British bombing strategy in 1939
Modest force, military targets
RAF Bomber Command had 23 operational bomber squadrons, with 280 aircraft
Modest force gave BR means to immediately strike back at Nazi GER, but only against military targets at first
Raids against warships + airfields
But bombers were easy targets for enemy fighters â heavy losses
Bombers flew at night, but only to drop prop leaflets
British bombing strategy in 1940
Ineffective strategic night bombing
After H invasion of FR, RAF began night-time bombing campaign against GER industry, esp synthetic oil production
Plans to hit specific factories proved impractical as failed to identify factories + refineries in darkness
Bombs scattered far and wide
Bomber Command lacked strength to do serious damage
British bombing strategy in 1941
Battle of Atlantic takes precedence
Bomber Command stronger, but navigation over blacked-out Europe was still major problem
Setbacks in Battle of Atlantic meant major effort was needed against GER warships and U-boats
GER night-fighters + anti-aircraft guns becoming more effective
Heavy losses caused slump in morale
British bombing strategy in 1942
Harris and âarea bombingâ of civilians with Lancasters
Bomber Command received new aircraft, Avro Lancaster, and new leader = Air Chief Marshal Harris
War Cabinet sanctioned âarea bombingâ - targeting of whole cities to destroy factories and their workers
Was judged necessary to defeat enemy that seemed on brink of victory
British bombing strategy in 1943
Increasing strength with US
New tactics + tech enabled crews to find + hit targets with increasing precision
Major attacks launched against GERâs industrial heart in Ruhr Valley
Attempts to knock out Berlin failed
US Eighth Air Force joined RAF in âround the clockâ (24/7) offensive
British bombing strategy in 1944
Air supremacy
Combined Allied bomber force began overwhelming GER
US escort fighters shot Luftwaffe out of sky
Successful offensive launched against GERâs vulnerable fuel supplies
Bombers flew in support of D-Day, softening up coastal defences + hitting railways to block GER reinforcements
Enemy troops carpet bombed in advance of major Allied ground offensives
British bombing strategy in 1945
Total devastation
Bomber offensive reached peak destruction
RAF alone had 108 squadrons with 1500+ aircraft
Raids against oil + comms most effective
Starved of fuel, GER military machine ground to halt
Industrial cities pounded to rubble
Record 4851 tons of bombs dropped on Dortmund in one night
Enemy production massively disrupted; ceased in some places
Locations so far untouched were razed to the ground
Stats of bombing German cities
305,000 killed
780,000 wounded
1.9m homes destroyed
4.9 people evacuated
20m people deprived of utilities
Cities:
July 1943, Hamburg: 43,000 dead
Feb 1945, Dresden: 25,000 dead
Feb 1945, Pforzheim: 20,000 dead
Impact of bombing on German civilians
Evacuation + separation of families
Disease due to lack of clean water + food
Homelessness
Large proportions of cities left in rubble; streets blocked to emergency services
Number of civilian deaths dwarfs the deaths of BR civilians in Blitz
e.g. famous Coventry: 554 vs Hamburg: 43,000
Dresden estimated 25,000-200,000 deaths
How effective was Allied bombing campaign?
Aim 1: Destruction of GERâs war economy / capacity to fight
Aim 2: Destruction of German civiliansâ morale to destabilise Nazi regime
Effectiveness of Allied bombing campaign in destruction of Germanyâs capacity to fight
Attacks on GERâs canals + railways made transportation of war material difficult
Bombing campaign absorbed significant proportion of GER resources that couldâve been used on East/Western Fronts
Bombing of GERâs synthetic oil plants + refineries extremely successful + made large contribution to general collapse of GER in 1945
BUT
Overall GER industrial production increased throughout war, implying that damage to GER war economy wasnât as great as Allies hoped
Effectiveness of Allied bombing campaign in destruction of German civiliansâ morale
GER population were terrorised by Nazi regime into silence, those accused of defeatism could be arrested
Regime lied about numbers killed in raids, leaving population unknowing
Bombing extremely likely to have had profound effect on depressing morale, inducing defeatism, fear, apathy
Nazis kept no accurate, quantitative data on effect of bombing on morale, unlike BR
Increase in resistance to Nazis which coincided with heaviest bombing (1944-45) but canât be said that this was because of the bombing, as it coincided with other factors
Cost of bombing campaign to Allies
BR only spent 7% of military resources, but:
150,000 US + BR servicemen dead
Allies lost nearly 30,000 planes
Arguments to justify bombing of Dresden
Red Army advancing towards Dresden, which was major transport hub that could be used for reinforcements
Arguments against bombing of Dresden
Deprived Allies of moral high ground
Nazi prop exploited this, emphasising that Dresden was great cultural centre with no military resources
Allies knew effects of firebombing + Dresden was full of 300,000 refugees fleeing the advancing Red Army
Clear by Feb 1945 Allies would win war - bombing Dresden didnât affect final outcome
Military + industrial resources in Dresden were on outskirts of city and couldâve been attacked without bombing city