Logic, Game Theory, and Behavioral Economics Lecture Review

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Vocabulary-style flashcards covering logic, set theory, game theory equilibria, expected utility, risk aversion, portfolio theory, contract theory, and prospect theory based on Christos A. Ioannou's lecture transcript.

Last updated 5:33 PM on 8/1/26
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50 Terms

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Conditional Statement

A logical statement consisting of a hypothesis or antecedent in the “if” clause and a conclusion or consequent in the “then” clause.

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Converse

Given an if-then statement “if p, then q,” the converse is defined as the statement “if q, then p.”

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Contrapositive

A related statement to “if p, then q” defined as “If not q, then not p,” which is logically true if the original statement is true.

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Tautology

A compound statement in logic that is always true, such as p[q¬p]p \lor [q \Rightarrow \neg p].

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Theorem

A tautology of the form [p1p2pk]q[p_1 \land p_2 \land \dots \land p_k] \Rightarrow q, where the statements p1,p2,,pkp_1, p_2, \dots, p_k are referred to as assumptions.

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Modus Ponens

A logical rule of inference stating that from (pq)p(p \Rightarrow q) \land p, one can infer qq.

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Modus Tollens

A logical rule of inference stating that from (pq)¬q(p \Rightarrow q) \land \neg q, one can infer ¬p\neg p.

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Constructive Dilemma

A logical rule stating that from (pq)(st)(ps)(p \Rightarrow q) \land (s \Rightarrow t) \land (p \lor s), one can infer (qt)(q \lor t).

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Universal Quantifier

Denoted by \forall, it represents the statement “For all xx in XX, p(x)p(x).”

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n-fold cross product

Also called the Cartesian product, it is the set of ordered n-tuples from X1,X2,,XnX_1, X_2, \dots, X_n, written as X1×X2××XnX_1 \times X_2 \times \dots \times X_n.

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Game

A formal representation of a situation in which a number of individuals interact in a setting of strategic interdependence.

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Strategic Interdependence

A situation where each individual’s welfare depends not only on her own actions but also on the actions of other individuals.

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Action Profile

A combination a=(ai,ai)a = (a_i, a_{-i}) consisting of the action chosen by player ii and the actions chosen by all other players.

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Strictly Dominant Strategy

A strategy sis_i is strictly dominant for player ii if it uniquely maximizes that player's payoff regardless of the strategies chosen by rivals.

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Strictly Dominated Strategy

A strategy for which there exists an alternative strategy that yields a greater payoff for the player regardless of what the other players do.

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Nash Equilibrium

A strategy profile where each player’s strategy choice is a best response to the actual strategy choices played by their rivals.

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Mixed Nash Equilibrium

An equilibrium where players assign positive probabilities to their strategies such that other players are indifferent over their own strategies.

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Rational Preference

A preference relation (\succsim) that is both complete (all pairs can be compared) and transitive (ordering is consistent).

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Cobb-Douglas utility function

A mathematical utility representation defined as u(x1,x2)=x1αx21αu(x_1, x_2) = x_1^{\alpha} x_2^{1-\alpha} for α(0,1)\alpha \in (0, 1).

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St. Petersburg Paradox

A problem proposed by Gabriel Cramer regarding a coin-toss game, used by Daniel Bernoulli to argue that value is based on utility rather than price.

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Support

The finite subset of outcomes in a set XX to which a probability distribution assigns a positive value.

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Reduced Lottery

A simple lottery that generates the same final probability distribution over outcomes as a given compound lottery.

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Continuity Axiom (Axiom C)

A preference axiom stating that if pqrp \succ q \succ r, there exist probabilities such that mixtures of pp and rr are ranked relative to qq, excluding lexicographic preferences.

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Independence Axiom (Axiom I)

Also called the Substitution Axiom, it states that preference between two lotteries should be independent of any third lottery they are both mixed with.

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Allais’ Paradox

A famous empirical violation of the Independence Axiom described by Maurice Allais in 1953 demonstrating that human choice often contradicts Expected Utility Theory.

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Risk Aversion

A characteristic of a decision maker who prefers a certain amount equal to the expected value of a lottery over the lottery itself; equivalent to utility function concavity.

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Certainty Equivalent

The guaranteed amount of money, denoted c(F,u)c(F, u), that provides an individual the same utility as a given risky gamble F()F(\cdot).

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Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion

Defined as rA(x)=u(x)u(x)r_A(x) = - \frac{u''(x)}{u'(x)}; it measures the degree of risk aversion based on the curvature of the Bernoulli utility function.

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First-Order Stochastic Dominance

A condition where distribution F()F(\cdot) yields unambiguously higher returns than G()G(\cdot) if every expected utility maximizer who values more over less prefers FF.

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Mean-Preserving Spread

A method of creating a riskier distribution from an original one by adding zero-mean noise to the outcomes without changing the overall mean.

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Beta (\beta_i)

A measure of non-diversifiable systematic risk of an asset calculated as βi=Cov(Ri,Rm)Var(Rm)\beta_i = \frac{\text{Cov}(R_i, R_m)}{\text{Var}(R_m)}.

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Security Market Line (SML)

A graphical representation of the MEDAF (CAPM) that plots the expected return of an asset relative to its systematic risk (beta).

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Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)

The hypothesis stating that in an efficient market, prices reflect all available information, making it impossible to systematically beat the market except by chance.

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Likelihood Matrix (L)

In information theory, a matrix L=[qms]L = [q_{m|s}] containing the conditional probabilities of receiving message mm given state of nature ss.

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Posterior Matrix

A matrix Π=[πsm]\Pi = [\pi_{s|m}] containing the updated probabilities of state ss occurring given the receipt of message mm.

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Value of Information

The expected utility gain from choosing an optimal action after receiving a message compared to the optimal action chosen given only prior beliefs.

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Contingent Commodity

A commodity that is specified not only by physical traits, but also by the specific state of nature in which it is made available for consumption.

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Arrow Security

A simplified financial asset that pays one unit of value in one specific state and zero in all other states.

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Revealing Equilibrium

A Rational Expectations equilibrium where all agents can learn the true state of nature by observing market prices.

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Market for Lemons

An adverse selection model by George Akerlof (1970) where asymmetric information regarding quality causes high-quality goods to be withdrawn, potentially collapsing the market.

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Signaling

A solution to asymmetric information where the informed agent moves first to reveal their type, such as through education or warranties.

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Screening

A solution to asymmetric information where the uninformed agent (principal) moves first to design contracts that force the informed agent (agent) to reveal their type.

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Informational Rent

The utility above the reservation level that a 'good type' agent receives in a screening contract to ensure they do not mimic a 'bad type.'

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Moral Hazard

A problem of asymmetric information involving hidden actions where the principal cannot observe the agent's actual effort level.

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Participation Constraint

A contractual constraint requiring the principal to provide the agent with at least their reservation utility to ensure they accept the contract.

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Incentive Constraint

A contractual requirement that induces the agent to choose the action or disclose the information desired by the principal.

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Representativeness Heuristic

A cognitive heuristic where probabilities are mistakenly evaluated by the degree to which an event is representative of a stereotypical category.

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Availability Heuristic

A bias where the frequency or probability of an event is judged by the ease with which relevant instances come to mind.

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Reflection Effect

The behavioral finding that people tend to be risk averse in the positive domain (gains) but risk seeking in the negative domain (losses).

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Isolation Effect

The tendency of decision-makers to disregard shared components of alternatives and focus only on the elements that distinguish them.