ART 6-10

What does Article 6 of the Civil Code provide about waiver of rights?

• Rights may be waived

• UNLESS the waiver is contrary to :

  • law,

  • public order,

  • public policy,

  • morals, or

  • good customs,

  • or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

How is "waiver" defined in Philippine jurisprudence?

The intentional relinquishment of a known right (Castro v. Del Rosario, 19 SCRA 196).

What are the requisites for a valid waiver of a right under Article 6?

1. The right must already exist at the time of waiver;

2. the party must have actual or constructive knowledge of the right and its material facts;

3. the waiver must be a clear, intentional relinquishment (express or by unequivocal acts); and

4. it must not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs, or prejudicial to a third person's recognized right.

Must a waiver always be shown by an express stipulation?

No; it may also be shown by acts admitting no other reasonable explanation (Arrieta v. National Rice and Corn Corporation, 10 SCRA 79).

What must exist at the time of the waiver for it to be validly made?

The right itself must already be in existence at the time of the waiver, and it must be exercised by a duly capacitated person actually possessing that right (Ereñeta v. Bezore, 54 SCRA 13).

When is a waiver considered "knowing and intelligent"?

• When the person knows a right exists and has adequate knowledge to make an intelligent decision, with awareness of the right's consequences;

• this must be illustrated on the record or by evidence, not presumed (Consunji v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001).

Does ignorance of a material fact negate a claimed waiver?

Yes; where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which a waiver of it can rest, and waiver cannot be established by consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact (Consunji v. Court of Appeals).

On what grounds is a waiver prohibited under Article 6?

If it is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

A law grants tenants of public land a preferential right to purchase the land they till. A tenant later signs a document appearing to waive this preferential right. Is the waiver valid?

Answer: No.

Law: Article 6, as applied in Gongon v. Court of Appeals (32 SCRA 412).

Application: The statute embodies a public policy of providing landless citizens with land of their own; a waiver of a right founded on public policy is void under Article 6.

Conclusion: The tenant's waiver of his preferential right is null and void.

A disabled employee, entitled by law to a certain amount of compensation, signs a satisfaction receipt accepting a lesser amount from his employer. Does signing the receipt validly waive the balance owed?

Answer: No. Law: Article 6, as applied in Franklin Baker Co. of the Philippines v. Alillana (21 SCRA 1247). Application: The law does not consider valid any agreement by which a worker receives less compensation than he is legally entitled to recover; such agreement is contrary to law and public policy. Conclusion: Signing the satisfaction receipt does not amount to a valid waiver of the employee's full statutory compensation.

Does accepting separation pay and terminal leave benefits waive an employee's right to contest an illegal dismissal?

No (San Miguel Corporation v. Cruz, 31 SCRA 819).

Where a statute's object is to promote great public interests, liberty, and morals, may it be defeated by a private stipulation?

No (Griffith v. New York Life Ins. Co., 101 Cal. 627, cited in 25 RCL 781).

Is a private agreement between spouses consenting to or allowing the other's adultery or concubinage a valid waiver?

No; since marriage is a social institution greatly affected by public interest, such an agreement is void, as it is contrary to public interest and morals.

A university requires college professors to hold a master's degree. A professor without the degree claims the university impliedly waived the requirement by continuing his employment. Is this claim of waiver valid?

Answer: No. Law: Article 6, as applied in Son, et al. v. University of Santo Tomas (G.R. No. 211273, April 18, 2018). Application: The claimed waiver cannot prevail because it is contrary to education regulations and prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law — the students and public entitled to expect only qualified teaching personnel. Conclusion: The alleged waiver of the master's degree requirement is invalid.

What does Article 7 of the Civil Code provide about repeal of laws and unconstitutional statutes?

Laws are repealed only by subsequent laws (violation cannot be excused by disuse or contrary custom); when courts declare a law unconstitutional, the law is void and the Constitution governs; administrative/executive acts are valid only if not contrary to law or the Constitution.

Distinguish express repeal from implied repeal.

Express repeal is literally declared by a new law naming or identifying the repealed law/provisions, specifically or in general terms; implied repeal arises when a new law is contrary to or inconsistent with a former law without expressly repealing it.

Are repeals and amendments by implication favored in statutory construction?

No; they are not favored (Quimsing v. Lachica, 2 SCRA 182).

Does a general repealing clause stating "all laws and parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly" qualify as an express repeal?

No; it fails to identify or designate the specific Act or Acts intended to be repealed and merely predicates the intended repeal on a finding of substantial conflict (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano).

Is a special law repealed by a later general law that does not specifically mention it?

No, not unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, even if the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases covered by the special law (Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty; City of Manila v. PSC; National Power Corporation v. Arca).

Can an ordinary statute override a provision of the Constitution?

No; the Constitution is the supreme, organic, and fundamental law of the land (Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 136).

In deciding the constitutionality of a statute, what presumption applies, and how should doubtful statutes be construed?

Every presumption favors the statute's validity, and whenever possible, courts give statutes a meaning that avoids conflict with the Constitution (Noblejas v. Teehankee, 23 SCRA 774).

Does the constitutionality of a statute depend on acts or omissions of the agencies enforcing it after its enactment?

No; constitutionality is determined by factors existing independently of, and unaffected by, subsequent acts or omissions of law-enforcing agencies (Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 774).

When must an entire statute fall even though only part of it is unconstitutional?

When the valid and invalid parts are so mutually connected and dependent on each other — as conditions, considerations, or inducements — that the legislature would not have enacted the valid part alone; then the interdependent provisions fall together (Lidasan v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496).

What is the test for whether the valid portion of a partly unconstitutional statute may stand on its own?

The valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume the legislature would have enacted it by itself even without the invalid part; enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute (Barrameda v. Moir, 25 Phil. 44, as quoted in Government v. Springer, 50 Phil. 259).

When are administrative rules and regulations considered binding on the courts?

When they are promulgated following the procedure fixed for their promulgation and their scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts disagree with the policy or wisdom behind them (Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA 627).

May an administrative agency's rules amend or expand the statute they implement?

No; an agency cannot amend an act of Congress — its rules must strictly comply with and adhere to the statute (Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, 33 SCRA 585).

What does Article 8 of the Civil Code provide?

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system of the Philippines.

What is the definition of "construction" as used in interpreting the law?

The art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case where that intention is rendered doubtful because the case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Caltex, Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247).

Under Article 8, what is the effect of Supreme Court decisions interpreting a law?

They form part of the legal system, assume the same authority as the statute itself, constitute evidence of what the law means, and are binding until reversed.

Are decisions of the Court of Appeals and lower courts binding precedents in the same way as Supreme Court decisions?

No; only Supreme Court decisions are authoritative and precedent-setting — decisions of inferior courts and the Court of Appeals are merely persuasive, and judges must apply the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court (Secretary of Justice v. Catolico, 68 SCRA 62; Albert v. CFI, 23 SCRA 948).

Under People v. Licera (65 SCRA 270), as of what date is a Supreme Court's construction of a law deemed part of that law?

As of the date of the law's enactment, since the Court's interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent the law purports to carry into effect.

When the Supreme Court overrules a doctrine and adopts a new one, how does the new doctrine apply to those who relied on the old one?

Prospectively only; it should not apply to parties who relied in good faith on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof, especially in construing criminal laws where punishability must be reasonably foreseeable (People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607).

An accused was authorized, under a doctrine then prevailing, to possess an unlicensed firearm as a secret confidential agent. Years later, the Supreme Court reversed that doctrine. May the accused be convicted of illegal possession of firearms based on the new, reversed doctrine?

Answer: No. Law: Article 8, doctrine of prospectivity of judicial rulings, as applied in People v. Jabinal (55 SCRA 607). Application: When a doctrine of the Court is overruled and a different view adopted, the new doctrine applies prospectively only and should not prejudice parties who relied in good faith on the old doctrine. Conclusion: The accused should be absolved because he acted in reliance on the doctrine prevailing at the time of the acts charged.

A judge contracted a second marriage without first securing a judicial declaration of nullity of his first, void marriage. At the time, prevailing jurisprudence held that no such judicial declaration was needed for void marriages. He is later charged administratively with immorality. Should he be held liable?

Answer: No. Law: Article 8 (judicial decisions form part of the legal system), as applied in Apiag v. Cantero (A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070, February 12, 1997). Application: Judicial interpretation is deemed part of the law as of the law's enactment, so a person who relied in good faith on the doctrine prevailing when he acted cannot be penalized once that doctrine is later overturned. Conclusion: The judge cannot be held administratively liable, since his second marriage was contracted in reliance on the doctrine then prevailing, before it was superseded by Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy.

What does Article 9 of the Civil Code provide?

No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

Under Article 9, what must a judge do when the law is silent, obscure, or insufficient?

Still render judgment, guided by equity, fairness, and a sense of justice; he cannot decline to decide simply because there is no express law on the matter.

How does the "judicial legislation" commentary explain the courts' role under Article 9 despite the separation of powers?

Although the judiciary cannot legislate and each government branch must respect the others' domains, Article 9 requires courts to still decide cases even when the law is silent, obscure, or insufficient — exploding the "myth" that courts never fill gaps in the law (Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 136).

A wife's paraphernal property was demolished to build a structure benefiting the conjugal partnership. Upon liquidation she sought reimbursement for its value, but no law expressly granted such reimbursement. May the court still order reimbursement?

Answer: Yes. Law: Article 9, as applied in In Re: Padilla (74 Phil. 377). Application: A judge cannot decline to render judgment merely because the law is silent; guided by the equitable maxim that no one should be unjustly enriched at another's expense, the court fills the gap with a solution demanded by justice and conscience. Conclusion: The wife is entitled to reimbursement for the value of her demolished paraphernal property even without an express statutory provision.

What does Article 10 of the Civil Code provide?

In case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

An illegitimate father legally adopts his own child. No law expressly provides what middle name the adopted child should use. May the child use her biological mother's surname as her middle name?

Answer: Yes. Law: Articles 9 and 10, as applied in In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Astorga Garcia (G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005). Application: Since the law is silent, the Court cannot decline to rule and must resolve the doubt in favor of right and justice; it is Filipino custom for a child to carry the mother's surname as a middle name, which promotes the child's identity and welfare. Conclusion: The adopted child may use her biological mother's surname as her middle name.

Where the law is clear, must it be applied according to its unambiguous provisions, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction?

Yes (Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Electric Company, 77 SCRA 469).

What is the primary duty of courts when a law is clear and unambiguous?

To apply the law as written; construction or interpretation is used only when application is impossible or inadequate (Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 39 SCRA 269).

According to the Code Commission, why is the rule in Article 10 necessary?

It is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure, strengthening the courts' resolve to avoid an injustice that might otherwise be authorized by some way of interpreting the law (as cited in In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005).

When there is ambiguity in the law, what must interpretation be faithful to?

The legislative purpose; what Congress intended must not be frustrated, and interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be attained even if there is doubt as to the meaning of the language used (Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs).

May courts reject a literal interpretation of a statute?

Yes, if a literal interpretation would be unjust or lead to absurd results (Borja v. Court of Appeals, 56 SCRA 509).