Evidence and Forensic Medicine | Quizlet

R v Keane

Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ stated that where the material in the possession of the prosecution "may prove the accused's innocence or avoid a miscarriage of justice, then the balance comes down resoundingly in favor of disclosing it"

R v H

the golden rule of full prosecution disclosure. This principle asserts that defendants must have access to all relevant materials that could aid in their defense, ensuring that trials are conducted fairly. However, the case acknowledges that there may be circumstances justifying limited disclosure, primarily when it serves a significant public interest—such as national security, law enforcement, or protection of sensitive information.
Minimal Derogation
The ruling emphasizes that any derogation from the golden rule should be minimal. The justification for withholding information must be robust, and courts must critically assess whether non-disclosure would undermine the trial's fairness. If such a risk is present, judges are obligated to order fuller disclosure—even if this could result in the prosecution halting the case to avoid disclosure obligations. This principle reinforces the notion that the defendant's right to a fair trial cannot be compromised for the sake of public interest. The court may order a summary or a redacted version of the sensitive information to be shared with the defense, or it might allow for certain parts of the evidence to be excluded altogether. In R v H, the defendant was charged with serious sexual offenses. During the trial, the defense sought disclosure of certain documents related to the prosecution's case, including materials that might assist in the defense or could undermine the prosecution's case.
Key Legal Issues
Public Interest Immunity (PII): The prosecution withheld some documents on the grounds of public interest immunity, arguing that their disclosure could harm ongoing police operations or compromise sensitive information.

Franklyn and Vincent v R

right to disclosure in summary trials- Right to Disclosure:
The court emphasized the fundamental right of defendants to access evidence that could affect their case. This aligns with the principles of a fair trial, where both parties need to be aware of the evidence presented.
In Franklyn and Vincent, the seriousness of the charges and the potential penalties were significant factors. As the penalties for the offenses (such as robbery) were severe, the court recognized that the obligations of the prosecution to disclose evidence became more onerous. it becomes even more critical for the prosecution to disclose all relevant materials to ensure that the defendants can adequately prepare their defense.
The ruling illustrated that failure to disclose important evidence can undermine the fairness of the trial. In this case, any non-disclosure that potentially impacted the defendants' ability to contest the charges could lead to a miscarriage of justice.
The judges asserted that the integrity of the trial process relies on transparency, especially when defendants face serious consequences.
Judicial Discretion:
The court also acknowledged the role of judicial discretion in managing disclosure. Judges must ensure that both parties have access to the evidence necessary for a fair trial, and they can order additional disclosures if it appears that the defense lacks crucial information. Prosecution should provide the defence with copies of statements on which they propose to rely. The more serious and the more complex the proceedings the greater the desirability that statements should be provided and the more likely that it will be practicable to provide the statemens. In contrast, where the offence is trivial, the provision of statements before trial is less important.

Stinchcombe v R

unused materal- the accussed was a lawyer charged with breach of trust, theft and fraud. Former secretary was a crown witness, favorable to defence. Defence counsel was informed of the existence but not of the content of the statements. Disclosure requests were refused. Supreme Court allowed appeal, new trial ordered,Court held Crown counsel has a legal duty to disclose all relevant information to the defence. the fruits of the investigation, which are in its possession, are not the property of the Crown for use in securing a conviction but the property of the public to be used to ensure that justice is done. Obligation to disclosure is subject to discretion with respect to the timing and manner of disclosure. Crown counsel has a duty to respect the rules of privilege and to protect the identity of informers. crown's discretion is reviewable by the trial judge, with respect to the relevance of information. Crown counsel was not justified in refusing disclosure here on the ground that the witness was not worthy of credit: whether the witness is credible is for the trial judge to determine after hearing the evidence. Since the information withheld might have affected the outcome of the trial, the failure to disclosure impaired the right to make full answer and defence. There should be a new trial at which the statement are produced.

Ferguson v AG of T&T

duties of a prosecutor- court found prosecution may call in aid of its case any witness as it thinks fit, but it is under a duty at CL to disclose to the defence material statements made by persons who are not called by as its witnesses and this duty extends to disclosure at or before the preliminary inquiry. Breach of duty of disclosure does not automatically entitle and accused to a remedy, either by way of acquittal or constitutional redress, Entitlement is dependent on the establishment of prejudice that the accused suffered by the failure to make disclosure.

Sangster and Dixon v R

Evidence which might reasonably have affected the decision of the jury to convict will be 'material' in that on appal against convinction it will render the conviction unsafe if the evidence has not been disclosed to the defence and has not been led at the trial.

R v. Linton Berry

Linton Berry was convicted of murdering Paulette Zaidie on January 11, 1987. Key elements included:
Circumstantial Evidence: The prosecution relied on circumstantial indicators rather than direct eyewitness accounts.
Witness Testimony: Joseph Zaidie received a call from Berry confessing to the murder and suggesting he investigate. Zaidie found Paulette dead in her vehicle.
Prior Threats: Witnesses testified to Berry's jealousy and previous threats against both Paulette and Zaidie, establishing a motive.
Behavioral Patterns: Testimonies highlighted Berry's obsessive behavior, reinforcing the prosecution's claim of intent.
Forensic Evidence: Forensic examinations were crucial:
Close Range Shooting: Paulette was shot at close range with a .44 caliber firearm.
Trigger Mechanism: Experts established that the gun's trigger had to be pulled for it to discharge, countering Berry's accidental shooting claim.
Defense Argument: Berry argued the shooting was accidental:
Accidental Discharge Claim: He contended that during a struggle, the gun accidentally discharged without intent to harm.
State of Shock: Berry claimed he was startled, leading to an involuntary pull of the trigger.
Appeal Grounds: Berry's appeal included several significant issues:
Judge's Comments: He argued that the judge's remarks ridiculed the defense, potentially biasing the jury.
Forensic Misinterpretation: Berry claimed misrepresentation of the forensic evidence by the judge.
Accident Defense Instructions: He contended that the judge did not adequately explain the concept of "accident" to the jury.
Legal Principles: Key legal principles include:

Pre-trial disclosure, 2017

within 56 days of the prosecution disclosinf evidence and other material...the defence shall pursuant to the overriding objective of the Rules and active case management disclose the following; a. the nature of the accussed's defence, including any particular defences on which he intends to rely. b. indicating the matters of fact on which he takes issue with the prosecution. c. setting out, in the case of each such matter, the reason he takes issue with the prosecution. d setting out particulars of the matters of fact on which he intends to rely for the purposes of his defence.

Woolmington v DPP

Unit 4-The defendant was charged with the murder of his wife from whom he was separated. He claimed that he had shot her and killed her accidentally when he was trying to convince her to come back home by threatening to kill himself. The jury was directed that, once it was proved that the defendant shot his wife, it was for him to prove the absence of malice, although malice was an essential element of the charge or murder. The defendant was convicted and unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal. He then appealed to the House of Lords.
Viscount Sankey LC: "if at any time during the trial it was permissible for the judge to rule that the prosecution had established his case and that the onus was shifted on the prisoner to prove that he was not guilty and that unless he discharged that onus the prosecution is likely to succeed, it would be enabling the judge in such a case to say that the jury must in law find the prisoner guilty and so make the judge decide the case and not the jury... Just as there may be evidence on behalf of the prosecution there may be evidence on behalf of the prisoner which may cause doubt as to his guilt. But while the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner, there is no such burden laid on the prisoner to prove his innocence and it is sufficient for him to raise a doubt as to his guilt; he is not bound to satisfy the jury of his innocence..."

R v Hepworth and Fearnley

Unit 4-In a case concerning the appellants convicted of receiving stolen bales of wool, the appeal centered on the adequacy of the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding the burden of proof and how to interpret the appellants' explanations for possessing the stolen goods. The judge outlined three key points for the jury: they must be satisfied that the wool was stolen, that the appellants received it, and that they knew it was stolen at the time of receipt. The court held that it is crucial for juries to be explicitly informed that the burden of proof lies with the prosecution, especially in receiving cases. It noted that if an accused provides an explanation for their possession, even if the jury doubts its truth, a mere possibility of its truth should create reasonable doubt about the prosecution's case. Lord Goddard C.J. emphasized that while specific wording is not essential, juries must be clearly directed that the onus is on the prosecution and that they must be sure of the accused's guilt before convicting. The court found that the judge's use of the term "satisfied" was insufficient, highlighting the need for clearer communication regarding the burden of proof.

The State v Hansraj Ori et al

Unit 4- In the case of Ori and Persaud, both defendants were charged with wounding with intent, with the prosecution arguing that they acted together in committing the offense. They were found guilty by the jury. Defendant 1, Ori, appealed his conviction, which was granted on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that he acted in concert with Defendant 2, Persaud. The appeal court concluded that the trial judge should have removed Ori's case from the jury's consideration due to the lack of evidence.
Meanwhile, Defendant 2, Persaud, asserted that he was not present at the scene of the incident, presenting evidence to support his alibi. Despite this, the jury convicted him as well. Persaud appealed his conviction, which was also allowed. The court found that the trial judge's instructions to the jury were too casual and insufficiently emphasized the burden of proof required for a conviction.
The court noted that the jury should have been reminded of their duty to acquit Persaud if they believed his alibi, reinforcing the prosecution's responsibility to prove all elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Crane JA highlighted that the trial judge failed to adhere to established guidelines for instructing the jury in such cases, particularly regarding the necessity of satisfying themselves about the prosecution's burden before reaching a verdict. Consequently, both defendants' convictions were overturned, with Persaud's conviction quashed due to the lack of evidence linking him to the offense.

R v Burns

Unit 4- In this case, the defendant (D) was charged with assaulting another man in an indecent manner while under the influence of alcohol and morphine tablets. D had no memory of the incident, which raised legal questions about insanity and automatism. The defense presented medical evidence suggesting that D's condition could be understood as either insanity or automatism, but the trial judge failed to clearly distinguish between these two concepts during his summing-up. This lack of clarity was particularly problematic regarding the burden of proof, as it is crucial to differentiate how each defense operates in court.
D was ultimately convicted, but on appeal, the court found that the trial judge's failure to properly differentiate between insanity and automatism constituted a significant error. The appeal court emphasized that when these issues are present, the judge must clearly explain their distinctions, especially concerning the burden of proof. Specifically, it is not the responsibility of the defense to prove automatism; rather, it is the prosecution's duty to negate this defense once the defense has established a sufficient basis for it. This ruling reinforced the importance of precise legal instructions to the jury in cases involving complex mental health issues.

Baptiste v The State

Unit 4- In this case, the appellant was tried for murder and raised defenses of self-defense, accident, and provocation. After being convicted, he appealed on several grounds, including the argument that the trial judge did not adequately instruct the jury on the burden of proof regarding these defenses.
The Court of Appeal determined that whenever a defendant raises self-defense, provocation, or accident, the trial judge has a duty not only to provide general instructions on the burden of proof but also to clarify that the prosecution must specifically disprove these defenses beyond a reasonable doubt. In this instance, the trial judge failed to emphasize that the burden lay with the prosecution to negate the appellant's claims effectively.
Although the trial judge handled the overall burden and standard of proof well, he repeatedly referred to the appellant's claims as mere "defenses" and did not adequately inform the jury that the issue of self-defense was legitimately in play. Furthermore, he neglected to explain that a plea of provocation could still be valid even if the appellant had intended to kill or inflict serious harm.
As a result, the appeal was granted, and a retrial was ordered. The court highlighted that if the prosecution did not meet its burden to disprove the defenses of self-defense or accident in a murder trial, the accused must be acquitted. If provocation was pleaded but not disproved, the appropriate verdict would be manslaughter instead of murder. This ruling underscored the necessity for clear jury instructions on the prosecution's obligations when such defenses are raised.

R v Johnson

Unit 4- In the case of R v Johnson, the appellant was charged with robbery with violence and presented an alibi as his defense. During the initial trial, the jury did not accept his alibi, leading to a retrial. In the summing-up of the retrial, the judge incorrectly instructed the jury that the appellant had a burden to prove his alibi and satisfy them that it was established.
On appeal, the court clarified an important principle of criminal law: when an accused person presents an alibi or any defense, they do not take on the burden of proof for that defense. Instead, the prosecution retains the responsibility to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This means that if the defense raises an alibi, the jury must be instructed that it is the prosecution's duty to negate that alibi.
The court emphasized that similar principles apply to other defenses, such as self-defense. A trial judge must ensure that the jury understands that the prosecution must disprove any defenses raised by the accused, reinforcing the idea that the burden of proof always lies with the prosecution. This ruling highlighted the necessity for accurate jury instructions regarding the burdens of proof in criminal trials, ensuring that defendants are not unfairly required to prove their innocence.

Wilsher v Essex Area Health Action

In this case, the plaintiff was born prematurely and required oxygen treatment in a special care unit managed by the defendants. Unfortunately, due to a catheter being improperly inserted into an umbilical vein instead of an artery, the plaintiff received an excessive amount of oxygen, leading to a condition known as retrolental fibroplasia, which ultimately resulted in blindness. The plaintiff sought damages from the defendant health authority, claiming negligent medical treatment.
Initially, the judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff, determining that the defendants were liable because they failed to prove that their negligence did not cause the plaintiff's condition. The Court of Appeal upheld this decision. However, the defendants appealed the ruling.
The higher court clarified that the burden of proving causation lies with the plaintiff. In cases where multiple factors could contribute to a condition, including the administration of excess oxygen, simply establishing that the defendants failed to take necessary precautions does not automatically prove that excess oxygen was the cause of the condition. The court noted that there was conflicting expert evidence regarding whether excess oxygen materially contributed to the plaintiff's condition, and the initial judge did not make the necessary factual findings on this issue.
As a result, the court determined that the causation issue needed to be retried before a different judge. The ruling emphasized that the burden of proof remains with the party asserting the affirmative of the issue—whether the plaintiff or the defendant—throughout the trial. If that party does not discharge their burden after all evidence is presented, the decision must go against them.

Joseph Constantine Steamship Line

Unit 4-the charterers claimed damages from the shipowners for failing to load cargo, citing an explosion on the ship that the owners argued had frustrated the voyage. Initially, the trial judge held that the charterers needed to prove there was no frustration, and their claim was dismissed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal stated that a party in breach cannot claim frustration without showing it occurred without their fault. However, the shipowners did not meet this burden, leading to a judgment in favor of the charterers.
The House of Lords clarified that when a contract is frustrated by the destruction of its essential subject matter, the promisor does not need to prove their neglect. Instead, it is the promisee who must prove that the frustration was caused by the promisor's default. Since the shipowners had established that the explosion frustrated the contract, they were not required to prove it was not their fault. Thus, the charterers had the burden to prove otherwise.
Ultimately, the shipowners' defense of frustration succeeded, reinforcing the principle that "he who asserts must prove" and clarifying the burdens of proof in contractual disputes involving frustration.

Bratty v AG

Unit 4- the appellant was convicted of murder and raised three defenses: automatism due to psychomotor epilepsy, diminished capacity to form intent, and insanity under the M'Naughten Rules. The trial judge allowed the jury to consider the insanity defense but not the other two.
Lord Denning clarified that while the prosecution must prove every element of the crime, there is a presumption that individuals possess the mental capacity to be held responsible for their actions. To challenge this presumption, the defense must present credible evidence indicating the defendant's actions were involuntary or that he lacked intent due to a mental disorder.
The court ruled that to successfully claim insanity, the defendant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he had a defect of reasoning from a disease of the mind, rendering him unaware of the nature of his actions. If the insanity defense fails, the option for a defense of automatism is also excluded. This case established important legal standards for mental health defenses in criminal law, clarifying the allocation of the burden of proof between the prosecution and the defense.

R v Edwards

Unit 4- the defendant was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor without a justices' license, in violation of section 160(1)(a) of the Licensing Act 1964. At trial, he was unrepresented and did not give evidence, instead making an unsworn statement denying occupation of the premises. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the prosecution should have presented evidence to show that there was no valid license, given their access to the register of licenses under section 34(2) of the Act.
The court held that there is an exception to the general rule that the prosecution must prove every element of the offense. This exception applies to offenses that prohibit certain actions but include specified provisos or exemptions. In such cases, it is not the prosecution's responsibility to demonstrate a lack of excuse or qualification. Rather, if the statute clearly prohibits an act unless certain conditions are met, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove that he was entitled to engage in that act.
In this case, the court found that the statute required the defendant to prove he held a justices' license, rather than obligating the prosecution to prove he did not. This ruling emphasized the importance of statutory interpretation in determining the allocation of the burden of proof in offenses with specific licensing requirements.

Muneem v Williams

Unit 4- the appellant faced two charges: driving a hire car without a license and driving a hire car without a valid insurance policy, both in violation of relevant ordinances. On appeal, he argued that there was no prima facie evidence that the vehicle was a licensed hire car and that the prosecution should have been responsible for proving that the insurance policy did not apply at the time of use.
The court held that the use of a motor vehicle on public roads is strictly prohibited unless there is a valid insurance policy in force that complies with the relevant regulations. The specifics of how the vehicle was being used were primarily within the appellant's knowledge, placing the burden on him to demonstrate that he was operating the vehicle within the terms of the insurance policy.
Regarding the second charge, while the appellant claimed that there was a valid insurance policy, the prosecution established that there was an exception within that policy. They presented evidence that the appellant was driving a hire car without holding a proper driver's license, which created a prima facie case that the insurance did not cover that use. Consequently, it was the appellant's responsibility to prove that the policy did indeed apply despite the exception, which he failed to do.
As a result, the court found no basis for the appeal, affirming the convictions and sentences. The ruling clarified that the onus was on the appellant to prove that his use of the vehicle was covered by insurance and that the prosecution was not required to prove the vehicle's licensed status as a hire car.

R v Ewens

Unit 4- defendant was charged with unauthorized possession of a drug under the Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act 1964. He claimed there was no case to answer, arguing that the prosecution hadn't proven he did not fall within the statutory exceptions. The chairman ruled that the prosecution was not required to establish this.
During the trial, the jury was instructed that, having shown the defendant was in possession of the drug, it was now his responsibility to provide evidence that his possession was lawful—specifically, that it resulted from a prescription from a qualified medical practitioner. The jury was told to acquit if they found his evidence credible but to convict if they believed he obtained the drug by other means. Ultimately, the jury convicted him.
Justice Melford Stevenson emphasized that it is the defendant's burden to prove any exceptions that are uniquely within his knowledge. This ruling reinforced the principle that once the prosecution establishes possession, the onus is on the defendant to demonstrate entitlement to any statutory defenses. The court upheld the chairman's interpretation of the law.

R v Hunt

Unit 4- In this case, the appellant was charged under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 for unlawful possession of morphine after police found 154 milligrams of a white powder, which was identified as morphine mixed with caffeine and atropine, in his home. Under the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 1973, possession of morphine is permitted if the concentration does not exceed 0.2%. However, the prosecution failed to present evidence regarding the proportion of morphine in the seized powder.
Initially, the judge ruled there was a case to answer, leading the appellant to change his plea to guilty. However, he later appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed his appeal, and subsequently to the House of Lords.
The House of Lords held that the burden of proving the accused's guilt lies with the prosecution, except in cases of insanity or specific statutory exceptions. These exceptions may either be express or implied, and the burden may shift to the accused in certain circumstances. The court noted that when the language of a regulation is unclear regarding the burden of proof, it can consider the legislative intent, including the mischief the provision aims to address and practical factors influencing proof.
In this case, regulation 4(1) was interpreted not as an exception to unlawful possession but rather as defining essential elements of the offense. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the morphine in the appellant's possession was in a prohibited form, which they failed to do. The court concluded that the prosecution had not established the necessary proof regarding the concentration of morphine, and consequently, no burden lay on the appellant to demonstrate compliance with the regulations. The requirement for possession was insufficient without also proving the quantity of the drug involved.

R v Gill

Unit 4- the court addressed the issue of whether the jury was correctly directed regarding the defense of duress. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the deputy recorder improperly placed the onus on him to prove he acted under duress. The court clarified that while the accused must present enough evidence to make duress a valid consideration for the jury—either through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses or by presenting his own evidence—the ultimate burden to disprove that defense rests with the prosecution. This means that once the defendant raises duress as a defense, it becomes the responsibility of the Crown to convincingly negate it and eliminate any reasonable doubt from the jury's mind. Ultimately, the court found that the overall direction given to the jury correctly reflected this legal framework, maintaining that while the evidential burden lies with the defendant, the legal burden of proof remains with the prosecution.

DPP v Bailey

Unit 4- the case involved B, a special constable in Jamaica, who shot and killed a man with whom he had previously had an altercation. During the trial for murder, B claimed the shooting was accidental, and did not raise self-defense as a defense. The judge excluded self-defense from the jury's consideration in his summation. However, the Court of Appeal of Jamaica allowed B's appeal, ruling that the judge should have directed the jury to consider self-defense based on the evidence presented. The court emphasized that it is the trial judge's responsibility to assess whether the evidence is strong enough to raise a prima facie case of self-defense that warrants consideration by the jury. Even if the defendant does not formally assert self-defense, any evidence that could support such a claim must be presented to the jury if it meets the necessary threshold. The court clarified that self-defense should be considered if the facts, as stated by the accused, suggest the possibility of self-defense, regardless of the formal defense strategy. Therefore, the failure to allow the jury to consider self-defense, given the circumstances, was deemed a significant error, leading to B's conviction for manslaughter being overturned.

Miller v Minister of Pensions

Unit 4-Lord Denning said: 'It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence "of course it is possible, but not in the least probable," the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice.'

Walters v R

Unit 4-Where in a criminal trial for murder the judge in the course of his summing- up directed the jury that "a reasonable doubt is that quality and kind of doubt which, when you are dealing with matters of importance in your own affairs, you allow to influence you one way or the other" and the Court of Appeal of Jamaica confirmed the conviction and refused the petitioner leave to appeal against his conviction for murder.HELD: Dismissing the petitioner's petition, that in the context of "doubt ", which could not be other than personal to the doubter, it was meaningless to talk of doubt as "objective" and otiose to describe it as "subjective"; that it was best left to the judge's discretion to choose the most appropriate set of words in which to make the jurors, whom he had had an opportunity to observe, understand that they must not return a verdict against a defendant unless they were sure of his guilt, and that it was the effect of the summing-up as a whole that mattered and not the particular formula of words used by the judge in his direction to the jury.
It is not the particular formula that matters: it is the effect of the summing-up. If the jury are made to understand that they have to be satisfied and must not return a verdict against a defendant unless they feel sure, and that the onus is all the time on the prosecution and not on the defence, then whether the judge uses one form of language or another is neither here nor there.

Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd

The plaintiff bought a capstan lathe from the defendants, the transaction being completed on hire-purchase terms with the intervention of a finance company. The plaintiff alleged that the director of the defendants had falsely represented to him that the lathe had been "Soag reconditioned," and that that representation either constituted a breach of warranty or a fraudulent misrepresentation, and he claimed damages from the defendants. Judge Leon decided that there was no contractual warranty and then decided that the question whether there was a fraudulent misrepresentation or not depended on the standard of proof which he was to apply.
HELD: In a civil action where fraud or other matter which is or may be a crime is alleged against a party or against persons not parties to the action, the standard of proof to be applied is that applicable in civil actions generally, namely, proof on the balance of probability, and not the higher standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt required in criminal matters; but there is no absolute standard of proof, and no great gulf between proof in criminal and civil matters; for in all cases the degree of probability must be commensurate with the occasion and proportionate to the subject-matter. The elements of gravity of an issue are part of the range of circumstances which have to be weighed when deciding as to the balance of probabilities.

Blyth v Blyth

Unit 4-In this case it was held that so far as the grounds for divorce are concerned or matrimonial cases, the case, like any civil case, may be proved by a preponderance of probability, but the degree of probability depends on the subject-matter. In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear. So far as the bars to divorce are concerned, like connivance or condonation, the petitioner need only show that on balance of probability he did not connive or condone as the case may be. The word "satisfied" in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 s. 4(2) does not import a criminal standard of proof. matrimonial cases can be established by a "preponderance of probability," meaning that the evidence must show that something is more likely true than not. However, the level of evidence needed varies depending on the seriousness of the allegations. For more serious offenses, such as adultery or abandonment, the evidence must be clearer and more convincing.
When it comes to defenses against divorce, such as connivance (where one spouse is seen as having cooperated in the other's wrongdoing) or condonation (forgiveness of an offense), the petitioner only needs to demonstrate that it is more probable than not that they did not connive or condone the behavior.

La Salle, Shah et al v R

Unit 4- A mutiny occurred in the First Battalion of T&T which had been organised by the accused. They were convicted of mutiny. The court held that the standard of proof where the burden is on the accused is proof on a balance of probabilities.

R v Carr-Briant

Unit 4- In this case, the appellant was charged with corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906, and received an eighteen-month prison sentence. During the trial, the judge instructed the jury that the appellant had to prove he gave the money without a corrupt motive, and that he needed to do this beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury had any doubt based on the appellant's evidence, they were directed to convict him. The appellant appealed, arguing that the judge misled the jury about the burden of proof required for the defense.
The court held that when the law assumes something against the accused unless proven otherwise, the burden on the accused is lighter than what the prosecution must meet to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused can meet this burden by showing that their evidence makes it likely or probable that they did not act with corrupt intent. Additionally, the court noted that the burden of proof for a defense, such as insanity, in criminal cases is similar to that in civil cases, meaning it does not require as high a standard as the prosecution's proof. This clarification emphasizes that the accused should not face the same rigorous burden as the prosecution when defending against charges.

R v Podola

In a capital murder case, the defense argued that the defendant was unfit to plead due to hysterical amnesia, which prevented him from remembering events related to the charge. The judge determined that the burden of proving insanity fell on the defense. The jury concluded that the defendant did not genuinely suffer from memory loss and found him fit to stand trial. He was then convicted and sentenced to death. The Secretary of State later referred the case to the Court of Criminal Appeal to clarify whether the burden of proof regarding fitness to plead lay with the prosecution or the defense.
The court ruled that when a preliminary issue regarding the accused's fitness to plead is raised, several principles apply. First, the jury must consider all evidence to determine if the accused is insane and unable to stand trial. If the defense claims insanity and the prosecution contests it, the defense must prove the defendant's insanity on a balance of probabilities. Conversely, if the prosecution asserts insanity and the defense disputes it, the prosecution bears the burden of proof, needing to establish this beyond a reasonable doubt.

Gomes v R

Unit 4- The appellant had been convicted of rape. In the original trial he raised the defence of duress. On appeal it was stated that there can be no doubt that "duress" is a defence and that when there is sufficient evidence, as in this case, the burden is on the prosecution to satisfy the jury that the act of the appellant was a voluntary one and that the jury must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.

Teper v R

Circumstantial evidence may sometimes be conclusive, but it must always be narrowly examined, if only because evidence of this kind may be fabricated to cast suspicion on another. It is also necessary before drawing the inference of the accused's guilt from circumstan tial evidence to be sure that there are no other co-existing circumstances which would weaken or destroy the inference. , there is no rule of law requiring the judge to direct the jury to acquit unless they are sure that the facts proved are not only consistent with guilt but also inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion.

Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority

In civil cases, if one party fails to present evidence or call key witnesses, the court may draw adverse inferences from the evidence presented by the opposing party regarding the withheld facts. Brooke LJ outlined the following key points:
A court may draw adverse inferences from the absence or silence of a witness expected to provide material evidence.
Such inferences can either strengthen the opposing party's evidence or weaken the party failing to call the witness.
Before drawing an inference, the opposing party must have presented some evidence, however weak, on the matter.
If the missing witness's absence or silence is satisfactorily explained, no adverse inference will be drawn, though a credible but unsatisfactory explanation may reduce or nullify its impact.

R v Khan

the Court of Appeal provided guidance on the handling of absent witnesses in criminal trials, emphasizing fairness and caution in jury directions. The key points are:
No Universal Rule: A blanket instruction not to speculate would be unfair, but failing to give a direction could lead to unjust speculation. Adverse comments on an absent witness might also be unjust if there's a valid but undisclosed reason for their absence. The judge's decision should be guided by fairness and the circumstances of the case.
Danger of Speculation: The risks of allowing the jury to speculate or making adverse comments are paramount considerations in determining whether to address an absent witness.
Commenting on Failure to Disclose: Since a defendant's failure to disclose their case in advance can now be commented upon, there is a stronger case for allowing commentary on an absent witness.
Burden of Proof: If the judge comments on the failure to call a witness, it may be appropriate to remind the jury of the burden of proof on the prosecution.
Pre-Comment Submissions: Before making any comment on the failure to call a witness, the judge should invite submissions from counsel in the absence of the jury to ensure fairness.
Overall, the Court emphasized the need for a balanced approach to avoid unfair prejudice while ensuring that the jury is not misled.

R v Goodway

the accused's lies to the police as to his whereabouts at the time of the offence were used in support of the identifi cation evidence adduced by the prosecution. It was held that whenever a lie told by an accused is relied on by the Crown, or may be used by the jury to support evidence of guilt, as opposed merely to refl ecting on his credibility (and not only when it is relied on as corroboration or as support for identifi cation evidence), a direction should be given to the jury that: (1) the lie must be deliberate and must relate to a material issue; (2) they must be satisfi ed that there was no innocent motive for the lie, reminding them that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour; and in cases where the lie is relied upon as corroboration, (3) the lie must be established by evidence other than that of the witness who is to be corroborated.

R v Burge

Lucas direction (or *Goodway direction*) is a judicial instruction given to a jury when there is a risk that they might use a lie told by the accused as evidence of guilt. It is typically required in certain situations where the accused's lies may influence the jury's perception of their credibility and the strength of their defense. The direction aims to prevent the jury from assuming that the accused's lies automatically indicate guilt.
The four situations in which a Lucas direction is usually necessary, as outlined in R v Burge, are:
1. Alibi Defense: When the defense relies on an alibi, and the prosecution suggests it may be false.
2. Corroboration of Evidence: When the judge directs the jury to look for corroboration of a piece of evidence, and that evidence includes lies told by the accused.
3. When the prosecution argues that a lie told by the accused, on a separate issue, implies guilt, such as using a lie as an implied admission of guilt.
4. When the judge anticipates that the jury might treat a lie as evidence of guilt, even if the prosecution has not specifically argued this.
The purpose of the direction is to clarify that while lies may suggest the possibility of guilt, they do not automatically prove it. The jury should not treat a lie as definitive evidence of criminal behavior unless they are satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant's guilt based on the overall evidence.
In certain situations, like when the prosecution simply contradicts the defense or when inconsistent statements are made, a Lucas direction may not be needed, as the general legal principles regarding burden of proof and credibility already apply. revelation of lies by the accused typically arises during the trial- 1. Cross-Examination 2.Witness Testimony 3.Documentary or Forensic Evidence

DPP v Kilbourne

the court addressed the concept of relevance in the context of evidence. It emphasized that evidence is relevant if it is logically probative or disprobative of a matter that needs to be proved. In other words, evidence must have the ability to make a fact in the case more or less probable, which is the essence of logical probativeness.
The term logically probative refers to the idea that the evidence can help establish the likelihood of a certain fact or event occurring. For example, a piece of physical evidence, like a fingerprint, might make it more probable that a defendant was at the scene of a crime. Similarly, disprobative evidence can make a fact less likely, such as evidence showing an alibi that contradicts the prosecution's case. if the evidence makes a disputed fact seem more likely, or if it weakens the argument for a certain fact, it is considered relevant. The relevance of evidence is not just about its logical connection to the matter in dispute; it is about how it influences the probability of the truth of that matter, based on the facts presented in the case.

R v Blastland

the House of Lords considered the issue of irrelevance in relation to evidence. The appellant, B, was charged with the buggery and murder of a boy. B admitted to meeting the boy and engaging in homosexual activity but claimed he fled when he saw another man, M, nearby, whom he feared might have witnessed the act. B suggested M was responsible for the crimes.
During the trial, the defense sought to introduce evidence that M had made statements before the boy's body was found, suggesting knowledge of the murder. The defense argued that these statements, although hearsay if used to prove the facts, were admissible to show M's state of mind—specifically his knowledge of the murder before the body was discovered.
The trial judge ruled the evidence inadmissible, and the House of Lords upheld this decision. Lord Bridge, in delivering the judgment, stated that evidence of someone's state of mind (like M's knowledge of the crime) is only admissible if it is directly relevant to an issue in the trial. Since the case was focused on whether B committed the crime, M's state of mind was irrelevant unless the jury could infer how M knew about the murder. This, Lord Bridge argued, was too speculative and did not provide a rational basis for the jury to conclude that M, rather than B, was the perpetrator.
The court determined that M's knowledge, while potentially interesting, did not directly address the key issue—whether B committed the crime. Therefore, it was irrelevant to the trial and properly excluded. Critics of the decision argue that the evidence should have been admitted, as it was at least as relevant as other evidence concerning M's movements, which was allowed, even though it didn't prove that M was the offender. This highlights the subjective nature of relevance in legal proceedings.

Weight vs admissibility

The weight of evidence refers to its persuasive value or probative worth in relation to the facts in issue. It involves assessing how much the evidence contributes to proving or disproving a fact, considering various factors such as:
Support or contradiction by other evidence presented.
In direct testimony, the demeanor, plausibility, and credibility of the witness.
In hearsay evidence, the circumstances surrounding the statement, such as its timing relative to the event and whether the maker had any motive to misrepresent the facts.
Weight is a question of degree: evidence can range from minimal probative value (making little difference to the case) to high probative value (potentially decisive). "Insufficient evidence" refers to evidence that is too weak to justify a finding, even if uncontradicted, while "prima facie evidence" refers to evidence strong enough to support a finding in a party's favor unless contradicted. "Conclusive evidence" refers to evidence that settles a fact beyond dispute, leaving no room for contradictory evidence.
The weight of evidence is separate from its admissibility. A judge determines whether evidence is relevant and admissible, while the jury (or fact-finder) decides how much weight to give to the evidence presented. However, the judge may consider weight when deciding admissibility, especially in cases involving preliminary facts that must be proven for certain evidence to be admitted. Additionally, the judge can comment on the cogency of the evidence during the summing-up, provided this doesn't interfere with the jury's role in assessing weight.
Ultimately, weight concerns how much influence evidence is likely to have on the outcome of the case, while admissibility concerns whether evidence should be considered at all.

question of law vs question of fact

Questions of Law
Definition: Questions of law pertain to the application and interpretation of legal principles. They involve determining what the law is and how it applies to the facts of the case.
Decided by: Judges.
Examples:
Substantive Law: Issues relating to the rights and obligations of the parties under the law.
Competence of Witnesses: Whether a person is legally qualified to testify.
Admissibility of Evidence: Deciding which pieces of evidence can be considered.
Jury Instructions: How the judge directs the jury on legal standards and principles.
Preliminary Facts: Sometimes the judge must decide factual questions to determine if legal standards are met, like whether evidence is admissible.
Questions of Fact
Definition: Questions of fact involve the determination of what actually happened in the case—based on evidence presented.
Decided by: Juries (in jury trials); Judges (in bench trials or where permitted by law).
Examples:
Credibility of Witnesses: Assessing if witnesses are trustworthy.
Weight of Evidence: How much significance or value should be given to the evidence.
Existence of Facts in Issue: Determining whether the facts in question occurred.

Evidential burden

the responsibility of a party to present sufficient evidence on a fact in issue to justify a finding in their favor.
Key Points:
Purpose: To provide enough evidence for an issue to be considered by the jury or tribunal of fact.
Judge's Role:
Determines if the evidence is sufficient (a question of law).
If sufficient, the issue goes to the jury; if not, the judge withdraws the issue.
Criminal Proceedings:
Defense: Must present enough evidence for common law defenses (e.g., provocation in murder charges).
Prosecution: Bears the burden for essential elements of the offense. Failure to meet this results in acquittal. No Case to Answer: Defense may argue there is no evidence to support the charge.
Judge's Decision: If evidence is insufficient or unreliable, the judge stops the case.

legal burden

The legal burden (also known as the "burden of proof" or "probative burden") refers to the ultimate responsibility placed on a party by law to prove a fact in issue. It is the burden of proving a claim to a specific standard of proof. The legal burden is determined once by the tribunal of fact (such as a jury or judge) at the end of the trial after both parties have presented all their evidence.
Key aspects of the legal burden:
Who bears it? The party that bears the legal burden must prove a particular fact or issue to the required standard (e.g., "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal cases or "on the balance of probabilities" in civil cases).
Standard of Proof: In criminal cases, the standard of proof for the legal burden is usually "beyond a reasonable doubt." In civil cases, it is typically "on the balance of probabilities."
Failure to discharge the legal burden: If the party with the legal burden fails to meet the required standard of proof, they lose on that issue. In criminal law, the prosecution must prove the defendant's guilt; in civil law, the claimant must prove their case.
Example: In a criminal trial, the prosecution may bear the legal burden of proving the defendant's guilt, while the defendant might bear the legal burden to prove a defense, such as insanity.

legal burden vs evidential burden

The legal burden concerns the overall duty to prove a fact to the required standard and is assessed at the end of the trial.
The evidential burden relates to the duty to present enough evidence for the tribunal of fact to consider the issue, and it is assessed throughout the trial. Key Differences Between Legal and Evidential Burden
Nature of the Burden:
Legal Burden: The ultimate responsibility to prove the fact in issue to a certain standard.
Evidential Burden: The obligation to present enough evidence for the issue to go before the tribunal of fact.
When it is Determined:
Legal Burden: Decided at the end of the case, when all evidence has been presented, and is based on the ultimate finding of fact.
Evidential Burden: Considered during the trial when the judge decides whether there is sufficient evidence to allow the issue to be put before the tribunal of fact.
Effect of Failing to Discharge the Burden:
Legal Burden: Failure to discharge the legal burden results in losing on that issue (e.g., a conviction in a criminal case).
Evidential Burden: Failure to discharge the evidential burden means the issue may be withdrawn from consideration by the tribunal of fact (e.g., the defense may not be considered by the jury).
Shifting of Burdens:
Legal Burden: The legal burden typically does not shift unless there is a rebuttable presumption of law that places the burden on the opposing party to disprove a fact.
Evidential Burden: The evidential burden can shift during the trial, particularly when rebuttable presumptions of law apply or when a party produces evidence sufficient to allow the issue to be considered by the tribunal of fact.

tribunal of fact

A tribunal of fact is the group or body responsible for determining the facts in a legal case. It evaluates and weighs the evidence presented during the trial to decide what happened with respect to the issues in the case. This is separate from the judge's role, which involves interpreting and applying the law to those facts.
There are two main types of tribunals of fact:
Jury: In many trials, particularly in criminal cases, the jury serves as the tribunal of fact. The jury listens to the evidence, deliberates, and then decides the facts—such as whether the defendant committed the crime, whether the elements of the offense have been proven, or whether the defense is valid.
Judge (in a bench trial): In some cases, particularly in civil cases or in bench trials (trials without a jury), the judge serves as the tribunal of fact. In this situation, the judge both applies the law and makes determinations about the facts based on the evidence presented during the trial.
The tribunal of fact is responsible for:
Assessing the credibility of witnesses and the reliability of evidence.
Deciding what actually happened based on the evidence, such as whether a crime was committed or whether the plaintiff's claims are supported by the facts.
Making factual determinations about elements of the case, such as intent, state of mind, or the existence of certain circumstances.
The judge's role, in contrast, is to oversee the trial, rule on legal issues, and ensure that proper legal procedures are followed. In jury trials, the judge will provide the jury with instructions on the law, but it is the jury (the tribunal of fact) that decides the factual issues.

Examination in chief

is the process during a trial in which a party calls a witness to testify in support of their case. It is the first questioning of a witness by the party who has called them to the stand, and its purpose is to establish facts that support the party's claims or defenses.
Key points about examination in chief:
Purpose: The goal is to elicit relevant facts from the witness that support the party's case. The questioning party is trying to build their narrative and show the facts that help prove their side of the case.
Questioning: During examination in chief, the lawyer asking the questions typically uses open-ended questions. These are questions that allow the witness to provide their own answers in detail (e.g., "What happened on the night of the incident?" or "Can you describe what you saw?"). Leading questions (questions that suggest the answer) are generally not allowed during examination in chief, as they can influence the witness's testimony.
Who does it: The party who calls the witness (either the prosecution in a criminal trial, or the plaintiff or claimant in a civil trial) conducts the examination in chief. It occurs before cross-examination (where the opposing party questions the witness) and re-examination (where the party who called the witness may ask additional questions to clarify points made during cross-examination).

Evidence Act T&T, s- 5, 6, 7, 8, 11

Unit 5- Section 5 - Impeachment of Witness Credibility:
A party producing a witness cannot use general evidence of the witness's bad character to challenge their credibility. However, if the witness's testimony is adverse (unfavorable), the party may contradict the witness with other evidence or, with the judge's permission, prove that the witness made a previous inconsistent statement. Before introducing this, the party must inform the witness of the statement and ask if they made it.
Section 6 - Inconsistent Statements:
If a witness denies making a prior statement that contradicts their testimony, the opposing party can prove the inconsistency by showing that the witness made the statement. Before proving the inconsistency, the party must inform the witness of the circumstances surrounding the statement and ask if they made it.
Section 7 - Cross-Examination on Written Statements:
A witness can be cross-examined about prior written statements related to the case, even if the document isn't shown to the witness initially. If the party intends to use the statement to contradict the witness, they must point out the specific parts of the writing to be used. The judge may require the production of the written statement at any point during the trial.
Section 8 - Previous Convictions:
A witness can be asked if they've been convicted of an indictable offense. If they deny it or refuse to answer, the opposing party may prove the conviction. A certificate of the conviction, signed by the relevant court officer, is sufficient evidence of the conviction without needing proof of the officer's signature or position.
Section 11 - General Application:
These provisions apply to all courts, both criminal and civil, and to anyone authorized by law or consent of the parties to hear, receive, and examine evidence.

Sexual Offences Act, s 30

Unit 5- Section 30 - Evidence Concerning Sexual Activity and Sexual Reputation:
This section restricts the use of certain types of evidence in cases involving sexual offenses:
Evidence of Sexual Activity:
In criminal proceedings for offenses under the relevant act, evidence about the complainant's sexual activity with anyone other than the accused is generally inadmissible.
However, if the accused believes such evidence is necessary for their fair trial, they can make an application to the court, which will consider the request in the absence of the jury. If the court agrees, such evidence may be allowed.
Sexual Reputation:
Evidence relating to the sexual reputation of the complainant is also generally not admissible. This means the complainant's prior sexual history or reputation cannot be used to challenge or support their credibility in the case.
The purpose of this section is to protect the complainant from irrelevant and potentially prejudicial evidence regarding their sexual history or reputation, ensuring that the trial remains fair to both the complainant and the accused.

Evidence Act, section 15 H

Unit 5- Admissibility of Previous Inconsistent Statements in Criminal Proceedings
(1):In criminal proceedings, when a person gives oral evidence (testifies) in court, and:
(a) They admit making a previous statement that contradicts their current testimony (i.e., the person acknowledges that they previously said something different from what they are saying now), or (b) A previous inconsistent statement made by the person is proved (i.e., the statement is shown to exist and to contradict the current testimony, through evidence as allowed by sections 5, 6, or 7), Then, that inconsistent statement is admissible as evidence. Specifically, the statement can be used as evidence for any matter that it addresses, just as if the person had orally testified to that matter during their current testimony.
Subsection (2): If in criminal proceedings, evidence of a previous inconsistent statement is introduced under section 15D(1)(c) (which typically involves proving an inconsistent statement through cross-examination or another method), then this statement is also admissible as evidence. It can be used for any matter stated in the inconsistent statement, just as if the person had testified to that matter orally.
This provision allows a previous inconsistent statement to be used as evidence in two ways:
Admitting or Proving the Statement: If the person admits to or if the previous contradictory statement is proven during the trial (via the relevant sections 5, 6, or 7), the statement can be used to show the truth of the matter it refers to.
Using Inconsistent Statements for Evidence: Even if the statement was made outside the court (before the trial), if it is inconsistent with what the person says in court, it can be admitted to challenge their testimony or to establish facts relevant to the case.

R v Sims

Unit 5, leading questions-The appellant was convicted of burglary and larceny. On appeal, the complaint was made that in examining a witness for the crown, the state counsel posed a leading question as to the time when the burglary was committed, and the answer was admitted into evidence. It was held that where it is desired to obtain evidence on some vital ingredient of an offence, it is the duty of state counsel to see that the questions he puts to the witness are not leading, because what is desired is not the evidence of the state counsel but the evidence of the witness himself and put in the form in which the question was asked, counsel for the state was putting in the mouth of the witness a vital ingredient of the offence of burglary.

R v Roberts

Unit 5, rule against self serving statements- a defendant cannot introduce evidence of statements they made after the crime (such as declaring their defense) to support their case, because such statements are considered self-serving and inadmissible. In this case, the defendant was convicted of murder and claimed that the death occurred accidentally while he was trying to resolve a quarrel with the girl. Two days after the incident, the defendant told his father that his defense would be accident. The trial judge did not allow this statement to be admitted as evidence. not relevant to the core issues in the trial. The statement about the defense does not assist in resolving the dispute or provide any new evidence related to the actual facts of the case (such as whether the killing was intentional or accidental). No Evidential Value: The statement essentially reflects what the defendant wants the defense to be, but does not offer objective proof or independent evidence supporting the claim. These statements do not help clarify the facts or issues in dispute during the trial, and so are excluded on the grounds of irrelevance.

Ratten v R

Unit 5- exceptions to self serving statements-res gestae- refers to statements that are so closely connected to the incident itself that they form an essential part of it- These statements are often spontaneous and made during or immediately after the incident. Because they are made under the pressure of the event, they are seen as more reliable and are treated as exceptional evidence. In this case, the accused's wife was shot, and he claimed the shooting was accidental. While the shooting occurred, a telephonist at the local exchange received a call from the accused's house. The voice on the phone was hysterical and sobbing and said: "Get me the police, please."
The key point is that the statement made by the wife, "get me the police, please," was admissible in court because it was considered part of the res gestae. Here's why:
Timing: The statement was made very shortly after the shooting occurred, and it was closely tied to the event.
Spontaneity: The voice on the phone was described as hysterical, showing that it was a spontaneous reaction to the traumatic event, not a fabricated or premeditated statement.
Connection to the Event: The statement was made under pressure from the immediate circumstances of the shooting. It was clear that the woman was calling for help because of the shooting, making it inextricably linked to the event.

R v Beattie

Unit 5- exception to the rule against self serving statements, Allegations of recent fabrication. the complainant accused her father of sexual abuse, claiming the abuse started when she was 6 or 7 years old. The father denied the allegations. At trial, the complainant's testimony differed from her initial police statement, and the defense argued that she might have fabricated the story. Rebuttal of recent fabrication: If the defense suggests that the witness's testimony is fabricated, prior consistent statements can be introduced to show the testimony was not a recent invention. Complaints made in sexual cases: A victim's complaint made at the first available opportunity (for instance, immediately after the alleged incident) is admissible to show consistency in their account. The court specifically rejected a fourth exception to the rule. This would have allowed a party, after cross-examining a witness to show inconsistencies in their testimony, to then re-examine the witness to show consistency by introducing prior statements. The second statement, in this case, was not admissible because it didn't directly address the issue of recent fabrication. The defense hadn't accused the complainant of fabricating her story; they had simply cross-examined her about inconsistencies. Furthermore, the second statement contained more material than the first statement and more than the complainant's testimony during her evidence in chief. could have introduced unnecessary information that was not directly relevant to the trial.
The second statement was not part of the rebuttal of any specific allegation and introduced additional material that could confuse or unduly influence the jury. Because the error was so significant, convictions quashed.

R v Lilyman

Unit 5, the defendant was charged with attempted rape and indecent assault.
The victim made a complaint shortly after the incident to her mother and mistress. The prosecution sought to admit this complaint as evidence to support the victim's credibility and show that her conduct was consistent with her assertion that the acts were done without her consent.
The defense objected to the admission of these complaints, arguing that such evidence was hearsay and should not be admitted to prove the truth of the allegations.
The judge allowed the evidence of the victim's complaint to her mistress to be introduced in the trial. In cases involving sexual offences like rape or indecent assault, complaints made by the victim shortly after the alleged incident are generally admissible. The purpose of such evidence is not to prove the truth of the complaint, but to show the consistency of the victim's behavior and to suggest that the victim's account is unlikely to be fabricated.
The complaint is relevant because it is inconsistent with the victim having consented. In other words, if the victim immediately reported the assault and described it consistently, it undermines any argument that the act was consensual. The prosecution can use this as evidence of the victim's truthfulness and the absence of consent. The jury was reminded that the complaint should not be used to assume the facts of the alleged crime, but only as evidence of the victim's consistency and to rebut allegations of consent. The court concluded that the evidence of the complaint was rightly admitted because it was used to show consistency and reliability of the victim's account, particularly with regard to her lack of consent.
The jury was properly cautioned that the complaint was not proof of the facts of the crime.

R v Osbourne and Virtue

Unit 5, previous identification- The Defendants were arrested on suspicion of robbery, but the police officer did not have sufficient evidence to formally charge them.
The officer interrogated the defendants about their whereabouts during the time of the robbery without administering a legal caution (which is required under the Judges' Rules, which govern police conduct during questioning).
After the interrogation, the defendants were placed on an identification parade (a line-up of potential suspects for witnesses to identify) where two women purportedly identified the defendants as being involved in the robbery. One of the women later failed to confirm the identification during trial, stating she was nervous and could not recall identifying anyone.
The police officer in charge of the identification parade was called to testify about the identifications made by the women at the parade.
The defendants were convicted of robbery. The main issue in this case was whether the identification parade evidence could be admitted, especially considering that one of the witnesses later expressed doubt about the identification.
The Court of Appeal held that the evidence of the police officer regarding the identifications made at the parade was admissible. The police officer was not contradicting the women's testimony but was offering evidence about the fact of identification made at the parade, not the reliability of the identification. This case confirmed that identification parade evidence can be used to establish the fact of identification at the time, even if subsequent witness testimony is inconsistent or unreliable, as long as the jury is instructed to assess the reliability of the identification. was not commenting on the truthfulness or reliability of her identification. the reliability of the identification was questioned.

R v Pearce

Unit 5, Accusations against accused and resulting admissions-falls under the exception for statements that show the attitude or state of mind of the accused at the time the statement was made Pearce was arrested, and later made two voluntary statements at the police station.
First statement: Pearce admitted that he suspected the goods were stolen but said he sold them for the same price he paid for them.
Second statement: Three hours later, Pearce denied knowing that the goods were stolen.
The trial judge excluded both voluntary statements from the trial, ruling that they were self-serving and thus not admissible. Pearce appealed, arguing that the statements should be allowed. First statement showing attitude: The first statement was important because it helped show Pearce's attitude at the beginning of the interview. was relevant to understanding his state of mind and how he responded when first questioned by the police. second statement, made a few hours later, also provided context for the earlier part of the interview. Since the two statements were part of a long series of questions and answers, it would have been unfair to exclude them selectively. important for a fair trial.
Fairness principle: Because the two statements were made as part of an ongoing interaction with the police, and the statements were not separate or isolated, it was important that the entire conversation be available for the jury to hear, in order to properly assess the accused's full response. The judge must allow statements made by the accused, even if they are self-serving, as long as they are part of the same series of questions and answers. Appeal allowed- conviction was quashed because the trial judge had excluded statements that should have been considered by the jury.

R v Storey

Unit 5- the defendant made a voluntary unsworn statement to the police, claiming that the drugs found in her flat belonged to a man who had brought them there. The statement was not made under oath, and the key issue was whether this statement could be treated as evidence of the truth of the facts it described (i.e., that the drugs belonged to someone else).The court ruled that the statement was not evidence of the truth of the facts it contained (that the drugs belonged to the other person). Instead, the statement was seen as evidence of the defendant's reactions to police questioning or the circumstances of the investigation. This means that the statement could show how the defendant responded to being questioned but could not be used to prove that the drugs actually belonged to someone else. a defendant's voluntary statement may be admissible as evidence of their state of mind or reactions, but it cannot be used to establish the truth of the statement. while relevant to understanding her response, did not affect the prosecution's case because it was not evidence of the truth of the facts asserted in it.

R v Richardson

Unit 5- refreshing memory with statements made shortly after the events in question- The defendant was charged with burglary and attempted burglary, and the case hinged on identification by witnesses.
Four prosecution witnesses had made statements to the police a few weeks after the alleged offences, and these statements were shown to them before the trial to refresh their memory.
The defence objected to the use of these statements, arguing that they should not be admissible. However, the trial judge allowed the use of these prior statements, and the defendant was convicted.Sachs LJ clarified that witnesses are allowed to refresh their memory by reference to prior statements in the witness box, provided the statement was made at the time or shortly after the events. This is a common practice in criminal trials.
In general, witnesses for the prosecution are permitted to see their police statements if they request it and can use them to refresh their memory during their testimony.
The judge made a distinction between statements made contemporaneously with the events (or very shortly thereafter) and those made much later, noting that contemporaneous notes or statements are acceptable because they more accurately reflect the witness's memory of the event. The court made it clear that while prior statements can be shown to a witness to refresh their memory, it is impermissible for multiple witnesses to compare statements with each other before the trial, as this could lead to collusion or tailoring of testimonies.

four requirements to use a document to refresh memory while in court

Unit 5- While in court
This may be done where permission is sought but the following four requirements must be satisfied.
o Contemporaneity- the statement must have been created close in time to the incident.
o Authorship of witness- the statement must have been created by or authenticated by the witness.
o Production and exhibition if necessary-.
o Original- The witness must be able to produce the original; if not he would have to be able to give an account for it.
The purpose of refreshing in court is just for you to read to yourself and give it back. It is only meant to assist you to remember what you said. It is your document so there is no need for anybody else to understand it. It can be a simple note. There is no need for it to even have been tendered as a documentary exhibit.
The witness must make the request to be refreshed.

R v Harvey

Unit 5, refreshing memory- improper use of a document to refresh a witness's memory during the trial. Specifically, the issue is whether a witness can refresh their memory using a document when they have not stated that their memory is faulty. The court ruled that D should not have been allowed to refresh his memory using the document, as he had not claimed that his recollection was imperfect. The principle behind refreshing memory during trial is that it is only allowed when a witness genuinely needs to refresh their memory.
In this case, since D had not indicated any difficulty in recalling what M had said, the use of the document was improper. This was seen as an attempt to self-corroborate D's testimony. In this case, the document that D consulted was not part of the formal evidence in the trial and was not a statement that could be used for corroboration, making its use unfair and prejudicial to the trial process. This direction improperly gave the jury the impression that they should prefer D's version (based on the document) over M's own conflicting testimony.

R v Kelsey

Unit 5, refreshing memory- A witness for the prosecution was asked to recall a car registration number related to the burglary.
The witness had originally dictated the registration number to a police officer, who made a note of it.
The officer then read the note back to the witness, who verbally confirmed its accuracy, but did not visually verify it at the time.
At trial, the witness was allowed to refresh his memory by referring to this note. The Court of Appeal (COA) ruled that the trial judge had been correct in allowing the witness to refresh his memory using the note.What matters is that the witness satisfied themselves that the record was accurate while the facts were still fresh in their mind. A witness can refresh their memory using a written note as long as they confirm the accuracy of the note (either visually or aurally) while the facts are fresh in their mind.
It is not strictly necessary for a witness to read the note themselves; hearing it read back to them is sufficient as long as they verify its accuracy.
If a witness has not visually confirmed a note but only heard it read back, an additional witness (in this case, the police officer) must authenticate the note before it can be used in court.

R v Bryant and Dickson

Unit 5-admissibility of records and a witness's ability to rely on them to refresh their memory during testimony. If a witness has kept a record (such as a log or a diary) as part of their duty, they are entitled to refer to that record during their testimony to refresh their memory.
Accuracy of the Record: The witness can testify that they are satisfied with the accuracy of the record, confirming that events were recorded correctly.

Maugham v Hubbard

Unit 5- An inadmissible document may be used to refresh a witness's memory. The case confirms that a witness can be shown an inadmissible document to refresh their memory, as long as the document is not directly relied upon as evidence in the case.
The witness's statement after refreshing their memory is considered the evidence, not the document itself.The witness was shown a document—a signed acknowledgment of money received—and although he did not initially remember the payment, he stated that after seeing the document, he had no doubt that he had received the money. The court ruled that the document could be used solely to refresh the witness's memory, but it was not admitted as evidence of the receipt itself. Instead, the witness's statement, made after refreshing his memory, was sufficient parol evidence to prove the payment. The case confirms that while a document may be inadmissible as evidence, it can still be shown to a witness to help them recall facts, and the resulting testimony, based on that refreshed memory, can be admitted as evidence. Importantly, the document itself is not considered evidence, and therefore, does not require any formal requirements like a stamp.

Ewer v Ambrose

Unit 5, unfavorable witness- In this case, the defendant called a witness to testify about a partnership that would support his defense, but the witness testified to the contrary, undermining the defendant's case. The court held that while a party cannot directly discredit or impeach their own witness, they are allowed to contradict the unfavorable testimony by presenting other evidence or witnesses.
Holroyd J explained that if a witness proves something contrary to the party's case, the party can't simply argue that the witness is untrustworthy or not to be believed. However, the party may introduce additional evidence to correct or challenge the witness's testimony. In other words, while the testimony of an adverse witness cannot be directly challenged on the grounds of credibility, the party calling the witness can present other evidence to refute the witness's factual assertions.
This principle ensures that a party is not trapped by an unfavorable witness and can still attempt to prove their case through other means. The core idea is that unfavorable testimony doesn't automatically negate a party's position—it can be contradicted by other evidence or witnesses, allowing the party to present a more complete picture.

R v Honeyghon and Sayles

Unit 5- the appellants were charged with murder and assault. Several witnesses were reluctant to testify, though they had made prior statements to the police. Three key witnesses either refused to testify or claimed to have no recollection of events. The prosecution sought to treat two of these witnesses as hostile, and the judge allowed this. The appellants appealed, arguing that the judge should have conducted a voir dire to determine whether these witnesses were genuinely refusing to testify.
The Court of Appeal outlined two key principles: the duty of citizens to assist in the prosecution of crime and the duty to ensure fairness and avoid prejudice in presenting evidence. The court ruled that the trial judge had discretion in allowing cross-examination of hostile witnesses, but it also noted that a witness who refused to testify could be dealt with as contempt of court. The appeal court quashed the conviction of one appellant, H, due to insufficient evidence but upheld the conviction of the other, S, as there was enough evidence against him.
Key Points:
A judge can treat a witness as hostile if they refuse to testify or contradict prior statements.
The court must balance the duty to encourage witnesses to assist in prosecutions with ensuring fairness in presenting evidence.
A voir dire is discretionary and may be unnecessary if sufficient evidence exists.

Norbert Aaron v The State

Unit 5, previous inconsistent statements- , the appellant, who was convicted of serious sexual offenses, appealed his conviction on several grounds, most notably the improper direction given to the jury by the trial judge regarding the defense of fabrication. The appellant's defense was based on the argument that the victim had fabricated the allegations against him. The prosecution's case, in turn, relied heavily on the victim's testimony and previous inconsistent statements.Section 15H deals with the use of prior inconsistent statements made by a witness and allows such statements to be used as evidence of the witness's credibility, particularly if the witness denies or gives conflicting testimony.
Section 15H provides that a previous inconsistent statement can be admitted as evidence in the following circumstances:
If a witness makes a statement in court that contradicts their previous statements.
The court may allow the earlier statement to be introduced to show that the witness's testimony is inconsistent.
The jury can then decide the weight to give to the previous inconsistent statements, particularly concerning the credibility of the witness. The defense, on the other hand, relied on the argument of fabrication—that the victim was lying or had fabricated the allegations against the appellant. The defense sought to challenge the victim's credibility, pointing out the inconsistencies in her statements as evidence that she had made up the allegations. The judge did not adequately explain to the jury how to consider the victim's prior inconsistent statements. The jury needed to understand whether those inconsistencies could be evidence of the victim's unreliability or whether they were a natural consequence of the victim's distress or confusion.cannot be used as direct evidence of the facts

Japhet Bennet v The Queen

Unit 5, previous inconsistent statements- Middleton initially made a statement to the police identifying Japhet Bennett as the shooter. However, at trial, Middleton recanted, claiming he never saw the shooter and denied the contents of his prior statement. The case centered around whether this previous inconsistent statement (PIS) could be admitted as evidence. The Court considered whether Middleton's recanted statement was reliable enough to be admitted, especially since it was the only evidence identifying the shooter. The defense could not cross-examine Middleton on the PIS, which weakened its credibility and fairness in the trial.
Lack of Corroboration: No other evidence supported Middleton's description of the shooter or the weapon, making the PIS even less reliable. The statement was made two days after the crime, which allowed time for potential fabrication, weakening its reliability.
The absence of any supporting evidence and the inability to cross-examine Middleton made the statement unreliable and unfair to admit.
The trial was deemed unfair because the PIS was the sole evidence against the defendant, and it could not be tested.The Court quashed the conviction, ruling that the PIS should not have been admitted.
The defendant was acquitted because the PIS was unreliable and lacked corroboration, and the trial did not provide a fair opportunity to challenge it. the defense should have had the chance to cross-examine Middleton to challenge his credibility and probe why he recanted. If Middleton had been properly cross-examined, the defense could have tried to expose any inconsistencies or motives for his recantation, which would have helped the jury evaluate whether his identification of Bennett was truthful or fabricated.absence of independent verification

Jashier Daniel v Roody Sookdeo

Unit 5, In criminal proceedings, evidence of an inconsistent statement made by a witness is admissible under section 15D(1)(c), provided that the statement is one which could have been given as oral testimony by the witness. Before a witness is confronted with a previous inconsistent statement, the following steps must be taken to ensure the process is fair and correct:
Witness Confrontation: The witness must be asked whether they made the inconsistent statement before introducing proof of its making. This requires specific focus on the contradictory part of the statement, rather than reading the entire statement to the witness.
Procedure if the Witness Denies the Contradiction: If the witness denies the inconsistency, the following procedure applies:
(a) The inconsistency is pointed out to the witness in front of the jury.
(b) If the witness denies it, they are temporarily stood down.
(c) A third-party witness (often the person who took the statement, e.g., a police officer) must testify to prove the statement was made, but the contents are not revealed at this stage.
(d) The witness is then brought back and shown the specific part of the statement where the contradiction occurs.
Witness Acknowledgement or Denial:
(e) If the witness acknowledges the contradiction, the matter is settled, and the witness's credibility is impugned.
(f) If the witness denies the contradiction, the statement is read into evidence, which means the full contents are introduced as proof of the inconsistency in the witness's testimony.
Jury Guidance: Finally, the jury is instructed on how to treat the statement:
If they accept the statement as being contradictory, they may discredit the witness's testimony.
If they do not believe the statement was made, they may ignore it completely.

R v. Cleghorn

Unit 5, judge may call witness- In criminal trials, a judge has the discretion to call a witness who has not been called by either the prosecution or the defense, provided that the judge believes it is necessary in the interests of justice. However, to avoid injustice to the accused, a judge should generally not call a witness after the defense case has closed, except in rare circumstances where something unexpected or unforeseen arises during the trial. the prosecution's evidence suggested that four people were present in a flat at the time of a rape. The prosecution called the complainant and one other person as witnesses, but did not call the fourth person, whose testimony might have been crucial. The defense, however, only called the defendant. After the defense rested its case, the judge decided to call the fourth person as a witness. This witness was cross-examined by both the prosecution and the defense, and as a result, the defense had to give further evidence, take additional instructions, and call two more witnesses. This dramatically altered the course of the trial, and ultimately, the defendant was convicted.
On appeal, the defense argued that the judge should not have called the witness after the defense case had closed. The court agreed, stating that while judges do have the discretion to call witnesses in the interests of justice, this should only happen in exceptional circumstances where no prejudice or injustice would be caused to the defendant. The general rule is that the judge should wait until after the defense case has closed, unless some unforeseen or unexpected matter arises.
The appeal court held that there was no justification for deviating from the general rule in this case, and as a result, the conviction was quashed.

R v Rice

Unit 5, Fresh evidence after the prosecution has closed its case.- There is a general principle of practice, though not a rule of law, requiring that all evidentiary matter on which the prosecution intend to rely as probative of the guilt of an accused person, or of the guilt of any one of a number of co-accused persons, should be adduced before the close of the prosecution case, if it be then available. Whether or not evidence subsequently for the first time available to the prosecution should be introduced at any later stage is a matter to be determined by the trial judge in his discretion, exercised, subject to certain limits, in such a way and subject to such safeguards as seem to him best suited to achieve justice between the Crown and the defendants, and between the defendants

R v Patel

Unit 5, fresh evidence- the appellant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the judge wrongly allowed fresh evidence to be introduced after the closing speeches by counsel. The case involved the appellant allegedly making false applications for mortgages, with dishonest statements about his employment and income. The appellant did not give evidence or call witnesses in his defense.However, during closing speeches, the investigating officer discovered a new mortgage application, which the prosecution sought to introduce as additional evidence to demonstrate the appellant's systematic dishonesty. The defense objected to the late introduction of this new evidence, arguing that it could prejudice the defendant's case. The appeal was dismissed, and the court upheld the judge's decision to allow the fresh evidence. The fact that evidence is introduced later in the trial does not automatically make it inadmissible, though the judge must carefully consider whether its late introduction would unfairly prejudice the accused. The court ruled that it was within the judge's discretion to allow the fresh evidence and noted that the defense had been given every opportunity to respond, including the option of an adjournment to take further instructions. significant probative value—it helped to show that the appellant's mortgage application system was dishonest. The fact that this evidence came late in the trial (after the closing speeches) was considered, but the court found that its strong relevance outweighed any potential prejudice to the defense. The judge also provided the defense with the opportunity to adjust its strategy, either by calling additional evidence or asking for a discharge of the jury.

R v Parks

Unit 5, fresh evidence- the Court of Criminal Appeal outlined the principles governing the exercise of discretion in allowing fresh evidence to be admitted on appeal under Section 9 of the Criminal Appeal Act. These principles guide the court when a convicted individual seeks to introduce new evidence after the trial, typically arguing that the new evidence would have affected the outcome of the case. The evidence must not have been available during the original trial. If the evidence was available but not introduced at trial, it will not be considered "fresh" and the appeal may be denied. This principle ensures that the court only considers evidence that could not have been reasonably obtained at the time of trial. The fresh evidence must be relevant to the issues in the case. If the evidence does not pertain to the facts or the legal issues that were the focus of the trial, it is unlikely to be admitted. The court must be satisfied that the new evidence is capable of influencing the outcome of the case, and is not merely peripheral or irrelevant. The evidence must be credible, meaning it should be capable of being believed by the court. It should come from a reliable source. The critical question here is whether the fresh evidence would have had the potential to alter the jury's verdict. Even if the fresh evidence would not necessarily have resulted in an acquittal, the court will consider whether it would have created doubt about the defendant's guilt.

Browne v Dunne

Unit 5, cross-examination- A witness must be cross-examined on any matters that challenge their credibility. They should be given a chance to explain any contradictions or issues raised during cross-examination. If a witness's testimony is so unbelievable that their credibility is self-evident, it may not be necessary to cross-examine them on specific details. In such cases, simply challenging the witness's overall credibility might suffice. It is unfair to later invite the jury to disbelieve a witness's testimony on matters that were not addressed during cross-examination. The witness should have the opportunity to respond during the trial.

R v Hart

Unit 5, cross-examination- If on a crucial part of the case, the prosecution intend to ask the jury to disbelieve the evidence of a witness called for the defence, counsel for the prosecution ought to cross examine that witness or at any rate, to make it plain while the witness is in the box that his evidence is not accepted. Three witnesses for the defence were not cross-examined. Therefore, none of the witnesses was given the opportunity of dealing with any objections by the prosecution to their evidence in chief. Nevertheless the jury was invited by the prosecution to disbelieve the witnesses. What is right and proper is for the witness to be challenged in the box or at any rate, that it should be made plain, while the witness is in the box that his evidence is not accepted. The conviction was quashed. All witnesses are subject to be cross-examined generally, even a co-accused who give evidence on his own behalf.

R v Sweet Escott 1971

Unit 5, credit- In cross-examining a witness on credibility, questioning about past convictions or misconduct is allowed, but there are limits. The remoteness of past misconduct or convictions is a key factor in determining whether it is material to the current case. If the misconduct is too far in the past and does not significantly undermine the witness's credibility in the present context, it may be deemed irrelevant. In Sweet Escott, the court found that questioning SE about convictions from 20+ years ago was not material enough to support a prosecution for perjury based on his testimony. the answers given by the accused must be material to those proceedings in order to form the basis of a prosecution for perjury.

AG v Hitchcock

Unit 5, rule of finality of answers on collateral issues- that once a witness provides an answer on a collateral issue (one that is not directly related to the main facts of the case), the cross-examiner must accept that answer as final. They cannot introduce evidence to contradict or rebut that answer, even if they believe it is false or misleading, unless it is directly relevant to the central issues of the case. the defendant was charged with using a cistern for making malt without proper authorization. A witness named Spooner testified that the defendant had used the cistern. During cross-examination, the defendant's counsel asked Spooner whether he had previously claimed that officers of the Crown had offered him £20 to say that the cistern had been used. Spooner denied making such a statement.
The defense then sought to ask a second witness whether Spooner had indeed said this, but the Attorney-General objected, arguing that the question was irrelevant and raised a collateral issue. The Lord Chief Baron agreed, ruling that the question could not be asked, because the matter was collateral to the main issue and not directly connected to the trial's focus.
The defense sought a new trial, claiming that the rejection of this evidence was improper. However, the court held that the denial of the bribe by Spooner was collateral and not relevant to the core issue of whether the cistern had been used as required by law. Therefore, the court upheld the ruling, confirming that a witness's answer on a collateral matter (such as a prior alleged bribe) must be accepted as final, and the defense could not contradict it by introducing further evidence.

R v Mendy

Unit 5, Exceptions to the rule of finality, Bias or prejudice- the appellant was on trial for assault. During the trial, a constable observed a man in the public gallery taking notes. The man then left the courtroom and was seen by both the constable and a court officer discussing the case with the appellant's husband. It appeared that the husband was receiving guidance from the man in order to better testify that he, not the appellant, was responsible for the assault.
Later, when the husband testified, he denied having any interaction with the man in the public gallery. This led to a question of whether the prosecution could call the constable and the court officer to give evidence to rebut the husband's denial.
The Court of Appeal (CoA) ruled that this was permissible under the "bias exception" to the collateral-finality rule. The court held that:
The husband's denial of the incident with the man in the public gallery was relevant to his credibility.
The husband appeared to be part of a scheme to deceive the jury by falsely implicating himself in order to protect the appellant.
Since this bias or partiality could affect the husband's credibility, the jury had the right to know about it. fairness of the trial. The rule of finality is a principle in cross-examination that states that once a witness has answered a question on a collateral issue, the opposing party must accept that answer as final. This means that the cross-examining party cannot introduce further evidence to contradict the witness's answer on that matter.

R v Busby

Unit 5, exceptions to the rule of finality- the appellant was charged with burglary and handling stolen goods. The case hinged, in part, on remarks made by the appellant during police interviews. These remarks were not direct admissions but were seen as damaging to his defense. The appellant did not testify at trial, but his defense cross-examined two police officers to suggest that the remarks were fabricated and that one of the officers had threatened a potential witness, X. Both officers denied these claims.
The defense wanted to call X to give evidence about the alleged threats by the officer. However, the trial judge excluded X's testimony, ruling that it was merely an attack on the credibility of the police officers and did not go to the facts in issue. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge and found that the exclusion of the evidence was a material irregularity. The court ruled that if X's evidence was true, it would suggest that the police were willing to go to improper lengths to secure the appellant's conviction. Since the appellant's defense was that his statements to the police were fabricated, the credibility of the officers became a critical issue. If the officers had been shown to engage in misconduct, such as threatening a witness, it would have undermined their reliability and supported the appellant's claim that his statement was coerced or fabricated. . Given that the prosecution's case rested heavily on the credibility of the police officers, the exclusion of X's testimony deprived the defense of an important opportunity to challenge the integrity of the officers and the validity of the statements. This led to the conviction being quashed.

R v Jennifer Pottinger

Unit 5, previous inconsistent statement- the appellant was charged under the Motor Vehicle Insurance Law for failing to produce a certificate of insurance when requested by a police constable while she was driving. At trial, the defense attempted to tender a certified copy of the constable's testimony from a previous trial involving the same appellant. The defense argued that the copy should be allowed as evidence to challenge the constable's credibility or to support the appellant's case. However, the trial magistrate rejected this evidence.
The court's ruling was based on two key points from the Evidence Law:
Section 17: This section allows a former statement of a witness to be admitted only if the witness has made a statement at trial that is inconsistent with their earlier statement. In this case, the constable's testimony at the trial did not contradict the prior statement. Therefore, the defense could not use the previous testimony as evidence under this provision.
Section 27 of the Judicature Law: This section permits the introduction of certified copies of evidence from a previous civil trial, but not from a criminal trial. Since this was a criminal case, the defense's attempt to use a certified copy of the constable's testimony from a previous trial was improper.
The ruling emphasized that for a previous statement to be admissible under Section 17, there must be an inconsistency between the statement and the witness's testimony at the current trial. Since the constable had not made any inconsistent statement, and because the Judicature Law restricts the use of certified copies of evidence from previous trials to civil matters, the defense's request was denied.

R v Golder

Unit 5, Previous statements must be formally tendered, are not automatically evidence- the defendants were charged with burglary and larceny, and a key witness who had previously incriminated the defendants during committal proceedings repudiated her statement at trial. Although the prosecution treated her as a hostile witness, she refused to admit that her deposition (a written statement) was true. Despite this, the trial judge essentially allowed the jury to consider the content of the deposition as evidence and convicted the defendants. Previous statements are not automatically evidence: The court emphasized that while previous statements can be used during cross-examination to challenge the witness's credibility (i.e., to show that the witness's trial testimony is unreliable), such statements do not become evidence of the truth of the facts stated within them.
Inconsistent statements: If a witness makes statements at trial that contradict earlier statements, those prior statements may be used to challenge the witness's credibility, but they cannot be treated as substantive evidence. This applies whether the earlier statement was sworn or unsworn. In other words, even if the witness admits to having made the earlier statement, that statement cannot automatically be accepted as true by the jury unless the statement is formally tendered as evidence in the trial.
Specific to the case: In Golder, the trial judge effectively allowed the jury to treat the prior deposition as reliable evidence, which was incorrect. The prior statement was not evidence in the trial unless it was formally tendered as such and the proper procedure followed."Formally tendered" means that a document or piece of evidence is officially submitted to the court for consideration and admitted into the trial record in accordance with legal procedures.

R v Pestano

Unit 5, previous statements- In this case, four individuals were convicted of rape. A prosecution witness initially incriminated two of the accused but later recanted part of his testimony regarding the other two. The prosecution sought to challenge the witness's credibility by cross-examining him about his prior deposition and another statement he made in a different case. Although the witness did not revert to his original statement, the prosecution continued to rely on his evidence.
The defendants appealed, arguing that the prosecution should not have been allowed to cross-examine the witness on his previous depositions, and that once he contradicted his earlier statements, his entire testimony should have been disregarded.
The court held that it was permissible for the prosecution to cross-examine the witness using his previous statements to test his recollection and credibility. The ruling clarified that when a witness is treated as hostile, their evidence should not automatically be disregarded. The court referred to Driscoll v R (1977), which rejected a rigid rule that a witness's evidence should always be treated as unreliable once they contradict their previous statements. Instead, the court emphasized the need to evaluate the witness's credibility in light of all the circumstances, allowing for further examination of their testimony.

R v Isaacs

Unit 5, witness denying making statement- The applicants were convicted of murder, and the only eye-witness for the prosecution, DB, gave inconsistent testimony at trial compared to her earlier deposition. Counsel for the defense sought to tender a specific sentence from DB's deposition that seemed inconsistent with her trial testimony, but DB denied having made such a statement. The judge, however, ruled that the entire deposition had to be put into evidence, rather than just the specific sentence. The court found that the judge should have admitted only the disputed sentence, as it was directly relevant to the cross-examination of DB's credibility. There was no justification for introducing the entire deposition.
Once the disputed sentence was admitted, the judge could use the rest of the deposition, if necessary, to explain or modify the witness's earlier statements.
By not admitting the disputed sentence, the judge excluded evidence that could have helped the jury assess DB's credibility. when a witness denies a prior inconsistent statement, only the specific portion of the statement that contradicts the witness's testimony should be tendered. The entire previous statement should not be introduced unless it is relevant for a broader purpose, such as explaining or modifying the contradictory part of the statement. Uraz Mohammed v T&T- This section allows for the admission of previous inconsistent statements under more specific conditions:
If the statement is inconsistent with the witness's testimony, and the witness denies making it, the entire statement can be put in as evidence.
However, if only part of the statement is inconsistent, only the contradictory part should be introduced, and the rest of the statement may not be necessary unless it serves to explain the inconsistency or provides additional context.

R v Gibbons

Unit 5, the (hostile) witness who admits-the court examined the use of a witness's previous statement when the witness adopts or confirms the contents of that statement during cross-examination. The case involved a situation where the witness, P, was reluctant to testify and had difficulty recalling the events of a crime. The prosecution applied for P to be declared hostile, which allowed them to cross-examine him on his prior statement to the police.If a hostile witness or a witness under cross-examination adopts or acknowledges the contents of their previous statement, that statement becomes part of the witness's evidence. This means it can be treated as evidence of the matters stated in it.The defendant argued that the trial judge erred by allowing the jury to rely on P's testimony, particularly given P's reluctance to confirm his statement and the inconsistencies with other evidence. The defendant contended that no reasonable jury, properly directed, could have convicted based on P's evidence.
Appeal Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The court held that, despite the challenges to P's testimony, there was still sufficient evidence from P and another witness, W, for a jury to reasonably convict the defendant. The jury had acquitted the co-defendants, but in the case of the defendant, they had both P's and W's evidence to consider.

R v Richardson and Longman

Unit 5, Reputation of Untruthfulness- whether a witness could testify about the reputation for truthfulness of another witness or offer an opinion about their credibility. General Reputation for Truthfulness: A witness may be asked whether they have knowledge of the impugned witness's general reputation for truthfulness. If they do, they may also be asked whether, based on that reputation, they would believe the witness's sworn testimony.
Personal Knowledge and Opinion: A witness may also express their personal opinion about whether the impugned witness is truthful, provided that the opinion is based on their personal knowledge of the witness.
Limitations on Specific Incidents: While a witness may testify about the reputation or personal opinion regarding the truthfulness of another, they cannot, during direct examination, provide details of specific incidents or facts that form the basis of their opinion. However, such specific incidents can be explored during cross-examination. This case confirms that while witnesses can comment on another's reputation for veracity and offer an opinion on their truthfulness, they are not permitted to mention particular incidents of untruthfulness during direct examination. Such specifics may only be introduced during cross-examination.

Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner

Unit 5, Admissibility of Medical Evidence on Witness Impairment- A witness may suffer from physical or mental conditions that affect their ability to give reliable evidence. When this is the case, medical expert evidence can be admissible to reveal these impairments, as it can affect the jury's assessment of the witness's credibility and reliability.The evidence was admissible because it was relevant to the facts in issue. Expert opinion evidence is allowed in areas requiring special knowledge that is beyond the ordinary experience of the jury, such as conditions that could impair the witness's ability to provide an accurate account. The court held that expert medical evidence is admissible not only to challenge the credibility of a witness but also to show that the witness's evidence is unreliable due to physical or mental impairments. In cases where a witness's physical or mental condition may affect their ability to give a reliable account, expert medical evidence can be introduced. This evidence helps the jury assess the witness's reliability and is admissible when it pertains to issues requiring specialized knowledge beyond the jury's ordinary understanding. The case reinforced that such evidence is not limited to questions of credibility but can also be crucial to understanding the accuracy of the witness's testimony.

R v Mackenney and Pinfold

Unit 5, medical evidence of disability of opponent-the appellants were convicted of murder, and during the trial, they sought to introduce evidence from a psychologist regarding the mental state of the chief prosecution witness. The psychologist had not examined the witness but had formed the opinion that the witness was a psychopath, likely to be lying, and that his behaviour while giving evidence could mislead the jury about his truthfulness.
Initially, the trial judge ruled the psychologist's evidence inadmissible. However, the case was appealed, and fresh evidence was presented from a psychiatrist, who similarly had not examined the witness but shared the psychologist's opinion. The appeal court held that the evidence of the psychologist would now be admissible, even though the expert had not examined the witness. This decision reflected a shift in the understanding of what expert testimony could address, including psychological assessments about the witness's mental state and potential for deception.
Weight vs. Admissibility: The court clarified that the absence of an expert examination was a matter for weight, not admissibility. In other words, the psychologist's or psychiatrist's testimony could be admitted, but the fact that they had not personally examined the witness was a factor that the jury and court could consider when evaluating the reliability of the expert's opinion.
Impact on Conviction: The new expert evidence, which had not been available at trial, contributed to the quashing of the convictions. The fresh evidence cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution's key witness, which led to the conviction being overturned.

G v DPP

Unit 5, medical evidence of disability of opponent- the appellant was convicted of indecent assault committed when he was 14 years old. The complainants were young children, aged 6 and 8. The evidence presented against the appellant consisted of video-recorded interviews with the children. The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the admissibility of the children's evidence and seeking to introduce psychiatric evidence regarding their competence as witnesses. The court emphasized that a child's evidence should be admitted unless it is clear that the child cannot give intelligible testimony—i.e., the child cannot provide evidence that is capable of being understood.
Determining whether a child is competent to give evidence is within the judge's discretion, and it does not require expert testimony. This means that a judge can decide based on the child's demeanor, communication ability, and understanding without needing an expert to assess their competence. The appellant wanted to call psychiatric evidence to challenge the children's competence to testify. However, the court held that it was within its discretion to refuse expert evidence on the competence of the child witnesses. The judge may assess the child's ability to understand and give evidence without the need for expert input. The appellant also raised a concern about the video-recorded interviews not adhering to the Home Office and Department of Health's Memo of Good Practice on video-recorded interviews with child witnesses. While the court acknowledged that failure to follow the memo could make child evidence potentially suspect, the failure to adhere to the memo did not automatically render the evidence inadmissible.

Stroud v Stroud

Unit 5, Cross Examination on Documents- A doctor was called as a witness in a divorce case where the wife was petitioning for divorce on grounds of cruelty.
During cross-examination, counsel for the husband (H) requested and read from certain medical reports made by other doctors, which were in the doctor's possession but had not been presented or referred to in the witness's direct testimony (examination-in-chief). The question arose as to whether the wife, as the party seeking divorce, could require the medical reports to be put into evidence. The wife's legal team argued that by reading from the reports during cross-examination, the husband's counsel had effectively introduced those reports into the case and therefore should be required to formally enter them into evidence. The court ruled in favor of the wife, stating that once a cross-examiner uses a document during questioning, they are bound to put the document into evidence if the opposing party requests it.
The court acknowledged that this rule had evolved in a time before discovery (where parties disclose documents to each other), but it held that the rule still applied, especially in cases where the relevant documents were not previously disclosed or used in the direct testimony. Cross-examiner's use of a document: If a cross-examiner introduces a document that was not used to refresh the witness's memory during direct examination, they must be prepared to put the document into evidence if requested by the other party.

Senat v Senat

Unit 5, Cross Examination on Documents- the issue revolved around the use of documents in cross-examination and the obligations of a counsel when they inspect documents during trial. Specifically, the question was whether a document that was inspected during cross-examination had to be formally entered into evidence. A wife petitioned for divorce on the grounds of her husband's adultery.
The wife presented an address book as evidence, which she claimed showed that the husband had committed adultery with one of five named women.
The evidence was admitted under section of the relevant Act but was not considered corroborative (i.e., not sufficient by itself to prove the adultery, but could be used as part of a broader case).
The husband's counsel, during cross-examination, inspected the address book but did not immediately put it into evidence. The question then arose as to whether the inspection of the document obliged the husband's counsel to formally enter it into evidence. The issue was whether the mere inspection of the address book by the husband's counsel during cross-examination required the document to be formally entered into evidence, or whether it was sufficient for the counsel to simply inspect the document without needing to submit it.The court ruled that since the address book was written by the husband, it was not independent testimony and could not be considered corroborative evidence (i.e., it was not automatically accepted as proof of adultery). The case established that merely inspecting a document during cross-examination does not require it to automatically be entered into evidence, unless the opposing party requests it. However, if a party uses the document in such a way (e.g., cross-examthe opposing party has the right to require the document to be formally admitted into evidence.

Prince v Samo

Unit 5, re-examination- Re-examination is the process where the attorney who conducted the examination-in-chief is allowed to clarify or explain points that arose during cross-examination. Re-examination cannot introduce new evidence that was not touched upon during cross-examination.
It can only address ambiguities or issues raised in cross-examination. If a point was raised or challenged in cross-examination, re-examination can clarify or explain that specific issue. The court held that where a witness had mentioned part of a conversation during cross-examination, only the parts of the conversation that are directly related to or explain what was discussed in cross-examination can be introduced in re-examination. You cannot re-examine on unrelated matters or bring up the entire conversation if only part of it was discussed during cross-examination. Re-examination is often used to restore the credibility of the witness if their testimony was challenged or undermined during cross-examination.
However, the evidence introduced in re-examination must be related to the cross-examination and cannot be new or unrelated material. Unlike examination-in-chief, leading questions may be asked in re-examination, but only to a limited extent and if necessary to clarify or explain the testimony.
This is in contrast to cross-examination, where leading questions are generally allowed.

R v. Milliken

Unit 5, re-examination- the defendant alleged that he had been falsely charged by a police officer as part of a conspiracy involving two other police officers. In response, the prosecution sought to introduce rebuttal evidence to contradict the defendant's allegations of a police conspiracy.
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to allow the rebuttal evidence. Winn LJ emphasized that rebuttal evidence is generally permissible when it is necessary to fill gaps in the prosecution's case and is relevant to the truth of the defence. In this case, the evidence was not aimed at proving the defendant's guilt but rather at discrediting the defendant's claim of a conspiracy against him. Essentially, the rebuttal evidence consisted of denials of the defendant's accusations and sought to undermine the credibility of his defence, which was based on questioning the honesty of the police officers. The prosecution can introduce rebuttal evidence to counter the defence's claims, particularly if the evidence is necessary to address gaps in proving guilt. Rebuttal evidence does not need to be probative of the defendant's guilt but can be used to disprove the truth of the defendant's defence. If the defence attacks the credibility of a witness or claims a conspiracy (as in this case with the police officers), the prosecution can present rebuttal evidence to challenge the validity of those allegations. : The trial judge has discretion to allow rebuttal evidence, and the Court of Appeal will generally uphold this discretion if the rebuttal evidence is relevant and necessary to counteract the defence. Re-examination cannot be used to introduce new evidence that was not covered in examination-in-chief.

R v Scott

Unit 5, re-examination- the appellant was charged with theft after attempting to return a set of curtains to a store without a receipt, claiming he had purchased them the previous day. During the trial, the defendant introduced a new version of events, stating that he had not paid for the curtains at the furnishing section but rather near the entrance of the store. This was the first time this detail was mentioned.
At the end of the defence case, the prosecution sought to introduce rebuttal evidence in the form of till rolls showing no record of a payment for the curtains. The trial judge allowed this evidence to be admitted.The prosecution may be allowed to introduce rebuttal evidence after the defence has given its case if the evidence was not reasonably foreseeable or required during the prosecution's case-in-chief. The trial judge has discretion to admit rebuttal evidence, but this discretion is limited to situations where the prosecution could not have reasonably anticipated the need for that evidence at an earlier stage. If the prosecution can reasonably foresee that a particular piece of evidence is necessary to prove their case, they must call that evidence as part of their case-in-chief, not wait until after the defendant's evidence. The general principle is that the prosecution should not withhold evidence that it knows will be necessary to counter the defence, unless there is a specific reason not to. The trial judge's decision to admit rebuttal evidence is generally upheld unless it can be shown that the evidence should have been produced earlier in the prosecution's case. The trial judge was correct in admitting the rebuttal evidence because the prosecution could not have reasonably anticipated the defendant's new claim during the defence case.

no case submission

a legal argument made by the defence during a criminal trial, typically after the prosecution has presented its case, which asserts that the prosecution has failed to provide enough evidence to establish a prima facie case (i.e., sufficient evidence to prove the defendant's guilt). Essentially, the defence argues that even if all the evidence presented by the prosecution is accepted as true, it is not enough to convict the defendant, and therefore, the case should be dismissed before the defence is required to present its case. Key Elements of a No Case Submission:
1. Failure to Prove Essential Elements 2.Insufficient Evidence 3.Legally Deficient Case 4.Timing- If the judge agrees with the no case submission, they may dismiss the case and direct an acquittal, meaning the defendant will not be required to present a defence or even testify, and the trial will end in the defendant's favour.
If the judge disagrees with the submission, the trial will continue, and the defence will be required to present their case.

Warren v Warren

Unit 6, Held: A judge cannot be compelled to give evidence of those matters of which he became aware relating to, and as a result of the performance of his judicial functions. However the judge will remain competent to give evidence, and if a situation arises where his evidence is vital, he should be able to be relied on and not allow the fact that he cannot be compelled to give evidence to stand in the way of his doing so .Judges are generally immune from being compelled to testify about matters they learned in the course of their judicial functions.
This immunity exists to protect the integrity of judicial decision-making and to ensure that judges can make decisions without fear of later being questioned or cross-examined about their reasoning or the information they considered while performing their duties. Judicial Independence: The main reason for this rule is to preserve the independence of the judiciary. If judges were compelled to testify about matters related to their judicial duties, it could create a conflict of interest or pressure them to be less independent in their decision-making. It could also lead to the perception that judges are subject to scrutiny or influence from external parties.
Confidentiality of Judicial Functions: Judges are privy to sensitive information during the trial process—such as private deliberations or discussions with other judges. Allowing a judge to be compelled to testify about these matters could undermine the confidentiality of judicial proceedings and potentially compromise the fairness of the process.

R v Lee

Unit 6, the defendant was convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse, and the complainant (X) gave contradictory and unsatisfactory evidence at trial. The judge initially assumed X, who was 15 years old, was a child of tender years and therefore questioned her in a manner that did not require her to give sworn evidence. After realizing X's true age, the judge allowed her to give sworn evidence and asked if she wanted to change her earlier unsworn testimony. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was overturned. The case highlighted the importance of a witness's competence and the proper procedure for giving evidence. A child witness, even if underage, can give sworn evidence in criminal cases, provided they understand the nature of the oath. However, improperly treated testimony, especially if contradictory, cannot be relied upon even if later "ratified."

Evidence Act T&T ss2, 13

Unit 6- section 2- General Principles of Evidence:
Under English law, the rules of evidence in force as of 30th August 1962 are to be followed in any legal proceedings involving the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence, the competency of witnesses, the swearing of witnesses, the form of oaths, and the admissibility of documents. This applies in both civil and criminal cases, as well as before any person or authority authorized to receive and examine evidence. section 13- Right to Testify:A person charged with an offense is competent to testify on their own behalf in a criminal trial. This applies whether they are charged alone or jointly with others.
Conditions for Testifying:The accused may only be called as a witness if they apply to do so. They cannot be forced to testify, and if they choose not to testify, the prosecution cannot comment on their decision.
Place of Testimony:If the accused does choose to testify, they must do so from the witness box or another place where witnesses give evidence unless the court orders otherwise.

Children's Act Section 98

Unit 6- Children Under Ten Years of Age:A child under the age of ten may give unsworn evidence in criminal proceedings. Before this evidence is accepted, the court must assess whether the child has enough intelligence to understand the duty to tell the truth and whether they can provide reliable testimony.
Corroboration:The unsworn evidence of a child cannot be corroborated solely by the unsworn evidence of another child. However, if the child's unsworn evidence is given on behalf of the prosecution, it must be corroborated by other material evidence implicating the accused. This could include non-oral evidence, such as physical evidence or documentary evidence.
Uncorroborated Evidence:Despite the need for corroboration in most cases, an accused may be convicted based on uncorroborated unsworn evidence of a child if the court warns the jury of the dangers of relying solely on such evidence.
False Evidence:If a child over ten years of age gives false evidence (which, if sworn, would amount to perjury), they may be charged with perjury and, if convicted, could face the same punishment as someone convicted of perjury under section 99 of the Summary Courts Act.

Fazal Mohammed v The State

unit 6, children- the appellant was convicted of murder for killing his wife. A key witness for the prosecution was the deceased's daughter, aged 13 at the time of trial. She testified that the appellant was the one who killed her mother. However, the issue on appeal was whether the trial judge properly ensured that the child witness understood the nature of the oath before she was allowed to give sworn evidence. In this case, the trial judge did not record any inquiry or the child's understanding of the oath, even though the child was sworn in to give evidence. The only available record showed that the child was 13 years old, attended school, and was sworn under the relevant statute. However, the judge did not explicitly document an inquiry into her understanding of the oath. The Court of Appeal treated the evidence as inadmissible because there was no record that the judge had made the necessary inquiry. However, the court upheld the conviction, reasoning that the absence of the inquiry did not affect the overall strength of the case, as the jury's verdict would likely have been the same based on other evidence. The Privy Council agreed with the Court of Appeal, emphasizing that the judge's failure to ensure the child's understanding of the oath was a breach of proper practice. They affirmed the rule in Trinidad and Tobago that judges must inquire into a child's understanding of the oath before permitting them to testify. They also noted that the inquiry should be recorded in the judge's notes, as is done in England.
The Privy Council made it clear that if there is no inquiry into the child's understanding of the oath, the evidence is inadmissible.

R v Nelson

Unit 6, the appellant was convicted of unlawful wounding based on the testimony of the complainant, a school girl. The key issue in the appeal was the competence of the child witness to give sworn evidence, specifically whether the court had properly ensured that she understood the nature of the oath before testifying.The complainant, a school girl, gave sworn evidence during the trial, but it was not clear whether any inquiry was made by the resident magistrate to ensure that the girl understood the nature of the oath. In cross-examination, the girl revealed that she did not know what it meant to swear an oath, saying, "I do not know what it means when I took the Bible and swear." Waddington J.A. expressed doubt about whether the complainant was competent to give sworn evidence. The absence of an examination to ascertain the child's understanding of the oath meant that the court could not be satisfied that the girl was competent to testify. This led the appeal court to conclude that the trial judge had failed in his duty to properly assess the witness's competence. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was quashed. The case was sent back because of the failure to ensure that the child understood the nature of the oath before being sworn in to give evidence.

R v Reynolds

Unit 6, the appellant was on trial for indecently assaulting an 11-year-old girl. The main issue in the case was whether the child was competent to give evidence on oath, and whether the procedures followed during her testimony were in line with proper legal standards. The court followed the principles set out in R v Dunne (1928), which emphasized that while the judge has the duty to decide whether a child can give sworn evidence, it is critical for the jury to hear the child's answers and observe the child's demeanor during questioning.
The jury must be present when the child is questioned, as this allows them to assess the child's credibility and the weight to be attached to their evidence. The court held that the jury's absence during the examination of the school attendant officer was an irregularity that undermined the fairness of the trial.
Lord Goddard concluded that this procedural error was serious enough to result in the conviction being overturned. The conviction was quashed, and the case was sent back for retrial.

R v Z

unit 6, the appellant was convicted of incest based on the testimony of his 6-year-old daughter, who gave unsworn evidence via video link. The judge allowed the child to testify unsworn after questioning her to determine whether she had the requisite intelligence and understanding of the duty to speak the truth.
The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing that the judge should not have permitted the child to give unsworn evidence.There is no minimum age specified in the statute for when a child can give unsworn evidence. It is entirely up to the judge's discretion whether to permit a child's unsworn testimony.
The test the judge must apply is whether the child has sufficient intelligence to justify receiving their evidence and whether they understand the duty to tell the truth.The court emphasized that the younger the child, the more care must be taken before allowing unsworn testimony. However, in this case, there were no grounds to interfere with the judge's decision.
Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed because the judge had properly assessed the child's competence to give unsworn evidence.