Physics and Politics of Nuclear Warfare Exam 1

what characterizes offensive weapons

movement under fire, survivability, and speed

what characterizes defensive weapons

volume of fire and intelligence

what if O>D

war is more common because war pays

what happens if D>O

lots of stalemates

why did deterrence fail in 1914

combatants failed to recognize that the offense/defense balance had shifted towards defense

what was the real tactical revolution involving armor

interwar combination of armor and dispersed strategy and airpower, producing blitzkrieg

why was aircraft potentially revolutionary

aircraft combined stealth/survivability and speed and could attack an adversary’s population without first defeating its military

what did airpower make possible

attacking civilians, industrial production/economy, and morale directly

what was the key assumption about bombers

the bomber will always get through

who developed a major theory about airpower

Guilio Douhet argued airpower could reduce the importance of ground operations and defenses, strategic airpower mattered more than tactical airpower and striking first was important

british theory of strategic bombing

center of gravity was civilian morale, terror bombing intended to reduce support for government

american theory of strategic bombing

center of gravity is industrial economy; attack economic bottlenecks and critical nodes (WWII oil and ball bearing attacks)

what truman say about atomic energy in 1945

it constituted a new force too revolutionary to consider within old ideas

jacob viner prediction

soldiers might be safer than civilians in urban homes

Bernard Brodie argument

the military’s purpose should shift from winning wars to averting them

how does conventional warfare differ from nuclear warfare

conventional war has a more monotone relationship between additional force and utility, nuclear war has diminishing marginal returns after a point

what is the nuclear shift

shift from wartime offense/defense to peacetime deterrence and coercion

what is the key factor in the nuclear revolution beyond the tech

the distribution of nuclear capabilities among multiple actors

3 paradoxical implications of MAD

1) the victim can also be responsible for vulnerability 2) killing weapons can be viewed as bad while killing people is viewed as good 3) more weapons may sometimes be better

Stability/Instability Paradox (SIP)

nuclear deterrence may stabilize the nuclear level while potentially allowing or failing to prevent limited conventional conflict

Mueller’s puzzle

why are there only 9 nuclear states rather than 43 that could become nuclear states?

why did McNamara call the cold war the social scientists’ war?

nuclear weapons made strategy really important, while social science also contributed to counterinsurgency and political development

Bernard brodie

Major civilian strategist who worked at RAND and helped develop thinling about nuclear strategy and the possibilities of a science of strategy

major advantage of Operations Research

systematic analysis had demonstrated advantages over relying solely on military experience

key contribution social science to strategy

theory

4 theories of why states acquire nuclear weapons

rational actor, bureacratic policies, domestic politics, and culture

preferred role for civilians in military strategy

they should be part of, rather than dominate, the defense-policy debate

Massive Retaliation

Eisenhower-era strategy of responding to a Soviet attack anywhere in the world with nuclear weapons, credibility declined after USSR developed nuclear weapons

3 key variables in early nuclear targeting

number of bombs, number of aircraft, and number of targets

what was SIOP designed to reduce

fratricide, time over target conflicts, and inefficiency

4 factors shaping early U.S. nuclear doctrine

strategic situation, technology, politics, and military organizational interests

what technological changes pushed the U.S. toward greater nuclear reliance

more powerful/mini bombs, increasing weapons and delivery systems, and expanded intelligence coverage that increased the number of potential targets

BRAVO targeting

targets intended to blunt soviet nuclear capability: bombers, airfrields, missiles, and sub bases

ROMEO targeting

targets intending to slow Soviet/Warsaw Pact conventional advances such as conventional forces and transportation infrastructure

DELTA targeting

soviet defense industry/industrial base supporting the war effort

civilian vs military conceptualization of deterrence

punishment vs denial

overkill

possessing or planning to use nuclear destructive capability far beyond what is necessary to accomplish strategic objectives

keynes quote

policymakers are influenced by theories even when they don’t realize it, so they should make their theoretical assumptions explicit

what is a military revolution

a development in tech, military organization, or political organization that changes the balance in favor of one form of force or threat over another

why is the nuclear revolution considered a military revolution

nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the relationship between offense and defense, war and peace, and threat/use of force

military revolutions that occurred before the nuclear revolution (in order)

Infantry, Artillery, Shot and Sail, Gunpowder, Rifilingm, Railroads and telegraph, Naval, Nuclear

major military revolutions especially important for 1880 WWI

Industrialization, railroads/telegraph, rifling, improved artillery, and the changing offense-defense balance

important defense and offense chain link

more machine guns and artillery means more firepower which means less mobility which means defense matters more so stalemate

Operations Analysis

a systematic, analytical approach to military problems that uses evidence and quantitative analysis to determone how to use resources and systems effectively, important to rise of civilian strategists

WWII applications of Operations research

air defense, anti-submarine warfare

difference between operations research and systems analysis

operations research worked better when comparing concrete systems with known characteristics. Systems Analysis was much less successful when trying to model large competing strategies, such as whether to prepare for a first strike

how did airpower revolutionize warfare

it seperated strategic victory from tactical victory

what did WWII demonstrate about strategic bombing

airpower could not win the war by itself

2 challenges to Brodie

1) the military never brought into MAD/deterrence and wanted to use nukes like conventional weapons

2) other civilian thinkers asked what constituted stable deterrence

Wohlstetter

wizard of armaggedeon, worked for us govt before WWII, dragged into war effort to manage industrial production, spent 12 years at RAND

delicate balance of terror

concern that MAD could be unstable because deterrence depends on vulnerable nuclear forces

What was Wohlstetter’s key innovation in the basing study

he asked what would happen if the Soviets targeted U.S. bombers rather than cities

What did Wohlstetter conclude about SAC vulnerability

75-85% of U.S. bombers could be destroyed in a Soviet first strike

Why were U.S. overseas bases vulnerable

short-range bombers needed bases near the Soviet Union, making them vulnerable to attack

what is the purpose of the nuclear triad

redundancy: ensuring some nuclear forces survive a first strike and can retailiate

what makes a robust second strike capability

it must be sustainable, survivable, controllable, and effective

what was wohlstetter’s core insight about deterrence?

a secure second-strike capability is essential for stable nuclear deterrence