IB HISTORY OF THE AMERICAS - Historiography

Toru Haga (Japan Industrialization Origins 1)

Seclusion eliminated the factor of instability in foreign relations and let the shogunate focus its energies on perfecting the administrative setup. At the same time the country wasn't really walled off..The shogunate could bring in the things it needed and keep out what it didn't. It could take in all the information it found useful without letting out any information it didn't want to. In this way it ensured the nation's security, both externally and internally. It was brilliant...'

Historian Kenneth Pyle (Japan Industrialization Origins 2)

These unequal treaties imposed for the first time in Japan's history extensive restrictions on its national sovereignty, and, while they did not require the cession of any territory...placed Japan in a semi-colonial status. In the long run the treaties became a symbol of the national impotence that was exposed by renewed contact with the West, and recovery of national independence and international respect became an overriding goal..In the short run the treaties ignited political conflict that destroyed bakufu authority...'

Historian W. G. Beasley (Japan Industrialization Origins 3)

The events of the summer of 1858 marked the beginning of modern nationalism in Japan....enforced acceptance of the treaties brought a new awareness of a foreign threat directed at something larger than the villages or domains that most Japanese described as 'home'. the Treaties, after all, applied ot everyone...A recognition of political unity slowly spread, first from major centres to the provinces, then from samurai to other sections of the population. It was given focus by the call to 'honour the emperor'.

Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu (Japan Industrialization Origins 4)

[Japan's] general progress, during the short space of half a century has been so sudden and fast that it [is]..rare in the history of the world. This leap forward is the result of the stimulus which the country received on coming into contact with the civilisation of Europe and America...We possess today a powerful army and navy, but it was after Western models that we laid their foundations...We reorganised the systems of central and local administration and effected reforms in the educational systems of the empire. All this is nothing but the result of adopting the superior features of Western institutions.'

Historian George Wilson (Japan Industrialization Origins 5)

The samurai elite and the popular movements were simultaneously groping for a new and stable order in Japan'. It was this strong and purposeful leadership that the new government set about establishing in 1868 by '..suppressing many of the signs of disarray and malaise, consolidating power, and creating a national ethic that would answer the popular need for surety and direction.' In this interpretation, the role of the foreign crisis was to bring into sharp focus the impotence of the old system and to prompt revolutionary action to create a new order. (Radicalism)

Historian Harold Bolitho (Japan Social and Political 1)

As in the rest of the world, the factory system in Japan meant much misery. Since machines could be worked by women, and even children, there was no need to employ men. This majority of factory workers were women, working up to fourteen hours a day in some cases, withut regular lunch or rest periods. Child labour was used, discipline was harsh and diseases like tuberculosis and beri beri were common, and there were some appalling industrial accidents. This was especially so in the coal mines, of course, where 2,000 miners were killed in one explosion in 1878. But it was also true of the factories, for safety precautions were few, and workers were often housed in dormitories above the flimsy wooden sheds in which they worked.

Historian Kenneth Pyle (Japan Social and Political 2)

..But the extreme adulation of the Western cultural model could not sustain itself one the vogue had passed; it was too destructive of Japanese pride. Moreover, many of the new social values introduced during the enlightenment decades of the 1870s and 1880s ran counter to deeply ingrained mores of the Japanese people and, above all, were incompatible with the institutions of the countryside where the vast majority of the population had its roots. Finally, the Meiji leaders saw that the values of the enlightenment could not coexist with the formation of the song national consciousness required to unite the hearts and loyalties of all the people in the struggle to industrialize'.

Historian Gordon Greenwood (Japan Social and Political 3)

Almost inevitably the Japanese leaders adopted western forms without being able to transplant the spirit of the institutions or the spirit of the society which gave the institutions meaning. Sometimes this was deliberate because many of the Meiji leaders had little sympathy with the ideals of western liberalism. What they often did sometimes accidentally, sometimes deliberately, was to place old Japanese wine in new western bottles. Despite the surface changes, much of the feeling and many of the values of the old Japan remained and even the new institutions and the new forms of economic organization were often subtly shaped by traditional Japanese attitudes....predominantly Japan remained feudal in spirit and outlook, if not in institutions and economic organisation.

Historian W. G. Beasley (Japan Social and Political 4)

By this time [early 20th century] unions faced a 'modern' cohort of entrepreneurs and managers.... they were more the bureaucrats of big business, loyal as much as to the firm as to the nation, measuring their achievements in terms of profit or market share; and they pursued their aspirations more through collective bodies, such as trade associations and chambers of commerce, than as individual tycoons. Many of these organizations were exceedingly influential...They gave business men a voice in matters of national economic policy. They also constituted a political pressure group - hostile to socialism and the trade unions, opposed to large budgets, committed to private property and the rule of law - which governments ignored at their peril'.

Japanese government official Hayashi (Japan Social and Political 5)

We must continue to study and make use of Western methods...If new warships are considered necessary we must, at any cost, build them; if the organisation of our army is inadequate we must start rectifying it from now; if need be, our entire military system must be changed. At present Japan must keep calm and sit tight, so as to lull suspicions nurtured against her; during this time the foundations of her national power must be consolidated; and we must watch and wait for the opportunity in the Orient that will surely come one day. When this day arrives Japan will decide her own fate; and she will be able not only to put into their place the powers who seek to meddle in her affairs; she will even be able, should this be necessary, to meddle in their affairs

Historian J. H. Plumb (Britian Industrialization Origins 1)

After 1740...there was a steady growth of population due to a marked, if small, decline in the death rate...This growth of population had a tonic effect on the British economy. It increased the home market, provided more labour, and swelled the growing man-eating towns. Yet perhaps the most important effect was the survival of more children of the middle and lower class parents than ever before. This was the greatest stimulant of all. With some education, a little capital, occasionally an influential relative, the expanding world offered them endless opportunities of advancement....Without a rapidly expanding lower middle class with sufficient education and technical background the Industrial Revolution would have been impossible. This and a growing labour force, adequate capital and expanding markets were the prerequisites; they provided the opportunities to which human ingenuity and skill readily responded.

Historian Robert Raymond (Britian Industrialization Origins 2)

By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the many components of the mighty engine of the Industrial Revolution were working together to generate an irresistible surge of production and economic growth in the British Isles. Everywhere, perishable contraptions of wood and leather were being replaced by enduring machines of iron and brass. The natural forces of wind and water and muscle had been largely superseded by steam, tireless and obedient. The conversion of the back and forth action of the piston into rotary motion by the introduction of the crank multiplied the application of steam throughout the industry [and]..provided a degree of control over engines that was foolproof and unfailing.. Among the first of the manual enterprises to be seduced by the new technology was the ancient craft of spinning and weaving...The rotative steam engine gave the final impetus to the growth of the textile belt across Lancashire and Yorkshire, and thousands of such engines were soon turning spindles and driving flying shuttles. Textiles became Britain's greatest export earner, and it is from the menchanization of this industry that many historians date the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.

Historian T. S. Ashton (Britian Industrialization Origins 3)

If we seek - it would be wrong to do so - for a single reason why the pace of economic development quickened about the middle of the eighteenth century, it is to this we must look. The deep mines, the solidly built factories, well constructed canals and substantial houses of the Industrial Revolution were the products of relatively cheap capital.

Historian Phil Chapple (Britian Industrialization Origins 4)

The response of individuals to economic opportunities was a driving force behind industrialisation. Arkwright, Derby, Watt, Boulton and Wedgwood are all familiar names of the period individually and collectively, perhaps, they demonstrate the inventive and innovative spirit of the age. Yet the unknown millions, including textile operatives, labourers, coal miners, farmers and merchants were all part of the industrialisation process. They were part of what became a revolution in human experience.

Historian Phylis Deane (Britian Industrialization Origins 5)

..the iron industry played a role in British industrialisation that was both pervasive and stimulating. It provided cheaply and abundantly the commodity on which, more than any other single material except coal, modern industry was to depend for its essential equipment. Nineteenth century industrialisation may have been started by the textile innovations of the end of the eighteenth century. Sustained industrialisation however depended upon the availability of coal and iron, and would have been inconceivable without the steam engine and technical progress in the iron industry which also took effect in the last three decades or so of the eighteenth century.'

Inquiry into the State and condition of the Town of Leeds' ,1842 (Britian Social and Political 1)

"In one cul-de-sac in Leeds there are 34 houses, and in ordinary times, there dwell in these houses 340 persons, or ten to every house. The name of this place is Boot and Shoe yard from whence the Commissioners removed, in the days of cholera, 75 cartloads of manure, which had been untouched for years.

The 'Times', a British newspaper (Britian Social and Political 2)

We prefer to take our chance with the cholera than be bullied into health. There is nothing a man hates so much as being cleansed against his will or having his floor swept, his halls whitewashed, his dung heaps cleared away and his thatch forced to give way to slate.

Financier and Politician George Hudson (Britian Social and Political 3)

The country is sick of centralisation, of Commissions, of inquiries, The people want to be left to manage their own affairs. They do not want Parliament to be so paternal as it wishes to be - interfering in everybody's business and, like all who interfere, not doing its own so well.

Historian Emma Griffin (Britian Social and Political 4)

Yet, despite the economic transformation that occurred during these years, the gains for the labouring poor appear to have been extremely modest. Real wages were moving along an upward bending curve, but even so, as late as 1870, the rise remained relatively slight. Furthermore, a range of indicators measuring the quality of life suggest that these gains were largely cancelled out by the concurrent worsening of living conditions. Life expectancy remained depressingly low in the cities: infant mortality remained high, even rising in some places, and heights were stagnant or falling, reinforcing the suggestion that living conditions were deteriorating...Considered in this light, modestly rising real wages appear a very small compensation for the high price extracted in terms of health, longevity and wellbeing....the slow pace at which the gains of economic growth in the nineteenth century were translated into tangible benefits for the labouring poor remains an enduring feature of the world's first industrial revolution.'

Declaration of the Birmingham Political Union (Britian Social and Political 5)

That honourable House [of Commons], in its present state, is...too far removed in habits, wealth and station [position], from the needs and interests of the lower and middle classes of people, to have...any close identity of feeling with them. The great aristocratic interests of all kinds are well represented there... But the interests of Industry and Trade have scarcely any representatives at all!

Historian Akira Iriye (Paper 1: Japan 1)

"By 1931 the Kwantung Army had come to believe that the very survival of Japan depended on securing Manchuria's industrial resources. Acting on its own initiative and without civilian oversight, it exploded a section of the South-Manchuria Railway and then 'restored order' by force—a textbook example of how militarist excesses had become the principal driver of foreign policy."

Historian Peter Duus (Paper 1: Japan 2)

"Japan's leaders felt trapped between domestic depression, rising popular nationalism, and the 'Western' tariff barriers that throttled silk exports. Militarists argued that territorial expansion offered relief from recession and would unify the nation behind the army's banner—a potent fusion of economic grievance and ideological zeal."

Historian Louise Young (Paper 1: Japan 3)

"The Lytton Commission's 1932 report condemned Japan's seizure of Manchuria as an act of unprovoked aggression. Yet by the time the League of Nations formally denounced the 'Manchurian Incident,' Tokyo had already forged the puppet state of Manchukuo—demonstrating that moral censure alone could not compel a determined militarist regime to back down."

Historian Akira Iriye (Paper 1: Japan 4)

"The Marco Polo Bridge clash of July 1937 transformed localized Manchurian skirmishes into an all-out Sino-Japanese war. Neither side had sought a full-scale confrontation, but once guns spoke, political elites in both Tokyo and Nanjing found it impossible to restrain the momentum of mobilization."

Historian Daniel Yergin (Paper 1: Japan 5)

"When Washington froze Japanese assets and imposed an embargo on oil in July 1941, it left Tokyo with a stark choice: capitulate or seize the resources of Southeast Asia by force. Pearl Harbor was not the 'bolt from the blue' that Americans imagined, but the logical consequence of economic strangulation and the conviction of Japan's militarists that only conquest could avert national catastrophe."

Historian MacGregor Knox (Paper 1: Germany and Italy 1)

"Mussolini's regime viewed the post-1919 settlement as a 'mutilated victory' and in 1935 invaded Abyssinia to restore the glory of Rome. The expedition combined high-tech weaponry—bombers, mustard gas—and mass mobilization, demonstrating that Fascism's revolutionary zeal could as easily be turned abroad as at home."

Historian Ruth Henig (Paper 1: Germany and Italy 2)

"The League's sanctions against Italy were half-hearted and unevenly applied; when Britain and France proved unwilling to close the Suez Canal or embargo oil, Mussolini concluded that the Western powers lacked both the principle and the will to enforce peace."

Historian Richard J. Evans (Paper 1: Germany and Italy 3)

"Hitler's worldview rested on the idea of Lebensraum in the East. The 1935 rearmament programme, in defiance of Versailles, was not merely military self-defence but the first step in a plan to settle Germans on 'liberated' Polish and Soviet lands—an ideology of conquest disguised as 'autarky.'"

Historian Ian Kershaw (Paper 1: Germany and Italy 4)

"The Anschluss of March 1938 and the later Munich settlement offered Hitler free rein without a shot being fired by Britain or France. Appeasement had become a strategic illusion: each concession only whetted his appetite for more territory and more power on the continent."

Historian Paul Kennedy (Paper 1: Germany and Italy 5)

"Between 1936 and 1939, the democratic powers' policy of 'give-and-take' convinced Hitler that aggressive revisionism carried no penalty. When German troops crossed the Polish frontier in September 1939, it was not a miscalculation so much as the final proof that deterrence without credible force was nothing but a bluff."

Historian Raymond Bertieaux (Emergence of Authoritarian States: Mobutu Sese Seko - Economic Factors)

"Commercial markets having remained depressed during the greater part of the year 1958, the global index of prices of products exported by the Congo was 6.2 % lower than in 1957 and 23.8 % lower than in 1956. In consequence, the value of exports fell from 24.3 milliards in 1957 to 20.8 milliards in 1958, a reduction of 15 %, although the volume exported remained steady.Imports fell by 10 % in volume and 18 % in value, the latter showing a reduction from 21.9 milliards in 1957 to 18 milliards in 1958."

Historian Alan J. K. Sanders (Emergence of Authoritarian States: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Economic Factors)

Sanders explains that in the 1930s Mongolia was forced to undergo a rapid economic transformation from a largely nomadic, subsistence society into one subject to Soviet economic planning. He argues that the drive toward collectivization and industrialization was not only ideologically motivated but also designed to integrate Mongolia into the Soviet economic sphere. This transformation—marked by forced collectivization of pastoral life and abrupt shifts in state economic policy—disrupted traditional modes of production, led to significant dislocations in livestock and agricultural output, and ultimately laid the groundwork for deep economic divisions between those forced to abandon their traditional livelihoods and those who came to benefit from state-led industrial modernization.

Historian Crawford Young (Emergence of Authoritarian States: Mobutu Sese Seko - Social Division)

Young argues that while the évolués (a class of Western-educated Congolese) were instrumental in advocating for independence, their Western orientation often alienated them from the broader populace, leading to tensions within the nationalist movement. This disconnect hindered the formation of a cohesive national identity, as the aspirations of the évolués did not always align with those of the rural majority.

Historian Alan J. K. Sanders (Emergence of Authoritarian States: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Social Division)

Sanders argues that the imposition of Stalinist policies—especially the forcible collectivization and systematic purges of Buddhist clergy and aristocrats—brought about a radical break with Mongolia's traditional way of life. In his analysis, the destruction of longstanding feudal and nomadic institutions not only dismembered the old social order but also paved the way for a new, Soviet‐aligned elite, thus creating a society divided between those whose cultural and economic foundations were violently uprooted and those who emerged under the new regime

Historian Jean Obenga (Emergence of Authoritarian States: Mobutu Sese Seko - Impact of War)

"World War II disrupted the established colonial order in the Congo, and created opportunities for Congolese nationalists to mobilize and challenge Belgian rule."

Historian SERGEY RADCHENKO (Emergence of Authoritarian States: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Impact of War)

"'Mongolia's strategic location—as the vital buffer zone between Soviet territory and Japanese-occupied Manchuria—was not a marginal footnote but a linchpin in the fierce power struggle of the 1930s. In my view, the intense competition between the Soviet Union and Japan over Mongolia was fundamentally about securing not only a defensive frontier but also a launching pad for broader regional influence in East Asia.'"

Historian Ludo de Witte (Emergence of Authoritarian States: Mobutu Sese Seko - Weakness of Political System)

He argues that from that moment on [first coup], the real power was no longer in hands of the politicians but had been moved to the elite troops that allied themselves with Mobutu.

Historian Stephen Kotkin (Emergence of Authoritarian States: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Weakness of Political System)

Kotkin argues that the Bolsheviks (rather than the mongolians themselves) exploited Mongolia's political instability to install a Soviet-aligned government, replacing weak indigenous rule

Historian George B. N. Ayittey (Methods used to Establish Authoritarian States: Mobutu Sese Seko - Persuasion and Coercion 1)

He argues Mobutu's early career was marked not only by his shrewd, persuasive public persona but also by his willingness to enforce discipline by threat and violence - a dual strategy that laid the foundation for his later autocratic rule.

Historian Ludo De Witte (Methods used to Establish Authoritarian States: Mobutu Sese Seko - Persuasion and Coercion 2)

De Witte argues that Mobutu's rise to power was a result of a "political action aimed to strengthen the army, the president's sole support, and Mobutu's position within the army." He points to the promotion of Mobutu to major-general by President Kasa-Vubu on January 23, 1961, as a strategic move to consolidate military support.

Historian Alan J. K. Sanders (Methods used to Establish Authoritarian States: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Persuasion and Coercion)

Sanders describes the 1930s as a period in which the Mongolian regime—under heavy Soviet influence—wielded persuasion and coercion in tandem. He argues that while state propaganda aimed to "persuade" the populace of the socialist project's righteousness, the same regime simultaneously employed ruthless coercive tactics (purges, forced collectivization, and repression of Buddhist institutions) to eliminate dissent and reshape society.

Historian Ludo De Witte (Methods used to Establish Authoritarian States: Mobutu Sese Seko - Role of Leaders)

De Witte argues that Mobutu's coup against Lumumba in September 1960 was not merely a power move but part of a broader strategy orchestrated by Western powers like the USA to neutralize Lumumba, whom they perceived as a threat due to his nationalist and leftist inclinations, especially towards communism and the Soviet Union.

Historian Tom Ginsburg (Methods used to Establish Authoritarian States: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Role of Leaders)

Ginsburg argues that Mongolia was nearly a puppet state of the Soviet Union and was totally reliant on Stalin, stating that "Soviet assistance played an essential role in the re-establishment of Mongolian independence after centuries of Chinese domination. The intimate relationship between Russia and Mongolia for the next seven decades reflected in part the fear among Mongols of renewed Chinese intervention, for Russia was perceived as the lesser of two evils. Mongolian nationhood carried with it the price of nearly total reliance on the Soviet Union, and this was seen as acceptable by the leadership."

Historian Thomas M. Callaghy (Methods used to Establish Authoritarian States: Mobutu Sese Seko - Ideology)

argues that Mobutu's early actions were pragmatic, aimed at stabilizing the nation rather than promoting a specific ideological framework. His primary focus was on consolidating power amid the political instability following the Congo's independence in 1960.

Historian SERGEY RADCHENKO (Methods used to Establish Authoritarian States: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Ideology)

Radchenko argues that Choibalsan was not such a radical socialist as he is often depicted, and in no way led the revolution. He explains how "socialist historians once praised Choibalsan as the Mongolia's revolution. In fact, Choibalsan was not so much the maker of the revolution as its survivor. Carefully navigating a bitter power struggle in the 1920s, as prominent Mongolian politicians one after another fell victim to each other's scheming and Soviet manipulation, he suddenly emerged from obscurity in 1934."

Historian Thomas M. Callaghy (Methods used to Establish Authoritarian States: Mobutu Sese Seko - The Use of Force)

He argues that Mobutu's leadership was characterized by a strong alignment with Western interests, which involved the use of force to suppress his opposition to allow for an unchallenged rise to power in 1965 with the backing of the CIA when doing so.

Historian U. Heo (Methods used to Establish Authoritarian States: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - The Use of Force)

Heo discusses Choibalsan's role in Mongolia's state-building process. He argues that Choibalsan's leadership was characterized by a strong alignment with Soviet policies, which involved the use of force to suppress dissent and establish a centralized, authoritarian state with his total control by 1939

Historian Thomas M. Callaghy (Methods used to Establish Authoritarian States: Mobutu Sese Seko - Propaganda 1)

Callaghy argues that Mobutu's early propaganda efforts were crucial in establishing his image as a unifying leader capable of restoring order. (the most important)

Historian Stuart A. Reid (Methods used to Establish Authoritarian States: Mobutu Sese Seko - Propaganda 2)

Reid analyzes how Mobutu's propaganda during this period was designed to appeal to Western powers, particularly the United States, by aligning with their anti-communist sentiments. In this way, he argues the propaganda was aimed at the western powers rather than the people of the Congo.

Historian James Boyd (Methods used to Establish Authoritarian States: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Propaganda)

Boyd argues that Choibalsan used Buddhism to his advantage to persuade the mongolian people on his side, convincing them of a messiah as he states "[Choibalsan] launched a campaign to woo the population of Outer Mongolia from the Church using Lamaist notions of a messianic.

Historians Turner and Young (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Mobutu Sese Seko - Use of Legal Methods)

"Completion of the consolidation phase of the regime was symbolized by the creation of its own political machinery and constitutional framework in 1967. After a brief period of ambiguity when the possibility of a second party was hinted at (it was explicitly permitted by the 1967 constitution), Mobutu made clear that the newly created MPR intended to occupy all political space. As the MPR was to represent all Zairians, there was no need for a second party (on the MPR, see chapter 7). The constitution of 1967, drafted by the New Regime, formally enshrined the presidential system which had already been created through metamorphosis of the First Republic institutions; presidential hegemony was assured both with respect to the ministers, whose function was simply to execute the decisions and policies of the president, and the legislature, whose role was circumscribed by the concurrent power of the president to make laws. Adoption of a new constitution permitted disbanding of the old parliament. The country, Mobutu said, "has a revolutionary people and government, but a Parliament composed of retrograde politicians elected under debatable circumstances."26 In March 1967 Parliament was dissolved; a new one would not be constituted until 1970, at the end of the initial fiveyear period of Mobutu rule."

Historian Shagdariin Sandag (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Use of Legal Methods 1)

Sandag details how Choibalsan, heavily influenced by Joseph Stalin, employed legalistic frameworks to legitimize mass arrests and executions. These purges targeted a wide array of individuals, including political dissidents, intellectuals, and members of the Buddhist clergy. By manipulating the legal system, Choibalsan was able to systematically eliminate opposition, thereby instilling a pervasive atmosphere of fear and securing his authoritarian rule.

Historian Bat-Erdene Batbayar (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Use of Legal Methods 2)

Batbayar examines how Choibalsan, under the aegis of Soviet influence, restructured Mongolia's legal and political institutions to mirror those of the USSR. This restructuring involved the implementation of laws and policies that facilitated the suppression of political adversaries and the centralization of power. Baabar emphasizes that Choibalsan's legal reforms were instrumental in transforming Mongolia into a Soviet satellite state, effectively eroding its sovereignty and aligning its governance with Soviet interests.

Historians Turner and Young (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Mobutu Sese Seko - Use of Force)

"Since the 1965 coup, therefore, a major preoccupation of Mobutu has been management of the army leadership; this has entailed knowing when not to oppose the generals, as on the Zairianization question or perhaps the issue of Mulele's execution in 1968. To control the security forces Mobutu has created an elaborate system of clientage and fostered rivalries. The heads of the various services are responsible directly to Mobutu. Factions of officers are defined in terms of institutional affiliation (regular army, paracommandos, CND) , ethnic or regional identity, generations and levels of training, financial advantages, and probably other factors as well. The gauge of an officer's importance is favor with the president, who exploits the rivalries among factions and individuals and tolerates inept performance as the price of personal security. "

Historians Turner and Young (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Mobutu Sese Seko - Charismatic Leadership)

"The personalization of power in the New Regime reached its peak in 1974, when public ideology was renamed 'Mobutuism.' The president had acquired an array of praise-names daily reiterated in the regime media: Guide of the Zairian revolution, the Helmsman, Father of the Nation, Founding President. The press carried a front-page photograph Mobutu nearly every day; pictures of the president were de rigueur not only in all The Patrimonial State and Personal Rule 169 public places, but also in the homes of the politically ambitious. The extravagance of the personality cult at its 1974-75 peak is exemplified by a declaration by Interior Minister Engulu: 'In our religion, we have our own theologians. In all religions, and at all times, there are prophets. Why not today? God has sent a great prophet, our prestigious Guide Mobutu-this prophet is our liberator, our Messiah. Our Church is the MPR. Its chief is Mobutu, we respect him like one respects a Pope. Our gospel is Mobutism. This is why the crucifixes must be replaced by the image of our Messiah. And party militants will want to place at its side his glorious mother, Mama Yemo, who gave birth to such a son.' For one period of several weeks in early 1975 official media were forbidden to mention by name any other figure but Mobutu; other persons were referred to only by the title they held. Power at the summit was totally personalized; all other office-holders disappeared into anonymity."

Historian Bat-Erdene Batbayar (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Charismatic Leadership)

Baabar notes that Choibalsan's political ascent was significantly influenced by Soviet support, particularly from figures like Kliment Voroshilov, which bolstered his authority within the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). Baabar also highlights that Choibalsan's involvement in the 1930s purges, targeting perceived political adversaries, was a strategy to eliminate opposition and solidify his control. Additionally, Baabar points out that Choibalsan's efforts to unify all Mongols under the Mongolian People's Republic, though ultimately thwarted by Stalin, were part of his vision to expand his influence and consolidate power.

Historians Turner and Young (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Dissemination of Propaganda 1)

Turner and Young argue that Mobutu Sese Seko's leadership was characterized by a manufactured, top-down ideological project—rooted in the vague doctrine of "authenticity"—that served more as a tool for consolidating personal power and constructing a personality cult than as a genuine national renaissance. They suggest that Mobutu's regime relied heavily on symbolic politics, propaganda, and theatrical gestures rather than substantive transformation. Turner and Young emphasize the ideological incoherence and performative nature of "authenticity" (e.g., renaming cities, changing clothing styles, organizing dance troupes), which was promoted aggressively through state-controlled media but failed to materialize into coherent policy or intellectual legitimacy. Despite attempts to defend the ideology (like Mobutu's rhetorical shift from retour to recours à l'authenticité), even regime-friendly intellectuals like Mulumba Lukoji recognized its conceptual hollowness. The abandonment of the planned international colloquium further reveals how authenticity lacked intellectual substance or global resonance. Turner and Young also show that Mobutu fostered a political culture of extreme personal glorification, bordering on deification, where his supposed achievements were mythologized in song and state discourse. Projects like the Inga dam or renaming the currency became personal "hauts faits," while songs like "Djalelo" exemplified how national identity was fused with Mobutu's persona, creating a quasi-theocratic legitimacy.

Historian Bat-Erdene Batbayar (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Dissemination of Propaganda 2)

In his comprehensive history, Batbayar details how Choibalsan, influenced by Soviet directives, orchestrated mass purges targeting political opponents, intellectuals, and Buddhist clergy. These actions were accompanied by propaganda campaigns that labeled victims as "counter-revolutionaries" and "Japanese spies," thereby justifying the purges and eliminating potential challenges to his authority.

Historian Shagdariin Sandag (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Dissemination of Propaganda 3)

Sandag's research highlights Choibalsan's role in the violent purges of the late 1930s, which resulted in the deaths of an estimated 30,000 to 35,000 Mongolians. Propaganda was used to portray these purges as necessary measures against enemies of the state, thereby consolidating Choibalsan's power and aligning Mongolia more closely with Soviet interests.

Historian Dashdavaa Dashnyam (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Dissemination of Propaganda 4)

In his analysis, Dashdavaa emphasizes Choibalsan's efforts to promote pan-Mongolian unity through propaganda. By advocating for the unification of all Mongol-speaking peoples under the Mongolian People's Republic, Choibalsan sought to bolster nationalistic fervor and legitimize his leadership. However, these ambitions were curtailed by Stalin, who advised against actions that could provoke conflict with China.

Historians Turner and Young (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Mobutu Sese Seko - Nature, Extent, and Treatment of Opposition )

Turner and Young argue that Mobutu Sese Seko's leadership was defined by authoritarian consolidation of power masked by ideological spectacle, resulting in a parasitic state that systematically repressed opposition while projecting an illusion of national unity and cultural revival. From a historical perspective, they present Mobutu not as a nation-builder but as a manipulative autocrat who used state ideology—specifically authenticity—and legal mechanisms like the 1974 constitution to entrench personal rule. Turner and Young's analysis emphasizes how the regime constructed a hollow national identity through symbolic gestures (e.g., name changes, fashion reforms, political songs) while avoiding substantive reform or ideological coherence. The abandonment of intellectual debates on authenticity underscores its function as a political tool rather than a serious cultural doctrine. Simultaneously, Turner and Young highlight the coercive foundations of Mobutu's state. The MPR's status as the only legal party and the role of the "seventh scourge" (security forces) demonstrate how opposition was eliminated not just ideologically but through fear, surveillance, and constitutional manipulation. Their use of terms like "parasitic predator" reflects a revisionist, state-critical historiography that interprets Mobutu's regime as an extractive dictatorship—one that drained national resources while cloaking repression in nationalistic and cultural rhetoric. In this view, Mobutu's leadership was not simply a failed experiment in postcolonial nationhood, but a calculated system of control that exploited the language of authenticity and order to legitimize authoritarianism and personal enrichment.

Historian Bat-Erdene Batbayar (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Nature, Extent, and Treatment of Opposition 1)

In his comprehensive history, Baabar details how Choibalsan, under Soviet directives, orchestrated purges to eliminate political rivals and suppress dissent. He notes that Choibalsan's ascent to power involved the removal of Prime Ministers Genden and Amar, both of whom were arrested and executed under fabricated charges. Baabar emphasizes that Choibalsan's loyalty to Stalin and his willingness to implement Moscow's policies were pivotal in his consolidation of power.

Historian Shagdariin Sandag (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Nature, Extent, and Treatment of Opposition 2)

Sandag's research highlights the extensive purges carried out during Choibalsan's regime, often referred to as the "Great Terror." He documents that Choibalsan, with guidance from Soviet advisors, targeted a wide range of individuals, including lamas, intellectuals, political figures, and ethnic minorities such as Buryats and Kazakhs. These purges were instrumental in instilling fear and eliminating any potential opposition to his rule.

Historian Christopher Kaplonski (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Nature, Extent, and Treatment of Opposition 3)

Kaplonski examines the role of Soviet influence in shaping Mongolia's political landscape during Choibalsan's era. He argues that while Choibalsan was a key figure in consolidating Mongolia's statehood, his actions were heavily influenced by Stalin's directives. Kaplonski points out that Choibalsan's anti-Chinese sentiments and nationalist ambitions were factors in his policies, but his reliance on Soviet support was crucial in maintaining his authority.

Historians Turner and Young (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Mobutu Sese Seko - The Impact of the Success and/or Failure of Foreign Policy on the Maintenance of Power)

Turner and Young argue that Mobutu Sese Seko's leadership relied heavily on external support, using Cold War alliances and debt diplomacy to sustain his regime. They contend that his foreign policy was opportunistic, aimed more at regime survival than advancing national interests. Mobutu's failed intervention in Angola damaged Zaire's African credibility, but he maintained Western backing by portraying himself as a barrier against Marxist chaos. In their view, Mobutu manipulated international relations to legitimize his rule despite internal decay and diplomatic isolation.

Historian SERGEY RADCHENKO ((Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - The Impact of the Success and/or Failure of Foreign Policy on the Maintenance of Power)

"In the uncertain final months of the Second World War, Choibalsan made a bid to unite disparate Mongolian speakers, extending Mongolia's reach all the way to the Great Wall in the southeast and the Tibetan plateau in the southwest." "Choibalsan's aspirations were dealt the final - decisive - blow by the Chinese Communist revolution. Mao Zedong sought an alliance with the Soviet Union, and Stalin could not undercut him by helping Choibalsan help himself to parts of northern China. In fact, it was Mao who in February 1949 pushed the other way, asking Stalin's envoy Anastas Mikoyan to surrender Mongolia to China. " "Choibalsan sought to bring the disparate Mongol tribes in China under the one roof of his Mongolian People's Republic, even if that meant enlarging Mongolia at China's expense. It was Stalin who vetoed these plans, telling Choibalsan in February 1946 that his scheme would 'require a new war with China,' which neither of them needed. Choibalsan pleaded to at least be allowed to conduct separatist propaganda in the Mongolian-speaking areas. 'Quietly, you may,' assented Stalin." Here Radchenko argues that Choibalsan's ambitions to unite all Mongol-speaking peoples under the Mongolian People's Republic were ultimately constrained by larger geopolitical forces, particularly Stalin's desire to maintain strategic relations with China. From a historical perspective, Radchenko portrays Choibalsan as a nationalist constrained by Soviet realpolitik, showing how Mongolian expansionist aspirations were subordinated to Stalin's broader priorities—especially his alliance with Mao during the early Cold War.

Historian Emizet F. Kisangani (Consolidation and Maintenance of Power: Mobutu Sese Seko - Ungrouped [you decide])

"Most public officials knew that regardless of their inefficiency and degree of corruption, they could reenter the government. To hold a government position required neither a sense of management nor a good conscience. On most occasions, effectiveness and a good conscience were major obstacles to political advancement. Mobutu demanded absolute personal allegiance in return for the opportunity to accumulate wealth"

Historian Madeleine Woker (Aims and Results of Policies: Mobutu Sese Seko - Domestic Economic Policies 1)

Woker argues that Mobutu's regime intertwined economic nationalism with liberalization. While promoting self-sufficiency and nationalization, the government maintained strong ties with foreign capital. This dual approach laid the groundwork for later neoliberal policies, as privatized capital and internationalized markets were already integral to nationalized companies.

Historian Thomas Turner (Aims and Results of Policies: Mobutu Sese Seko - Domestic Economic Policies 2)

Turner notes that Mobutu's early economic policies brought temporary stability. The regime balanced the budget, increased revenues, raised real wages, and reduced inflation, leading to an 8% economic growth. However, neglect of agriculture and over-reliance on coercion, instead of market incentives, Turner argues eventually led to economic decline.

Historian Crawford Young (Aims and Results of Policies: Mobutu Sese Seko - Domestic Economic Policies 3)

Young discusses the policy of "Zairianization," where foreign-owned businesses were nationalized and transferred to Mobutu's allies and family members. This move, intended to promote economic independence, resulted in widespread corruption, theft, and mismanagement, which Young argues was the most important cause of economic collapse and increased dependence on foreign aid.

Historian Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (Aims and Results of Policies: Mobutu Sese Seko - Domestic Economic Policies 4)

Nzongola-Ntalaja highlights that Mobutu established a kleptocratic system where public officials exploited their positions for personal gain. He argues that this pervasive corruption led to infrastructure decay, economic mismanagement, and a significant gap between the elite and the general populace. The country's economy deteriorated, becoming heavily reliant on foreign aid and investments, and so he argues that corruption was the main cause of this economic suffering.

Historian Bat-Erdene Batbayar (Aims and Results of Policies: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Domestic Economic Policies 1)

Baabar argues that Choibalsan's economic policies were largely dictated by Soviet interests, particularly the collectivization of agriculture and the expansion of state control. He states that while these policies aimed to modernize Mongolia, they led to widespread repression, forced collectivization, and economic hardship for nomadic herders.

Historians Dashpurev and Rouelle (Aims and Results of Policies: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Domestic Economic Policies 2)

In their research on Mongolia's socialist economy, they highlight that Choibalsan's economic reforms, particularly industrialization efforts, were meant to align Mongolia with Soviet economic structures. They argue that while industrialization was a goal, the actual impact was minimal since Mongolia remained heavily dependent on the USSR for machinery, expertise, and financial support.

Historian Tsedendambyn Batbayar (Aims and Results of Policies: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Domestic Economic Policies 3)

In his works on Mongolian political history, Batbayar notes that Choibalsan's policies were focused on eliminating the aristocracy and religious influence to centralize economic power under the state. He argues that this led to short-term gains in state control but significantly disrupted traditional Mongolian pastoralism and local economic systems.

Historian Ochirbat Punsalmaa (Aims and Results of Policies: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Domestic Economic Policies 4)

In her analysis of Mongolian economic transformations, she states that Choibalsan's policies were part of a broader Stalinist model that sought to create a command economy. She points out that while this brought infrastructure developments, such as the establishment of factories and collective farms, it also resulted in inefficiencies and shortages, as many economic initiatives were poorly planned.

Historian Urgunge Onon (Aims and Results of Policies: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Domestic Economic Policies 5)

Onon emphasizes that Choibalsan's economic policies aimed to rapidly industrialize Mongolia and integrate it into the Soviet system. However, he also stresses the human cost, including mass purges of intellectuals and economic managers who were accused of being "counter-revolutionaries."

Historian Jean-Marie Mutamba Makombo (Aims and Results of Policies: Mobutu Sese Seko - Political Policies 1)

Makombo explains that Mobutu's regime emphasized the use of a "language of power," referring to the linguistic strategies employed by those within the ruling circle to consolidate authority. This approach facilitated the centralization of power and reinforced Mobutu's authoritarian governance.

Historian Jean-Mari Kazungusibwa Viancy (Aims and Results of Policies: Mobutu Sese Seko - Political Policies 2)

Viancy observes that in 1973, Mobutu initiated a political plan known as "zaïrianisation," aimed at promoting social security for citizens. This policy sought to replace colonial influences with indigenous culture, but its implementation led to widespread corruption and mismanagement, undermining its intended goals.

Historian Thomas Turner (Aims and Results of Policies: Mobutu Sese Seko - Political Policies 3)

Turner notes that Mobutu's regime, after seizing power in 1965, reduced the number of provinces and curtailed their autonomy, resulting in a highly centralized state. Mobutu increasingly placed his supporters in key positions, and in 1967, he created the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR), which became the nation's only legal political party under his new constitution. This suppression of political pluralism stifled dissent and entrenched Mobutu's control over the Congolese political landscape.

Historian Bat-Erdene Batbayar (Aims and Results of Policies: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Political Policies 1)

Batbayar argues that Choibalsan's political policies were primarily aimed at consolidating power under a Stalinist model. He asserts that Choibalsan followed Soviet directives closely, using mass purges to eliminate political rivals, Buddhist clergy, and perceived enemies of the state. The impact was devastating: thousands were executed, and Mongolian society was terrorized into submission, ensuring absolute state control.

Historian Tsedendambyn Batbayar (Aims and Results of Policies: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Political Policies 2)

Batbayar emphasizes that Choibalsan's policies sought to transform Mongolia into a Soviet-style socialist state. He highlights the abolition of the traditional aristocracy, the destruction of Buddhist institutions, and the centralization of power in the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). The consequence, he argues, was the complete eradication of Mongolia's traditional ruling class and the creation of a one-party totalitarian system.

Historians Dashpurev and Rouelle (Aims and Results of Policies: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Political Policies 3)

These scholars note that Choibalsan's political policies were designed to eliminate opposition and enforce ideological conformity. They argue that while the aim was to solidify Communist rule and ensure loyalty to the USSR, the impact was widespread paranoia, mass purges, and the destruction of Mongolia's independent political thought.

Historian Urgunge Onon (Aims and Results of Policies: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Political Policies 4)

Onon describes Choibalsan as a puppet of Stalin, whose political decisions were dictated by Moscow. He notes that the repression of political dissent through purges and executions was not just about power consolidation but also about transforming Mongolia into a reliable Soviet satellite. The impact, he says, was the total submission of Mongolia to Soviet influence, at the cost of immense human suffering.

Historian B. Shirendyb (Aims and Results of Policies: Khorloogiin Choibalsan - Political Policies 5)

Shirendyb, a Soviet-era historian, presents a more favorable view, arguing that Choibalsan's policies were necessary to modernize Mongolia and protect it from foreign influence. He credits Choibalsan with strengthening national unity and laying the foundation for socialist development. However, modern scholars often critique this interpretation as Soviet propaganda.

Historian Ghislain C. Kabwit (Aims and Results of Policies: Mobutu Sese Seko - Social Policies 1)

Kabwit explains that Mobutu's Authenticité campaign aimed to eliminate colonial influences and promote a unified national identity. This policy led to significant changes, including renaming the country to Zaire, mandating the adoption of African names, and banning Western attire in favor of the "abacost." While intended to foster cultural pride, these measures often resulted in societal confusion and resistance, as they were implemented in a top-down manner without sufficient public consultation.

Historian Jean-Marie Mutamba Makombo (Aims and Results of Policies: Mobutu Sese Seko - Social Policies 2)

Makombo discusses Mobutu's language policies, particularly the promotion of Lingala as a national language. This move was part of a broader strategy to centralize power and unify the nation under a single cultural framework. However, it also marginalized speakers of other languages and altered existing linguistic hierarchies, leading to tensions among different ethnic groups.

Historian Crawford Young (Aims and Results of Policies: Mobutu Sese Seko - Social Policies 3)

Young notes that the Authenticité campaign extended to religious practices, with Mobutu's regime exerting control over religious institutions. The government mandated that all religious groups affiliate with one of four recognized umbrella organizations, effectively banning independent churches. This policy aimed to reduce foreign influence and consolidate state control over social institutions but led to resentment among religious communities and infringed upon religious freedoms.