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T1 – Frameworks for Regional Governance, they do
Undermines StateSov leading to decisions imposed on states despite opposition (e.g. when they counter economic interest).
Exemplified by EU through institutions like European Commission and ECJ, hold sig power to enforce regional policies and legal rulings across all members.
ECom: Auth to propose and enforce legislation across union as executive body, empowered to take action against member states that violate EU rules, consequence of pooled sov in supranational. E.g. Poland and Hungary sanctions and funding cuts due to rule-of-law violations, Ecom power to impose penalties if noncompliance without state’s consent.
ECJ: Power to strike down national laws if contradict EU law in areas such as competition, trade, environment. Members cannot introduce laws to aid important economic sectors through tariffs/subsidies as discriminates against other members in EUsm. Competitiveness laws have supremacy. Can hurt struggling sectors e.g. Italy (struggles with automotive/steel), unable to aid competitiveness and prevent job losses. Negative impact achieved by encroaching on state sov.
T1 – Frameworks for Regional Governance, they dont
Majority of bodies are intergovernmental, members retain autonomy.
ASEAN decision making based on consensus, core principle of non-interference in each members’ internal affairs, no policy/initiative can be implemented without unanimity. Allows simultaneous regional cooperation and state sovereignty.
Arab League is loose coop alliance prioritising sovereignty, focus not on imposing binding policies. Members like Egypt/Saudi Arabia can pursue foreign policy independently even in conflicting against regional priorities (attitudes towards Israel).
Intergovernmental aspects even within highly integrated regional orgs like EU, members retain control over core areas of national interest (taxation, defence, foreign relations).
Seen in fact they maintain independent defence forces, sovereignty over military action. Shown by France independent military interventions in Africa (e.g. Mali), showing EU countries do not have to coordinate everything through EU.
T1 – Frameworks for Regional Governance, overall
Supranationalism can undermine sovereignty, but not so much that states are no longer sovereign. Members retain sig control, and when combined with dominance of intergovernmentalism, regional orgs do not undermine sovereignty or reduce influence of states.
T2 – Political Regionalism, they do
Reduce sovereignty by eroding cultural and political identity by having to force alignment with shared values that may be incompatible with tradition. In EU, states must comply with liberal policies, attitudes on immigration, HR, and social welfare.
Impacts e.g. 2015 EU mandatory migration relocation quotas on Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic despite opposition.
Countries may feel forced to remain within regional orgs, accept changes they disagree with due to econ benefit, thus eroding state sov and influence.
E.g. Malaysia occasional opposition to ASEAN-wide environmental regulations, may impact their palm oil industry. However, they continue to adhere, forced to back down as they are trade-dependent economy reliant on ASEAN trade network.
T2 – Political Regionalism, they dont
Prev argument is weak as states can leave regional orgs to regain sovereignty, can never be permanently lost to regional orgs. Reflects realist perspective that participation only for self-interest.
E.g. 2016-2020 UK exercised right to leave EU under A50 of Lisbon Treaty after referendum determining British citizens wanted to regain sov over immigration, trade, regulatory autonomy.
Similarly, ASEAN and AU do not impose binding membership. No member has exited from ASEAN perhaps as sovereignty is reinforced, participation remains strategic rather than obligatory.
T2 – Political Regionalism, overall
Regional orgs don’t reduce state sov or influence as any control ceded is voluntary and temporary, can be regained at any point, best demonstrated by Brexit.
CCLN
Regional Orgs do not undermine state sov at all or reduce influence as while members may lose in supranational org, contingent on approval they do not have to give as they can leave. Pooling sov increases overall influence rather than diminishing it.