1/16
Looks like no tags are added yet.
Name | Mastery | Learn | Test | Matching | Spaced | Call with Kai |
|---|
No analytics yet
Send a link to your students to track their progress
Clark, Golder, Golder
Madison writes extensively about need of protection from majorities in the Federalist Papers
Fed 10 - Tyranny of majority
Fed 47 - Accumulation of power is tyranny
Fed 51 - separation of powers and checks and balances are goodÂ
Federal states split sovereignty into different levelsÂ
De jure requires geopolitical division, independence, and direct governance.
De facto depends on degree of decentralisation – taxes are a useful proxy
Bicameral states have different legislative assembliesÂ
Can be congruent or incongruent and asymmetric or symmetric
ConstitionalismÂ
Higher law constitution has constitutional review – restricts the legislation
Lijphart
Consensus democracies have more counter-majoritarian institutionsÂ
Federal systems, bicameral legislature, judicial review
Tsebelis
Veto players: actors whose agreement is required for a change in the status quoÂ
More veto players → less potential for policy change
Political stability depends on the number, congruency, and cohesion of veto players
Bureaucrats can select any point inside the core → lots of policy discretion
Courts are important when there are many veto playersÂ
They act like a third legislative chamber
When many veto players exist, power can be delegated to sub-groups, such that only one group has veto power over a particular issue
If legislative chambers are congruent, then they count as one veto player (absorption rule)
Empirical studies on oil and health policies support this normative theory, but more is needed
Stone-Sweet
Definitions and effectiveness of judicial review
A constitution specifies the meta-norms of how all legal norms are to be produced, applied, enforced, interpreted, and changed
Constitutions today project rights, reject legislative sovereignty, and make overriding of constitutional rulings difficultÂ
Judicial review can be performed by the judiciary or a separate constitutional court
Effective systems require (1) judges have an actual case load, (2) judges resolve disputes with defensible reasons, and (3) the governed must accept the rulings
Weak systems can be ignored → ineffectiveÂ
European (centralized) vs American (decentralized) model
Roux
Judicial intervention in politics is supposed to be limited to rights
South African Constitutional Court has had judicial review of resource allocation
Socioeconomic right cases
Court acted as a legislative legitimizer
Gibson and Caldeira
Without legitimacy, the south african constitutional court’s decisions do not materialize → cannot act as a veto player
Veto players have the power to effectively go against what is popular
Courts with lots of legitimacy (US, German) can convince people to follow unpopular decisionsÂ
South Africa’s court has low legitimacy as measured by surveys
Binder
bicameralism makes policy change harder
Divided government (institutional intrabranch conflict) is positively correlated with legislative gridlockÂ
Hassan
Decentralisation doesn’t always protect minoritiesÂ
Theoretically, decentralisation should help ease ethnic tensions in sub-Saharan Africa
Decentralisation stresses local ethnic identities over national identities → heightens ethnic tensions
Reality shows that executives are unwilling to decentralize de facto because it diminishes their power
Centralized states result in disproportionate distribution of state resourcesÂ
Requires horizontal checks or independent bureaucracies
Decentralisation brings the government closer to the people via more local level decisions
BUT can also just reproduce inequalities at lower tiers (ex: US southern state slavery)
Miller
Federalism harms minoritiesÂ
Civil rights promises inclusion
American federal system has enabled inequalityÂ
Perpetuated slavery, jim crow, prison state, etc
Limits authority and incentives of central government to address issues
Lawmakers in the best position to address issues are insulated from political pressure
Too many venues for black and latinos to get representation
Johnson
Federalism has enabled inequality (complements Miller article)Â
Racial federalism: federal state where divisions of power are marked by the ability of each unit to use race as a criteria for determining citizenship rights and public policy
Hurricane katrina displays these patternsÂ
Federalism has enabled slavery, Jim Crow laws, segregation, etc.Â
Meier
Bureaucracy is reasonably effective and highly responsive to legitimate political demandÂ
Bureaucracy - permanent, goal-oriented open systems
Structured around policy-oriented goalsÂ
“Storehouses of expertise” due to permanence
Perform best when given autonomyÂ
Bureaucrats are encouraged to become specialized in their fields
Continuous and unaffected by election styles (ex: UK)
Bangura
Technocrats (policy experts) are good because most legislators lack technical experienceÂ
But decisions still need to be subject to public scrutiny
What is the purpose of democracy?
To represent the people
Bare minimum requirement is a majority
Ideally represent as many as possible through pareto improvements from majoritarian modelsÂ
What is the role of counter-majoritarian institutions?
Protect minority interests/rights - MadisonÂ
Prevent persistent minorities and tyranny of the majority
How effective are counter-majoritarian institutions/what makes them effective?
Effectiveness can be measured by Tsebelis’ veto player framework
If the institution is an effective veto player then they are able to change policy
Bicameral legislatures that are incongruent are veto players
Can increase legislative gridlock
Judicial system that is effective is a third legislative veto player
Though South Africa has interesting results
Federal system theoretically increases representation of geographic minorities (French Canadians)
BUT has also been used poorly in Sub-Saharan Africa and US to perpetuate inequalityÂ
BureaucracyÂ
Can choose points inside the win set
What are the different counter-majoritarian institutions?
Bicameral legislature
Judicial system/constitutional court
Federal system
Bureaucracy
How reliant are counter-majoritarian institutions on popularity
Constitutional courts are reliant on popularity - no legitimacy = no effect
Federal systems are reliant on local popularity