A Defense of Abortion - Judith Jarvis Thomson

Flashcards on Judith Jarvis Thomson's 'A Defense of Abortion'

Judith Jarvis Thomson

Professor of philosophy emeritus at MIT, known for her views on ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, and abortion.

Central Premise (Thomson's Argument)

For the sake of argument, Thomson grants that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception.

Thomson's Objective

To demonstrate that even if the fetus is a person with a right to life, abortion is not always morally impermissible.

Kidnapped Violinist Analogy

Thomson's famous thought experiment used to challenge the idea that the right to life always outweighs a woman's right to decide what happens to her body.

Slippery Slope Arguments (Regarding Fetal Personhood)

Arguments suggesting that because development from conception to birth is continuous, there's no non-arbitrary point to designate when a fetus becomes a person; Thomson finds these unconvincing.

The Extreme View

The position that abortion is impermissible even to save the mother's life.

Direct Killing vs. Letting Die

The argument that performing an abortion is directly killing the child, whereas doing nothing is only letting the mother die; Thomson challenges the moral implications of this distinction.

Right to Self-Defense (Thomson)

Thomson asserts that a woman has the right to defend her life against the threat posed by the unborn child, even if it results in the child's death.

Third-Party Intervention (Abortion)

Thomson argues third parties are not obligated to intervene and force a woman to sustain a fetus's life, especially when it requires significant sacrifices from the woman.

The Right to Life (Thomson's Interpretation)

Having a right to life does not automatically guarantee the right to use, or continued use of, another person's body, even if needed for survival.

Unjust Killing

Thomson argues that to oppose abortion effectively, one must demonstrate that it constitutes unjust killing, violating the fetus's right to life.

Responsibility and Rights

Thomson posits one does not acquire rights to someone else's body simply because of the biological relationship, unless there's assumed responsibility.

People-Seeds Analogy

Used to counter the claim that voluntary intercourse leading to pregnancy automatically gives the fetus a right to use the mother's body.

Indecency vs. Injustice

Thomson distinguishes between actions that might be considered indecent (callous) versus those that are truly unjust (violating rights).

Good Samaritan vs. Minimally Decent Samaritan

Thomson contrasts extraordinary acts of altruism with basic levels of decency, suggesting that women should not be legally obligated to be Good Samaritans to a fetus.

Special Responsibility

Thomson argues special responsibility isn't inherent in a biological relationship but arises from an explicit or implicit assumption of it.

Permissibility vs. Right to Secure Death

Thomson distinguishes between the permissibility of abortion and the right to actively ensure the death of the detached fetus.