Philosophy of mind

Substance Dualism

The idea that the mind and body are distinct substances.

Property Dualism

The belief that mental states are properties of the physical brain but are not reducible to physical states.

Epiphenomenalism

The view that mental states are caused by physical states but do not influence physical states.

Descartes' Argument from Doubt

The argument that if I can doubt my body's existence but not my mind's, they must be different.

Interaction Problem in Dualism

The challenge of explaining how a nonphysical mind interacts with a physical body.

Explanatory Weakness of Dualism

Dualism fails to explain how mental states arise or interact with each other.

Philosophical Behaviorism

The belief that mental states are behavioral dispositions.

Methodological Behaviorism

The idea that psychological study should focus only on observable behavior.

Behaviorist Revolution

The movement that rejected introspection as unreliable and emphasized observable behavior.

Behaviorist Manifesto

The idea that psychology should be objective and focus only on observable behavior.

Classical Conditioning

Learning through association.

Operant Conditioning

Behavior shaped by reinforcement and punishment.

Token Economies

Using reinforcement principles in practical applications.

Logical Behaviorism

The view that mental states should be defined in terms of behaviors.

Criticism of Radical Behaviorism

It fails to account for internal mental experiences and subjective consciousness.

Chomsky's critique of Skinner's behaviorism

Chomsky argued that language acquisition cannot be explained solely by behaviorist principles.

Identity Theory

The view that the mind is identical to the brain; mental states are physical brain states.

Type Identity

The belief that each mental state corresponds to a specific type of brain state.

Restricted Type Identity

The idea that different species may have different physical realizations of the same mental state.

Token Identity

The view that each instance of a mental state corresponds to an individual brain state.

Multiple Realization Problem

The idea that mental states can be realized in different physical systems.

Examples of Brain Injury & Mind Injury

Phineas Gage (prefrontal cortex damage) and H.M. (medial temporal lobe removal).

Ontological Simplification through reduction

Explaining higher-level theories through more fundamental theories.

Functionalism

The view that mental states are defined by their causal role in processing information.

Relationship of Functionalism to Turing Machine

The mind is modeled as a system of inputs, states, and outputs.

Pros of Functionalism

It avoids the problems of the identity theory, especially multiple realizability.

Cons of Functionalism

It does not fully explain consciousness, such as qualia.

Computational Theory of Mind (CTM)

The view that mental processes are analogous to symbol manipulation in a computer.

Syntactic vs. Semantic processing in CTM

Syntactic processing involves the structure of symbols, while semantic processing concerns the meaning of those symbols.

Pros of CTM

It explains reasoning and problem-solving.

Cons of CTM

It does not explain subjective experience, as highlighted by Searle's Chinese Room Argument.

Physicalism

The view that everything, including mental states, is ultimately physical.

Supervenience

The idea that mental properties depend on physical properties but are not reducible to them.

Explanatory Gap

The problem that physicalism struggles to fully explain consciousness.

Ontological Simplification through elimination

Refining explanations by eliminating unnecessary entities or concepts.

View of Eliminativists

The belief that mental states don't exist and need a new scientific vocabulary.

Fictionalism

The view that mental states don’t exist, but it’s useful to act as if they do.

Dennett's Three Stances

1. Physical Stance: Examining physical mechanisms. 2. Design Stance: Understanding functions and purposes. 3. Intentional Stance: Assuming rational behavior in others.