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backwards induction
consider best response of 2nd mover, choose option best for 1st mover
to see if player have first move advantage
compare to simultaneous move game
oligopoly
more than one firm
duopoly
2 firms
Bertrand Competition
firms compete on price (what they are choosing is price), firms always have an incentive to lower prices to capture market share (NE P=MC)
MR
same intercept, twice the slope as the demand curve
cournot
firms choose quantity simultaneously (q, choice variable, max profit, objective function)
Cournot steps
write objective function in terms of choice function
set derivative of objection function equal to zero
solve for choice variable
prisoners dilemma, game is finite
won’t cooperate
PV of perpituity
x/r
tit-for-tat
choose to cooperate but if i deviate they will deviate
Cournot NE
solve for intersection of firms’ best response functions
Stackleberg
has leader and follow, leader chooses quantity first (means we use backwad induction)
Stackleberg steps
find BR for follower first
leader firm choose quantity to maximize profit for themselves taking the other firm’s best response into account
sub BR of follower firm into Demand, sub demand into profit for leader
do same next steps for Leader firm (taking derivative, solve for leader firm quantity)