philosophy final

Moral Agency

A moral agent is capable of doing wrong. It makes sense to hold them accountable for their actions

Moral Patiency

A moral patient is capable of being wronged. What happens to them matters morally; if you smash a window, the window is not the moral patient as the person who owns the window is the one being wronged

Kant’s feature that grants moral patiency

Shows that in order to be a moral agent, you have to be capable of doing the calculation (categorical imperative). You have to be able to think about what would the world be like if everyone behaved in the way I’m behaving, follow every rule I follow, would that be a world in which I’m attempting to do any work in. If you can’t do that calculation, you can’t be a moral agent b/c that’s how you determine right or wrong. Kant believes this feature is what makes us moral patients, or matter morally.

It is our capacity to value things that gives us value beyond price. Only rational beings have moral value.

Explain Kant’s view that humans have intrinsic moral worth and the moral theory that follows from that view. Explain how it follows from Kant’s theory that non-human animals do not have moral worth. What kind of objection is given by Singer and Regan that Kant cannot be correct about the moral value of humans? Is their objection sufficient to defeat Kant’s criteria for moral value?

Kant believes that humans have intrinsic moral worth because they are rational and autonomous beings. This means that humans have inherent value through their ability to reason, act from duty, and choose moral principles for themselves. This view is followed by Kant's moral theory, the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative has two formulations: act according to maxims that you would be willing to allow anyone or everyone to follow and always treat people, yourself or others, as ends-in-themselves never as "mere means." By arguing that we must respect each person's rational nature and view them as having intrinsic moral worth, Kant says this doesn't apply to animals as they lack rationality and autonomy. Through his theory, Kant believes that animals only have instrumental value, and no moral rights since they cannot perform the actions of an autonomous human. He believes humans have no direct duties to animals, and that they only matter morally indirectly, because cruelty to animals may make a person more likely to mistreat humans.

Singer argues that what matters morally is sentience, not rationality, which both humans and animals have. He also brings up how some humans, (infants, people with sever cognitive disabilities) are not rational or autonomous, saying that Kants theory is arbitrary and speciesist. Regan argues that the capacity for rational moral reasoning is not necessary for having a life that matters to that being. He thinks that Kant excludes animals for the wrong reason and includes humans for the wrong reason as rationality is not what makes a life morally considerable. Their objections don't fully defeat Kant's criteria but they do hold some merit. Their objections show how Kant's criteria fails to explain why all humans have moral worth and fail to justify why animals are excluded. It reveals how Kant's criteria is too narrow and internally inconsistent in this manner.

Singer’s feature that grants moral patiency

“equality of consideration” how much does someone matter in comparison to others (animals). Believes animals deserve the same amount of consideration as humans in our moral calculations. Moral value can’t be based on the equality of abilities or rationality.

Our capacity for suffering and enjoyment makes us moral patients (utility/utilitarian). Since things are affecting you, it gives you value as it can make you feel better or worse.

Our capacity to have those internal mental states (positive or negative) that makes you matter, especially as we take interest in it.

Describe Peter Singer’s argument that all animals are equal. Make his conclusion clear for your reader – including describing at least one radical consequence of his view. Does the fact that Singer’s theory contains such radical consequences for our treatment of animals count as a reason to reject his argument? Describe what you take to be the most devastating criticism of Singer’s argument. Is this criticism adequate to defeat Singer’s argument (why or why not?

Peter singer, a moral objectivist, believes in the “equality of consideration.” This beliefs stems from the question of how much someone matters in comparison to others, which applies to humans and animals. He believes that animals deserve the same amount of consideration as humans in our moral calculations. Rather than looking at the level of somethings rationality or abilities, he focuses on something’s capacity to suffer or feel pleasure, especially if they take interest in it. Since it is objective (through verbal reactions) that animals feel pain, then it means that animals and humans matter equally. He concludes that if the capacity to have internal negative or positive mental states is what gives something value, then animals and humans have equal moral value.

One radical consequence of Singer’s view though is that animal experimentation is almost always unjustified. Singer argues that if you wouldn’t perform an experiment on an human infant or someone with severe cognitive disabilities, then you can’t justify doing the same on animals. This would radically challenge medical research, cosmetics testing, and drug testing on animals and suggest that we should stop or limit most of them. Radical consequences wouldn’t be enough to reject his argument since a conclusion being radical wouldn’t mean that it’s wrong, especially since other morally progressive, historical movements began as radical. Also in order to reject his argument, critics would need to find a morally relevant trait that all humans have and all animals lack, which is extremely difficult.


The most devastating criticism of Singer’s argument is that humans have morally significant abilities that animals lack such as rationality, language, culture, etc. Critics believe that these capacities justify greater moral status for humans. I don’t believe this criticism is adequate to defeat Singer’s argument since it would imply that infants and cognitively impaired humans have less moral status since they cannot perform those abilities, especially since some animals might have greater animals than them. In response to this as well, Singer would still defend that this doesn’t change the moral weight of feeling pain, and how it puts humans and animals on the same level.

Fox’s feature that grants moral patiency

The capacity for autonomy and the ability of a human to recognize autonomy in others grants moral patiency.

Only beings who are autonomous and can recognize autonomy in others belong to the moral community.
Membership in the moral community is not about being human per se, but about cognitive capacities (self-awareness, reasoning, recognizing moral obligations). Animals are NOT considered moral patients to Fox

According to Michael Allen Fox, where do moral obligations come from? Why would this
view make it impossible for us to have moral obligations to animals? How does Fox deal
with the objection that not all humans are autonomous (in his sense)? Is his defense
against this kind of criticism adequate?

According to fox, moral obligations are social constructs and come from the mutual recognition of autonomy among members of a society. Humans agree on rules because they understand their own interests and the interests of other autonomous beings, not animals. It would be impossible to have moral obligations to animals as they are not autonomous and cannot recognize autonomy in others. They are not part of the moral community, so humans don't have a clear moral obligation to them.

Fox deals with the objection that not all humans are autonomous by recognizing three categories of non-autonomous humans: infants/future autonomous humans, temporarily non-autonomous humans, and permanently non-autonomous humans. Fox says that infants are still autonomous and members of the moral community as they have the future potential to meet the capacities of autonomous beings. In regards to temporarily non-autonomous humans such as those who developed disabilities or illnesses that impact their autonomous features, they are still treated with respect and have the same moral value as other humans since they previously had full autonomy and met social conventions. Permanently non-autonomous humans are treated with respect and empathy for their states as it “could’ve been you,” and are still morally valued. Moral treatment is extended to all humans, as they are still valued in the moral community, despite any handicaps.

His defense has some merit, but it cannot completely prove his argument. It gives reason and justifications for cases of “non-autonomous” humans, but this extension could be seen as arbitrary. Critics could easily argue that it’s random to defend permanently non-autonomous humans and infants, but not animals who could have more autonomous features than them. Additionally, the “could’ve been me” argument could easily apply to animals, as someone “could’ve been an animal.”

Regan’s feature that grants moral patiency

If a being is a "subject of a life" and has intrinsic value, then it has moral patiency. Its interests matter morally for its own sake, and has an inner life.

A subject of life has desires, a sense of the future, an emotional life, preferences and interests, the ability to experience pleasure and pain, some self-awareness, and the ability to pursue goals.

Give Tom Regan’s account of what gives something intrinsic value. Why does he think his view is better than Contractarianism and Utilitarianism? What radical consequences follow from Regan’s view? Does the fact that Regan’s theory contains such radical consequences for our treatment of animals count as a reason to reject his argument?

Something has intrinsic value is it is an "experiencing subject of a life." A being that does so has beliefs, desires, and perceptions. Not only do they experience these, but they also have memories, a sense of the future, and feel pleasure and pain. Regan argues that both humans and many animals meet this standard. He also believes that beings with intrinsic value have the right not to be harmed or used.

Contractarianism is the belief that morality is based on agreements between rational agents, as beings with morality are rational contractors. Regan thinks his view is better than contractarianism since his would include all humans (babys, those with disabilities, etc.) who are not in a rational state yet. It would also avoid the racist, sexist, and classist results that the contract theory has historically allowed. Regan believes his theory would be more morally fair and inclusive to all groups, including animals as well. Utilitarianism is the belief that a morally right action is one that maximizes total happiness and minimizes total suffering. Regan thinks his view is better than Utilitarianism since utilitarianism allows violating the right of innocent individuals for the greater good. He claims that it treats individuals as replaceable, focuses on quantities of happiness, and ignores the moral worth of individuals. In comparison to this, he believes that his views treats individuals as equally valuable, doesn't allow sacrificing some (people or animals) for the masses, and matches our moral intuitions about human rights.

Some radical consequences of Regan's view include ending the factory farming of animals, ending animal experimentation, and ending zoos and circuses that use animals for entertainment. This means that humans would have to adapt and change their lifestyles to protect the lives of animals, and not harm them. These consequences cannot fully disprove his theory, but that doesn't mean that it is perfectly sound. If his theory were true, then the consequences would have to be accepted, and all humans would have to change their ways of life. While this doesn't disprove his theory, it shows how difficult it would be for it to come into effect, considering the radical consequences.

What is Mind-Body Dualism?

• Mind does not equal brain (or any other physical object)

• Mental events does not equal physical brain events (but they are caused by them)

the view that the mind and the body are two fundamentally different kinds of things. The mind is non-physical, thinking, and conscious, while the body (including the brain) is physical, extended, and obeys the laws of physics.

What must Dualists believe about the nature of mental states and their relation to the physical world?

• Mental states are non-physical: They have properties (like consciousness, intentionality, or qualia) that cannot be reduced to brain activity.

• Mental states are distinct from physical states: Your mind could exist without your body, and vice versa (e.g., Descartes’ idea that he can doubt the body but cannot doubt the mind).

• Mental states can interact with the physical world: For example, your intention to raise your arm causes your physical arm to move, but this doesn’t make the mental state identical to a physical brain state.

What is Mind-Body Identity Theory?

• Mind = brain 

• Mental events = physical brain events

the view that mental states are identical to physical brain states. Every thought, sensation, or experience corresponds to a specific neural process in the brain. Example: Feeling pain = firing of C-fibers in the nervous system. There is nothing “extra” beyond the physical process.

What must Identity Theorists believe about the relationship between mental terms and terms
we use to describe the physical world?

• Mental terms refer to physical processes: Words like “pain,” “belief,” or “seeing red” ultimately describe brain states or neural activity.

• No additional substance exists: There is no separate “mind-stuff”; everything mental is grounded in the physical world.

• Knowledge of brain states explains mental phenomena: By studying the brain, we can explain consciousness, sensations, and other mental experiences—though, as Carruthers notes, subjective experience might still require first-person perspective to recognize.

Why is it impossible for you to doubt whether you think, or whether you exist? How
does Descartes use this fact to argue that his body is not identical to his mind in
Meditation 2? Make the critical flaw in that argument absolutely clear to your reader
(using, if you like, what Carruthers says against such arguments).

It is impossible for you to doubt whether you think because you can be certain that you are thinking, even if you try to doubt everything. That act alone would be thinking as well. If you are doubting, then you are thinking, and if you're thinking, then you must exist. The very act of doubt presupposes a thinking subject. In Mediation 2, Descartes uses this logic to argue that the mind is not the body by distinguishing the differences between the mind and body. Descartes states that he knows he exists as a thinking thing (his mind). He can doubt all physical things, but he cannot doubt his own mind, that he is thinking. In regards to his body, he states that he can doubt the existence of his body or any physical object, because all sensory knowledge can be mistaken. Since he can doubt the existence of the body but not the mind, the mind and body cannot be identical. The mind is thinking while the body is extended.

One critical flaw of Descartes' argument is that just because you can doubt something doesn't prove it is ontologically distinct. The fact that you can doubt your body while being certain of your mind doesn't show or prove that the mind exists independently of the body. For example, you can imagine a clay sculpture looking like a lion, but that doesn't prove the sculpture is separate from the clay. Not only that, but the argument combines epistemic distinction with metaphysical distinction. Epistemic distinction is what you can know or doubt while metaphysical distinction is what actually exists independently. Descartes assumes that because the mind is indubitable (epistemically certain) and the body is dubitable, they must be metaphysically distinct, but this inference is not justified. Furthermore, Carruthers critiques this argument by stating you might have a "thinking self" that is inseparable from your physical brain, even if you can't doubt the thinking part. Doubt tells us about what is accessible to the mind, not about the fundamental nature of reality. Therefore, Descartes’ reasoning fails to prove the mind is a separate substance from the body.

Make the argument for mind-body dualism given by Descartes in Meditation 6 as
convincing and clear as possible for your reader using Gertler’s original formulation of
the argument. Now give the most serious criticism of the argument. How does Gertler
alter the argument to avoid the problem? Does Gertler’s revision of the argument succeed?

In Meditation VI, Descartes argues that the mind is not identical to the body by appealing to conceivability and possibility. In the argument, Descartes first states: I can conceive of my mind existing without my brain or body. By this meaning, using introspection alone, he can clearly and distinctly conceive of himself as a thinking thing even while conceiving his body as not existing. He then says: Anything that I can clearly and distinctly conceive is made real by God. Descartes relies on God's perfection here as God would not deceive us by making something appear possible when it is not. Therefore, with those two points, it is possible for a mind to exist without a body or brain. But he then states that if two things are identical, it is impossible for one to exist without the other. This identity implies that if A = B, then A without B is impossible. His argument concludes that the mind is not is not identical to the body or brain; mind-body dualism is true as mental states are not physical brain states. This argument is strong as it doesn't rely on scientific facts and instead uses first-person awareness of mental states and a strong metaphysical principle about identity.

The most serious criticism of the argument is the problem of conceiving impossibilities. By this, the criticism is that we can conceive of things that are in fact impossible. For example, we can conceive the idea of water without H2O, but is it still metaphysically impossible. When Descartes conceives of the mind without the body, he may be using incomplete concepts. The concept of pain, for example, may hide its true physical essense (neural activity), just as water hides its essence as H2O. This argument shows how the move from "I can conceive of mind without body" to "mind can exist without body" may be invalid.

Gertler revises the argument by including the idea of sufficiently comprehensive concepts. SCCs are concepts are concepts that include all the essential features of the thing being conceived. So mental concepts are fully revealed as there are no "hidden essences" waiting to be discovered. He changes Descartes' first point by saying: I can conceive of mental events without any physical brain events using SCC's. Then he goes on saying anything that is conceivable using SCCs is at least logically possible. Therefore, mental events without physical brain events are possible. He concludes the argument similar to Descartes by saying if mental events were identical to physical brain events, one could not exist without the other. Therefore, mental events are not identical to physical brain events. Gertler's revision does succeed in strengthening Descartes' original argument by explaining why conceivability fails in some cases but may succeed in the mental case, but it cannot fully prove that his argument is correct. For example, science may reveal hidden essences of mental states, and the idea that first-person access does not guarantee metaphysical transparency may still undermine the argument.

Explain the mind/brain identity theory. What is the most notable theoretical benefit of such a view? Now describe one of the following problems for the view in detail: (a) the problem of ‘felt qualities’ (or qualia), (b) the problem of ‘complete knowledge’, or (c) the problem of intentionality; whichever you think is the most difficult problem for identity theorists to overcome. Now explain Carruthers’ defense against the problem you described. Is Carruthers’ defense adequate (why or why not?).

The mind/brain identity theory states that the mind just is the brain, and that mental events are identical to physical brain events. According to this view, thoughts, sensations, perceptions, and emotions are not non-physical properties; rather, they are just equal to neural processes in the brain. For example, feeling pain just is the firing of certain neurons, and seeing red just is a pattern of activity that happens in the brain. It claims that mental states are not just caused by brain states, but that they are the very same things just described in different ways. The most notable theoretical benefit of this argument is that it connects two powerful claims that Dualism fails to do. This argument fixes the problems between common sense and the scientific worldview in regards to mental and physical states. Common sense says thats that we naturally believe that mental states cause things to happen in the world. For example, my desire to raise my arm causes my arm to rise. The scientific worldview states everything that happens in the physical world has a complete physical cause, so there is no need to appeal to non-physical substances to explain physical effects. The mind/identity theory solves the problem between these two claims by saying mental causation just is physical causation as mental events are physical events.

The most difficult problem for theorists to overcome is the problem of intentionality, which states that mental states can be about or directed at something. For example, a belief can be about Paris and a desire can be about food. The argument using this problem against the identity theory follows: (1) Some mental states are intentional (they are about other things). (2) No purely physical state can be intentional. (3) Therefore, mental states cannot be identical to physical brain states. This argument is strong because it shows how intentionality is a defining feature of the mental. Physical states such as electrical charges and chemical reactions appear to be just matter obeying the laws of physics, and not inherently about anything. For example, a random arrangement of seaweed spelling a sentence would not be about anything while writing on a board saying "My hat is pretty" is only there because a person intended them to be. If intentionality cannot be reduced to physical processes, then the identity theory cannot be true.

Carruthers' defense of this problem lies in premise 2 of the argument, that no purely physical state can be intentional. Carruthers argues that some purely physical systems show forms of intentionality, even though they are nothing more than matter obeying physical law. For example, a factory machine could be programmed to detect and pick out the best lemons based on color and shape. It's internal physical state guides behavior that is directed towards lemons rather than other objects. Carruthers argues that this is a basic form of intentionality as the system's behavior is about lemons. He is trying to convey the point that its not that machines have minds, but that directedness and aboutness can arise in purely physical systems. This means that the brain could simply be an intentional, physical system. Carruthers argument successfully shows that it isn't completely impossible for physical systems to have intentionality. He brings up the claim that intentionality can come in degrees, and that it can emerge from physical structures. Despite this, his argument cannot fully disprove this theory as all machine intentionality could trace back to human mental states, meaning true intentionality still requires a mind and is specifically directed by humans. This would show that Carruthers failed to fully prove that purely natural physical states, independent of any intentional agents, can be genuinely intentional.