PoP - Counterpowers

0.0(0)
Studied by 0 people
call kaiCall Kai
learnLearn
examPractice Test
spaced repetitionSpaced Repetition
heart puzzleMatch
flashcardsFlashcards
GameKnowt Play
Card Sorting

1/16

encourage image

There's no tags or description

Looks like no tags are added yet.

Last updated 9:56 PM on 6/12/26
Name
Mastery
Learn
Test
Matching
Spaced
Call with Kai

No analytics yet

Send a link to your students to track their progress

17 Terms

1
New cards

Clark, Golder, Golder

  • Madison writes extensively about need of protection from majorities in the Federalist Papers

    • Fed 10 - Tyranny of majority

    • Fed 47 - Accumulation of power is tyranny

    • Fed 51 - separation of powers and checks and balances are good 

  • Federal states split sovereignty into different levels 

    • De jure requires geopolitical division, independence, and direct governance.

    • De facto depends on degree of decentralisation – taxes are a useful proxy

  • Bicameral states have different legislative assemblies 

    • Can be congruent or incongruent and asymmetric or symmetric

  • Constitionalism 

    • Higher law constitution has constitutional review – restricts the legislation

2
New cards

Lijphart

  • Consensus democracies have more counter-majoritarian institutions 

    • Federal systems, bicameral legislature, judicial review

3
New cards

Tsebelis

  • Veto players: actors whose agreement is required for a change in the status quo 

    • More veto players → less potential for policy change

  • Political stability depends on the number, congruency, and cohesion of veto players

  • Bureaucrats can select any point inside the core → lots of policy discretion

  • Courts are important when there are many veto players 

    • They act like a third legislative chamber

  • When many veto players exist, power can be delegated to sub-groups, such that only one group has veto power over a particular issue

  • If legislative chambers are congruent, then they count as one veto player (absorption rule)

  • Empirical studies on oil and health policies support this normative theory, but more is needed

4
New cards

Stone-Sweet

  • Definitions and effectiveness of judicial review

  • A constitution specifies the meta-norms of how all legal norms are to be produced, applied, enforced, interpreted, and changed

  • Constitutions today project rights, reject legislative sovereignty, and make overriding of constitutional rulings difficult 

  • Judicial review can be performed by the judiciary or a separate constitutional court

  • Effective systems require (1) judges have an actual case load, (2) judges resolve disputes with defensible reasons, and (3) the governed must accept the rulings

  • Weak systems can be ignored → ineffective 

  • European (centralized) vs American (decentralized) model

5
New cards

Roux

  • Judicial intervention in politics is supposed to be limited to rights

  • South African Constitutional Court has had judicial review of resource allocation

    • Socioeconomic right cases

  • Court acted as a legislative legitimizer

6
New cards

Gibson and Caldeira

  • Without legitimacy, the south african constitutional court’s decisions do not materialize → cannot act as a veto player

  • Veto players have the power to effectively go against what is popular

  • Courts with lots of legitimacy (US, German) can convince people to follow unpopular decisions 

  • South Africa’s court has low legitimacy as measured by surveys

7
New cards

Binder

  • bicameralism makes policy change harder

  • Divided government (institutional intrabranch conflict) is positively correlated with legislative gridlock 

8
New cards

Hassan

  • Decentralisation doesn’t always protect minorities 

  • Theoretically, decentralisation should help ease ethnic tensions in sub-Saharan Africa

    • Decentralisation stresses local ethnic identities over national identities → heightens ethnic tensions

  • Reality shows that executives are unwilling to decentralize de facto because it diminishes their power

  • Centralized states result in disproportionate distribution of state resources 

    • Requires horizontal checks or independent bureaucracies

  • Decentralisation brings the government closer to the people via more local level decisions

    • BUT can also just reproduce inequalities at lower tiers (ex: US southern state slavery)

9
New cards

Miller

  • Federalism harms minorities 

  • Civil rights promises inclusion

  • American federal system has enabled inequality 

    • Perpetuated slavery, jim crow, prison state, etc

    • Limits authority and incentives of central government to address issues

  • Lawmakers in the best position to address issues are insulated from political pressure

  • Too many venues for black and latinos to get representation

10
New cards

Johnson

  • Federalism has enabled inequality (complements Miller article) 

  • Racial federalism: federal state where divisions of power are marked by the ability of each unit to use race as a criteria for determining citizenship rights and public policy

    • Hurricane katrina displays these patterns 

  • Federalism has enabled slavery, Jim Crow laws, segregation, etc. 

11
New cards

Meier

  • Bureaucracy is reasonably effective and highly responsive to legitimate political demand 

  • Bureaucracy - permanent, goal-oriented open systems

    • Structured around policy-oriented goals 

    • “Storehouses of expertise” due to permanence

    • Perform best when given autonomy 

  • Bureaucrats are encouraged to become specialized in their fields

  • Continuous and unaffected by election styles (ex: UK)

12
New cards

Bangura

  • Technocrats (policy experts) are good because most legislators lack technical experience 

  • But decisions still need to be subject to public scrutiny

13
New cards

What is the purpose of democracy?

  • To represent the people

  • Bare minimum requirement is a majority

  • Ideally represent as many as possible through pareto improvements from majoritarian models 

14
New cards

What is the role of counter-majoritarian institutions?

  • Protect minority interests/rights - Madison 

  • Prevent persistent minorities and tyranny of the majority

15
New cards

How effective are counter-majoritarian institutions/what makes them effective?

  • Effectiveness can be measured by Tsebelis’ veto player framework

    • If the institution is an effective veto player then they are able to change policy

  • Bicameral legislatures that are incongruent are veto players

    • Can increase legislative gridlock

  • Judicial system that is effective is a third legislative veto player

    • Though South Africa has interesting results

  • Federal system theoretically increases representation of geographic minorities (French Canadians)

    • BUT has also been used poorly in Sub-Saharan Africa and US to perpetuate inequality 

  • Bureaucracy 

    • Can choose points inside the win set

16
New cards

What are the different counter-majoritarian institutions?

  • Bicameral legislature

  • Judicial system/constitutional court

  • Federal system

  • Bureaucracy

17
New cards

How reliant are counter-majoritarian institutions on popularity

  • Constitutional courts are reliant on popularity - no legitimacy = no effect

  • Federal systems are reliant on local popularity