POLITICAL REALIGNMENT & DEALIGNMENT

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25 Terms

1
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What is the main finding of the Burn-Murdoch (2024) Financial Times article on racial realignment?

American politics undergoing racial realignment: Democrats losing non-white voters faster than any demographic. Biden's lead among non-white voters dropped from 50 points (2020) to 12 points (2024 polling). Democrats' advantage among Black, Latino, Asian voters at lowest since 1960. Many non-white voters held conservative views but voted Democrat due to history/community—now realizing they've been "voting for wrong party."

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What is the "preference cascade" mentioned in Burn-Murdoch's article?

Term from Republican pollster Patrick Ruffini's book Party of the People (2023). As US becomes less racially segregated, frictions preventing non-white conservatives from voting Republican diminish. Self-perpetuating process: discovering Republicans among your own group weakens stigma further.

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What is the UK "Red Wall" parallel Burn-Murdoch mentions?

Communities in northern England (identified by pollster James Kanagasooriam) with conservative demographics and attitudes but hadn't voted Tory due to "long-held sense party was not for them."

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What is the main finding of Piketty et al. (2022) "Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right"?

Study of 21 Western democracies (1948-2020), 300+ elections. Complete reversal of education cleavage: 1950s-1960s, left parties (social democratic/socialist) supported by low-education AND low-income voters. Now: high-education voters vote LEFT, high-income voters still vote RIGHT. "Disconnection" of education and income effects. Created "multi-elite party systems": intellectual elite (Brahmin Left) vs economic elite (Merchant Right).

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What are the three types of parties analyzed in Piketty et al.?

(1) Social democratic and affiliated: Social democrats, socialists, communists, greens, left parties. (2) Conservative and affiliated: Conservatives, Christian democrats, anti-immigration, liberals/social-liberals. (3) Other: Regional parties, independents (~7% of vote).

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What is the "economic-distributive" vs "sociocultural" axis in Piketty et al.?

Two dimensions of political conflict from Comparative Manifesto Project data: Economic-distributive: Pro-free-market vs pro-redistribution positions.

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What role did green and anti-immigration parties play in Piketty et al.'s findings?

Green and anti-immigration parties accelerated reversal but only explain ~**15% of overall shift**. Reversal started 1950s—decades before these parties existed. Green parties: supported by high-education voters since 1980s. Anti-immigration parties: supported by low-education voters. But traditional left/right parties also transformed. When excluding green parties, reversal still goes from -19.1 to +4.3 (vs +8.2 with them included).

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How does the article by Burn-Murdoch describe non-white conservative voters?

As “natural conservatives” whose voting behavior historically conflicted with their policy views.

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What is the central claim of the FT article?

American politics is undergoing a racial realignment as non-white voters shift away from Democrats.

10
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What role do social networks play in party identification?

Homogeneous social networks reinforce Democratic loyalty; diverse networks weaken it.

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What is meant by a “preference cascade”?

As more non-white voters openly support Republicans, social stigma decreases and shifts accelerate.

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How does the article by Burn-Murdoch interpret identity vs ideology?

As racial identity weakens, voters increasingly vote based on beliefs rather than group identity.

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What is the core argument of Piketty et al.?

Political cleavages have shifted from class-based to education-based across Western democracies.

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What is the “Brahmin Left”?

Highly educated voters who support left-wing parties.

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What is the “Merchant Right”?

High-income voters who support right-wing parties.

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What kind of party system emerges from this shift?

A “multi-elite” system competing for different elite groups.

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Why does redistribution weaken under this system?

Cross-cutting cleavages dilute class-based coalitions for redistribution.

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What does Barker mean by “dealignment”?

The breakdown of stable class-based voting patterns.

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Which group strongly favored Democrats, according to Barker?

High-income and asset-owning elites.

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What does Barker argue about “Bidenomics”?

It failed to materially improve workers’ share of income despite strong macro indicators.

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What role does capital play in dealignment?

Capital hedges across parties, reducing partisan stakes for elites.

22
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According to Piketty et al., left-wing parties are now most strongly supported by…

Higher-educated voters.

23
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According to Burn-Murdoch, declining racial segregation leads voters to vote more based on…

Ideology rather than identity.

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According to Barker, recent elections demonstrate…

Dealignment rather than class realignment.

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