STUDIES: attribution theories + biases

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33 Terms

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attribution theory.

Term

Definition

Attribution theory

Social-psychological explanations of how people infer causes of behaviour (their own + others).

Function

Helps predict behaviour, understand motives, and gives sense of control.

Types

Internal (dispositional) vs external (situational) attributions.

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covariation model example (Tom Laughs at Comedian).

Pattern

Attribution

Hi consistency + Low distinctiveness + Low consensus

Internal (Tom is easily amused)

Hi consistency + High distinctiveness + High consensus

External (comedian is funny)

Low consistency (any)

Discounting — different cause (mood, situation)

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weiner (1979, 1985) - attributional theory

Dimension

Meaning

Examples

Locus

Internal vs External

Effort vs Luck

Stability

Stable vs Unstable

Ability vs Mood

Controllability

Controllable vs Uncontrollable

Effort vs Illness

  • how individuals interpret events and how this relates to their thinking and behavior.

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Achievement Attributions Matrix (Image-Based).

Internal

External

Stable: Ability (uncontrollable)

Stable: Task difficulty (uncontrollable)

Unstable: Mood (uncontrollable)

Unstable: Luck (uncontrollable)

Controllable–Stable: Typical effort

Controllable–Stable: Consistent help/hindrance

Controllable–Unstable: Unusual effort

Controllable–Unstable: Unusual help/hindrance

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Weiner: Specific Affective Responses.

Attribution Type

Emotion

Internal success

Pride, increased self-esteem

Internal uncontrollable failure

Shame

Internal controllable failure

Guilt

External controllable failure

Anger

External uncontrollable failure

Pity

External controllable success

Gratitude

Stable failure

Hopelessness

Unstable failure

Hopefulness

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Weiner: Future Expectations & Behaviour.

Pattern

Expectation

Behaviour

Failure + Stable cause

Low expectations

Giving up

Failure + Unstable cause

Higher expectations

Persistence

Success + Stable cause

High expectations

Confidence

Success + Unstable cause

Lower expectations

Uncertain

  • most adaptive: Attribute failure to internal, unstable, controllable factors → “I didn’t study enough this time.”

  • least adaptive: Attribute failure to stable, uncontrollable factors → “I’m just not smart enough.”

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fundamental attribution error (FAE).

Term

Definition

FAE

Tendency to over-attribute others’ behaviour to internal causes and underestimate situational factors.

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explanations for FAE.

Explanation

Summary

Perceptual salience

people are more likely to pay attention to + act on the most salient stimuli— eg: focusing on person in a situation (Fiske & Taylor, 1978, 1975).

Differential forgetting

External causes fade from memory more quickly.

Cultural factors

Individualistic cultures show stronger FAE (Choi et al., 2003).

Linguistic factors

Language makes dispositional descriptions easier than situational ones.

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false consensus effect - ross et al. (1977)

Term

Definition

False consensus

Tendency to believe others would behave the same way as oneself.

Classic Study

Key finding

Ross et al. (1977) board-bearing study

Agree to wear sign → think 62% others would agree. Refuse → think 67% others would refuse.

  • procedure: ptps told about hypothetical conflict situation + given two options for a response, one of which = potentially embarrassing task (eg: carrying a large sign that said "Eat at Joe's" around uni campus). ptps chose an option + estimated percentage of their peers that would choose each option + described attributes of person who would choose each option.

  • results: most participants assumed others would make the same choice as they did. (eg: those who agreed to carry the sign thought a majority of others would also agree). 

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Self-Serving Bias

Term

Definition

Self-serving bias

Internal attributions for success (self-enhancing), external attributions for failure (self-protecting).

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Influences on Self-Serving Bias.

Factor

Effect

High self-esteem

Strong self-serving attributions.

Low self-esteem

“Depressive attributional style”: failure attributed internally.

Self-presentational concerns

Modesty or fear of looking arrogant can limit self-enhancement.

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other self-serving distortions

Distortion

Explanation

Illusion of control (Langer, 1975)

Overestimating ability to control chance outcomes.

Just world hypothesis (Lerner, 1977)

Belief that people get what they deserve; victim-blaming.

Responsibility attribution (Weiner, 1995)

Greater responsibility assigned when outcomes are severe.

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heider (1958) — theory of naïve psychology.

  • core idea: people are intuitive “scientists” who seek to understand the causes of behaviour.

  • aim: to propose that humans naturally construct causal explanations to make sense of social events.

  • key concepts:

    • internal (dispositional) vs external (situational) attributions.

    • people prefer stable, controllable causes because they reduce uncertainty.

  • historical context: foundational to attribution theory; inspired later models by kelley (1967) and weiner (1979).

  • exam link: “explain how attribution theory helps us understand social behaviour” → define dispositional vs situational causes.

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kelley (1967) — covariation model of attribution.

  • aim: to explain how individuals use information about consistency (does this person behave the same way every time in this specific situation), distinctiveness (does this person behave differently in other situations), and consensus (do other people behave the same way in the same situation) to infer causality.

  • hypothesis: people act like scientists, attributing causes logically based on observed covariation of behaviour and context.

  • procedure: participants read vignettes (scenarios) describing behaviour with varying levels of consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus. participants were then asked to attribute cause of the behavior— eg: to the person (internal), the stimulus (external), or the circumstances.

  • results: generally supported Kelley's predictions for internal and external attribution.

    • high consensus + high distinctiveness + high consistency → external attribution.

    • low consensus + low distinctiveness + high consistency → internal attribution.

    • low consistency (any configuration) → discounting (search for alternative cause).

  • critique: later research (e.g., mcarthur, 1972; kassin, 1979) found consensus info is often ignored — leading to false consensus bias.

  • exam link: “discuss the use of covariation information in causal attribution” → include kelley’s three dimensions.

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jones & harris (1967) - the Castro study (essay rater paradigm → FAE).

  • aim: to test whether people over-attribute others’ behaviour to dispositions even when situational constraints are clear.

  • procedure:

    • students read pro- or anti-castro essays allegedly written by peers.

    • half were told writers freely chose positions; half were told writers were assigned.

  • results:

    • participants rated pro-castro writers as personally pro-castro, even when told they had no choice.

  • numerical result: mean attitude score = +0.67 in forced condition vs +1.20 in free-choice.

  • conclusion: people underestimate situational influence → FAE.

  • exam link: “outline evidence for the fae and discuss its causes” → cite jones & harris (1967).

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fiske & taylor (1975) — perceptual salience study.

  • procedure: two actors sit face-to-face and have a conversation with a ring of observers around them. most observers could only see the face of one actor.

  • results: observers reported that the actor they could see more clearly was the dominant one and played a bigger role in setting the conversation’s tone.

    • researchers termed this “perceptual salience.”

  • later evidence by fiske & taylor (1991): humans prefer simpler cues for making conclusions, dubbing people as “cognitive misers” (human tendency to think + solve problems in ways that minimize mental effort) → found that salient objects lend themselves to this cognitive ease.

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storms (1973) — actor-observer effect.

  • aim: to test whether changing perceptual perspective affects causal attributions.

  • procedure:

    • 4 participants: 2 actors, 2 observers. actors converse; observers watch.

    • later, each rewatched video from either their own or the other’s perspective.

  • results:

    • standard condition: actors blamed situation; observers blamed actors (typical actor-observer bias).

    • reversed camera condition: bias reversed — actors made more dispositional attributions.

  • conclusion: perceptual salience drives attribution bias.

  • exam link: “explain the actor–observer effect with empirical support.”

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ross et al. (1977) — false consensus effect.

  • aim: to examine whether people overestimate how typical their own opinions are.

  • procedure:

    • students asked: would you wear a “eat at joe’s” sandwich board for 30 minutes.

    • then estimated % of peers who would agree.

  • results:

    • those who agreed → predicted 62% of peers would agree.

    • those who refused → predicted 67% would refuse.

  • conclusion: people assume their own behaviour is “normal” — they project their choices onto others.

  • exam link: “describe and evaluate the false consensus effect.”

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miller & ross (1975) — cognitive explanation of self-serving bias.

  • theory: attributions arise from logical reasoning, not only motivation.

  • finding: success attributed to internal causes because effort logically precedes success; failure attributed externally when success was expected.

  • exam link: “compare motivational and cognitive explanations of self-serving bias.”

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abramson et al. (1978) — depressive attributional style.

  • aim: to investigate how self-esteem influences self-serving bias.

  • finding: low self-esteem individuals fail to self-protect; attribute failures internally.

  • term: “depressive realism” — tendency to make accurate (but self-critical) attributions.

  • exam link: “how does self-esteem affect attributional bias?”

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berglas & jones (1978) — self-handicapping.

  • aim: to study anticipatory self-protection mechanisms.

  • procedure:

    • participants took 20-question intellectual performance test w/ solvable puzzles (exp group 1) vs unsolvable puzzles (exp group 2) + were told they did well.

    • before second task of solving same test, ptps chose between two bogus drugs:

      • actavil (performance-enhancing).

      • pandocrin (performance-inhibiting).

  • results:

    • 70% of those in unsolvable condition, especially males, chose pandocrin.

      • provided ready-made external excuse (the drug) = if they failed the second test → attribute failure to drug, not lack of ability (discounting principle) → protects their self-image VS if they succeed → attributed to high ability (augmentation principle).

  • conclusion: self-handicapping protects self-esteem — a form of self-serving bias.

  • exam link: “explain self-handicapping as an example of self-serving bias.”

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langer (1975) — illusion of control.

  • aim: to show how people overestimate control over chance events.

  • procedure: lottery tickets either self-chosen or randomly assigned.

  • results: participants valued self-chosen tickets at ~$8.67 vs random tickets at ~$1.96.

  • conclusion: people act as if control enhances outcomes, even in random situations.

  • exam link: “discuss how cognitive biases distort causal attribution.”

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lerner (1977) — just world hypothesis.

  • theory: people need to believe the world is fair → victims must “deserve” misfortune.

  • finding: observers blame innocent victims to preserve belief in a just world.

  • modern link: explains victim blaming in cases of poverty, illness, or assault.

  • exam link: “explain how belief in a just world affects social perception.”

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petersen (1980) — differential forgetting hypothesis.

  • aim: to test whether dispositional information is remembered better than situational information, leading to bias in attributions.

  • hypothesis: people forget situational explanations faster, which explains why dispositional attributions dominate.

  • procedure: participants read short behavioural vignettes where either dispositional (e.g. “lazy”) or situational (e.g. “tired from work”) causes were provided. they were later tested on recall accuracy after a delay.

  • results:

    • 72% recall accuracy for dispositional causes.

    • 43% recall accuracy for situational causes.

  • conclusion: dispositional causes are more cognitively “sticky” — they’re easier to store and recall, reinforcing the fundamental attribution error.

  • exam/mcq link: “which explanation for the fae involves memory bias?” → differential forgetting hypothesis.

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chen et al. (1988) — valence and the actor-observer bias.

  • aim: to test whether the actor–observer bias depends on whether behaviour is positive or negative.

  • hypothesis: the actor–observer bias would be stronger for negative outcomes because actors avoid self-blame.

  • procedure: participants described causes of their own and others’ positive and negative behaviours.

  • results:

    • negative behaviours: 80% external attributions by actors vs 35% by observers.

    • positive behaviours: minimal difference (actors 68% internal, observers 61%).

  • conclusion: actor–observer bias is driven by motivational self-protection, especially for failures or socially undesirable acts.

  • exam/mcq link: “the actor–observer bias is most pronounced for which type of behaviour?” → negative behaviour.

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burger (1981) — consequence severity and responsibility.

  • aim: to examine how the severity of an outcome affects attribution of responsibility.

  • hypothesis: the more severe the consequences, the more internal responsibility people assign.

  • procedure: participants read vignettes about identical actions with either mild or severe consequences (e.g. car accident causing minor injury vs death).

  • results:

    • severe outcome: 78% internal attribution rate.

    • mild outcome: 48% internal attribution rate.

  • conclusion: people commit an outcome bias — judging intent or responsibility by results rather than by the actual action.

  • exam/mcq link: “according to burger (1981), people assign more responsibility when?” → outcomes are severe.

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van bavel & cunningham (2010) — iterative reprocessing and attribution.

  • aim: to explore neural evidence that attribution involves dynamic, iterative processing between context and memory.

  • hypothesis: identity-relevant information biases attributional reasoning by activating self and social category representations.

  • procedure: fmri study — participants viewed images of ingroup and outgroup members performing ambiguous actions and judged cause (intentional vs situational).

  • results:

    • stronger medial prefrontal cortex (mpfc) activation when judging ingroup behaviour → deeper processing.

    • reduced activity for outgroup members → heuristic processing.

  • conclusion: attributions are shaped by identity salience and cognitive accessibility — linking social identity theory and attribution theory.

  • exam/mcq link: “which study links attribution processes to neural identity networks?” → van bavel & cunningham (2010).

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taylor & koivumaki (1976) — positivity bias in causal attributions.

  • aim: to test whether people attribute positive outcomes to internal causes more than negative ones.

  • hypothesis: regardless of actor status, people will claim internal credit for success.

  • procedure: participants evaluated hypothetical success and failure scenarios of both themselves and others.

  • results:

    • success: 82% internal attributions.

    • failure: 31% internal attributions.

  • conclusion: self-serving bias generalizes beyond self-perception — people assume positive acts reflect inner traits.

  • exam/mcq link: “the tendency to attribute success internally and failure externally is called what?” → self-serving bias (taylor & koivumaki, 1976).

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weiner (1995) — responsibility judgments in helping contexts.

  • aim: to expand attribution theory to moral judgment and prosocial behaviour.

  • hypothesis: attributions of controllability predict emotional and behavioural responses to others’ needs.

  • procedure: participants read scenarios about individuals in need (e.g. job loss due to laziness vs disability). they rated controllability, sympathy, and willingness to help.

  • results:

    • low controllability (disability): sympathy = 7.9/10; helping intention = 8.2/10.

    • high controllability (laziness): sympathy = 3.4/10; helping intention = 3.1/10.

  • conclusion: perceived responsibility mediates emotional and helping responses — a key link between attribution and prosocial behaviour.

  • exam/mcq link: “according to weiner (1995), what factor determines willingness to help?” → perceived controllability of cause.

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rubin & hewstone (1998) — attributional asymmetry and group membership.

  • aim: to investigate intergroup bias in attributions.

  • hypothesis: people attribute ingroup success internally and outgroup success externally.

  • procedure: british and indian students rated causes of ingroup vs outgroup academic success.

  • results:

    • ingroup success → 76% internal attribution

    • outgroup success → 58% external attribution

  • conclusion: attributional asymmetry reinforces social identity — a cognitive bias sustaining group favouritism.

  • exam/mcq link: “ingroup favouritism in causal explanation is called?” → attributional asymmetry (rubin & hewstone, 1998).

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zuckerman (1979) — comprehensive review of self-serving bias.

  • aim: to meta-analyze the presence of self-serving bias across studies.

  • findings: across 26 studies, 80% showed self-serving attribution patterns regardless of task type.

  • notable: stronger effect in individualist cultures (mean effect size r = .32) vs collectivist (r = .15).

  • conclusion: culture moderates the degree of self-enhancement via attribution.

  • exam/mcq link: “which cultural variable affects self-serving bias?” → individualism vs collectivism (zuckerman, 1979).

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mcarthur (1972) — role of consensus in attribution.

  • aim: to test kelley’s covariation model empirically.

  • procedure: participants rated causes of behaviour using manipulated levels of consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus.

  • results: participants relied most on consistency (β = .65) and least on consensus (β = .21).

  • conclusion: people underuse consensus information — leading to biased, internally focused attributions.

  • exam/mcq link: “which covariation cue is least used in causal reasoning?” → consensus.

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shaver (1985) — cultural perspectives in attribution.

  • aim: to examine differences in attributional tendencies between western and eastern participants.

  • results:

    • americans made 65% dispositional attributions for social behaviour.

    • japanese participants made 58% situational attributions.

  • conclusion: individualist cultures emphasise personal responsibility; collectivist cultures emphasise context.

  • exam/mcq link: “cross-cultural differences in attribution support which explanation?” → cultural model of attribution (shaver, 1985).