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why does EM seem counter-intuitive
it seems certain that we have thoughts, desires, beliefs etc
why is the certainty of our mental states a weak objection (reason one)
things seeming obvious doesn’t mean they are the case e.g. the sun circling the earth
ow does the certainty of mental states misunderstand the Churchland’s claims
they don’t deny the existence of psychological phenomena, they just deny that folk psychology
what does folk psychology arguably have, which paul churchland denies
strong predictive and explanatory powers
what is folk psychology meant to do
explain human behaviour, specifically human action
developments in what have led to developments in folk psychology
developments in psychology have expanded its predictive and explanatory power
what could we argue about folk psychology and its developments
it will continue to develop and exist as a theory
why can eliminativism refute the claim that folk psychology has good predictive power etc
relies on us knowing how behaviour relates to the rest of mental life, developments in FP are relatively superficial
how do FP claim that EM is self-refuting
eliminativism is an argument, based on beliefs, but one of its principle claims is that there are no beliefs
what fallacy do EM claim the self-refuting objection commits
begs the question
what could we compare the self-refuting claim with
the 19th century claim about ‘special life force’ - claiming this doesn’t exist does not mean one drops dead
hoewver, how can the self-refuting claim be pushed further
EM claim Intentionality (including things like beliefs) must be eliminated, so they cannot provide an alternative conceivable account of meaning
rather than an empirical theory, what might we claim FP/the concept of Intentionality is
a condition of intelligibility
