It only caused temporary relief so she underwent a second surgery

• D, the doctor, didn’t warn her about the risks the second time, C said it was battery

• Held: she consented, no battery. Consent is valid if the claimant has been informed of the broad nature of defendant’s acts

*Blake v Galloway [2004] 1 WLR 2844

• Teenagers playing a game involving throwing woodchips

• C got an eye injury and sued D in battery

• Held: consent barred any battery claim (implied consent)

Herd v Weardale Steel Coal & Coke Co Ltd [1915] AC 67

• C worked in a coal mine and would normally leave at 4pm

• One day he refused work and demanded to be let out

• The lifts were unavailable and he was let out at 1.30pm but the lift was technically available 20 minutes before

• C claimed false imprisonment for the 20 minutes

• Held: C had voluntarily gone knowing there was normally no way out until 4 pm -> could not argue that no way out earlier was false imprisonment

Pile v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2020] EWHC 2472

• C was arrested for being drunk and disorderly after vomiting over herself and behaving aggressively

• Female officers stripped her and gave her new clothes

• She claimed trespass to the person

• Held: police have lawful authority to remove and replace detainees’ clothing when necessary for hygiene, even without explicit consent, not violating ECHR article 8 if proportionte

F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1990] 2 AC 1

• 36-year-old woman with a severe mental disability could not consent to sterilisation.

• Her mother sought a court declaration that the operation would be lawful to prevent harm from a possible pregnancy.

• Held: The House of Lords ruled the sterilisation lawful as it was in the woman’s best interests

Cross v Kirkby [2000] The Times 5, April 2000

• Protestor, C, attacked a farmer with a baseball bat

• Farmer, D, struck back

• Held: lawful self-defense, protester’s injuries resulted from his own criminal actions, ex turpi causa (no action can arise from wrongdoing).

Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962

• Cs brought a claim on behalf of a man who was killed during a police raid

• Police claimed self-defense, believed the man was about to attack him

• Man was lying in bed, unarmed

• Held: in favour of C, a defendant relying on self-defence in tort must have a reasonable belief that he is under attack

Chief Constable of Merseyside Police v McCarthy [2016] EWCA Civ 1257

• C sued for battery after being tasered for 11 seconds instead of 5

• Held: officer's actions were reasonable as the extra discharge was accidental and occurred in a tense, fast-moving situation

R (on the application of Officer W80) v Director General of the Independent Office for Police Conduct [2023

• Officer shot and killed a suspect, claiming he honestly believed there was an imminent threat.

• Applied the civil test, finding his belief honest but unreasonable.

Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67

• critically ill in intensive care; doctors sought court approval to withhold further invasive treatment and CPR, believing it would not benefit him

• Held: Doctors need not provide treatment they consider inappropriate, but any treatment must be lawful and in the patient’s best interests.

• “Futility” means treatment of no real benefit to the patient, and “recovery” means a quality of life the patient would find worthwhile

• The patient’s wishes, feelings, beliefs, and values are central to deciding best interests

ZH v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2013] EWCA Civ 69

• C was autistic & epileptic, refused to leave a pool; police restrained him for ~40 mins in handcuffs/leg restraints and a van cage

• He suffered PTSD and worsened epilepsy

• Ds failed to consult carers where practicable

• Held: An honest (but unreasonable) belief something is in C’s best interest is not enough

Hague v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison [1992] 1 AC 58

• No claim for false imprisonment arises when detention is lawful and made in good faith.

• Held: Even if the detention was mistaken, it was lawful if done under proper authority.

Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57

• D told P that her husband had suffered an accident, knowing he had not.

• P suffered: ‘violent shock to her nervous system, producing vomiting and other more serious and permanent physical consequences at one time threatening her reason, and entailing weeks of suffering and incapacity to her as well as expense to her husband for medical attendance.’ per Wright J

• Held: C recovered damages for her injuries.

Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53

• Two prison guards subjected Cs to a non-negligent but deeply inappropriate strip-search. Cs sued in trespass, breach of privacy and Wilkinson.

• Held: Wilkinson claim failed, C had not suffered a recognised psychiatric injury no action (on these facts at least) was available for ‘mere’ distress.

*O (A Child) v Rhodes [2015] UKSC 33

• C sought an injunction to stop D publishing an autobiography.

• D’s history of suffering sexual abuse risked causing C harm recoverable under Wilkinson.

• Held: D’s appeal allowed. Difficult to see how there could be an action for publishing true, non-threatening information. D had neither satisfied the requisite ‘conduct’ or ‘mental’ elements for the Wilkinson tort

MXX v A Secondary School [2023] EWCA Civ 996

• 13-year-old pupil; 18-year-old on one-week work experience.

• PXM groomed and assaulted claimant, partly via Facebook.

• Held: No vicarious liability for school. Work experience can be like employment, but torts must be closely connected to duties.

 

Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Trust [2007] 1 AC 224

• C was harassed by a manager working at D (company), C argued that D was vicariously liable

• Held: an employer can be vicariously liable in damages under section 3 of the 1997 Act for a course of conduct by one of its employees that amounted to harassment in breach of section 1 of that Act.

Ferguson v British Gas [2009] EWCA Civ 46

• C recieved repeated bills and threatening letters from D (company) after switching companies

• Held: Conduct could meet the harassment threshold (“oppressive and unacceptable”)

• Company could be liable if it “ought to have known” about the harassment.

Iqbal v Dean Manson Solicitors [2011] EWCA Civ 123

• D sent three letters to C all generally questioning C’s ability and the propriety of C acting for a client, T.

• Held: Each letter was capable of constituting harassment. The act focuses on courses on conduct, not individual instances

Jones v Ruth [2011] EWCA Civ 804

• C co-owned a house; neighbours added third storeys and extended properties.

• Claims included nuisance, trespass, personal injury (psychiatric), harassment, and financial loss.

• Awarded damages for nuisance, trespass, harassment; personal injury under harassment initially denied.

*Hayes v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17

• Ex-employee harassed former boss for years via hundreds of letters alleging fraud, tax evasion, and embezzlement.

• Also intruded into his private life, contacting authorities, GP, and landlord.

• Court found harassment

Levi v Bates [2015] EWCA Civ 206

•  C2 sued D for publishing articles about her husband, C1.

• Held: The Act did not require D to target C. Parsing the Act showed the test was whether C could properly be described as a ‘victim’ of D’s behaviour.

Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M&W 109; 152 ER 402

• The defendant contracted with the Postmaster General to supply a mail coach, while a third party provided the coachman and horses.

• The claimant, the mail coachman, was injured due to latent defects in the coach and sued the defendant, despite no contractual relationship.

• Held: Claim failed. The defendant’s duty was owed only to the Postmaster General; it did not extend to the claimant. Allowing the claim would create unlimited liability.

*Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562

• May M’Alister’s friend buys her some ginger beer and ice cream at a café in Scotland.

• As May finished, she discovered a rotting snail in the ginger beer and was very sick as a result. She sued the manufacturer…

• Held (by majority): Despite no contractual relationship between them D did owe a duty of care in negligence. Winterbottom could be distinguished.

• Neighbor principle from lord Atkin

Grant v Australian Knitting Mill Ltd [1936] AC 85

• C bought two underwear, didn’t wash because there was no instruction to

• Wore 1 for 1 week then 2nd for next week, developed rash

• C sued retailer and manufacturer

• C claimed negligent in failing to take reasonable care to prepare the garments and overabundance of Sulphur compounds

• Held: liable, duty of care established + not confined to food or medicine, can be external

Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728

• Local authority approved building plans for flats, which were later constructed.

• By 1970, flats developed structural cracks and became dangerous.

• Tenants sued the council for failing to properly inspect foundations to ensure compliance with plans.

• Held: council may be liable if it failed to properly exercise its discretionary inspection powers; claim not statute-barred, limitation period ran from when danger became apparent.

Haley v London Electricity Board Respondents [1965] AC 778

• Defendants (electricity undertakers) dug a trench and left a hammer across the pavement, leaning on railings.

• Claimant, who was blind, did not see the hammer and tripped over it, falling into the trench and suffering serious injury.

• Claimed negligence; defendants argued they had taken reasonable steps for sighted pedestrians.

• Held: liable, as the defendants should have foreseen the risk to blind pedestrians and taken adequate precautions (e.g., fencing). Duty of care includes taking reasonable steps for known or foreseeable vulnerabilities.

Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605

• Auditors produced a statutory audit report misrepresenting a company’s profits. C relied on it when buying shares, suffered loss.

• Held: auditors owed no duty of care to shareholders; duty was only to the company.

• Established Caparo test for duty of care- foreseeability, proximity, fair just and reasonable

• Duty arises only when auditors know the report is for a specific class and specific purpose, preventing unlimited claims.

The Nicholas H [1996] 1 AC 211 /Marc Rich v Bishop Rock

• D signed off on a ship that sank shortly thereafter, destroying C’s cargo.

• CA dismissed the claim. C appealed.

• No duty of care. The damage was physical damage not pure economic loss but it was not fair, just or reasonable to allow a duty to cut across the established framework of responsibilities (failed 3rd element of Caparo test)

Sutradhar v Natural Environment Research Council [2006] UKHL 33

• R wrote a govt irrigation report in Bangladesh, didn’t test for arsenic.

• Plaintiff drank the water, got arsenic poisoning, sued R.

• Held: no duty of care, R had no control over the water and no sufficient proximity to those who drank it.

• Testing one issue (e.g., irrigation) doesn’t create a duty to cover unrelated risks.

*Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4

• Claimant, 76, injured when knocked down by drug dealer fleeing arrest; two police officers fell on her during the arrest.

• She sued police for negligence. Trial judge found foreseeable harm and proximity but dismissed claim citing police immunity under Hill v CC Yorkshire.

• Supreme Court held: duty of care owed; no need to apply full Caparo test for established liability like personal injury.

• Lord Reed: courts normally follow precedent; Caparo test not universal. Established principles govern personal injury cases; extension of law unnecessary here.

*Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2018] UKSC 50

• Hospital receptionist negligently advises C on waiting times.

• Majority of the Court of Appeal [pre-Robinson!-CPM] rejected a duty of care on ‘fair, just and reasonable’ grounds.

• Held: Court of Appeal were mistaken. This fell in an established category so there was no chance to consider whether imposing a duty was fair, just and reasonable.

• The duty took effect from the moment C was ‘booked in’; there was no distinction drawn between clinical and non-clinical staff.

*Rushbond Plc v JS Design Partnership LLP [2021] EWCA Civ 1889

• The appellant’s cinema was damaged by fire after the respondent architect failed to lock the door during a site visit.

• Whether the architect owed a duty to secure the property or whether it was a pure omission.

• First instance: Claim struck out; no duty assumed.

• Court of Appeal: Decision reversed; architect’s actions arguably created a duty of care, and failure to secure the property made the situation worse.

James-Bowen v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2018] UKSC 40

• Four Metropolitan Police officers were involved in the arrest of a suspected terrorist who later claimed they had assaulted him.

• He brought civil proceedings against the Commissioner, who admitted liability and settled, issuing a press release that the officers argued implied their personal culpability.

• The officers sued the Commissioner seeking damages for reputational, economic, and psychiatric harm, claiming a duty of care was owed to them to conduct litigation in a way that protected their interests.

• Held (UKSC): No duty of care was owed. The officers’ interests were different from the Commissioner’s, and it would be unjust and unreasonable to impose a duty to safeguard employees’ reputations or economic interests.

Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37

• Five men (and the administratrix of a sixth) had stored sperm samples within fertility unit prior to chemotherapy

• Due to a failure to maintain liquid nitrogen levels, the sperm thawed and was destroyed.

• Whether the loss of sperm constituted personal injury or property damage, and whether psychiatric injury could be claimed.

• Held (Court of Appeal): The sperm was considered the men’s property for negligence and bailment purposes. The Hospital was a gratuitous bailee and breached its duty of care.

Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd [2008] 1 AC 281

• Appellants previously succeeded in negligence claims for asbestos exposure, claiming pleural plaques indicated future illness.

• They argued that anxiety and depression caused by the plaques, combined with the plaques themselves, should be actionable.

• Whether symptomless plaques, fear and anxiety, or the two combined, amounted to actionable damage.

• Held (House of Lords): Appeal dismissed; plaques were not actionable, and fear/anxiety could not create liability in the absence of initial damage.

*Dryden & Ors v Johnson Matthey PLC [2018] UKSC 18

• Claimants employed, developed platinum salt sensitisation due to negligent failure to maintain safety standards

• Once diagnosed, they were barred from working in areas with exposure risk, resulting in loss of employment or reduced pay

• Held (Supreme Court): The physiological change causing a loss of bodily function (inability to work with platinum) amounted to personal injury

Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co (1856)

• D water company installed fire-plugs in full compliance with statutory rules and normal best practice.

• An exceptionally severe frost caused a plug to burst, flooding C’s house. C sued in negligence; County Court found D liable; D appealed.

• Held: No breach. A reasonable person would not guard against such freak weather. Classic definition of negligence given: omission to do what a reasonable person would do, or doing what a prudent person would not do.

Philips v Whiteley (William) Ltd [1938]

• P required surgery allegedly caused by D’s negligent ear-piercing in a shop’s jewellery department.

• C claimed that D should use surgical antiseptic…

• Held:  Standard was a jeweller offering ear piercing, not a surgeon…

*Nettleship v Weston [1971] 

• D gives C driving lessons.

• C agreed on the basis that the car was insured against risk of injury to passengers.

• D crashes into a lamppost, injuring C.

• Held (Salmon LJ dissenting on this point): The standard of care required was the same objective and impersonal one owed by every driver, regardless of the fact that D was a learner.

• This standard was not lowered by C’s knowledge about D.

Wilsher v Essex AHA [1987]

• C, a premature baby, was given excess oxygen after a junior doctor misplaced a catheter, giving misleading readings.

• C developed blindness, but there were several possible medical causes; it was unclear which was responsible. C argued negligence had increased the risk of harm.

• Held: Claim fails. Trainees are held to the same standard as fully qualified doctors.

Mullin v Richards [1998]

• C and D, both 15, were playing, C is blinded.

• Adults would have foreseen the risk of such an injury occurring…D is held liable and appeals…

• Held: Age was relevant. Would a 15-year-old would have foreseen the risk? This remained an objective test of the reasonable 15-year-old.

Mansfield v Weetabix Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1263

• D crashed his lorry into C’s shop as a result of a hypoglycemic state caused by a medical condition of which D was unaware.

• Held: The standard was a reasonably competent but unaware driver

Orchard v Lee [2009]

• C, a school dinner lady supervising a playground, was injured when a 13-year-old D ran backwards into her while playing tag. She sued in negligence.

• Duty was accepted; the issue was breach and how the reasonable child standard applies.

• Held: No breach. A 13-year-old is judged by the standard of a reasonable 13-year-old, not an adult (Mullin v Richards applied).

Dunnage v Randall [2015]

• D visited C’s home

• A had a schizophrenic fit, set fire to himself with petrol, died and C was injured

• C claimed negligence and sought damages against the A’s insurers (D) for ‘accidental’ bodily injury

• C’s claim succeeded; A had acted negligently towards C as he fell below the standard of care required, which is that of a reasonable person despite his mental impairment

Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951]

• Facts: D knew P only had one good eye. P injured his good eye and claimed in negligence for D’s failure to provide goggles.

•  Held by majority: The risk of increased harm meant D ought to have provided P with protective goggles.

*Bolton v Stone [1951]

• P was struck by a cricket ball walking close to D, a cricket club.

• Held:  A foreseeable risk a ball might hit a passerby did not equate to negligence.

• The risk was so remote a reasonable person would not take further measures.

Latimer v AEC Ltd [1953]

• Facts: A storm spread a slippery oil over D’s factory floor. D spread sawdust on the floor.

• P nevertheless slipped and injured his ankle whilst working.

• Held: D had not breached his duty to C. Reasonable precautions had been taken.

Roe v Minister of Health [1954]

• Ds not liable for injuries caused by using contaminated anaesthetic.

• No-one appreciated the contamination could happen!

Wooldridge v Sumner [1963]

• D rode his horse very fast leading to C’s injury..

• Held In the context of a race, it was an error of judgement, not D’s negligence.

The Wagon Mound (No 2) [1967] 

• C’s ship was damaged when oil from D’s ship, The Wagon Mound, overflowed into Sydney Harbour and later was set alight by floating debris.

• Held: Trial judge had been wrong. If the reasonable man would have taken precautions against a real, even if remote risk, and D did not, D was negligent.

Royal Opera House v Goldscheider [2019]

• C, a viola player, was exposed to extreme noise (130+ dB) during rehearsals, sitting directly in front of the brass section, and developed acoustic shock symptoms.

• D argued acoustic shock wasn’t a real injury and suggested C had Meniere’s disease; also claimed musical integrity required high volume.

• Held: ROH liable. Breach of common-law duty and Noise at Work Regulations 2005. Acoustic shock accepted as an actionable injury.

• Musicians are entitled to full hearing protection; no “artistic exemption.”

Czernuszka v King [2023]

• C, a novice rugby player, was catastrophically injured when D, an experienced player, drove her downwards in a dangerous, non-recognised “tackle” while C was bent over and vulnerable.

• Evidence showed D had been playing aggressively, intent on targeting C, and acted with reckless disregard for safety.

• Held: D liable. The test is whether the defendant failed to take care appropriate in all the circumstances (Condon v Basi).

• Blake v Galloway’s “recklessness” standard applies only to informal horseplay, not organised sport.

Hetherington v Fell & Ferryhill Wheelers Cycling Club [2025]

• Cs were in a cycling club

• While cycling they got injured and tried to sue the club for negligence

• Held: club not liable as this would discourage other clubs from hosting events which were good for fitness and have a social purpose

Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957]

• Facts:  C was badly injured during electro-shock therapy. C sued D for i) not doing the treatment like some other doctors, and ii) not telling C the risks.

•  Held: If a responsible body of medical practitioners undertaking the same treatment would have done as D had done…then D is not negligent

Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Co Ltd [1960]

• Workmen carrying cement on his shoulder climbing a ladder with no handrail

• Workmen slips and sues

• Employer claimed it was industry norm

• Held the employer should have done something regardless of industry norm

Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998]

• C, a 2-year-old, died after a doctor did not attend due to a non-working bleep. Mother claimed negligence, arguing the child would have been saved by intubation.

• Evidence showed even if the doctor had attended, intubation would not have been performed; another doctor agreed.

• Held: No breach of duty. Under the Bolam test, a medical practitioner is not negligent if their method is one accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion, provided it is logical and defensible.

Baker v Quantum Clothing Group Ltd [2011

• Cs, employees in the knitting industry, suffered hearing loss from prolonged exposure to high noise levels.

• Held (Supreme Court): Employers not liable; they had followed generally accepted industry standards.

• Employers can rely on recognised practices to defend against negligence unless the practice is clearly bad or they had special knowledge of risks.

McCulloch and others v Forth Valley Health Board [2023]

• C, a patient, claimed a doctor breached the duty to obtain informed consent by not discussing NSAIDs as a treatment option.

• Evidence showed the doctor reasonably considered NSAIDs inappropriate given C’s condition and medical history; other experts supported this judgment.

• Held: No breach. Whether a treatment is a “reasonable alternative” is a matter of professional judgment (Bolam/Bolitho). Doctors must inform patients of reasonable options they identify, but are not required to discuss treatments they reasonably consider clinically inappropriate.

*Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015]

• D did not disclose to C’s mother the risk of vaginal delivery. C suffered serious injury during labour.

• Sidaway had applied Bolam to disclosure cases…

• Held: Sidaway was wrong, D ought to have disclosed the risk.

• The reasonable patient or the patient themselves is the guide to what risks they will run. Medical expertise, which is the justification for Bolam is irrelevant.

George v Eagle Air Services Ltd [2009]

• C sued airline after aircraft crash killed mechanic (employed by airline) and pilot.

• Defence: aircraft airworthy; mechanic riding outside employment; accident report excluded.

• Held: Liability under res ipsa loquitur; airline failed to provide non-negligent explanation.

Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969]

• C went to hospital with severe stomach pains; nurse called D (doctor) who told her to send C home.

• C died five hours later from arsenic poisoning; even if D had examined C, death was unavoidable.

• Held: No liability. D’s omission did not cause the death. Introduced the “but for” test: if harm would have occurred anyway, D is not liable.

Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988]

• C claimed property damage from tree roots of D’s trees; D knew of risk since 1998 but failed to implement a cyclical pruning programme.

• Held: Breach of duty caused damage. Appeal dismissed. Bolitho test applied: courts ask what D would have done if it had taken reasonable steps.

Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956]

• C contracted pneumoconiosis from inhaling silica dust at work; D breached a statutory duty by failing to provide an extractor fan. Some dust would have been present anyway.

• Trial judge held D liable, shifting burden of proof to D. D appealed.

• Held: Burden of proof remains on C. C must show the “guilty dust” materially contributed to the disease; it need not be the sole cause.

Holtby v Brigham & Cowan Ltd [2000]

• C was exposed to asbestos by D for 12 years and also by other employers; he developed asbestosis.

• Trial judge reduced damages to reflect only the period of exposure caused by D. C appealed, citing McGhee and Wardlaw.

• Held: Appeal dismissed. D liable only in proportion to the exposure they caused.

Bailey v Ministry of Defence [2008] 

• C, suffering from pancreatitis, was negligently treated by D hospital; she choked on vomit, suffered cardiac arrest, and sustained brain damage.

• Held (Court of Appeal): D liable. Negligent treatment materially contributed to C’s brain injury.

• Material contribution test extended to indivisible injuries where ‘but for’ causation cannot be established but the negligent cause was more than negligible.

Williams v The Bermuda Hospitals Board [2016]

• C suffered appendicitis; negligent delay in treatment (D) caused extra sepsis over six hours, damaging C’s heart and lungs.

• Issue: Did the delay materially cause the heart and lung injury?

• Held (Privy Council): D’s negligence materially contributed to the injuries. Successive events can each materially contribute.

 

*Holmes v Poeton Holdings Ltd [2023]

• C (H) developed Parkinson’s disease, allegedly caused by D (P) exposing him to unsafe levels of TCE at work. C claimed 100% of losses.

• Trial judge applied the material contribution test and found D’s exposure materially contributed to C’s disease. D appealed, arguing the test does not apply to indivisible diseases.

• Held (Court of Appeal): Material contribution test applies to indivisible diseases. Claimant does not have to prove ‘but for’ causation. Fairchild exception applies only when scientific evidence cannot attribute contribution to a defendant.

McGhee v National Coal Board [1973]

• C worked at D’s brickworks; D failed to provide washing facilities, so C cycled home covered in brick dust and developed dermatitis. Some dust exposure was unrelated to D’s breach.

• Held: C only needed to show that dust exposure attributable to D’s breach materially increased the risk of dermatitis.

• Lord Salmon: If D’s negligence materially increases the risk of an industrial disease, D is liable even if other factors also contributed.

Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003]

• C developed mesothelioma from multiple employers’ asbestos exposure; it was impossible to prove which D caused it.

• Held: Each D materially increased the risk; this sufficed for causation.

• Authority: Where causation cannot be proven, liability arises if D materially increased the risk.

• Lords clarified that the material contribution test does not reverse the burden of proof

*Barker v Corus [2006]

• C contracted mesothelioma from asbestos exposure during employment with multiple employers, possibly including self-exposure.

• Held (House of Lords): Fairchild principle applied; liability arises if D materially increased the risk.

• Damages are assessed based on D’s contribution to the risk, with external factors (including C’s own actions) considered only at the damages stage.

Sienkiewicz v Greif [2011

• C died of mesothelioma after asbestos exposure at work, partly from negligent exposure that increased risk by 18%.

• Whether the Fairchild exception applies in single-employer cases and if a “doubles the risk” test is required.

• Held (UKSC): Appeal dismissed; Fairchild exception applies. Liability arises where D materially increases risk, even if exposure does not double the risk.

• Minor exposures are disregarded only if de minimis; the defendant’s negligent exposure was material.

Durham v BAI (Run off) Ltd [2012]

• Claimants with mesothelioma sued insolvent employers’ employer liability insurers.

• Held: Policies trigger on exposure during the insured period; insurers must cover mesothelioma arising from that exposure.

• Confirms exposure-based coverage for EL policies and resolves insurer liability uncertainty.

Zurich Insurance v International Energy Group [2015]

• Employee exposed to asbestos for 27 years; insurer covered only 6 years.

• Held: Insurer pays pro-rata for damages (6/27 years) but 100% of defence costs.

• Outside the UK Compensation Act 2006, Barker proportionate liability applies; insurers liable only for their period on risk.

Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks [2016]

• C claimed against six employers (Ds) for asbestos exposure contributing to the risk of H contracting lung cancer.

• Held (Court of Appeal): The Fairchild exception applied. Liability arises if D materially increased the risk.

• Damages were apportioned based on D's relative contribution to the risk, affirming that the Barker approach applies outside of mesothelioma cases.

Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987]

• C, a child, fell and injured his hip, which the hospital failed to diagnose on the first visit, leading to avascular necrosis and disability.

• Held (House of Lords): C could not recover damages for the hospital's negligence because he failed to prove factual causation.

• There is no recovery for loss of a chance where the chance of avoiding the injury was below 50% (it was 25%), as negligence claimants must prove causation on the balance of probabilities.

 Gregg v Scott [2005] 

• C was misdiagnosed with a non-cancerous lump, causing a year's delay in treating his non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, during which his chance of survival dropped from 42% to 25%.

• Held (House of Lords): The claimant could not establish factual causation and failed in his claim for negligence.

• The claimant must prove it is more likely than not (over 50%) that the harm would have been avoided but for the breach; therefore, 'loss of a chance' is not an actionable head of damages for personal injury claims.