Reading 12 - UN Security Council and Peacekeeping

The United Nations (5)

1. Conceived during WWII, following failure of LON after WWI

2. Latest attempt at int cooperation to save succeeding generations from war 

3. Main purpose: maintenance of int peace + security, outlawed use of force except in self-defence/ authorization from Security Council

4. Charter’s foundation is state sovereignty - sanctity of a state’s monopoly on use of force + authority over defined pop within territorial borders

5. UN’s security mostly marginalized for most of Cold War -> not until Iron Curtain fell + later Soviet Union imploded that UN assumed a more substantial role in int peace + security

3 facets of the UN (7)

1. Intergovernmental institution (the ‘first UN’)

   1. Area for decision-making + negotiation - primarily states

2. Administrative entity (the ‘second UN’)

   1. Comprise leaders + staff members serving in myriad departments, agencies, programmes and commissions 

   2. Secretariat is at core 

3. Collection of non-state actors that routinely engage world body (the ‘third UN’)

   1. Compromise of non-governmental org academics, experts, consultants and independent panels

Security Council (5)

1. Responsibility for maintaining int order -> designed to have mili ‘teeth’ to ensure compliance w its decisions ab security

2. Composition + powers

3. Post-Cold War expansion of tasks

4. Impact of US hegemony

5. Inc access of non-state actors

Composition + powers (6)

1. 10 rotating members elected for 2 year, non-renewable terms w no vetos + 5 permanent members w veto 

2. Permanent membership not mirror contemporary distribution power

3. Authority to call disputing parties to resolve conflict through peaceful means such as fact-finding, good offices, negotiation, arbitration + judicial settlement

4. Right to investigate disputes that might endanger int peace + security + to recommend terms of settlement

5. May impose diplomatic + econ sanctions or authorize mili force

   1. Iraq trade sanctions brought controversy due to devastating humanitarian impact so began applying only targeted sanctions via arms embargoes, financial asset freezes, travel bans + commodity boycotts

Post-Cold War expansion of tasks (6)

1. Extended to peacekeeping operations to lower excessive use of veto + power P5

   1. Peacekeeping operations involve civilians + soldiers + police goal is to help keep a lid on conflicts by monitoring ceasefires, interpositioning troops between belligerent forces + maintaining disengagement zones

   2. Deployed w consent of parties + do not use force except in self-defence + defence of mission mandate

   3. ‘2nd-gen’ peacekeeping incl electoral assistance, human rights monitoring + weapons collection, activities once seen as within domestic jurisdiction of states

      1. Still based on consent +restrictions on use force

   4. 1990s shift to peace enforcement + wider scope to threats to int peace + security (interference w humanitarian action + violence against civilians + overthrow of a demo elected president + accompanying instability)

Impact of US hegemony (3)

1. Since end Cold War, US approval/acquiescence is essential to pol + operational functioning of world body in security arena 

2. US may choose to go it alone which generates legitimacy crises for UN -> e.g. US invasion of Iraq w no approval 

3. Has shifted between multilateral + unilateral urges (multialetral w Obama possibly unilateral w Trump)

Inc access of non-state actors

Esp in post-Cold war era -> due to expansion of threats to int order to incl human rights violations + humanitarian disasters

General assembly (3)

1. More inclusive than SC for deliberations - each member equal status 

2. Unlike SC resolutions are recommendations not binding - adopted by simple majority except for ‘important qs’, which require 2/3 of members present + voting

3. Through United for Peace it can talk ab security issues

The Secretariat (4)

1. Formed by int civil servats 

2. Sec-Gen appointed by assembly on rec of council -> usually rotates from region to region 

3. Essential that Secretary-General does not incur wrath of any of P-5

4. Secretariat + Secretary-General are charged w carrying out SC decisions + Sec-Gen can call SC to any matter which may threaten maintenance of int peace + security -> but generally pursued quiet diplomacy to check if P-5 in accordance

Other UN organs (4)

1. ECOSOC, the ICJ and Trusteeship Council 

2. ECOSOC’s - econ, social, cultural, education + health as well as HR-> weak link w SC 

3. ICJ is peace settlement disputes mechanism but need consent by states 

4. Trusteeship not really working

21st century challenges (2)

• Intra-state conflicts - often linked to global arms, trade + drug trafficking networks

• Terrorism + WMD

Intra-state conflicts - often linked to global arms, trade + drug trafficking networks (3)

1. Maybe due to superpower rivalry that fuelled many conflicts due to CW so abundant financial + mili aid flowing from the USA + Soviet Union to Third World clients dried up, given diminished geostrategic significance of these allies on a reconfigured int stage

2. Maybe due to globalization, tech change, rapid econ interactions which have made border porous 

3. Key to avoid conflicts preventive diplomacy or systemic prevention (address int-level factors that enhance risk of conflict such as global illicit trade in small arms)

Terrorism + WMD (2)

1. Lack of consensus over definition of terrorism is problematic esp cuz SC authorization of self-defence as response to terrorism

2. Since late 1990s, UN has stepped up its non-proliferation efforts in WMD arena

Peace operations

Serve problem-solving purposes in societies experiencing violent unrest – ending a conflict, separating belligerents, securing humanitarian relief or introducing demo

Peace operations - characteristics (7)

1. To bring about liberal peace 

2. Used in 2 main situations: to smooth decolonization processes between powers + emergent sovereign territories; + to disrupt conflicts between indep states

3. Inc peacekeeping in civil wars + wars of state dissolution in which non-state activists combat each other + gov forces

   1. Problematic because regulating violent struggles over domestic control within states + civilians key targets

4. Small post-WWII missions were eclipsed by ambitious deployments

5. Sovereignty at centre of consent for them has diminished esp for failed / weak states 

6. Non-UN actors claiming special dispensations arising from regional interest/expertise, played major roles in contemporary operations

Language and meaning of peacekeepinng (5)

• Conflict prevention

• Peacemaking

• Peacekeeping

• Peace enforcement

• Peacebuilding

Conflict prevention

Application of structural / diplomatic measures to keep intra-state / interstate tensions + disputes from escalating into violent conflict.

Peacemaking

Measures to address conflicts in progress + usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement

Peacekeeping (2)

• Technique designed to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted + assist in implementing agreements achieved by peacemakers

• Evolved from a primarily mili model of observing ceasefires + separation of forces after interstate wars, to many elements – mili, police + civilian – working together to help lay foundations for peace

Peace enforcement

Application with authorization of Security Council, of range of coercive measures incl use of mili force to restore int peace + security.

Peacebuilding

Measures targeted to reduce risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities + lay foundation for sustainable peace + development

Surge, retraction and resurgence of peace operations (3)

1. Since the 2000s inc in operations -> made its mili deployment 2nd in world 

2. Imp colonial legacies to explain global ordering of peacekeeping in general + of South’s commitments in particular

   1. Most UN operations were aimed at former colonies, esp in Africa + Middle East

Peace operations - Burden sharing and reforms (4)

• Coercion and hybridity

• Brahimi Report 2000

• Deparment of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) reform

• Revisionism and the Hihg-Level Independent Panel (HIPPO) 2010-16

Coercion and hybridity (2)

1. Allow ad hoc coalitions to act as peace entrepreneurs to solve a bit UN burden-sharing

2. Operations in which UN + other forces worked together could reduce problems arising from overstretch + mirrored phases of stabilization.

Brahimi Report 2000 (5)

1. Rec closer matching between resources + mandate

   1. Due to experience in Rwanda + Srebenica when Dutch troops endangered civilians - call for peacekeeping to be more robust 

2. If peacekeepers could move up a gear to enforcement + back again w/o losing their impartiality + w/o having to rely on consent of parties to a conflict, it was imagined that this would answer Rwandan prob of determined armed groups w unsophisticated weapons

3. More consultation w troop contributors had to be instituted to avoid ‘risk w/o representation’.

4. Funds released for planning + starting up missions before mandate agreed

Flaws in Brahimi Report (5)

1. Assumed strategy could be devised for both peacekeeping (no force) + enforcement (force) as if units could choose force spectrum

2. Assumed peace could be secured by mili means + w/o resistance

3. Analysis rested on a misrepresentation of potential effectiveness of enforcement, when failure not in military strategy but in pol strategy

4. While peacekeeping sought to avoid war-fighting, two seemed to meld as mili doctrines of major powers evolved ‘almost in lockstep’

5. if int forces were to interfere in governance issues, multiple agencies would need to create + manage ambitious peacebuilding policies

Deparment of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) reform (3)

1. The DPKO sought integrated mission planning to establish lines of authority w other UN + non-UN bodies

   1. Integrated organizational capacity would be achieved by establishing ‘backstop teams’ in DPKO for each operation, + establishing joint operation centres in the field

2. Promote balance + gender sensitivity in peacekeeping

Revisionism and the Hihg-Level Independent Panel (HIPPO) 2010-16 (7)

1. New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping -> Underpin UN linkages w int mili organizations

   1. Preparing + planning for interventions in a businesslike way, DPKO + DFS were to provide strategic guidance

2. Successor to Brahimi Report from HIPPO

   1. Critiqued weak conflict analysis, slow deployments into field, lack gender considerations, incoherent + distant management, a distressing treatment of UN field workers, lack of engagement w host communities + governing authorities + scandals arising from HR abuses

   2. Exposed paradoxes, compromises and contradictions

   3. Strategic partnership principles -> UN was to forge strategic partnerships w other agencies + organizations + ensure firm task delineation

   4. Quest for efficiency can require more division of labour

      → Reform UN Secretariat, demands for specialist role

Exposed paradoxes, compromises and contradictions (3)

• Ambiguity of use of force -> peacekeepers were to ‘operate on assumption that use of force may be necessary from outset’

• Assuming that threat of it might deter attacks BUT robust peacekeeping needed well-defined mandates, assured resources + continued pol peace processes

• Panel said enforcement as last resort

Strategic partnership principles -> UN was to forge strategic partnerships w other agencies + org + ensure firm task delineation (5)

1. Consultative decision-making + common strategy;

2. Division of labour based on respective comparative advantage;

3. Joint analysis, planning, monitoring + evaluation;

4. Integrated response to conflict cycle, incl prevention

5. Transparency, accountability + respect for int standards.