C H A P T E R 3 Skepticism and Subjectivism

Q: What is moral nihilism?

A: Moral nihilism is the view that morality does not objectively exist and that moral claims are ultimately meaningless.

Q: How does moral nihilism differ from cultural relativism?

A: Cultural relativism sees morality as relative to culture, while moral nihilism denies that morality has any real justification at all.

Q: Do moral nihilists act morally?

A: Some do, but not because they believe in morality—rather, they might conform to avoid punishment or out of personal preference.

Q: How is Friedrich Nietzsche connected to moral nihilism?

A: Nietzsche critiqued traditional morality and called for a "revaluation of all values," but scholars debate whether he rejected morality entirely or sought to redefine it.

Q: Who was Thrasymachus, and how does he relate to moral nihilism?

A: Thrasymachus, in Plato’s Republic, argued that justice is merely the "interest of the stronger," a view that undermines the idea of objective morality.

Q: How does Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment illustrate the idea of morality as a social construct?

A: The novel follows Raskolnikov, a student who believes that morality is just a convention meant to restrain the weak. He argues that truly great individuals can and should rise above morality if it helps them achieve higher goals.

Q: What is the key question in the discussion of morality and custom?

A: The central issue is whether morality has an independent justification or if it is merely a set of customs that people follow out of habit, without deeper reasoning.

Q: What does Raskolnikov’s failure suggest about morality?

A: After committing murder, he suffers intense guilt and paranoia, suggesting that morality might not be just a social construct but something deeply ingrained in human psychology.

Q: What is the key difference between moral nihilism and the belief that the strong can override moral rules?

A: - Moral nihilism rejects all morality as meaningless.

• Raskolnikov’s view keeps morality but gives special rights to the strong, making it a new moral system rather than nihilism.

Q: How does Friedrich Nietzsche challenge traditional morality?

A: Nietzsche argues that we must re-evaluate morality, questioning whether it is truly good or simply a tool used to control people. He specifically criticizes Christian morality, which he sees as promoting humility, meekness, and self-denial—values he considers part of a "slave morality."

Q: What does Nietzsche mean by "slave morality"?

A: Slave morality, according to Nietzsche, is a moral system developed by the weak to restrain the strong. It values traits like humility, obedience, and self-sacrifice, which Nietzsche sees as life-denying rather than life-promoting.

Q: How does Nietzsche propose we evaluate moral values?

A: Nietzsche suggests that morality should be judged by whether it is "life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, and species-cultivating." If a moral system no longer serves these purposes, it should be replaced with a more positive and empowering set of values.

Q: What is the difference between "good and evil" and "good and bad" in Nietzsche's philosophy?

A: Nietzsche argues that traditional morality divides actions into good and evil, which is a moral framework imposed by the weak. Instead, he proposes a morality of "good and bad," where good means strong, creative, and powerful, while bad simply refers to the absence of strength and greatness rather than moral evil.

Q: Is Nietzsche a moral nihilist?

A: No. While Nietzsche rejects traditional morality, he does not argue that morality itself is meaningless. Instead, he seeks to replace outdated values with a morality that allows the strong to assert themselves, rather than being constrained by rules designed to protect the weak.

Q: What is Individual Subjectivism in morality?

A: Individual Subjectivism is the view that moral truths are relative to each individual, meaning that each person's moral beliefs are valid for them, but there is no objective moral truth that applies to everyone.

Q: How does Individual Subjectivism differ from Cultural Relativism?

A: Cultural Relativism holds that morality is defined by cultural norms, meaning different cultures have different moral codes. In contrast, Individual Subjectivism claims that morality is personal, varying from person to person, rather than being determined by a shared cultural standard.

Q: How does Individual Subjectivism compare moral judgments to personal taste?

A: Just as people can prefer different flavors of ice cream (e.g., chocolate vs. vanilla) without either being objectively right or wrong, Individual Subjectivism argues that moral disagreements are similarly based on personal preferences rather than objective truths.

Q: What is the main appeal of Individual Subjectivism?

A: The main appeal is that it dissolves moral disagreements—if moral beliefs are just personal preferences, then conflicts over morality are not genuine contradictions but simply differences in opinion, much like differences in taste.

Q: What is a major problem with Individual Subjectivism?

A: It implies that moral disagreements are no more important than disputes about personal preferences, making it difficult to justify moral condemnation of harmful actions (e.g., murder, slavery) since each person's opinion is equally valid. This raises concerns about whether subjectivism undermines the seriousness of morality.

Q: What is Expressivism in moral philosophy?

A: Expressivism is the view that moral judgments do not state objective facts or even personal beliefs but instead express emotions or attitudes. For example, saying “Lying is wrong” is like expressing disapproval of lying rather than stating a factual claim.

Q: How does Expressivism differ from Individual Subjectivism?

A: Individual Subjectivism holds that moral judgments express factual statements about a person's moral attitudes(e.g., "I disapprove of lying"). In contrast, Expressivism argues that moral judgments only express emotions or attitudes(e.g., saying "Lying is wrong" is like saying "Boo to lying!"), without stating any facts about the speaker.

Q: What is Ayer’s argument for Expressivism?

A: A.J. Ayer argued that moral disagreements often stem from differences in factual knowledge, and once people agree on the facts, the dispute may disappear. But if the disagreement remains even after agreeing on all facts, it shows that moral judgments are just expressions of emotion rather than factual statements.

Q: What was Charles Stevenson’s improvement to Expressivism?

A: Stevenson argued that moral judgments not only express emotions but also aim to persuade others to share the same emotions. Unlike cheering for a sports team, where persuasion isn't the goal, moral language tries to influence others' attitudes and actions.

Q: What is a major criticism of Expressivism?

A: Expressivism struggles to explain why some moral views (e.g., racism, genocide) seem objectively wrong. If moral judgments are just emotional expressions, then condemning racism is no different from expressing a dislike for a food. This intuitive problem makes many question whether Expressivism provides a satisfying account of morality.

Q: What is the main idea behind Objective Moral Concepts?

A: Objective moral concepts hold that some moral truths are independent of personal opinions or cultural perspectives. They suggest that moral facts exist and can be discovered, rather than being created by individuals or societies.

Q: What is Bernard Williams' distinction between thin and thick ethical concepts?

A: Williams distinguishes between:

• Thin concepts (e.g., right, wrong, good, bad), which mainly express approval or disapproval.

• Thick concepts (e.g., kind, brave, generous, cruel), which combine a descriptive element with moral evaluation. For example, calling someone “kind” implies both a factual description of their actions and moral approval.

Q: How do thick ethical concepts support moral objectivism?

A: Thick concepts contain descriptive content that makes it objectively false to misuse them. For example, calling someone “kind” when they stub out a cigarette on your arm seems objectively incorrect. This suggests that some moral claims are grounded in objective reality, not just personal opinion.

Q: What is the subjectivist challenge to thick moral concepts?

A: Subjectivists argue that the descriptive and evaluative aspects of thick concepts can be separated. For instance, a Martian anthropologist with no moral values could still describe human actions as “kind” without approving of them. This implies that moral approval is subjective and separate from factual description.

Q: What is John McDowell’s argument against the subjectivist view?

A: McDowell argues that descriptive and evaluative elements in moral concepts cannot be separated. He suggests that you cannot truly understand concepts like "kindness" without recognizing their moral value. This supports moral objectivism, as it implies that moral qualities are real aspects of the world, not just personal opinions.

Q: How do subjectivist theories and J. L. Mackie’s error theory explain moral language and judgments?

A: Subjectivist theories, particularly expressivism, argue that moral language is deceptive—it seems to state objective facts but actually expresses emotions or attitudes. For example, “Hitler was evil” is seen as expressing disapproval rather than attributing an objective property to him. On the other hand, J. L. Mackie’s error theory accepts that moral statements assume the existence of objective values, but he argues that these claims are false because objective moral values do not exist. Error theory is a form of moral nihilism because it denies that moral truths exist, rendering moral claims like “Hitler was evil” erroneous.

Q: Why is error theory considered nihilistic, and how does it differ from expressivism?

A: Error theory is considered nihilistic because it claims that all moral statements are false due to the non-existence of objective moral values. It argues that moral judgments, such as “Hitler was evil,” are based on the false assumption of objective morality. While expressivism reinterprets moral statements as expressions of emotion rather than factual claims, error theory holds that these statements are meaningfully false. Mackie rejects the existence of objective moral properties because they would need to be radically different from anything else, which we have no evidence for.

Q: What is the argument from queerness in Mackie’s error theory?

A: The argument from queerness claims that objective values would be so strange and unlike anything else in the universe that it is hard to believe they exist. Mackie argues that objective values would be entities or qualities unlike anything we know in the physical realm, raising deep metaphysical and epistemological questions about their nature and how we would recognize or be motivated by them.

Q: What is the metaphysical question raised by the argument from queerness?

A: The metaphysical question is: What would an objective value be? If objective values existed, they would not belong to the physical realm. They would need to be distinct entities, yet we have no idea what they would look like or where they could exist, making the concept of objective values seem odd or “queer.”

Q: What is the epistemological challenge posed by the argument from queerness?

A: The epistemological challenge is: How can we know about objective values? Since objective values are imagined to exist outside the physical realm, it’s unclear how we could come to know or recognize them. This presents a challenge for epistemology, the study of knowledge—specifically, how knowledge of such strange entities is possible.

Q: How does the subjectivist view answer the metaphysical, epistemological, and motivational questions raised by Mackie?

A: The subjectivist answers these questions by stating that values are preferences or emotions, which are familiar and real things we encounter within ourselves. These subjective values do not have to exist in a separate, non-physical realm. We know them through introspection (like knowing pain), and we are motivated to pursue them because they are our own values, not something imposed by an external reality.

Q: How does Mackie’s argument from queerness support error theory?

A: Mackie’s argument from queerness supports error theory by showing that objective values would have to be odd, non-physical entities that we cannot understand or be motivated by in a way that makes sense. Since objective values don’t seem to exist in any comprehensible form, error theory concludes that all moral judgments presupposing their existence are false.

Q: What is the challenging difficulty for subjectivism, nihilism, and error theory when it comes to approving or disapproving of actions?

A: The challenging difficulty is understanding why we approve or disapprove of certain actions in the first place. For example, when we approve of a kind action, it’s unclear whether that approval is just a personal expression of preference or if it’s rooted in a deeper understanding that helping others is objectively good.

Q: What is the critique of subjectivism based on the recognition that we approve of kind actions?

A: The critique suggests that subjectivism ultimately rests on objectivism. If we approve of kind actions, it’s because we implicitly recognize that helping others is objectively good. Thus, subjectivism may not fully explain why we approve of actions, as it presupposes a recognition of objective moral values.