philosophy final

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39 Terms

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Legal vs. Ethical Norms

Legal norms are rules enforced by the state through laws and punishments, while ethical norms concern what is morally right or wrong regardless of legality. Something can be legal but unethical (e.g., exploiting loopholes), or illegal but ethically justified (e.g., civil disobedience). Ethics evaluates laws themselves, not just obedience to them.

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Clifford’s Principle

Clifford’s principle states that it is always morally wrong to believe something on insufficient evidence. He argues that beliefs guide actions, so irresponsible believing harms both individuals and society. Thus, we have an ethical duty to proportion belief to evidence.

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Pratical Arguments

Practical arguments aim to justify what we should do rather than what is true. They involve reasons for action, such as desires, goals, or consequences, instead of evidence aimed at truth. Moral and decision-making reasoning often uses practical arguments.

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Bad Epistemic State

A bad epistemic state is a condition in which a person holds beliefs without proper justification or evidence. This includes wishful thinking, self-deception, or ignoring counter-evidence. Such states are epistemically irresponsible and can lead to moral harm.

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One Philosopher’s Diagnosis of Epistemic Error

Clifford diagnoses epistemic error as believing without sufficient evidence, which he sees as a moral failure. He argues that careless belief weakens society’s ability to reason and spreads error. Epistemic mistakes thus have ethical consequences.

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One Philosopher’s Solution to Epistemic Error

William James offers a solution by allowing belief without sufficient evidence in certain “genuine options.” When a decision is forced, momentous, and cannot be decided by evidence alone, James argues it can be permissible to believe. This contrasts with Clifford’s strict evidentialism.

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Intellectual vs. Moral Virtue: Aims and Scope

Intellectual virtues aim at truth and knowledge (e.g., open-mindedness), while moral virtues aim at right action and character (e.g., honesty, courage). Intellectual virtues govern belief formation, while moral virtues govern behavior. Both are necessary for responsible agency.

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An example of intellectual virtue

Open-mindedness is an intellectual virtue because it involves willingness to consider evidence that challenges one’s beliefs. A person who fairly evaluates opposing arguments demonstrates respect for truth. This helps prevent dogmatism and epistemic error.

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Hume’s Necessity Principle

Hume’s necessity principle states that causal necessity is not something we perceive directly, but something inferred from constant conjunction and habit. We expect causes to produce effects because of repeated experience, not because we perceive a necessary connection. Thus, necessity exists in the mind, not in objects.

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Hume’s Hypothetical Liberty (and Example)

Hypothetical liberty is freedom understood as the ability to act according to one’s desires without external constraint. For example, if I freely choose to leave a room because I want to, even though my desires are causally determined, I am still free in Hume’s sense. This view is compatible with determinism.

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False sensation of liberty (according to hume)

Hume argues that we feel free because we are conscious of acting according to our will, but ignorant of the causes that determine that will. This creates a false sensation of liberty. Once causes are examined, actions appear determined.

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Chisholm’s Metaphysical Problem of Human Freedom

Chisholm’s metaphysical problem asks how free will is possible if actions are either caused by prior events or occur randomly. If actions are caused, freedom seems undermined; if uncaused, responsibility seems lost. The challenge is explaining genuine agency.

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Internal vs. External Causes that Can Undermine Human Freedom

External causes include coercion or physical restraint, while internal causes include psychological compulsions or addictions. External causes clearly undermine freedom, but internal causes raise harder questions. Chisholm argues true freedom requires agent causation, not merely internal causation.

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Transient vs. Immanent Causation

Transient causation occurs when one event causes another distinct event (e.g., a rock breaking a window). Immanent causation occurs when the agent causes an action directly from within themselves. Chisholm uses immanent causation to explain free agency.

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One objection to immanent causation

One objection is that immanent causation is mysterious and lacks scientific explanation. Critics argue it introduces a special kind of causation that cannot be empirically verified. This makes it philosophically controversial.

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Chisholm on Free Will vs. Freedom of the Person

Chisholm distinguishes free will (the power to choose) from freedom of the person (absence of constraint). A person may act freely in one sense but lack ultimate control. True freedom requires being the originator of one’s actions.

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Frankfurt’s concept of a person

Frankfurt defines a person as a being capable of second-order desires—desires about which desires they want to act on. This capacity allows reflection and self-control. Persons differ from non-persons because they can care about their will.

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First-Order vs. Second-Order Desires (with Example)

First-order desires are desires to do or have something (e.g., wanting to smoke). Second-order desires are desires about those desires (e.g., wanting not to want to smoke). Freedom depends on which desires the agent endorses.

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Second-Order Desires vs. Second-Order Volitions

Second-order desires are general wishes about desires, while second-order volitions are desires that a particular desire be effective in action. A person is free when their effective will aligns with their second-order volitions. This explains autonomy.

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Frankfurt’s wanton and example

A wanton is someone who lacks second-order volitions and does not care which desires move them to act. For example, an addict who feels no concern about acting on their addiction is a wanton. Wantons lack personhood in Frankfurt’s sense.

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freedom of will vs. freedom of action

Freedom of action concerns whether one can act without external constraint. Freedom of the will concerns whether one’s will reflects one’s reflective endorsements. Frankfurt argues moral responsibility depends on freedom of the will, not determinism.

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Frankfurt’s 2 criticisms of chisholm

Frankfurt criticizes Chisholm for relying on a mysterious notion of agent causation. He also argues Chisholm places freedom too far back in metaphysical origins rather than in psychological structure. Frankfurt focuses on identification with one’s will.

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Frankfurt’s View of Moral Responsibility and Determinism

Frankfurt argues that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise. What matters is whether the agent identifies with their will. Thus, determinism is compatible with responsibility.

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Wallace’s Default Mode of Thinking and Reflection

Wallace argues that humans operate in a default, automatic mode shaped by habit and environment. Freedom arises through reflective self-control that allows one to revise responses. Reflection enables moral responsibility.

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“Wallace Wants” vs. “Frankfurt Wantons”

Wallace emphasizes reflective control over attention and interpretation, while Frankfurt focuses on second-order volitions. Frankfurt’s wantons lack concern for their will; Wallace’s unreflective agents fail to exercise attentional control. Both address freedom differently.

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Kant: Sensible vs. Intelligible Worlds

The sensible world is governed by natural causation and empirical laws. The intelligible world concerns rational agency and freedom. Kant argues humans belong to both worlds simultaneously.

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Kant’s Transcendental Freedom

Transcendental freedom is the capacity to initiate actions independently of natural causation. It is required for moral responsibility. This freedom cannot be empirically observed but is necessary for moral law.

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Kant’s Three Senses of Practical Freedom

Practical freedom includes freedom from compulsion, freedom of choice guided by reason, and autonomy under moral law. These senses explain how moral responsibility functions in practice. Practical freedom operates within empirical constraints.

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The Moral Law and the Role of Morality in Human Freedom

For Kant, obeying the moral law is the highest expression of freedom. Acting morally is acting according to reason rather than impulse. Freedom and morality are inseparable.

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Kant’s Solution to the Chisholm–Frankfurt Debate

Kant resolves the debate by placing freedom in the intelligible self rather than empirical causation. Determinism governs appearances, while freedom governs rational agency. This avoids randomness and determinism conflicts.

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Kant’s Complex View on Determinism (Two-Worlds View)

Kant accepts determinism in the empirical world but denies it at the level of rational agency. Humans are causally determined as phenomena but free as noumena. This preserves moral responsibility.

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Mind-Body Problem

The mind-body problem asks how mental states relate to physical states. It questions whether the mind is physical, non-physical, or both. This problem affects views of consciousness and freedom.

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Meaning of “Material” and “Spiritual”

Material refers to physical, extended, and measurable substances. Spiritual refers to non-physical, mental, or immaterial aspects of reality. Different philosophies prioritize one or both.

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One Epistemic, Logical, or Empirical Ground for the Immateriality of the Mind

One argument is that mental states have intentionality—aboutness—which physical states lack. Thoughts can be about nonexistent things, unlike physical objects. This suggests the mind is not purely material.

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What Psychology Studies (and What It Does Not Study)

Psychology studies behavior and mental processes empirically. It does not resolve metaphysical questions about the ultimate nature of the soul or free will. Its methods are scientific, not metaphysical.

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One Philosophical or Scientific Objection to Spirit

A common objection is that mental states correlate strongly with brain activity. Damage to the brain alters personality and cognition. This suggests mental life depends on physical processes.

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materialism vs. dualism

Materialism claims everything, including the mind, is physical. Dualism claims mind and body are distinct substances or properties. The debate concerns consciousness and personal identity.

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panpsychism

Panpsychism holds that consciousness is a fundamental feature of all matter. Even basic physical entities possess proto-mental properties. This view avoids emergence problems but raises explanatory challenges.

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Interactionist Dualism vs. Parallelism

Interactionist dualism claims mind and body causally interact. Parallelism claims they run in harmony without interaction. The key issue is causal explanation.