phil of mind midterm 2

Why do Prinz and Pismenny deny that love is a basic emotion? Briefly assess their reasoning.

They argue that love lacks the quick onset, universal expression, and physiological patterns of basic emotions like fear. Instead, they view love as a socially embedded, long-term syndrome of thoughts, behaviors, and feelings.

Explain Lady Lovelace’s objection to the Turing Test. How could a defender of the Turing Test best respond?

Lovelace claimed machines can’t create or originate anything new—they only do what they're programmed to do. A defender might argue that complex systems can produce emergent, unpredictable outputs, much like trained human behavior.

Suppose someone objected to the Turing Test by suggesting that it mistakenly constrains machine intelligence to fit a human mold. How might Turing respond? Briefly assess the plausibility of this response.

The objection says the test unfairly limits AI to human-like communication. Turing would likely respond that the test isn’t about defining intelligence universally but about assessing whether machines can convincingly simulate human intelligence.

Explain Susan Schneider’s ACT. Briefly assess the plausibility of this way of testing for AI consciousness.

Schneider’s ACT proposes a flexible, multi-test approach to detect AI consciousness, given the complexity and opacity of AI systems. It’s a cautious and pragmatic method, though it may never fully resolve the mystery of subjective experience.

Udell and Schwitzgebel raise a worry about Schneider’s ACT relating to her claims about “boxing in” the AI. Explain this worry and briefly assess it.

They worry ACT imposes human-centered criteria, potentially excluding non-human conscious AIs. While the concern is valid, ACT’s flexibility might help avoid overly narrow definitions of consciousness.

Explain the systems reply to the Chinese Room. Briefly assess the plausibility of this reply. How might Searle respond?

The systems reply claims that while Searle doesn’t understand Chinese, the whole system does. Searle responds that even if he internalized all components, he still wouldn’t understand—implying the system as a whole lacks true understanding.

Explain the Churchlands’ “Luminous Room” reply to the Chinese Room argument. Briefly assess the plausibility of this response.

They compare Searle’s argument to doubting electric light because it lacks sparks, emphasizing how intuition can mislead. This response is plausible if one accepts that understanding may emerge from unfamiliar physical processes.

According to Clark and Chalmers, what conditions must be met for something to count as part of the extended mind? Briefly assess the plausibility of this set of conditions.

They argue that if an external tool is reliably used, trusted, and easily accessible, it should count as part of the mind. This view is plausible for its functional clarity, though some critics worry it overextends cognition.

Discuss the objection from “information integration” to Clark and Chalmers’ extended mind thesis (see especially Weiskopf’s paper). How might Clark and Chalmers respond?

Weiskopf argues external tools lack the tight integration found in internal mental states. Clark and Chalmers might respond that real-world cognition often involves fragmented processes, both inside and outside the brain.

What is the primary reason Chappell gives to support the claim that male and female consciousnesses differ? Briefly assess this reasoning.

She argues that gendered embodiment and social experience shape perception and consciousness. This is persuasive if we accept that how we live in the world shapes not just what we experience, but how we experience.

Pessimists about introspection often offer arguments from introspective variation. Explain how these arguments work and then briefly discuss how an optimist might respond.

Pessimists argue that inconsistent introspective reports show we’re unreliable judges of our own minds. Optimists might say such variation can be reduced with training or better methods, and reflects complexity rather than failure.