Ethics 2nd Year Final Exam

DTC

DTC

The moral theory associated with this theological picture is divine command theory (DCT).• DCT: the rightness or wrongness of actions depends on God's commands.

Socrates-Euthyphro

When Socrates asks Euthyphro the definition of piety Euthyphro says "What is loved by the gods is holy, and what is not loved is not"
The issue with this is that the gods are often contradicting one another

Euthyphro makes a correction: "What is loved by the gods is holy and what is opposite (so hated) is not"
Following this Socrates asks:
Is the action holy because the gods love it or do the gods love it because it is holy?

Two Prongs:
Prong 1—The gods love something because it is holy
If this is the case then something being god-loved is not a relevant factor to determining whether it is holy or not. God-loved and holy may overlap but they are not necessarily the same.
Here if this is true then god is entirely irrelevant in defining moral rightness because some other objective factor determines piety.

Prong 2—Something is holy because the gods love it
If this is the case then piety is arbitrary. Because the gods may love one thing one day and love the opposite another day.
This would be a unsatisfactory definiton of piety.
Here, if this is true then we have no rational explanation of moral correctness. We are simply forced to follow god blindly
Furthermore, the belief that morality is special that some actions are worth more than others would become obsolete. It becomes difficult to argue for moral considerations over others.
Some might argue further and say god is good and hence would not just make anything at all moral. However, how does one define goodness here? Isn't anything that god commands good? Furthermore, if goodness is objective then we're back to prong 1 and god is constrained in his actions.

Aristotle -- Basic Argument for Eudaemonia as the Chief Good

All human action is aimed at some sort of good, there is a reason for why we do what we do.
For example: You cook to eat, eat to nourish yourself, nourish yourself for health etc.
However, if actions are always aimed in a hierarchy, each end always trying to appease a further end, then our actions are in effect fruitless and vain.
He argues for a chief good, a good that is good in itself rather than for the sake of something else, and at which all human action ultimately aims: Eudaimonia or Happiness. All actions that we do are ultimately for our happiness.

It is the ultimate good because it is not good for the sake of anything else, all other goods are good for the sake of happiness. It is complete and self-sufficient

What is Eudaemonia?

Nature assigns all beings a characteristic activity; eudaemonia is to do that activity well.

For humans this activity is the ability to reason, we must reason well to be good and to achieve eudaemonia. Therefore, eudaemonia is not something to be possessed, it is an action to be done.

For Aristotle, reasoning well is virtue and being virtuous.
There are two kinds of virtues:
Intellectual: Concerned with proper use of reason
Practical: Attained through habituation, concerned with character (who we are is dependent on our actions)

How Does One Achieve Virtue?

According to Aristotle virtue is habit. The only way to be virtuous is to be virtuous continuously, it is a learned habit.
Being virtuous does not come naturally to anyone, just as being vicious does not come naturally to anyone. (Learning to read analogy)
One must continuously do virtuous actions to be a virtuous person.

Virtue is derived from Habit
Habits cause us to act differently than we naturally would
Virtues have a different origins than natural abilities.

Difference Between Virtue and Natural Ability

Virtue requires work on oneself, it can be (likely will be) difficult.
Natural behaviour is easy, 'it comes naturally'.
For example: our eyes have the natural ability to see, we do not learn to see.
We learn to read, reading is a habit we develop, we do not have the natural ability to comprehend lines on a page as words.
Similarly, virtues are learned by continuously doing virtuous actions.

What is the apparent objection against the argument that virtues are developed habits and that one must continuously do virtuous actions to be virtuous?

The apparent problem: If one becomes a virtuous person by doing virtuous actions continuously throughout life are they not already a virtuous person?

Response: Aristotle explains his response to this via analogy. Consider music; if a baby bangs the drums musically by accident it may be an amazing thing but it does not make the baby a musician. A crank music box plays music perfectly because it is programed to do so, it does not do so intentionally and hence it is not a musician. Virtuous and muscial actions are those that would be performed by a virtuous or musical person. There is a difference between doing virtuous actions and being a virtuous person. Doing virtuous actions may lead to an individual becoming virtuous but it does not guarantee being virtuous. A one off action is not telling of an individuals character, they must continuously do actions to be considered virtuous.

Aristotle told us that three conditions need to be met to count a virtuous action as an action done virtuously:
1. an agent must know what they are doing;
2. she does it for the sake of the virtue; and
3. she has an unshakable character for those actions.

Virtue as a Mean

Virtues are excellences while vices are corruptions of character. To acquire virtue, one must do the relevant actions in the right way, to the right degree, at the right time, etc. One must perform the actions in the middle of excess and deficiency. Virtue is the mean according to Aristotle, the perfect middle. To illustrate this in an example imagine your child spills ice cream on your very expensive new couch. Now, to yell and overreact would not be the right action, it would traumatize the child, after all children make mistake. On the other hand, being completely unbothered by it would not teach the child that what they did was a mistake. The correct action is something in the middle. Giving consequences without trauma.

Context is incredibly important in performing virtuous actions. Aristotle compares this to health, he says that when a doctor examines a cough, he prescribes different medications depending on the context of the cough. Medications for the common cold and pneumonia are very different. It is the same with virtues, one must judge the context to determine their actions.

Voluntariness (Virtue as a Mean cont')

Aristotle also emphasizes voluntariness: one should only be praised for their voluntary actions. (One cannot be praised for say, their heart beating well).

An external first principle where the agent has contributed nothing is considered involuntary. Ignorant actions are involuntary.

Voluntary actions have its first principle in the agent himself.

Rational Choice (Virtue as a Mean Cont')

To understand virtuous actions we need to understand rational choice; rational choice is voluntary but not all voluntary action is rationally chosen. We make a rational choice between options we have for action. Our choice can be good or bad, correct or incorrect. We deliberate our choice, what is in our power, what we have the options to do. Rational choice is the result of deliberation. We deliberate when we are unsure whether an action will serve our end.

When we reason correctly in a given situation, we will arrive at the mean. And if we have the habit to act virtuously, we will tend to perform the mean action. And because we act for virtue's own sake, our virtuous actions are voluntary. Aristotle says that there is a special sort of rationality that we use to hit the mean: calculative reason. We need to deliberate about all the relevant features in a given situation to calculate how to do the mean of the excess or lack off.

The Phronimos

The phronimos (Practical wisdom) is an expert at calculative reason: she reasons correctly and so acts virtuously. Phronesis is a type of wisdom because the person who is practically wise acts virtuously—she gets it right. The phronimos is an ideal—she is the perfect practical reasoner who always acts well. How does she do it? She has developed a virtue to see the moral truth. • She filters out irrelevant considerations and acts on the correct ones.

Phronesis helps us achieve eudaimonia because:
1. We will reason well regarding means to ends.
2. But we must also have the right end in mind, so we need the virtue

Where does Hobbes think our ideas of good and evil come from? Explain the implications of this view for the objectivity of morality.

Hobbes rejects Aristotle's idea of some chief good or anything that is objectively good for all. He believes that our good and evil are derived from our desires and aversions. We apply the words good and bad to the objects of desire/aversion. What is good is relative to the person's desires. Each person's good may be different because they are attracted and averse to different objects.

Implications: deliberations ultimately arrives at apparent good or evil. The truth cannot always be known to us, we can only try to reason well about satisfying desires and avoiding what we are averse to.

Why do we not have a good reason to follow self-destructive desires? (Ethical Egoism)

Ethical Egoism ensures this: Ethical egoism is an enlightened selfishness. An action is right if and only if: it maximizes my self- interest.
- Actions that do not harm my interest are permissible.
- Actions that harm my interest are wrong.
My self-interest is the sum of my desires and aversions: by fulfilling as many of these as possible, I will maximize my self-interest.

When we deliberate, we do more than arrange and weigh passions. We think about their consequences, and weigh those costs as well. Example: I desire to do heroin, but I see that it might also kill me (something I am deeply averse to) as a consequence. So, the heroin desire turns out to misrepresent what is good for me, even if it brings me immediate pleasure.
Note that the ability to evaluate the consequences of my passions is imperfect: I might make mistakes and sometimes it isn't possible to foresee consequences.

***Our happiness depends on constant success at satisfying desires and avoiding that to which we are averse.

Self-interest does not mean what I think my self-interest is: I can be wrong. This is what allows us to differentiate Ethical Egoism from a simple subjectivism. There is a fact, relative to my desires, which maximizes my interests.
I can fail to know or see what is actually in my interest. To discover my real interest, I need to deliberate well about my desires and how to satisfy them. So, I can choose to do heroin, but this will likely put an end to my ability to satisfy many other important desires that I have. So I shouldn't do it.

The State of Nature and Contractualism -- Hobbes

Hobbes argues that given our self-interest, we are necessarily driven to conflict. We are driven to gain more and more power to be able to satisfy our desires.
1. We will compete over goods.
2. We will preemptively fight to secure what we have.
3. We will be led to conflict because we are prideful.

As a result, it is rational for us to agree to a contract. We should agree to restrain our ability to serve our own ends insofar as it stops others serving their own ends. So, the contract places a mutual limit on our freedom in order each of us to better serve our happiness.

This is derived from Ethical Egoism as it will maximize our self-interest by constraining some options.

Free Rider Problem

Suppose that we agree to make stealing wrong. No one steals, and everyone is advantaged by it. As it turns out, you have an opportunity to steal $1 million and no one will find out—no consequences. In this situation, you ought to steal despite the agreement, because it maximizes your self-interest. You have taken advantage of the system that protects everyone's interest because it served your own interest and do not suffer for it.

Hume's Rejection of Rational Morality

Reason cannot bring us to action, whereas sentiment moves us
- When I engage in reasoning, I merely end up with another thought—never action.
- Without sentiment, desire, and interest, there is no action

When we look at why we praise and blame actions, characters, etc., we discover a connection with our sentiments and interests
- What he finds is that everything that is good is useful or has utility, it serves and interest
- He finds that everything that is bad is useless, serves no interest

Consequently, if something is not beneficial or useful, it is not good. We distinguish between good and bad based on its usefulness.
E.g., generosity is good because perhaps it is useful to others. Manners are good because it is useful for social coordination.

Hume's Argument Against Selfishness

If selfishness was the root of our judgments of goodness, it could not explain why we talk about past people or actions as being good.
Since selfishness cannot adequately explain our moral judgments and feelings, we have to look at an expanded interest. Hume thinks we find actions good or bad because we find them useful to the species/society/the human community.
The feeling that arises in us when we imagine the far off virtuous person is sympathy: concern for the interest of others/society. A good action resonates with our feelings of sympathy.

For example: In a movie, I witness a person keep a promise. This has no bearing on my interest, however I feel sympathy with their action and think they did the right thing. I think that it is useful for us, collectively, to keep promises. It is in all of our interests that promises are kept.

Hume is a common-sense kind of guy—there is no need for special theories, our feelings of sympathy are triggered when we recognize actions are useful to society. Custom leads the way.

Kant's Concept of the "Good Will"

"It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be taken to be good without limitation, except a good will."

Will = intention, can be good or bad
The good will is good without limitation as it cannot be affected by external factors.
An individuals actions only have moral worth when the quality of their will is good. The consequences of said actions do not matter, only the maxim, the principle from which the will originates, matters.
One can have an incredible resolve, however, this can be good or bad dependent on their will. The effects of our will cannot determine its quality, if we do an action with good will but bad consequences we are not liable for it.
Kant asks us to suppose that a person who has a good will never has the opportunity to act, the moral worth of their decision is just as good as having acted on it. What matters in evaluating them is the quality of the will. What determines a good will is us and reason, not the effects of my actions.

Kant's Concept of "Duty"

Any actions or will inconsistent with duty cannot have moral worth, nor can any action that may follow duty but that is done with personal inclination rather than purely good will. The first point is straightforward, any action that is not in accordance to one's duty cannot have moral worth. For example, the duty to remain truthful, so lying would have no moral value. The second example is slightly more complex, and Kant provides an analogy to explain it: (Shopkeeper example). According to Kant, for an action to have moral worth, one must ignore the positive or negative effects on oneself and do the morally right thing from duty rather than just doing an action in accordance with duty for the wrong reasons

One's intentions are determined by two influencing factors: the a priori principle and the a posteriori incentive. The priori principle refers to the moral law itself, it is priori because it is not dependent on any prior experience. The posteriori incentive is the material, it refers to desires, inclinations and potential consequences of actions. The will, then, is stuck between these two factors, and Kant believes that duty is what ensures that we make the correct decision. Duty grounds good will to take the priori principle and do the morally right thing

Duty and Respect for the Law

We do our duty because we ought to do it—it is required. Our moral duty has a necessary claim on us—our desires have no claim. Our desires come and go. Duty presents itself to us not as an inclination/desire but as a necessity.

We respect its authority as law. So, when we recognize our duty, it has a grip on us as authoritative. And when we act from duty, we respect the law. Again, my desires might conflict with the moral law and moral reasons. I ought to adjust my motivations because it is required by moral law.

Necessitation

Necessitation appears to us as rational agents as an 'ought'. I might will some thing else than what I ought to will: but this will not change what I ought to will. This just shows that human beings are, in some sense, free to determine their will according to maxims. The moral question is: which maxim do I adopt?

I have the power to will contrary to moral reasons despite the experience of their necessity. Necessitation is normativity: that the reason makes a claim on me, no matter what I want to do or how I will.
Consider a case where you decide to act against a moral reason—it bears down on you usually producing guilt (a psychological effect) because it has force.

Kant's Categorical Imperative

Imperatives
- Imperatives are normative statements, statements that include an ought: 'you ought to perform this action'
- So the laws of practical reason will be expressed in imperative form

Kant introduces two main kinds of imperatives:

Hypothetical Imperatives
- Hypothetical imperatives represent actions as good for some purpose
- 'you ought to perform this action in order to achieve this end' 'if you have this end, then you ought to perform this action'
- You ought to take the means appropriate to your ends
- Maxims are evaluated based on the effectiveness of the means for achieving the end

Categorical Imperatives
- Categorical imperatives represent an action as good in itself, without reference to an end: you ought to perform this action
- Kant says it is the form of the maxim: a categorical imperative 'concerns not the matter of the action or what is to result from it, but the form and the principle from which it does itself follow'

The CI is a practical law: it is necessary. The CI depends on nothing for it is a normative force: it is unconditional (View necessitation)
The command applies to rational agents no matter what they think, want, etc. This is why the CI is a law: laws are not optional, their force is unconditional and universal.

The HI is in a sense optional: I can give up my ends if I so choose.• The normative force of HIs are conditional and situated.

Types of Duties

Duty to Self VS Duty to Others

Imperfect duties: apply only in certain circumstances
- I can't be beneficent if I am poor

Perfect Duties: apply in all circumstances
- I should always not kill myself

Categorical Imperative Formulations

Used to determine whether our maxims align with the categorical imperative.

Universal Law Formulation: act according to the maxim which you can accept as a universal law
- For example; promise-keeping, would you be ok with promises never being kept?

Humanity Formulation: Rational agents are ends in themselves with absolute worth.
- For example: hiring you for a job and refusing to pay is wrong. We must respect the inherent value people have as humans

The Autonomy Formulation: The will of every rational agent is a universally legislating will.
- We make the universal laws just as we follow them

Freedom -- for these formulations to be possible humans must be free to determine their maxims/wills.

Utilitarianism is based on two main tenants. What are those tenants?

Hedonism: Hedonism is the claim that the good is pleasure. Pleasure is not just one of many good things: pleasure is the good. Pain is bad. In some sense, what is good and what is bad is going to correlate to pleasure and pain.

Consequentialism: it identifies the rightness/goodness of an act with its consequences. Do not value intentions. They care about the effects of actions.

"Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness"
Hedonism appears with the appeal to happiness.
Consequentialism appears in the phrase 'tending to promote/produce'

Act Utilitarianism

To evaluate an action's morality:
1. Determine who is affected by the action.(consequences+equality)
2. Determine whether they are pleased or pained by the action.(hedonism)
3. Aggregate all of the pleasures and pains that an action causes or would cause. (proportion)
4. If the act produces a net positive outcome, then it is right/acceptable. Otherwise it is unacceptable.

When defining this DO NOT STATE: "the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people".
Act-utilitarianism only cares about the greatest happiness—the number of people does not matter.

Doctrine of Swine Objection

Doctrine of Swine objection: the objection worries that the death of a pig is not as significant as the death of a human child, and utilitarianism cannot explain this difference. Its commitment to equality via sentience forces this judgment. The objection assumes that not all pleasures and pains are worth the same but utilitarianism must treat them the same.

Response to Doctrine of Swine Objection

Mill's response: quality of pleasure/pain matters, not just quantity. There are higher and lower pleasures and pains. The pleasures associated with base needs like eating, sleep, sex etc. are pleasures common to all sentient beings. But humans have the capacity to develop higher pleasures and lower pains. We have the capacity to feel a depth of pleasure and pain that other species do not.
Mill says that there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.

It is unquestionable that those who know higher pleasures, who know both pleasures of mere sensation and the appreciate the importance of higher pleasures of intellect would never choose to be changed into the lower animals even if with a smaller capacity they are more likely to feel the full capacity of their pleasure. No intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. The reason is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, in proportion to their higher faculties. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied, than a pig satisfied.

Demandingness Objection

Effectively, act-utilitarianism asks us to look out for the happiness of the world. This is quite the demand for the average person who does not have very much effect in the world.

Response: We only need to concern everyone on special occasions: when I am in a position to affect everyone.
Typically, my actions affect only a few, so it is no great demand on individuals to consider how they affect those near to them.

Rule-Utilitarianism

We calculate happiness by the tendency of acts of a type to produce pleasure and pain. Give us a set of ready rules to use to determine how to act. These rules are justified by utility.

The reason Mill introduces rule-utilitarianism: Many people find the implication that the ends justify the means of act-utilitarianism unpalatable. It seems to give many unethical results if the consequences are aligned. He describes the view (rule) as a response to demandingness: there are moral rules supported by utility that allow us to avoid considering everyone all the time.

Rule Utilitarianism focuses on rules or policies for action, not particular actions. We will still focus on the consequences of our actions, but we calculate happiness by the tendency/historical pattern of certain acts to produce pleasure and pain. Here, it is never right to lie even though, on this one occasion, lying would produce net positive happiness. In act-utilitarianism, it is right to lie whenever it produces net positive happiness.

Mills claim that happiness is the only desirable thing

The argument:
Ends in themselves are desirable: they compel our action
Like visible and audible things, the desirable is known by being desired
And each person desires her happiness
So, each person's happiness is desirable—an end in itself
If each person's happiness is desirable, then the happiness of all is desirable
So, the happiness of all is desirable
So, the happiness of all compels our action

This argument only establishes one half of utilitarianism: that happiness is good. Mill now needs to argue that every other good depends on happiness.

He applies the same reasoning to each candidate: the only thing that makes X worthwhile in the first place is as a means to happiness; once one develops a habit to pursue X, X makes one happy. X is a part of one's happiness.

Example: Money.
I pursue money to make me happy. Eventually, making money makes me feel happy. Thus, happiness is the end.

Williams Negative Responsibility

Negative responsibility: If I am ever responsible for anything, then I must be responsible for things that I allow or fail to prevent, as I am for things that I myself bring about. The point here is that I am morally responsible for the states in the world that my actions bring about, including how my actions cause other to act and thereby bring about states of affairs.

Utilitarianism is focused on impartiality: we are all equal, no one is worth more than another. Williams thinks that negative responsibility pushes impartiality to the extreme. It doesn't matter who directly brings abut the best state of affairs. It only matters that each contributes to it rather than doing nothing or worse.

Williams Argument Against Utilitarianism

If a moral theory leaves essential values unexplained, then it is flawed
Personal integrity and responsibility are essential values
Utilitarianism can account for personal integrity and responsibility by agent affect
But agent affect is not coherent in utilitarianism
Utilitarianism leaves unexplained personal integrity and responsibility
Utilitarianism is a flawed moral theory

Williams believes that utilitarianism can force individuals to abandon or significantly alter the projects that give their lives meaning. This ultimately leads to a reduction of the self, as the individual becomes merely an instrument for achieving a supposedly greater good. The individual becomes, in essence, a tool for maximizing desirable outcomes, rather than an agent pursuing their own meaningful projects and commitments

Example Illustration

Consider George: George who has just taken his Ph.D. in chemistry, finds it difficult to get a job. An older chemist says that he can George a decently paid job in a lab which does research into chemical warfare. George says that he cannot accept this, since he is opposed to warfare. The older man replies that he is not too keen on it himself, but George's refusal is not going to make the job or the lab. go away; what is more, if George refuses the job, it will certainly go to a contemporary of George's who is not inhibited by such scruples and is likely to push the research with greater zeal than George would. What should George do?

Consider Jim: Jim finds himself in the central square of a small South American town. Tied up against the wall are a row of twenty [indigenous people], most terrified. A heavy man in a khaki shirt turns out to be the captain in charge and explains that the [indigenous people] are a random group of the inhabitants who, after recent acts of protest against the government, are about to be killed. However, since Jim is an honoured visitor from another land, the captain is happy to offer him a guest's privilege of killing one of the [indigenous people] himself. If Jim accepts, then the other [indigenous captives] will be let off.

Examples cont'

In both of the above cases utilitarianism would urge both agents to act to preserve the most lives/do the least damage. This would result in a loss of integrity and personal values for both.

Utilitarianism can allow anything, even horrible actions completely separate from you and your values as a person, to be permissible under the right circumstances. Because utilitarianism fails to consider important factors about an agent, integrity, it fails as a theory.

Utilitarianism may respond to this by saying that the negative effects of acting against ones integrity can be brought into the fold as pain and hence integrity may be considered. However, Williams finds this insufficient and irrational according to utilitarianism.

According to utilitarianism you do nothing wrong in either examples by acting, so there is no reason for you to "feel bad". There is no reason to feel bad for doing the right action. We should bring our feelings in line with morality not the other way around.

Foot's Central Concern with Consequentialism

She believes that the reasons so many people are continuously drawn to consequentialism, despite its many objections/flaws, is because we all collectively believe that it would be absurd to prefer a worse state of affairs than better.

This forces us to commit to consequentialism:
The reason Jim must kill one instead of no one is because killing no one will lead to a worse state of affairs. Jim cannot rationally prefer a worse state of affairs over a better one—the one involving him killing one person.
Given the comparison of available outcomes, we just can't make sense of how it is rational to not kill one person in this case. Consequentialism forces itself upon us because of objective facts about wellbeing.

This thought process automatically pushes individuals towards utilitarianism:
Premise 1: it can never be right to prefer worse state of affairs to abetter.
P2: best and worst states of affairs are evaluated by well being.
P3: Utilitarianism accommodates the thought best.
Therefore, utilitarianism is the right moral theory.

Foot believes that our issue is with the assumption that a so-called "good state of affairs exists": we go wrong in accepting the idea that there are better and worse states in the sense that consequentialism requires.

Good state of affairs according to Foot

Consider sports: your favourite team is winning the championship game, you would consider this good, however, the opposing team likely will not.
It would be strange to suggest that your team winning is an objective good, it is not. It is relative to your feelings.

It is not even necessarily selfish. The good is relative to the context; say there is a massive earthquake and it is reported that 100 people died. But later reporters realize theres been a mistake and only 50 people died. One would consider this good. Objectively, it is not good for anyone to die, however, in this context 50 deaths is less than 100 and hence it is considered good.

Utilitarianism Response

Remember utilitarianism and the thought are committed to thinking that there is an objectively, neutrally good state of affairs.
This conflicts with our natural usage since it is not interest guided. To accommodate this fact, utilitarianism is committed to thinking that there is a speaker interest usage and the objective fact usage.
When I speak about my horse, there is a good relative to my interest and an objective good.

For example:
Suppose the robbers think that the new burglar alarm is a bad thing.This according to Foot's analysis is an intelligible thought to have for them. But, for utilitarianism, there is also an available thought for everyone, including the robbers, that the burglar alarm is a good thing because it preserves property.
The robbers can intelligibly say that it is bad and good (in different respects)

So in effect there are two "goods" the speaker relative good (that is dependent on what we value/have interest in) and the objective good (that we understand by considering multiple perspectives)

Foot Response

The utilitarian explanation of objectively good state's of affairs just doesn't track the way we tend to think in many cases—we lack a thought about objective good.

For example, say you lost a large sum of money. For you this is very very bad, now say a very honest police officer finds said money and returns it to you. This is good. You do not consider the other possibilities related to this incident: a homeless person finding the money and affording food etc.

For this objection to stand utilitarianism would need to show that we have this thought of the objective good all the time, but that is simply not true.

Foot for Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is particularly effective for Foot because it can accommodate the "good state of affairs" thought, when it is appropriate and when it is not.

Foot discusses two virtues: benevolence and justice:
Benevolence can be understood as helping others, even maximizing such help and minimizing misery
Justice has to do with what is owed to persons
Consider the innocent execution: maybe benevolence, the situation looks much different
Justice requires giving people their due, eg., that we respect their rights
To execute an innocent is to unduly harm them— it is an injustice par excellence
So, we have competing virtues: benevolence says to execute, and justice says absolutely not.
However, justice forbids while benevolence recommends
Justice seems to win out, so there is no better state of affairs— it is simply wrong to execute that innocent person.

- The idea is that virtue ethics doesn't necessitate thinking about good/bad states of affairs
- It can describe some situations in good or bad ways such as in cases of benevolence
- However, in matters of justice, the consequences and states of affairs just aren't relevant—what matters is receiving one's due
- Our compulsion to think about better states of affairs is grounded in an illusion