kripke, proper names - necessity - possibility

russell on names

usually really descriptions

descriptivism

for every name there is a def descrition such that they have the same linguistic meaning

consequences of descritivism

names have descriptive content

the content is included in the thruth conditions of scentences

if you understand a name you know the descriptive content

strength of descritivism

explanation why names can refer to objects

explains how id statements can be informative

can ascribe meaning to empty names

modal logic

logic of necessity and possibility

kripke, marcus

a prioricity

epistemic term, can be justified without recourse to experience

vs a posterioricit which can only be justified by recourse to experience

necessity

metaphysical term, could not have been otherwise even in other possible worlds

vs contingency, true but not necessary

kripke vs tradition

trad: x is a priori iff necessary, a post iff contignent

kr: there are a post necessary truths, there are a priori contingent truths

truth conditions

The … of a sentence is the condition of the world under which it is true. This condition must be such that if it obtains, the sentence is true, and if it doesn't obtain, the sentence is false.

… can be displayed using possible worlds.

rigid designator

an expression that designates (denotes) the same obj in every possible world

kripke on names

are rigid designators

kripkes modal argument

p1 names are rigid designators

p2 def descr are not rigid designators

c therefore names and definite descriptions do not have the same meaning

kripkes epistemic argument

p1 if name N has the same meaning as a def descr D, then the sentence ‘N is D’ is a priori

p2 the sentence ‘N is D’ is not a priori but a posteriori

C the name N does not have the same meaning as D

analyszability

something is … iff it is solely in virtue of meaning

kripke something is … if it is true in all poss worlds just bcs of its meaning

=> not .. then synthetic

kripkes first semantic argument

p1 many speakers understand and use the names ‘cicero’ and ‘feynman’

p2 but their conv about cicero are not enough to id a particular person

p3 nevertheless in using the names the speakers denote particular persons

c these speakers are not synonymous with any definite descriptions

kripkes second semantic argument

p1 many associoate godel only with being the discoverer of incompleteness of arithmetic

p2 suppose counterfactual that it was not godel but schmidt

p3 the many the usage the name ‘godel’ was nevertheless godel and not schmidt

c godel is not equiv with the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic

a posteriori necessary truths

a, hesperus is phosphorus

b, the evening star is the morning star

hesp and phos are names that designate the same object in all poss world so a is necessarily true but this id had to be discoverd empirically a is a posteriori

a priori contingent truths

a, length of a meter is 1m

b, i am here now

a meter is in fact 1m but could have been different, 1m is a rigid designator, it is the same in all poss worlds, therefore not necessary but contingent, but those who know what the standard meter is know a priori that a is true

semantics kripke

millian theory, meaning of a name is id to the name carrier

causal theory of semantics

n denotes x bcs x was named n and the name n was passed with each speaker intending to use n with the same meaning as before