Metaphysics of mind - Physicalist theories

Hard behaviourism

All propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states / movements (Carl Hempel).

Soft behaviourism

Propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions

Philosophical behaviourism

The general terms for theories that claim we can analyse mental concepts in terms of concepts that relate to the body, and in particular, the concept of ‘behaviour’.

What does Hempel say on the meaning on a scientific statement?

To know the meaning of a scientific statement is to know the conditions under which we would call it true and those under which we would call it false. So the meaning of a statement is established by the conditions of its verification = the observations that we can make to check its truth.

What is the first implocation of what Hempel says on the meaning of a scientific statement?

If we can't, in principle, empirically check the truth of the statement, it is meaningless.

What is the second implication of what Hempel says on the meaning of a scientific statement?

Two statements have the same meaning if they are both true or both false in the same conditions.

What is the third implication of what Hempel says on the meaning of a scientific statement?

We can translate a statement into a series of statements that simply describe the conditions of verification. Translation: a statement with the same meaning, but expressed in different words or concepts.

What is an example of translating a statement into a series of statements that describe the conditions of verification?

A statement with the concept temperature can be translated into a series of statements describing the observations we make to establish whether the first statement, using temperature is true. ‘It is 25 degrees Celsius’ can be translated to ‘the thermostat reads 25°C’.

According to Hempel, what is the meaning of psychological claims?

Its conditions of verification. Unless we can verify it empirically, it will be meaningless.

What are examples of conditions of verification for psychological claims?

Bodily behaviour, linguistic behaviour, physical bodily states, physiological changes, brain processes.

Why can't psychological claims be about private states of a person according to Hempel?

They only have meaning if they can be publicly checked (empirically observed + verified). So they must be about physical and behavioural states.

Why is Hempel hard behaviourism?

The conditions of verification don't only tell us how we know, hut what psychological concepts mean. There can be a complete translation without loss of meaning, this is an analytic reduction.

What are the implications of hard behaviourism?

Talk of mental states is just talk of behavioural and physical bodily changes. So there is no question of the mind-body interaction. Rather than saying mental states don't exist, Hempel says that there is no real question of whether they exist.

Hempel in a nutshell

For a science of the mind to be respectable it would have to be based on empirical observation. Since only human behaviour (not introspection) is publicly observable,psychology should be based on behavioural evidence alone. We can translate all talk of mental states, without loss of meaning, into observational statements about people's physical states and behaviour. Psychological states are therefore reducible to the concepts of physics.

What type of reduction does philosophical behaviourism use?

Analytic

What does Ryle understand substance dualism (‘the official doctrine’) as claiming?

The mind can exist without the body - they are two different substances. There are mental and physical properties, but while the body is in space and is subject to mechanical (physical) laws, the mind isn't.

Category mistake

To treat a concept as belonging to a different logical category from the one it actually belongs to.

What does Ryle say on substance dualism as making a category mistake?

The mind is not another ‘thing’. It is not a distinct, complex, organised unit, subject to distinct relations of cause and effect (to lose your mind and lose your keys is not to lose two things). Mental concepts (of ‘states’ and ‘processes’) do not operate like physical concepts.

The ‘para-mechanical hypothesis’

Since physical processes can be explained in mechanical terms, mental concepts must refer to non-spatial, non-mechanical processes. This is a category mistake.

Ryle on dispositions

Many mental states are dispositions of a person to behave in certain ways. We often speak of mental states expressed in action. E.g. cognitive processing skills, not a single action, but not something invisible or non-spatial - a disposition.

Ryle's objection to hard behaviourism

Hard behaviourism- to be in mental state X is to behave in way Y, e.g. to be in pain is to exhibit pain-behaviour. We could object using suppressed pain (pain without pain behaviour) or the fact that many mental states, e.g. knowing French, are dispositions, not occurrences. We would want to say someone knows French, even when they aren't exhibiting ‘French language behaviour’.

Disposition

How something will or is likely to behave under certain circumstances.

Why if mental states aren't categorical, are they not reducible?

Whether someone has a particular disposition is a matter of whether certain statements about what they could or would do are true or not. Many of these circumstances may never arise. Psychological statements don't describe categorical - actual, concrete, particular - states of some mental substance. Statements involving mental concepts can't be translated or reduced to a set of hypothetical statements about behaviour. Mental concepts can be analysed on these terms, but never completely replaced - the account in terms of what a person would do in circumstances x, y, z can't be completed.

How can an internal process like thinking be a disposition to behaviour according to Ryle?

There isn't one kind of thinking. This isn't a matter of a second independent mental process accompanying the behaviour, but a matter of how the behaviour is done. Thinking to oneself is internalised speaking. Mental processes only sometimes and only contingently take place internally. Processes that do take place don't define thinking any more than those that take place as publicly observable behaviours. Silence is inessential to the nature of thinking.

What is the relation between occurrences and disposition according to Ryle?

Thinking isn't just a disposition, but also an occurrence. To say someone is thinking or paying attention is to ascribe dispositions about what they could say if you asked them. This is what Ryle means by a ‘semi-hypothetical’ statement - it both explains an actual occurrence and licences inferences.

The conceivability argument reformulated to be arguing against behaviourism

P1. It is conceivable that mental states can exist without behavioural states.

P2. Therefore, it is possible that mental states can exist without behavioural states.

C1. Therefore, mental states and behavioural states are distinct.

C2. Therefore, behaviourism is false.

The knowledge (Mary) argument reformulated to be arguing against behaviourism

P1. Mary knows all the physical and behavioural facts about seeing colours before being released from her black and white room.

P2. On being released, she learns new facts about seeing colours.

IC. Therefore, not all facts about consciousness can be behavioural or physical facts.

C. Therefore behaviourism is false.

The philosophical zombies argument reformulated to be arguing against behaviourism

A philosophical zombie is a physical and behavioural copy of a conscious person but is lacking phenomenal consciousness.

It is conceivable that there are philosophical zombies.

If it is conceivable that there are philosophical zombies, then it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies.

If it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies, then behaviour and phenomenal consciousness cannot be the same thing / property.

Therefore behaviour and phenomenal consciousness cannot be the same thing / property.

Therefore behaviourism is false.

What does dualism think about an asymmetry of self knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states?

Dualism thinks of mental states as ‘inner’ or ‘logically private’ and defends an asymmetry of knowledge. Our mental states are inaccessible to other people (logically private). But they are known to us through conscious introspection. An associated issue arising from this is the problem of other minds.

What does behaviourism think about an asymmetry of self knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states?

We don’t have to infer that someone has a mind from their behaviour (as in dualism). To say that someone has certain behaviour dispositions is to say they have a mind. So we can know other people’s mental states. This means that behaviourism avoids the problem of other minds. But now, can I only know my own mental states by observing my behaviour? If they are behavioural dispositions, how could introspection reveal them?

Why is the lack of asymmetry between self knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states problematic?

We believe we know our own mind more than other’s minds. It is highly counter intuitive. I know that I have MS that are not realised in behaviour. It implies that I only know my own mind / MS via observation of behaviour.

Does Hempel respond to the issue of asymmetry between self knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states?

No, he approaches psychological concepts only from the scientific (third-person) point of view. He says nothing about how we can talk about and understand our own mental states.

What is Ryle’s response to the issue of asymmetry between self knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states?

Conscious introspection is a myth. We pay attention to ourselves just as we pay attention to others’ behaviour. He argues that self knowledge and knowledge of other minds is on par, gained in the same way, in each case by ‘paying attention’. To know what you think is just to be ready to say what you think, or be unsurprised by the occurrence of a thought or feeling. We just have more evidence in our own case, we are the audience of our inner speech, thinking, which others are not.

What is the distinctness of mental states from behaviour issue?

Many conscious mental states (e.g. pain) have a particular feeling, ‘what is it like’ - this cannot be understood just as a behavioural disposition, nor can they be captured in terms of conditions of verification. Behaviourism misses the phenomenology of the mind, the qualia. We can accept that pain often involves wincing, recoiling from the cause of the pain, nursing the damaged part of the body, etc. but this doesn’t capture the essence of pain, the essence of pain is that it hurts. Pain isn’t pain if it doesn’t hurt, therefore any definition of pain that does not include this aspect is insufficient.

What is a response to the distinctness of mental states from behaviour issue?

Hempel - this feeling side of mental states is still tied up in behaviour. We can talk meaningfully about it, but all we have to go on is behaviour and physical stress. Hempel responds that our understanding of people in terms of their mental states is tied up with their physical state and their behaviour. We can’t understand what it is for them to be in such-and-such a mental state without referring to such physical conditions. What would it be for someone to want chocolate but never seek it or express this in language? What is a desire if not something that motivates behaviour? The behaviour isn’t just evidence of their mental state, it gives us the meaning of the concept.

What is a perfect actor?

Someone who expresses the behaviour associated with a mental state, but lacks the mental state.

What is Ryle’s response to Putnam’s perfect actors objection (distinctness of mental states from behaviour)?

Mental states aren’t just expressing certain behaviours but having the disposition to do so. The actor doesn’t have the same dispositions that someone who really feels pain has. There are ‘if… then…’ statements that are true of the person in pain that are not true of the actor (even if the conditions that show this never occur).

Why might Ryle’s response to Putnam’s perfect actors objection be missing an important point?

Pain isn’t just a disposition to shout or wince, there is also how pain feels, ‘what is it like’ to experience pain. This is what distinguishes the person in pain from the actor. It is highly counter-intuitive to argue that this aspect of experience is constituted entirely by behavioural dispositions.

What are super-spartans?

People (or creatures) who so completely disapprove of showing pain that all pain behaviour is suppressed. They aren’t acting, this is how they are in everyday life. Through culture, they have no disposition to express pain at all. Yet they feel pain.

Why is the distinctness of mental states from behaviour (super-spartans) an issue for philosophical behaviourism?

Pain is conceivable without any associated pain behaviour. Pain can’t be understood just in terms of dispositions to pain behaviour, it is distinct from such behavioural dispositions. So philosophical behaviourism is false.

What is Hempels response to super-spartans?

There will be a difference in physiology. There must be some identifiable difference, or there would be no difference between being in pain and not.

What is the issue with Hempel’s response to super-spartans?

It takes us toward type identity theory. He isn’t talking about behaviourism anymore.

What are the issues defining mental states satisfactorily?

PB claims that we can understand mental states in terms of behaviour and dispositions to behave. But to provide such an understanding, we need to successfully identify the behaviour that provides the conditions of verification for saying that someone has a particular mental state (Hempel), or say what behaviour the mental state disposes us toward (Ryle). Even if we don’t need to be able to actually do this, we need to think that, in principle, such an analysis is possible. There are two reasons to think that it is not: 1. Multiple realisability and 2. Circularity.

What is the definition of multiple realisability that we use in PB?

The claim that there are many ways in which one and the same mental state can be expressed in behaviour. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are reducible to behavioural dispositions. / The claim that the same mental state can be expressed by different behaviours in different situations or even by different behaviours in the same situation by different people.

Why is multiple realisability an issue for PB?

It means that there can be no analysis of which behaviours express which mental state, if mental states and behaviours are the same thing then we would expect a ratio of 1:1.

What is an example of multiple realisability for PB?

Two people who both have the mental state of fear, for one person this is the behaviour of running away and for another it is the behaviour of standing shaking on the spot. Therefore there is no behaviour / behavioural disposition that we can equate the mental state to.

What is the first way that the objection from multiple realisability can be understood?

It shows that the analysis of mental states in terms of behaviour is not possible. There is no finite set of statements about behaviour which provides an account of the meaning of a mental concept.

What is the first way that the objection from multiple realisability can be understood in SLF?

P1. People with the same mental state behave differently, both in different circumstances and even in the same circumstance.

P2. It is not possible to draw up a finite list of hypothetical conditionals or statements of the conditions of verification that describe all the ways someone with that mental state may behave.

C1. Therefore, the claim that mental states can be analysed in terms of behaviour is false.

C2. Therefore, philosophical behaviourism is false.

What is the second way that the objection from multiple realisability can be understood?

If different people with the same mental state have dispositions to do different things in similar situations, how can we say that these different dispositions are actually the same mental state? What is it that makes it the same mental state, given that the dispositions are different? The objection shows that what makes any mental state the mental state that it is e.g. what makes a pain a pain cannot be simply how someone behaves or is disposed to behave. The conditions of verification and / or behavioural dispositions don’t express the identity conditions for mental states.

What is the second way that the objection from multiple realisability can be understood in SLF?

P1. People with the same mental state behave differently, both in different circumstances and even in the same circumstance.

C1. Therefore, what makes it true that two people have the same mental state is not that they have the same behavioural dispositions.

C2. Therefore, philosophical behaviourism is false.

What is the issue with circularity for PB?

How someone behaves in a particular situation depends not on just one mental state, such as being afraid, but on how this interacts with other mental states. We have to refer to other mental states to explain how someone might behave. We can’t analyse what dispositions to behaviour a mental state is, without referring to other mental states - what you are attempting to analyse appears again in the analysis. There is no way of analysing a mental state in terms of behaviour (in terms of conditions of verification or dispositions) without mentioning other mental states. So the analysis will be circular. A circular analysis is unsatisfactory. PB aims to tell us what mental states are, but can’t do so without talking about mental states in the analysis. So it doesn’t provide an analysis of what mental states are after all.

What is an example of circularity in analysing mental states in terms of behaviour?

To be afraid of snakes is to run if you know the snake is there, this refers to knowledge, knowledge is a justified true belief, but this refers to belief…

Why does multiple realisability and circularity attack Hempel’s hard behaviourism hard

He claims the meaning of psychological statements can be translated into their conditions of verification.

What could Hempel’s response to the issues of multiple realisability and circularity for PB be?

He could appeal to statements about physiology and brain process. But this is moving closer to TIT - physical properties rather than behaviour, are central to the analysis (this would not be IT as the identity theorist doesn’t claim that the activity in the brain means the same thing as the mind).

Why did Hempel abandon his theory of verificationism?

He accepted that scientific statements as a whole, including psychological ones, may introduce ‘hypothetical entities’, e.g. beliefs, genes, atoms, and so on. Claims about such entities cannot be understood just in terms of how we verify them; the relationship between talk of such things and testing the truth of claims about them is more complicated than that.

What are the issues of multiple realisability and circularity for PB in a nutshell?

MR - there is no finite list

C - no translation is possible as psychological concepts can’t be eliminated

What is Ryle’s response to the issues of multiple realisability and circularity for PB?

Multiple realisability and circularity aren’t objections, they misunderstand the theory. We can’t reduce mental concepts to a set of behavioural dispositions. Mental concepts are still concepts of behavioural dispositions, just at a higher level of generality. These aren’t objections, they are already built into his theory.

What is an objection to Ryle’s response to the issues of multiple realisability and circularity for PB?

We could argue that Ryle' doesn’t satisfactorily deal with the second version of the objection from multiple realisability. What makes a mental state the mental state that it is, given that it can be expressed in many behaviours? Even worse, given circularity, a mental state could be expressed in just about any behaviour, depending on what else one believes. If we have different behavioural dispositions, we can’t have the same mental state (if mental states = behavioural dispositions) yet we could both be afraid and act very differently.

What is Ryle’s reply to the objection to his response to the issues of multiple realisability and circularity for PB?

To think that this is an objection rather than something he explicitly includes in his theory is to misunderstand what he is saying. Behaviour doesn’t name a single piece of behaviour, a disposition is the potential to behave in may ways. If you can’t tell from one piece of behaviour what disposition is being expressed then you need to consider the broader spectrum of behaviour (if… then…). And on the whole, people with the same mental state have similar dispositions. The objections allow him to further clarify this point. This would also deal with circularity as Ryle says that the mind is irreducible which is why we keep having to refer to further mental states.

Why does PB deny mental causation?

Mental states are just behaviours. They can be reduced to physical states.

What does MBTIT claim according to the spec?

All mental states are identical to brain states (‘ontological’ reduction) although ‘mental state’ and ‘brain state’ are not synonymous (so not an ‘analytic’ reduction).

What are physical properties?

Properties investigated by natural sciences.

What would a type identity theory claim about mental properties?

Mental properties are just physical properties.

What would mind-brain type identity theory claim about mental properties?

Mental properties are physical properties of the brain.

What is an example of a mental state in MBTIT?

Thinking a thought is exactly the same thing as certain neurons firing.

What are examples of mental types?

Sensations, desires, beliefs, emotions

What does the type part of MBTIT claim?

Mental types of thing are actually physical types of thing. Each type of mental event is a particular type of physical event.

What is an example of a type of mental event being a particular type of physical event?

Pain is C-fiber firing, this means one cannot be in pain without C-fiber firing as one cannot both and not have a property simultaneously.

How is the relationship between mental events and physical events in MBTIT understood?

A bi-conditional bridge law.

What are examples of types and tokens?

AAA BBB CCC, there are 3 types but 9 tokens.

What is a type?

A particular kind

What is a token?

An instance

What does MBTokenIT claim?

Pain is a brain state but it is not necessarily that specific type, it could be a different type.

Why might mental events and physical events not seem the same?

We have different ways of knowing about them. This can be compared to the first person phenomenal understanding vs the third person neurological understanding. The event is the same just two ways of understanding it. Despite this seeming counter intuitive science has thrown up many surprising explanations e.g. solid objects are mostly empty space, water is hydrogen and oxygen, etc.

What are examples of correlation?

Hearts and kidneys, size and shape

Why is MBTIT identity and not correlation?

It is not that if you have C-fiber firing then you will also have pain, to have C-fiber firing is to have pain.

What is meant by ‘type identities’ in relation to MBTIT?

Each type of mental state is identical to a specific type of brain state. E.g. pain = c-fiber. Bi-conditional bridge law.

What is the difference between identity and correlation?

Correlation is a connection between two or more things / a relationship between different things. Identity is one thing being itself.

Why is neuroscience not enough to support identity theory?

Neuroscience can only establish correlations.

Why can neuroscience only establish correlation?

It is based on empirical evidence and it is impossible to check every case, it uses inductive reasoning.

What is a response to the issue that neuroscience isn’t enough to support identity theory?

Appeal to Ockham’s razor, don’t multiply entities beyond necessity.

What does JJ Smart argue about Ockham’s razor?

“If there are no overwhelming arguments in favour of dualism, then we should reject the idea of distinct non-physical substances or properties”. “Sensations are nothing over and above brain processes” - not correlated, but identical.

Why is the identity claim not analytic or conceptual?

The claim is not that ‘pain’ means ‘the firing of nociceptors’. But that two distinct concepts pick out just one property (like water and H2O). This is known as an identity of reference.

What are examples of things that are ontologically identical but not analytically identical?

Boris Johnson and Prime Minister, Clarke Kent and Superman.

What is an ontological reduction?

The things in one domain (e.g. mental things) are identical with some of the things in another domain. It is a reduction in terms of what we are claiming exists in the world (one kind of substance and property rather than two).

What are examples of ontological reductions?

Heat is mean molecular kinetic energy, lightning is electrical discharge, there is nothing more to a mental property than being a particular physical property.

How does all mental causation just become a form of physical causation in MBTIT?

All mental properties are identical with brain properties. Mental occurrences are identical with neurons firing. Mental states that involve behavioural dispositions are neurological connections. So all mental causation just becomes a form of physical causation. Mental states and processes cause actions because they are physical states and processes. The idea that brain processes cause my behaviour should not be controversial.

What are examples of how MBTIT would interpret mental causation?

For my desire for food to cause my searching for food is just for certain physical properties of my brain to cause that behaviour. To say my decision to watch TV is the cause of my picking up the remote control is just to say that some particular event in my brain with certain physical properties is the cause of my picking up the remote control.

What is the conceivability argument reformulated against MBTIT?

P1. It is conceivable that MS can exist without PS.

C1. Therefore it is possible that MS can exist without PS.

C2. Therefore MS and PS are distinct.

What is the knowledge / Mary argument reformulated against MBTIT?

P1. Mary knows all physical facts about the brain and colour vision before being released from her black and white room.

P2. On being released, she learns something new.

IC. Therefore, not all facts are physical.

C. Therefore MBTIT is false.

What is the philosophical zombie argument reformulated against MBTIT?

P1. It is conceivable that there are zombies.

P2. If it is conceivable that there are zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies.

C1. Therefore, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies.

P3. If it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies, then the mind cannot be the same thing as the brain.

C2. Therefore, the mind cannot be the same thing as the brain.

C3. Therefore, MBTIT is false.

What is the indivisibility argument reformulated against MBTIT?

P1. My mind is indivisible.

P2. My brain is divisible.

C. Therefore my mind and brain are distinct.

What is the begging the question objection to the indivisibility argument?

The indivisibility argument assumes that the mind is a ‘thing’ which can be divisible or not. This assumption begs the question against type identity theory, which maintains that the ‘mind’ should be understood in terms of mental properties possessed by the brain. There are many properties that it does not make sense to talk of as literally spatially divisible or not. For example, the brain has a particular temperature. ‘Being degrees Celsius’ is not a spatially divisible property, yet it is a physical property. So even if mental properties are not spatially divisible, they could still be identical with physical properties of the brain.

What is the response to the begging the question objection to the indivisibility argument?

If mental states are identical to brain states, then they must share all their properties in common. This is Leibniz’s principle of the indiscernibility of identicals: if ‘two’ things are really ‘one’ thing, then the ‘two’ things must be indiscernible, i.e. you cannot have quantitative identity without qualitative identity - Leibniz law. Second, a brain state, understood as the firing of particular neurons in the brain or the existence of certain neural connections, has certain spatial properties. In particular, it has a precise location in space, occurring in a certain part of the brain or as a certain pattern or shape across many parts of the brain. We can also talk about the spatial relations (up, down, left, right) between the neurons involved and therefore between ‘parts’ of the brain state. We can also talk about the spatial relations between one brain state and another. Brain states of the prefontal and frontal cortices occur a few inches closer to your forehead that brain states of the visual cortex. However, mental states do not have such spatial locations. For example, neuroscientists have associated activity in the prefontal and frontal cortices with thoughts and activity in the visual cortex with visual experience. But my thoughts are not literally a few inches closer to my forehead than my visual experience. Or again, my hopes are not literally about 18 inches above my heart. Mental states are not spatially located in the same sense that brain states are. Therefore, mental states cannot be identical with brain states.

What is the response to the begging the question objection to the indivisibility argument in SLF?

P1. If mental states are identical to brain states, then they must share all their properties in common.

P2. Brain states have a precise spatial location, and stand in spatial relations to both other spatial locations and other physical objects.

P3. Mental states are not located in space, at least in the same way.

C. Therefore, mental states are not brain states.

What is Smart’s response to the response to the begging the question objection to the indivisibility argument?

Because we don’t currently say that experiences have any spatial properties, attributing spatial properties to them sounds odd. But it is an empirical discovery that mental states, in fact, have these properties. If they are brain states, then they do have a spatial location.

What is an objection to Smart’s response to the response to the begging the question objection to the indivisibility argument?

This can’t be right, because it makes no sense to say that my thoughts are, for example, closer to my auditory experiences than to my visual experiences, or my fears are two feet away from my stomach. It is simply grammatically incorrect.

What does Smart reply to the objection to his response to the begging the question objection to the indivisibility argument?

This is just a matter of linguistic convention. We could add to our current grammatical rules to allow us to talk of experiences in spatial terms.

What does Ryle reply to Smart’s response to the objection to Smart’s response to the begging the question objection to the indivisibility argument?

Smart’s solution involves a category mistake. It is not ‘merely’ a linguistic convention that we don’t talk about the spatial location of thoughts or visual experiences. We should no more accept such claims than the claim that the number ‘4’ is a green triangle. This can’t be a matter of empirical discovery, because numbers are not the kind of thing that can take shape. Likewise, mental states are not the kind of thing that can have precise spatial locations. We might want to say that there is a correlation between a particular mental state and a brain state that has a spatial location. But this doesn’t show that the mental state itself is spatially located.

How may an identity theorist reply to Ryle’s reply to Smart’s response to the objection to Smart’s response to the begging the question objection to the indivisibility argument?

We should change our understanding of what ‘makes sense’ on the basis of scientific discoveries. For instance, they might argue that the correlation between mental states and brain states is best explained by their identity. If we reject TIT, our metaphysics becomes more complicated - we cannot reduce mental properties to physical properties.