historians

BH Klein

 economic mobilisation for war initially relatively modest, both guns and butter, not until 1943 defeat at Stalingrad that ‘total war economy’ began in earnest

Overy

hitler intended a great conflict for world power, this necessitated transformation of the economy to meet demands of total war. These preps were not intended to be done until 1943. Poland was meant to be a local war, didn't think britain and france would get involved

• ¼ of workforce in rearmament

• Government expenditure more than doubled= debt incr accordingly

• 17% of gdp towards military, compared to 8% britain and 1% USA

⇒ alr dominated by prep for war,but not yet reaching the full scale mobilisation required for total war, since that was meant for 43. 

Johnson

newest

concentrated its job of surveillance and repression on specific enemies:

§ The political left

§ Jews

§ Religious groups and asocials

Controversially, he claims that the Nazis and the German population formed a grim ‘pact’ – the population

turned a blind eye to the Gestapo’s persecution and in return the Nazis overlooked minor transgressions of

the law by ordinary Germans.

Mallman + Paul

new information - large cities such as hamburg only 40-50 Gestapo officers = role overstated

Delarue

trad interpretation of the police state- successful in instilling fear and eliminating opp

Jones

handful of aggressive decision makers during the july crisis

Joll

decisions of july crisis were heavily impacted by long term events

Mason

Nazi economy under incr strain from 1937 onwards, econ under tremendous pressure from hitlers rapid rearmament 

• Growing shortages

• Labour shortages

• Balance of trade difficult to finance

• Government expenditure expanding

Contributes to growing social discontent

= war is the only way out of domestic econ dilemma

Lowe

Great Britains willingness to go to war owed a lot to naval race tensions

Cooper

aggressive and clumsy foreign policy of Germany in short term events concerning territorial issues

Iriye

american participation spelled german defeat

Henig

German desire to benefit diplomatically and militarily widened the crisis

Pyle

“The Washington System was a house built on sand” — relied heavily on peaceful trade, when Great Britain and USA isolationismed it no longer worked

Reischauer and Craig

growing nationalism in china impacted chinese militarism

Hastings

it remains a moot point whether congress and the public wouldve allowed a declaration of war without pearl harbor

Hasegawa

Japan was pushed into war by the oil embargo

Knight

the republic was facing insurmountable problems by 1936

Preston

By 1931 barely anyone thought that spains problems cld only be solved by war

Salvado

Calvo Sotelos death pursuaded dithering officers

Tarr

socially poverty wasnt anything new

Lannon

SCW was a class and culture war

Lee

the way wwi broke out was not according to treaty obligations

Fischer

Germany’s confidence in her military capabilities deliberately faced conflict with Russia and France

AJP Taylor

all mobilisation plans depended on the railway

Sheridan

difficult to see how ccw couldve been avoided, “abyss of profound hostility and distrust”

Preston

Had the republic armed working class from the start, the revolt couldve been put down

Thomas

Inherent military strengths and later economic competence of nationalists and opposite of republicans determined the outcome of the war

knight

both sides were short of modern weapons and equipment. war couldntve been fought without foreign aid

Salvado

role of the nic seriously hampered the republican ability to wage war

Whealey

only around 5500 condor legion personnel in spain at any point == not that significant

vincent

defeat of the republicans inevitable given the scale of support for the nationalists

watson

war on land led to germany’s defeat, “accumulated strain” had “broken the army’s will to continue fighting

keegan

war at sea in the atlantic == decisive

Sheehan

illusion destroyed that a distinction cld be made between civilians and soldiers

Bourne

firepower replaced manpower as the instrument of victory

Beckett

as result of the tanks limitations, little agreement on whether it offered a real alternative to manpower