Ancient Greek Final

Posterior Analytics

One has scientific knowledge of p only if one has scientific demonstration that p.

Posterior Analytics

Scientific demonstration is universal categorical syllogisms.

Posterior Analytics

A syllogism is a discourse where the consequence follows from the premises.

Posterior Analytics

In scientific knowledge, the premises of demonstrative knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, better known than, and prior to the conclusion.

Theaetetus

But look here, this is no ordinary account of knowledge you've come out with: it's

what Protagoras used to maintain. He said the very same thing, only he put it in rather a

different way. For he says, you know, that 'Man is the measure of all things: of the things

which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not.' You have read

this, of course?

Yes, often.

Then you know that he puts it something like this, that as each thing appears to me,

so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so it is for you - you and I each being a man?

Theaetetus

So, after going a long way round, we are back at our original difficulty. Our friend, the

expert in refutation, will laugh. 'My very good people', he will say, 'do you mean that a man

who knows both knowledge and ignorance is thinking that one of them which he knows is the

other which he knows? Or is it that he knows neither, and judges that the one he doesn't know is

the other which he doesn't know? Or is it that he knows one and not the other, and judges that

the one he knows is the one he doesn't know? Or does he think that the one he doesn't know is

the one he does? Or all you going to start all over again and tell me that there is another set of

pieces of knowledge concerning pieces of knowledge and ignorance, which a man may possess

shut up in some other ridiculous aviaries or waxen devices, which he knows so long as he

possesses them though he may not have them ready to hand in his soul— and in this way end up

forced to come running around to the same place over and over again and never get any further?"

Aristotle Categories

Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a

subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man, and is never present in a subject.

By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole,

but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject.

Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject.

For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not

predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the body (for

color requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything.

Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus

while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar.

There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor

predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse. But, to speak

more generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable

of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject.

Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.

Aristotle - Posterior Analytics

We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as

opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think

that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of the fact and of no other,

and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is. Now that scientific knowing is

something of this sort is evident - witness both those who falsely claim it and those who

actually possess it, since the former merely imagine themselves to be, while the latter are

also actually, in the condition described. Consequently the proper object of unqualified

scientific knowledge is something which cannot be other than it is.

There may be another manner of knowing as well - that will be discussed later.

What I now assert is that at all events we do know by demonstration. By demonstration I

mean a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, a syllogism, that is, the grasp of

which is eo ipso such knowledge.

Aristotle - Physics

All the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things which

are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of

stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration). On

the other hand, a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these

designations—i.e. in so far as they are products of art —have no innate impulse to change.

But in so far as they happen to be composed of stone or of earth or of a mixture of the two,

they do have such an impulse, and just to that extent-which seems to indicate that nature

is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily,

in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute.

Metaphysics

If we adopt this point of view, then, it follows that matter is substance. But this is impossible; for both separability and 'thisness' are thought to belong chiefly to substance. And so form and the compound of form and matter would be thought to be substance,rather than matter. The substance compounded of both, i.e., of matter and shape, may be dismissed; for it is posterior and its nature is obvious. And matter also is in a sense manifest. But we must inquire into the third kind of substance; for this is the most perplexing.

Posterior Analytics

Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premisses by induction; for

the method by which even sense-perception implants plants the universal is inductive. Now

of the thinking states by which we grasp truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit of

error— opinion, for instance, and calculation, whereas scientific knowing and intuition are

always true: further, no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than

scientific knowledge, whereas primary premisses are more knowable than demonstrations,

and all scientific knowledge is discursive. From these considerations it follows that there

will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premisses, and since except intuition nothing

can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary

premisses— a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the

originative source of demonstration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific

knowledge.

Physics

It is necessary, no doubt, that the causes of what comes to pass by chance be indefinite; and that is why chance is supposed to belong to the class of the indefinite and to be inscrutable to man, and why it might be thought that, in a way, nothing occurs by chance. For all these statements are correct, because they are well grounded. Things do, in a way, occur by chance, for they occur incidentally and chance is an incidental cause. But strictly it is not the cause-without qualification-of anything; for instance, a housebuilder is the cause of a house; incidentally, a flute-player may be so.

Theaetetus

Look here, then, let us see if we can somehow round it off. What it is trying to express, presumably, is this. All these things are in motion, just as we say; and their motion is distinguished by its swiftness or slowness. What is slow has its motion in one and the same place, and in relation to the things in the immediate neighborhood; in this way it generates and the offspring are swifter, as they move throughout space, and their motion takes the form of spatial movement. Thus the eye and some other thing - one of the things commensurate with the eye - which has come into its neighborhood, generate both whiteness and the perception which i s by nature united with it (things which would never have come to be if it had been anything else that eye or object approached). In this event, motions arise in the intervening space, sight from the side of the eye and whiteness from the side of that which cooperates in the production of the color. The eye is filled with sight; at that moment it sees, and becomes not indeed sight, but a seeing eye; while its partner in the process of producing color is filled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but white, a white stick or stone or whatever it is that happens to be colored this sort of color. We must understand this account as applying in the same way to hard and hot and everything else: nothing, as were saying before, is in itself any of these. All of them, of all kinds whatsoever, are what things become through association with one another, as the result of motion.

Physics

Again in the sense of end or 'that for the sake of which' a thing is done, e.g. health

is the cause of walking about. ('Why is he walking about?' we say. 'To be healthy', and

having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.) The same is true also of all the

intermediate steps which are brought about through the action of something else as means

toward the end, e.g., reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments are means

toward health. Al these things are 'for the sake of the end, though they differ from one

another in that some are activities, others instruments.

Theaetetus

Very good. Now by 'thinking' do you mean the same as I do?

What do you mean by it?

A talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its consideration. Of

course, I'm only telling you my idea in all ignorance; but this is the kind of picture I have

of it. It seems to me that the soul when it thinks is simply carrying on a discussion in which

it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirms and denies. And when it arrives at

something definite, either by a gradual process or a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing

consistently and without divided counsel, we call this its judgement. So, in my view, to

judge is to make a statement, and a judgement is a statement which is not addressed to

another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed to oneself.

Metaphysics

There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others treats universally of being as being.

Metaphysics

Now since we are seeking the fist principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be some thing to which these belong in virtue of its own nature.

Metaphysics

There are many senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', but all that 'is' is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to 'be' by a mere ambiguity. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it.

Metaphysics

So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process toward substance, or destructions or privation or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these things or of substance itself

Metaphysics

As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only i n the case of things which have one common notion odes the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion. It is clear then that it i s the work of one science also to study the things that are, qua being.-- But everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names. If, then, this is substance, it will be of substances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and the causes

Metaphysics

If, now, being and unity are the same and are one thing in the sense that they are implied in one another as principle and cause are, not in the sense that they are explained by the same definition (though it makes no difference even if we suppose them to be like that—in fact this would even strengthen our case); for 'one man' and 'man' are the same thing, and so are 'existent man' and 'man', and the doubling of the words in 'one man and one existent man' does not express anything different (it is clear that the two things are not separated either in coming to be or in ceasing to be); and similarly 'one existent man' adds nothing to 'existent man', so that it is obvious that the addition in these cases means the same thing, and unity is nothing apart from being l...]"

Physics

"A difficulty presents itself: why should not nature work, not for the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but just as the sky rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity? What is drwn up must cool, and what has been cooled must become water and descend, the result of this being that the corn grows. Similarly if a man's crop is spoied on the thresing floor, the rain did not fall for the sake of this-in order that the crop may be spoiled-but that result followed. Why then should it not be the same with the parts in nature, e.g. that our teeth should come up of necessity-the front teeth sharp, fitted for tearing, the molars broad and useful for grinding down the food [..]"

Physics

"For teeth and all other natural things either invariably or normally come about in a given way; but not of one of the results chance or sponteneity is this true. We do not ascribe to chace or mere coincidence the frequency of rain in the winter, but frequent rain in the summer we do; nor heat in the dog-days, but only if we have it in winter. If then, it is agreed that things are either the result of coincidence or an end, and these cannot be the result of coincidence or sponteneity, it follows that they must be for an end [...]"

Metaphysics

"Now of these characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge; for he knows in a sense all the instances that fall under a universal. And these things, the most universal, are on the whole the hardest for me to know; for they are farthest from the senses. And the most exact of the sciences are those which deal most with first principles; for those which involve fewer principles are more exact than those which involve additional principles, e.g. arithmetic than geometry. But the science which investigates causes is also instructive, in a higher degree, for the people who instruct us are those who tell the causes of each thing."

Physics

Nature is a source or cauase of being moved and of being rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute.

Physics

This then is one account of nature, namely that it is the immediate material substratum of things which have in themselves a principle of motion or change.P

Physics

Another account is that ‘nature’ is the shape or form which is specified in the definition of the thing.

Physics

Hence it is clear that events which (1) belong to the general class of things that may come to pass for the sake of something, (2) do not come to pass for the sake of what actually results, and (3) have an external cause, may be described by the phrase ‘from spontaneity’. These ‘spontaneous’ events are said to be ‘from chance’ if they have the further characteristic of being the objects of deliberate intention and due to agents capable of that mode of action.

1. material - what is it made out of?

2. formal - what is it?

3. efficient - what brings it about?

4. final - what is its good?

Posterior analytics - The Four Causes

Posterior Analytics

Now of the thinking states by which we grasp truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit of error-opinion, for instance, and calculation, whereas scientific knowing and intuition are always true: further, no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge, whereas primary premises are more knowable than demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge is discursive. From these considerations it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premises, and since expect intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premises— a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge. If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge. And the originative source of science grasps the original basic premiss, while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact.

Posterior Analytics

What a name means

Nominal Definition

Posterior Analytics

Why something is

Real Definition

Posterior Analytics

Thus the former signifies without proving, but the latter will clearly be a quasi-demonstration of essential nature, differing from demonstration in the arrangement of its terms. For there is a difference between stating why it thunders, and stating what is the essential nature of thunder

1. Does A belong to B?

2. Why does A belong to B?

3. Does C exist?

4. What is C?

Posterior analytics

The four kinds of questions pertinent to scientific knowledge

Posterior Analytics

The kinds of questions we ask are as many as the kinds of things which we know. They are in fact four - 1. whether the connexion of an attribute with a thing is a fact 2. what is the reason of the connexion 3. whether a thing exists 4. what is the nature of the thing. Thus, when our question concerns a complex of thing and attribute and we ask whether the thing is thus or otherwise qualified, then we are asking as to the fact of a connexion.

Posterior Analytics

One has scientific knowledge that p only if one has scientific demonstration that p. Scientific demonstrations are a special kind of syllogism - universal categorical syllogisms.

Posterior analytics

A syllogism is discourse (logos = account) in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so. I mean by the last phrase that they produce the consequence, and by this, that no further term is required from without in order to make the consequence necessary

Posterior Analytics

There may be another manner of knowing as well – that will be discussed later. What I now assert is that at all events we do know by demonstration. By demonstration I mean a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, a syllogism, that is, the grasp of which is eo ipso such knowledge. Assuming then that my thesis as to the nature of scientific knowing is correct, the premisses of demonstrate knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the conclusion, which is further related to them as effect to cause

Substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state/having, action, passion

List of the categories

Not said of and not in (primary substance, a particular man)

not said of and in (accidental particulars, a particular shade of blue)

Said of and not in (secondary substances, universals, man)

Said of and in (accidental universals, blueness)

Categories

Predication and inherence

1. Attempt 1: An account is putting it into words

2. Attempt 2: Having an account enumerates the elements of a thing

3. Attempt 3: Having an account is grasping the mark that distinguishes the object from others

Theaetetus: what is the account (logos)

Knowledge is perception

Theaetetus First definition of knowledge

Knowledge is true judgment

Theaetetus Second definition of knowledgge

Knowledge is true judgment with an account

Theaetetus third definition of knowledge

1. Falsely judging A is B

2. Falsely judging what is not

3. Mistaken substitutions

4. Wax tablet model

5. Aviary model

Theaetetus how is it possible to judge falsely?

Theaetetus

We perceive but do not know the simple elements. We know only the complexes they make up. Either the complex is identical to elements or the complex is something distinct over and above the elements. If the former, then if one is known, the other is known. If the latter, then the complex has just the same status as a simple and can’t be known.

Theaetetus

“It seems to me that a man who knows something perceives what he knows, and the way it appears at present, at any rate, is that knowledge is simply perception

Theaetetus

But look here, this is no ordinary account of knowledge you’ve come out with: it’s what Protagoras used to maintain. He said the very same thing, only he put it in rather a different way. For he says, you know, that ‘Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not.’

Theaetetus

Perception, then, is always of what is, and unerring – as befits knowledge

Empedocles

Love and strife

Democritus

Atomism

Physics

Form, rather than matter, is the “nature” of a thing because a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it has attained to fulfillment than when it exists potentially. Bed is not born from bed but wood. 

Physics

Nature is the immediate material substratum of things which have in themselves a principle of motion or change. Nature is the shape or form which is specified in the definition of the thing. 

Metaphysics

The word ‘substance’ is applied, if not in more senses, still at least to four main objects; for both the essence and the universal and the genus are thought to be the substance of each thing, and fourthly the substratum. Now the substratum is that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else.