Micro Economics L3 - L7

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Lecture 3 - 7

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52 Terms

1
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What is Game theory

Seeks to better explain how individuals interact with each other

<p>Seeks to better explain how individuals interact with each other </p>
2
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What is the equation for working out Expected value

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3
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What is the equation for Utility

4
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What does risk neutrality mean and what graph/curve equation do we expect

5
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What does risk adverse mean and what graph/curve equation do we expect

Risk aversion refers to the preference for a certain outcome over a gamble with a higher or equal expected value. In graphical terms, the utility curve is concave, indicating diminishing marginal utility with increasing wealth.

<img src="https://knowt-user-attachments.s3.amazonaws.com/36abddfd-5e45-4ecb-8201-ef701add0ef8.png" data-width="100%" data-align="center"><p>Risk aversion refers to the preference for a certain outcome over a gamble with a higher or equal expected value. In graphical terms, the utility curve is concave, indicating diminishing marginal utility with increasing wealth. </p>
6
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What does risk loving individual mean and what graph/curve equation do we expect

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7
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What are the components of a decision tree (5)

8
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Example of risk neutral

<img src="https://knowt-user-attachments.s3.amazonaws.com/033bff1d-4120-422b-8c3b-820d0d629591.png" data-width="100%" data-align="center"><p></p>
9
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What is normal Form Games

10
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What are the assumptions of a normal form game (3)

11
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How can normal form Matrix form

12
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What is a iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies

13
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Example of a Iteration deletion of dominated strategies

14
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What is a Nash equilibrium

15
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How to find the Nash equilibria

16
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Explain some of the following games, coordination game, Battle of seas, Pareto Coordination game and Chicken

17
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What is a normal form game, a strategy, complete information, common knowledge and rationality

18
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What is a continuous strategy game

19
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What is Cournot competition and what are the equation he uses to show two firms and the two assumptions 

20
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List the three steps to find a Nash Equilibrium

21
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What are steps 1 and 2 to solve the best response curves

22
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What is the third step for solvong the best response equations

23
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How to find the position where the best response curve interact

24
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Go through example

25
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WHat is the medium Voter theorem

26
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Explain the intutition behind the median voter theorem

27
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What is an extensive form game/ what assumptions do we make

28
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What are the components of a decision tree$

29
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What is a strategy

30
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With this decision tree what are the possible outcomes 

31
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What is backwards induction

32
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Go through the trespass game

33
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What is a Subgame and SPNE

34
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Go through this example and work out the equilibrium

35
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Go through this example

36
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What are the criticisms of SPNE

37
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What are some additional criticisms of SPNE

38
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Define Nash equilibrium

39
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What is a repeated game/stage game

40
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What does a SPNE demand in a repeated game

41
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How is this first game impacted by being played twice

42
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What logic is applied to Finite repetitions

43
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What is the grim trigger strategy

44
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Notes on what discounting is

45
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How will player 1 continue cooperating

46
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Go through example

47
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Go through this example aswell on discounting

48
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How does indefinite repetitions impact the game

49
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Go through a continuous strategy

50
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Show steps 1-2 on the continuous strategy

51
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Show steps 3-4 on the continuous strategy

52
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