Paradox,Set of jointly inconsistent propositions, each of which is plausible when considered independently
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Pairwise inconsistent,sets such that it's impossible for more than one member of the set to be true at the same time
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Jointly inconsistent,sets such that it's impossible for all members of the set to be true at the same time
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Ways to resolve paradoxes,1. Argue that the propositions in the set aren't actually jointly inconsistent
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2. Identify the false proposition and explain why it seemed true
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3. Accept each member of the jointly inconsistent set
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Closure,If S knows that p, and S knows that q follows logically from p, then S knows that q too
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Deceiver Argument,Your sensory experiences could come about through ordinary perception, so that most of what you believe about the world is true. But your sensory experiences could also be caused deceptively, so that what you believe about the world is entirely false.
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You have no reason at all to believe that your sensory experiences arise in one way rather than the other.
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Therefore, you have no knowledge of the world around you.
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Underdetermination Principle,if you are faced with two or more mutually exclusive hypotheses and the information available to you gives you no reason to believe one rather than the other then you don't know that either hypothesis is the case
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Moorean View,A sensory experience has a distinctive character or content, and other things being equal, your having such an experience justifies you in holding a corresponding belief.
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Explanationism,If one hypothesis provides a significantly better explanation of the available evidence than its competitors do, that is reason to accept the hypothesis and reject its competitors
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Difficulties with Explanationism,1. No philosophical consensus about what an explanation is or what makes one superior to another
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2. Skeptical hypotheses can be formulated in importantly different ways
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Dilemma Argument Structure,A or B
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if A, then C
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if B, then C
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therefore, C
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mindless hypothesis,outwardly, you look and behave just as a minded person does, but really you do not see anything, think or believe or want or feel anything, etc.
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Introspection,A particular means of learning about one's own currently ongoing (or very recently past) mental states or processes, which is different from how anyone else can learn about those things
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Relations of Ideas,Every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain; discoverable by the mere operation of thought
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Matters of Fact,Can never imply a contradiction and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so conformable to reality
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Custom or Habit,Wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of understanding
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Deduction,An argument is deductively valid when the truth of its premises logically guarantee the truth of its conclusion
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Disjunctive Syllogism,A or B. Not A. Therefore, B.
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Modus Ponens,If A then B. A. Therefore B.
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Modus Tollens,If A then B. Not B. Therefore, not A.
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Enumerative Induction,The first time I ate sugar, it tasted sweet...The millionth time I ate sugar it tasted sweet. Therefore, all sugar tastes sweet.
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Relations of ideas can be known,"a priori", without relying on experience
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Matters if fact can be known only,"a posteriori", by relying on experience
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Principle of the Uniformity of Nature,the future will resemble the past
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Is PUN a relation of ideas or matter of fact?,Matter of fact
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Actuality Question,how do people actually x?
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Normative Question,How should people x?
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Inductive Logic,E confirms H \= H is confirmed by E \= E is some evidence for H
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Instance-Confirmation,A generalization is confirmed by any of its instances
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Equivalence Condition,If two hypotheses are logically equivalent, then anything that is evidence for one is evidence for the other too
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Shoe Irrelevance,A white shoe does not confirm "all ravens ar black" (or any other non-black non-raven)
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Denying Shoe Irrelevance,We accept Shoe Irrelevance when we know in advance that the thing isn't going to be a counterinstance and we deny Shoe Irrelevance when we don't know in advance that the thing isn't going to be a counterinstance
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Bayesianism,Observing an instance is some evidence for the generalization exactly when we are more likely to observe the instance if the generalization is true rather than if it's false
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Grue,An emerald is grue if it is either both first observed by someone before 2050 and also green; or both unobserved by anyone as of 2050 and also blue
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Non-projectable predicates,typically involve some spatial or temporal restriction, or reference to some particular individual; ex. grue
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Propositional Attitude,A way that individuals can be related to propositions, e.g., belief
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Fallibilism,We can know p, even if we don't have infallible evidence that p
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Justified True Belief,p is true
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S believe that p
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S's belief that p is adequately justified
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"No false steps",S knows p if and only if S has a justified true belief that p, and S's reasoning process in arriving at their belief that p didn't go through any false steps
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Causal Proposal,S knows p if and only if S has a justified true belief that p, and the truth of p plays a causal role in producing S's justification to believe that p
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Barn Facade,Driving through the country and see what looks like a barn -\> form the justified true belief that there is a barn
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And it is in fact a barn
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But all the other barn-looking things are actually fake barns
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Does the Barn Facade example have a false step?,Not clear, the only belief formed is that there is a barn right there, which is true
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Does the Barn Facade example have a causal connection?,Plausibly, yes. You're really looking at a barn, and your barn experiences are being caused by the barn in the usual way
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"None at all" response to the Fine-Tuning Argument,Improbable events occur all the time, and yet often they're in no particular need of explanation, and they're no evidence for particular hypotheses about the processes that brought those events about; OR we wouldn't be around to even ask this question if the constants weren't life-sustaining
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God response to the Fine-Tuning Argument,God (or perhaps some other kind of diving being) saw to it that these constants took on life-sustaining values
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Multiple Universes response to the Fine-Tuning Argument,If there are lots and lots of universes, it is not surprising that one of them would have life-sustaining constants
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Maximized Expected Utility,Act as to maximize the benefit you can expect from your action
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Dominance Principle,It is rational to perform an action a if it satisfies:
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Whatever else may happen, doing a will result in your being no worse off than doing any of the other things open to you
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There is at least one possible outcome in which your having done a makes you better off than you would have been had you done any of the other things open to you
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True or False? MEU and DP conflict.,True - they support opposite courses of action given Newcomb's Paradox
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Decision Theory,How S can "maximize her expected value", given what S actually believes (belief function) and what S actually values (value function)
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Naive Decision Theory,Coin flip example; for relatively small amounts of money, value functions are usually assumed to be monotonically increasing in dollars and linear in dollars; belief function is 50-50 with regard to whether the coin lands on heads or tails
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Evidential Decision Theory,If you're choosing between actions A and B, choose the action which is such that you expect to be doing best, on the assumption that you perform that action
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True or False? EDT tells to one box.,True; EV(one-boxing) \= c($1m in Opaque Box | I one-box)v($1m in Opaque Box & I one-box) + c($0 in Opaque Box | I one-box)v($0 in Opaque Box & I one-box) \= (.99) ($1,000,000) + (.01)($0) \= $990,000
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EV(two-boxing) \= c($1m in Opaque Box | I two-box)v($1m in Opaque Box & I two-box) + c($0 in Opaque Box | I two-box)v($0 in Opaque Box & I two-box) \= (.01)($1,000,000 + $10,000) + (.99)($0 + $10,000) \= (.01)($1,010,000) + (.99) ($10,000) \= $10,100 + $9900 \= $20,000
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Causal Decision Theory,Do the thing you expect to causally bring about the best outcome
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CDT applied to Newcomb Case:,one-boxing isn't a way to causally bring about that there is $1,000,000 in the Opaque box
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one-boxing is just excellent evidence that there is $1,000,000 in the Opaque box
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Two-boxing causes me to get an additional $10,000 regardless of what's in the Opaque box
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So you should two-box
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What can/cannot be rationally doubted according to Descartes?,Can \= that I have a body, that there is a physical world
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Cannot \= that I exist, that I think
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Doubt Argument,(1) I can doubt that my body exists.
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(2) I cannot doubt that I exist as a thinking thing.
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(3) I, a thinking thing, am not identical with my body.
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Leibniz's Law,x and y are identical iff x has every property that y has and vice versa
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Argument from Clear and Distinct Understanding,Suppose I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing from another
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Then it's metaphysically possible for those things to be separated
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But then those things are not identical to each other, since it's not metaphysically possible to separate something from itself
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Substance Dualism,(Descartes) The world contains two kinds of things: physical/material and nonphysical/immaterial
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Materialsim,Every thing and every property in the world can be explained entirely in physical terms, without invoking an irreducibly mental things or properties
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Identity Theory,The view that mental states are identical to physical brain states that realize them.
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Functionalism,Mental states are functional states - states defined by their causal connections to inputs, outputs and other functional states
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True or False? Functional states are multiply realizable.,True
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easy problems of consciousness,those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science (explainable in terms of computational or neural mechanisms)
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hard problems of consciousness,Those that seem to resist the standard methods of cognitive science, e.g. experience
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Naturalistic/Property Dualism,(Chalmers) A form of dualism both consistent with science and structurally similar to it because it posits fundamental entities connected by fundamental laws. A theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental.
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True or false? Inverted spectrum is an objection to Functionalism.,True - It's possible for Jamaal and Denice to be as described. When Jamaal and Denice are looking at the same thing, they're in the same functional state, but they're in different perceptual states → so perceptual states can't be functional states
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Jackson's Argument against Materialism,(1) Mary has all of the (accurate) physical information there is about color.
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(2) But there is some information about color that Mary doesn't have — namely, what it is like to experience it.
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(3) Therefore: There is information about color that is not physical information — i.e., Materialism is false.
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Paradox,Set of jointly inconsistent propositions, each of which is plausible when considered independently
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Pairwise inconsistent,sets such that it's impossible for more than one member of the set to be true at the same time
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Jointly inconsistent,sets such that it's impossible for all members of the set to be true at the same time
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Ways to resolve paradoxes,1. Argue that the propositions in the set aren't actually jointly inconsistent 2. Identify the false proposition and explain why it seemed true 3. Accept each member of the jointly inconsistent set
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Closure,If S knows that p, and S knows that q follows logically from p, then S knows that q too
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Deceiver Argument,Your sensory experiences could come about through ordinary perception, so that most of what you believe about the world is true. But your sensory experiences could also be caused deceptively, so that what you believe about the world is entirely false. You have no reason at all to believe that your sensory experiences arise in one way rather than the other. Therefore, you have no knowledge of the world around you.