week 7 philosophy - mind, body, qualia, and free will

what is Jackson’s main thesis in “Epiphenomenal Qualia”?

that qualia (subjective, qualitative experiences of consciousness) are non-physical and cannot be captured by physical science

what is epiphenomenalism (as used by Jackson)?

mental events are caused by physical events in the brain but have no casual effect on the physical world (subjective experiences, like thoughts and feelings, are. byproducts of brain processes)

what is Jackson’s goal in presenting epiphenomenal qualia?

to challenge physicalism (all info is physical info and that everything in the universe, including the mind, can be explained through physical processes) by showing some facts about consciousness (qualia) are not physical facts

what strategy does Jackson use to challenge physicalism?

a knowledge argument: even someone who knows all physical facts can still lack knowledge on subjective experience

who is Mary in Jackson’s thought experiment?

a scientist who knows all physical facts about colour vision but has lived in a black-and-white room and never seen colour 

what happens when Mary sees red for the first time?

she learns something new: what red looks like - a new piece of phenomenal knowledge

what does Mary’s new knowledge imply about physicalism?

since she knew all the physical facts before her release, the know knowledge must be non-physical, hence not all facts are physical facts → physicalism is incomplete or false

how does the Knowledge Argument support epiphenomenalism?

it shows that qualia exist as non-physical properties produced by physical states but not causally effective 

what is Jackson’s core claim?

complete physical knowledge still leaves something out - the subjective nature of experience

what is Strawson’s central claim about consciousness?

consciousness is not a mystery; it is simply experience, and it is physical

what does Strawson say is actually mysterious?

physical matter - physics tells us about structure and behaviour, not intrinsic nature (while we can measure and describe what matter does, we can never know what is is in itself - its “what-it’s-like” quality)

how does Strawson use Bertrand Russell’s insight?

Russell claimed we only know intrinsic nature of physical reality when it appears as conscious experience, thus consciousness = the only physical thing we know “from the inside”

what mistake do dualists and eliminativists both make, according to Strawson?

the “Very Large Mistake” - assuming we know enough about matter to say consciousness cannot be physical

why does Strawson reject the “hard problem of consciousness”?

because the puzzle is not how consciousness fits into physics - it’s that physics has yet to explain what matter is, so we can’t rule out consciousness as matter

what is Strawson’s response to Leibniz’s Mill argument?

• true: we won’t see consciousness inside the brain

• false: this does not imply consciousness is non-physical - it shows we misunderstand the physical

what is Strawson’s ultimate conclusion?

consciousness is a form of physical reality, and it may be our only window into the intrinsic nature of matter

what is Nahmia’s main thesis?

neuroscience does not disprove free will, it only disproves dualist (soul-based) free will, which we don’t need

what flawed assumption do some scientists make about free will?

that free will requires a non-physical mind controlling the brain (dualism), Nahmias rejects this 

what is Nahmia’s compatibilist definition of free will?

a set of natural, brain-based capacities for:

• imagining options

• deliberating about reasons

• planning actions

• exercising self-control (without coercion)

according to Nahmias, when do we act freely?

when our rational and self-control capacities operate normally and are not bypassed

why doesn’t early neural activity (Libet, Haynes experiments) refute free will?

because:

• it reflects preparatory activity, not a decision already made

• the experiments involve trivial actions, not meaningful deliberation

why does consciousness still matter to free will, according to Nahmias?

conscious deliberation influences important decisions; it is part of the casual chain, not bypassed by it

does neuroscience eliminate moral responsibility?

no - it reveals limits to self-control but does not show that free will is an illusion

what everyday scenario does Strawson use to introduce his basic argument?

choosing between buying cake or donating to charity, we feel free but that feeling may be misleading

what is determinism?

the view that every event is fully caused by prior events back to the beginning of the universe?

what is indeterminism?

the view that not everything is caused; some events are random

present Strawson’s Basic Argument in three steps

1. you act as you do because of the way you are

2. to be ultimately responsible, you must be responsible for the way you are

3. you cannot be responsible for the way you are, therefore: you cannot be ultimately morally responsible for wha t you do

why can’t you be responsible for “the way you are”?

because:

• genes + environment shaped you originally (not chosen)

• later attempts to change yourself are shaped by earlier traits

• even randomness cannot make you responsible (you can’t be responsible for luck)

what is the infinite regress version of the Basic Argument?

to choose your principles (P1), you need earlier principles (P2), and so on infinitely, this would require causa sui - literally the cause of your own existence and nature - which is impossible 

what is Nietzsche’s critique of the idea of causa sui?

that it is logical absurdity - like trying to pull yourself out of a swamp by your own hair

according to Strawson, does the Basic Argument eliminate the feeling of responsibility?

no, we still feel responsible emotionally, even if ultimate responsibility is impossible

what is Ian McEwan’s response to the Basic Argument?

even without ultimate responsibility, we can still take ownership of our actions, like being responsible for a child or pet 

what is Descartes’ argument for mind-body dualism?

we know the mind through thinking, which is more certain than the knowledge of the physical world, thus mind and body are ontologically distinct

what problem does Princess Elizabeth raise for Descartes?

if mind and body are completely distinct, how can a non-physical mind move a physical body? this is the interaction problem

how do views about the mind (dualism, physicalism) relate to free will?

dualism seems to allow a “non-physical will,” while physicalism suggests actions arise from the brain - but neither view automatically rules out free will 

why do we care whether free will exists?

because it affects judgments of moral responsibility, praise, blame, punishment, and personal identity