Short, J. R. A new world order isn’t coming, it’s already here − and this is what it looks like. The Conversation. https://doi.org/10.64628/AAI.9qyeyxrqn

Summary

Short argues that we are no longer waiting for a "new world order" — the shift has already taken place. The post–Cold War era of a U.S.-dominated “unipolar” global order has ended. Instead, a multipolar, fluid global order is emerging, shaped by several power centers (the U.S., China, Europe, and others) with shifting alliances, rising economic nationalism, military realignments, and growing influence of the Global South.

Rather than a smooth transition, the new order is unstable and in flux. As a result, global politics is likely to be characterized by uncertainty, constant negotiation, and competition — with traditional institutions, alliances, and rules-based global governance giving way to economic rivalry, strategic realignment, and regional power dynamics.

Key arguments/points

1. The historic “world orders” have shifted — we are no longer in the U.S.-led unipolar era

• Short sketches a history: from the 19th-century British imperial order, to 20th-century imperial rivalries (1880–1945), to the bipolar Cold War (1945–1991), to a brief unipolar world centered on U.S. dominance (1991–2008). UMBC

• But that unipolar moment ended: the combination of global wars, protracted conflict (terrorism, interventions), and economic crises (like 2008) weakened the U.S.’s ability — and the world’s appetite — for maintaining the prior order. Connecticut Post+1

→ The global era dominated by a single superpower and a rules-based order has ended.

2. A multipolar world is emerging, with multiple power centers and shifting global dynamics

• Short identifies at least four sources of power in the new order: the U.S., China, Europe, and (increasingly) various countries in the Global South. Metropolitan Digital+1

• The U.S remains important (territory, economy, military advantage), but no longer unchallenged. UMBC

• China — under strong leadership — is aspiring to a “Sino-centric” world influence; Europe is re-militarizing; and Global South countries are acting more independently, hedging between powers. UMBC+2Houston Chronicle+2

→ Influence is more distributed; global politics is becoming regionalized and competitive rather than hierarchical and stable.

3. Economic nationalism & declining faith in globalization replace neoliberal globalization and “free trade”

• The unipolar era was characterized by globalization, free trade, and frictionless global supply chains. Short argues that these are now unraveling. UMBC+1

• In their place, there is growing economic nationalism, protectionism, tariffs — a rollback of globalization's golden age. Asia Times+1

• This shift is both a response to and cause of the reshaping of global power — manufacturing has shifted, populist backlash has grown, and economic competition between powers intensifies. The Fulcrum+1

→ The global economic order is being remade: less integration, more rivalry and national economic interests.

4. Military realignments and re-militarization reshape alliances and security dynamics

• Because global dominance is no longer assured, many states are rethinking alliances and defense policies. The burden of security is shifting; allies are expected to contribute more. UMBC+1

• Europe, for example, is remilitarizing after decades of relative demilitarization. Some countries have joined military blocs (e.g. recent NATO expansions). Connecticut Post+1

• As a result, old alliances may transform; new ones may emerge; and security competition could intensify in multiple regions. Houston Chronicle+1

→ Global security architecture is in flux; the “rules-based” security order is giving way to a more fragmented, multipolar defense environment.

5. The Global South matters more — hedging, independence, and complexity increase

• Short points out that many countries in the Global South (e.g. large states like India, Indonesia, Brazil) are no longer simply pawns of the major powers. They act independently, hedging between competing powers rather than aligning permanently. UMBC+1

• The old world’s division (superpowers vs satellites) is dissolving; global influence is more diffused.

• This complexity adds unpredictability: alliances may shift; regional dynamics may matter more than global rules. Connecticut Post+1

→ The new order is more pluralistic and unstable; global governance will need to reckon with more diverse actors and shifting loyalties.

6. The new world order is not stable — we are in a period of flux, competition, and uncertainty

• Short emphasizes that what exists today is not a fixed order — it is a transitional phase. Old institutions and norms have weakened, but new ones have not yet consolidated. UMBC+1

• This transitional world brings risks: competition over resources, trade, military advantage, and influence; potential for conflict in contested spaces (oceans, cyberspace, space, Arctic, etc.). Connecticut Post+1

• At the same time, there remain opportunities — for new alliances, cooperation on global problems (climate, pandemics), and reconfiguration of global governance. Asia Times+1

→ The next several decades will likely be marked by volatility, negotiation, and redefinition of global power.

Lecture (Causes)

Causes of the Fall of the LIEO (According to Short) 1. 9/11, the War on Terror, and U.S. overreach

Short argues that U.S. power was overextended and delegitimized, especially through:

• The unilateral invasion of Iraq

• Prolonged failures in Afghanistan

• The expansion of surveillance, militarism, and exceptionalism

These events weakened U.S. credibility, strained alliances, and signaled the decline of the U.S. as the unquestioned global hegemon.

Why it matters:
The LIEO relied on U.S. leadership. When its leader became inconsistent, militarized, and less respected, the system eroded.

2. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis

Short sees 2008 as a pivotal moment:

• It exposed flaws in Western capitalism.

• It undermined U.S. ideological authority (free markets, deregulation).

• It accelerated the rise of China as an alternative model.

Why it matters:
The crisis shattered the myth that the West’s economic model was universally superior—undercutting the ideological backbone of the LIEO.

3. Rise of China and the BRICS

Short describes a profound shift in global power:

• China becomes a technological, economic, and geopolitical rival.

• BRICS nations increasingly coordinate against Western dominance.

• The “rest” no longer accepts Western-imposed rules unquestioningly.

Why it matters:
A multipolar world replaces U.S. primacy, disrupting the LIEO’s assumption of a Western-led world.

4. Free trade → outsourcing → economic populism

Short emphasizes that globalization:

• Shifted manufacturing to the Global South

• Deindustrialized Western economies

• Produced inequality and resentment

• Fueled right-wing and left-wing populist movements

Why it matters:
The internal political foundations of the LIEO collapse when citizens lose trust in globalization and reject elite-led internationalism.

Lecture (Consequences)

Consequences of the Fall of the LIEO (According to Short)

1. From a U.S.-dominated “rules-based order” to a multipolar one

Short’s central thesis:
We aren’t transitioning to a new order. We are already living in a new, fragmented, multipolar order.

The main poles now include:

• China (economic + technological superpower)

• United States (weakened but still powerful)

• Global South (assertive through BRICS+, regional alliances)

• Europe (becoming a distinct geopolitical actor rather than a U.S. appendage)

Meaning:
No single country dictates the “rules” anymore.
Instead, global politics is shaped by competing systems of rules.

Summary of Lecture

J. R. Short argues that the postwar Liberal International Economic Order has already collapsed due to a combination of geopolitical crises, economic disruptions, and shifting power dynamics. Key events such as 9/11, the War on Terror, and the 2008 financial crisis exposed U.S. weaknesses and eroded its legitimacy, while the rise of China and the BRICS created credible alternatives to Western leadership. Free trade and globalized production hollowed out Western economies, fueling domestic populism and undermining support for globalization itself. As a result, the old U.S.-dominated “rules-based order” has been replaced by a new, multipolar world structured around several competing power centers—China, the United States, the Global South, and increasingly Europe. This fragmented order is not emerging; it already exists.