Lecture 4 Review Flashcards

50 practice question-and-answer flashcards based on Lecture 4 of War and Peace (Chapter 3), covering definitions of war, costs of historical and contemporary conflicts, simple cost-benefit analyses, and crisis bargaining models.

Central puzzle of international relations regarding war

Why rational states resort to costly and destructive wars rather than reaching peaceful bargains.

Definition of war in international relations

An event involving the organized use of military force by at least two parties that reaches a minimum threshold of severity.

Minimum threshold of severity for defining war

$$1{,}000\text{ battle deaths}$$

Interstate war

A conflict in which the main participants are sovereign states.

Civil war

A conflict in which the main actors are within the same state.

Three main types of goods states fight over

1. Territory, 2. Policies, and 3. Regime change.

Most common good disputed in international wars

Territory.

Primary sources of value associated with territory in IR conflicts

Strategic military location, natural resources, economic assets, or cultural and historical significance.

Explanation #1 for war examined in Lecture 4

Wars occur when states have conflicting interests.

Main theoretical flaw of Explanation #1 (Conflicting Interests)

States constantly have conflicting interests that do not result in war, showing conflicting interests alone are insufficient to explain war.

Role of war costs in state decision-making

High costs create strong incentives for states to stay peaceful despite having conflicting interests.

Three general factors in a state's war cost-benefit analysis

1. Value of the good ($x$ or $v$), 2. Probability of winning ($p$), and 3. Costs of war ($c$).

Condition under simple cost-benefit analysis where a state chooses war

When the expected value of war exceeds its costs: $p \times x > c$.

Formula for a single state's expected gain from war

$$(p \times x) - c$$

Explanation #2 for war examined in Lecture 4

States fight wars when the benefit of war is greater than the cost of war.

Main theoretical flaw of Explanation #2 (Benefits Exceed Costs)

It ignores alternative peaceful options for redistributing or dividing the disputed good.

Bargaining

An interaction in which actors try to divide a disputed good.

Alternative to war evaluated by rational strategic actors

Peaceful bargained settlements.

Crisis bargaining

A bargaining interaction in which at least one actor threatens to use force if its demands are not met.

Characterization of war in crisis bargaining

An outside option that actors can exercise if bargaining fails.

Explanation #3 for war examined in Lecture 4

War occurs when bargained deals are not as attractive as war.

Main theoretical flaw of Explanation #3 (Deals Less Attractive Than War)

If war is costly, a negotiated bargain preferable to war should theoretically always exist for both sides.

Formula for the Expected Utility of War

$$\text{Expected Utility} = p \times v + (1 - p) \times 0 - c$$

State A's expected payoff from war over good $v$ with win probability $p$ and war cost $a$

$$p \times v - a$$

State B's expected payoff from war over good $v$ with win probability $1 - p$ and war cost $b$

$$(1 - p) \times v - b$$

Total joint costs paid by State A and State B if war occurs

$$a + b$$

Surplus divided by avoiding war in a two-state dispute

The combined war costs of both states ($a + b$).

Bargaining range

The set of peaceful deals that both states prefer over going to war.

Meaning of the claim that war is inefficient ex post

War consumes resources in costs ($a + b$), leaving both states with less total value than they could have divided peacefully beforehand.

State A's ideal point on a continuous bargaining line

The allocation where State A receives $100\%$ of the disputed good.

State B's ideal point on a continuous bargaining line

The allocation where State B receives $100\%$ of the disputed good.

Minimum share of a good State A requires to accept a peaceful deal

$$p - a$$

Maximum share of a good State A can receive while State B still accepts a peaceful deal

$$p + b$$

Lower bound of the bargaining range for State A's share of a good

$$p - a$$

Upper bound of the bargaining range for State A's share of a good

$$p + b$$

Author of the 1995 article 'Rationalist explanations for war'

James D. Fearon.

Primary contribution of James D. Fearon's 1995 paper to international relations

It established a rationalist framework explaining why rational states fail to strike negotiated deals and end up at war.

Three rationalist causes of bargaining failure identified by crisis bargaining theory

1. Information problems, 2. Commitment problems, and 3. Issue indivisibilities.

Information problem as a cause of war

A bargaining failure occurring when states possess private information about power or resolve and have incentives to misrepresent it.

Incentive to misrepresent

The strategic motivation of a state to exaggerate its capabilities or resolve to gain concessions during crisis bargaining.

Commitment problem as a cause of war

A bargaining failure occurring when states cannot credibly promise to honor a peaceful agreement in the future.

Issue indivisibility as a cause of war

A bargaining failure occurring when a disputed good cannot be divided into continuous shares without destroying its value.

Outside option

An alternative outcome an actor can pursue outside of negotiation, which in crisis bargaining is war.

Relationship between State A's probability of winning ($p$) and State B's probability of winning

If State A's probability of winning is $p$, State B's probability of winning is $1 - p$.

Effect of increasing costs of war ($a$ and $b$) on the bargaining range

Higher war costs expand the bargaining range of mutually acceptable peaceful deals.

Effect of decreasing costs of war ($a$ and $b$) on the bargaining range

Lower war costs shrink the bargaining range of mutually acceptable peaceful deals.

Flaw in analyzing war using single-state decision theory instead of bargaining theory

Single-state decision models ignore strategic interactions and peaceful division options negotiated with the opposing state.

Fundamental takeaway regarding negotiated agreements when war is costly

Because war is costly ($c > 0$), there should always exist a range of negotiated bargains that both states prefer over fighting.

Central question crisis bargaining theory attempts to answer

Why do rational states fail to reach a deal within the existing bargaining range and instead choose an inefficient war?

Policy dispute in international relations

A conflict where one state demands that another state change its foreign or domestic behavior.