Introduction to secret affairs lesson 3

Intelligence collection / espionage

Purpose: Obtain information

Acknowledgement: Usually secret or unacknowledged

Example: The CIA’s U-2 reconnaissance flight over the Soviet Union

Covert action

Purpose: Influence conditions or outcomes abroad

Acknowledgement: The sponsor avoids official acknowledgement

Example: An unacknowledged drone strike, propaganda campaign, or proxy operation

Secret diplomacy

Purpose: Negotiate privately

Acknowledgement: Participants know whom they represent

Example: The Oslo talks

Overt statecraft

Purpose: Influence openly

Acknowledgement: Publicly acknowledged

Example: EU sanctions against Russia

Why secret statecraft can support peace

Reducing uncertainty

Managing the security dilemma

Replacing military competition

Enabling deterrence

Creating back channels

Providing an escalation off-ramp

Why secret statecraft can increase conflict

The same practices can also intensify insecurity.

Espionage can resemble preparation for attack

Information can create an opportunity for violence

Discovery creates fear and humiliation

Covert action can be misinterpreted

Deniability weakens control and accountability

When relations are stable but competitive

• Intelligence collection may be treated as expected behavior.

• Tacit rules can limit escalation.

• Open secrecy can give both sides room to avoid public retaliation.

• Covert competition may substitute for open warfare.

• Intelligence can reduce uncertainty and support deterrence.

When relations are unstable or crisis-prone

• Espionage may look like preparation for attack or subversion.

• Covert action may confirm the target’s worst fears.

• Ambiguity can increase rather than reduce uncertainty.

• Leaders may attribute operations prematurely.

• Exposure can create pressure for punishment and counter-retaliation.

What is the connection between “When relations are stable but competitive” and “When relations are unstable or crisis-prone”

Ambiguity is useful when adversaries share an interest in restraint. It is dangerous when mistrust causes them to interpret uncertainty in the most threatening way.

Levels of secrecy

Complete secrecy

Plausible deniability

Implausible deniability

Partial acknowledgement

Full acknowledgement

Complete secrecy

The operation itself is unknown

Plausible deniability

The activity is known, but sponsorship remains genuinely uncertain

Implausible deniability

Sponsorship is widely understood but not officially acknowledged

Partial acknowledgement

Some involvement is admitted while details remain concealed

Full acknowledgement

The state publicly accepts responsibility

What did traditional thinking emphasise?

plausible deniability: the sponsor’s role should remain uncertain enough that an official denial is believable.

What does modern covert action emphasise?

implausible deniability or open secrecy: responsibility is widely understood, but the sponsor still refuses formal acknowledgement.

Rovner’s argument about tacit intelligence rules.

Full secrecy is not always necessary. What matters may be the preservation of an official fiction that allows governments to manage audiences and avoid escalation.

Rovners argument on technology

Technology alone cannot explain whether intelligence stabilizes or destabilizes relations. States have repeatedly tried to conceal activities from remote surveillance and destroy collection platforms.

The same applies to cyber operations. Cyber espionage and cyber sabotage can use similar access methods, creating a “cybersecurity dilemma.” However, routine cyber spying has not automatically produced military crises. Its meaning depends on context:

• during predictable rivalry, it may remain part of an intelligence contest;

• during mobilization or crisis, the same intrusion may look like preparation for war.

Therefore: technology shapes capabilities and risks, but political relations shape interpretation.

Covert action’s main tools

1. Propaganda and psychological operations: shaping perceptions and behavior through truthful, manipulated, or fabricated information.

2. Electoral and political intervention: secretly supporting candidates, parties, or political outcomes.

3. Economic sabotage: degrading material capabilities.

4. Paramilitary action: using proxies, special forces, drone strikes, captures, or targeted killings.

Covert action’s trade-offs

Appeal	Connected risk
Access and surprise	Operational complexity and loss of control
Escalation management	Ambiguity and misinterpretation
Lower domestic political costs	Weaker oversight and accountability
Lower international costs	Exposure, reputational damage, and blowback
Quiet signaling	The target may receive the wrong message
Proxy warfare	Proxies may pursue their own interests

How states should respond (to covert action)

1. Interpret

Ask:

• What happened?

• Was it espionage, influence, sabotage, crime, or preparation for attack?

• Who physically conducted it?

• Who authorized it?

• Was the purpose to damage, warn, test, or provoke?

Do not assume every action is centrally controlled by a single master strategist. Agencies, contractors, proxies, and local actors may have different levels of autonomy.

2. Disclose

Choose whether to:

• remain quiet;

• share evidence privately with allies;

• attribute responsibility publicly.

Disclosure may strengthen legitimacy and mobilize support, but it may also expose intelligence sources and increase pressure to retaliate.

3. Counteract

Choose between:

• denial: stop or disrupt the operation so it cannot succeed;

• punishment: impose costs to deter future action.

Denial generally carries lower escalation risk. Punishment may strengthen deterrence, but it can begin an unpredictable cycle of retaliation.