Metaphysics of Mind Key Terms

Ability Knowledge

Knowing how
e.g. I know how to ride a bike

Acquaintance Knowledge

Knowledge of
e.g. I know of my teacher

Category Mistake

Putting a concept into a logical category which it doesn't belong to.
e.g. 'this number is heavy' but numbers don't have a weight

China Thought Experiment

By Ned Block, an objection to functionalism
If population of China, using radios, duplicated the functioning of your brain, would this create conscious experience just as your brain does?
If not, functionalism is false

Conceivable

Can be imagined mentally without contradiction
e.g. David Chalmers argues his zombie argument is conceivable

Conceptual interaction problem

The objection to interactionist dualism that mind and body cannot interact causally, because they are too different in nature
e.g. the mind is outside space while the body is in space.

Consciousness

Subjective phenomenon of awareness of the world and your mental states
e.g. pain is a conscious experience

The easy problem of consciousness

Problem of analysing and explaining functions of consciousness
e.g. that we can report our mental states.
For Chalmers, it is "easy" to provide a successful analysis of these facts in physical terms

The hard problem of consciousness

Problem of analysing and explaining the phenomenal properties of consciousness, and what its like to have a conscious experience.
For Chalmers, it is "hard" to provide successful analysis of these properties in physical terms.

Eliminative Materialism

Folk Psychology's definition of mental states do not exist. Our common sense understanding of them is mistaken.
Proposed by Churchland's

Empirical Interaction Problem

Objection to interactionist dualism that the claim mental states cause changes to body goes against laws of physics.
The total energy of universe is constant, law of conservation of energy.

Epiphenomenalism (dualism)

Mental states and events are epiphenomena.
Mental states are not causally connected to physical.
Often combined with property dualism.

Folk Psychology

intuitive beliefs about people's behavior, thoughts, and feelings.
e.g. if someone is thirsty, they will normally try and find a drink.

Functionalism

All mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised.

The causal role Functionalism

A version of functionalism which interprets the function of mental states in terms of the role they play in a network of causes and effects.
A mental state can be "realised" by any state that plays that causal role.

Ghost in the Machine

Ryle's name for substance dualism

Hard Behaviourism

Proposed by Hempel.
All propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that only use language of physics to talk of bodily states.

Intentionality

Property of mental states that makes them of or about something
e.g. the desire to eat chocolate is about chocolate

Interactionist (substance) dualism

Theory that mental events and physical events can cause one another, even though mind and body are distinct substances.

Interactionist (property) dualism

Theory that mental events and physical events can cause one another even though mental and physical are distinct fundamental properties.

Introspection

Direct, first-person awareness of one's own mental states

Inverted qualia

Thought experiment that supposes that two people experience different colours when looking at the same object, but otherwise think and behave in identical ways
e.g. both call the object 'red'.
Argument is presented as an objection to functionalist account of phenomenal consciousness.

Logically possible

Logically possible if it doesn't involve a contradiction

Masked Man Fallacy

A fallacious form of argument that uses what one believes about an object to infer whether or not the object is identical with something else,
e.g. I believe the Masked Man robbed the bank; I do not believe my father robbed the bank; therefore, the Masked Man is not my father.
This is a fallacy, because one's beliefs may be mistaken
Challenges the use of conceivability to infer what is possible/actual.

Materialism

Theory that the only substance is matter/physical.
Everything that exists depends on matter, including the mind.

Mental states

Mental phenomena can endure over time like beliefs and desires.
Term covers mental phenomena or properties, like states, processes or events.

Metaphysically possible

If there is at least one possible world which it is true

Multiple Realisability

Claim that there are many ways in which a mental state can be expressed in behaviour.
An objection to behaviourism.
Claim that mental state can have its function performed by different physical states.
An objection to fuctionalism.

Ontologically distinct

Two things are ontologically distinct if they are not the same thing, neither is able to be reduced to the other, and the existence of one is not determined by the existence of the other
e.g. substance dualists claim that mind and body are ontologically distinct substances.

Phenomenal Concept

A concept by which you recognise something as of a certain kind when experiencing or perceiving it
e.g. a phenomenal concept of red as 'this' colour.

Phenomenal consciousness

A form of consciousness with a subjective experiential quality, as involved in perception, sensation, and emotion. 'What it is like' to experience such mental phenomena.

Phenomenal properties

Properties of an experience that give it its distinctive experiential quality, and which are apprehended in phenomenal consciousness.

Physicalism

Theory that everything is physical or supervenes on the physical

Physically possible

Physically possible if it could be true given the laws of nature in the actual world

Problem of other minds

Question of how we can know other minds exist, given that our experience of other minds is just from one's behaviour. Our minds are private, and we cannot directly know of other minds.
Issue of dualism

Property dualism

There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible or supervenient upon physical properties.
Mental is a property of physical, but doesn't supervene

Proposition

A declarative statement.
Can go after "that", "I know that..." "I believe that..."
e.g. mice are mammals

Propositional knowledge

Knowing that
a proposition is true or false
e.g. I know that Paris is in France

Qualia

intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible

Reducible to...

A phenomenon or property is reducible to another if the first can be completely explained by in terms of the second.
e.g. MBTIT claims mental properties are reducible to physical properties.

Soft Behaviourism

(Ryle) Propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions

Substance dualism

Theory that mind and body are two separate substances

Super-spartans

People (or creatures) in Putnam's thought experiment who don't show pain and they no longer have any disposition to demonstrate pain in their behaviour.
Objection to behaviourism.

Supervenient upon...

Properties of "type A" are supervenient upon properties of "type B" when there is no difference in type A without a difference in type B.
They are dependant on each other.
e.g. Physicalism says mind and mental states supervene on physical or is physical

Mind Brain Type Identity Theory

Theory that mental properties are identical (ontologically reducible) to physical properties.
Mental=physical

Zombie argument

The argument for property dualism that if consciousness were identical to physical properties, it would not be metaphysically possible for something to have that physical (functional) property without consciousness. However, 1) philosophical zombies are conceivable, and so 2) metaphysically possible. Therefore, 3) consciousness is non-physical and physicalism is false.

Philosophical Zombie

A physical duplicate to a person, existing in another possible world, but without phenomenal consciousness.
Identical functionally and physically, but differ mentally to a human.