property dualism

what do property dualists believe

• the brain is a physical object some of the properties of which are mental states

• mental states are caused by the physical workings of the physical brain but are in no way reducible to or supervenient upon any physical states/properties of the brain/any other physical thing

superinvenience

• a relation between sets of properties

• a property x is said to supervene upon a property or sets of properties y only if a difference in y is necessary for a difference in x to be possible

• eg beauty. take a painting that has the property of beauty - it is a beautiful painting. the property of beauty is supervenient upon the physical propertyies of the painting (colour, style etc.) BC any change in the degree of beauty requires a change in the physical properties of the painting

• mental states may be properties of physical brains, but they are not supevenient upon the physical properties of brains

epiphenomenalism

• physical causes the mental but the mental does not cause the physical or anything else

• form of property dualism

• eg. mental states are like the smoke from a factory chimney - they are caused by the factory but they do not affect the factory and have no effect upon the brain

• except unlike smoke, mental states are nonphysical and have no causal impact on the wider world

• uni-directionality - mental states cause nothing to happen - either on the physical or other mental states

• makes room for intentionality, desires, sensations etc. but also accepts that human behaviour can be fully explained empirically

• the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge

• if epiphenomenalism is true, how can we know about and reflect upon our mental states

• we are aware of our mental states by reflection ?

• but if mental states were mere epiphenonmena, then the cannot show up when we introspect and we can’t possibly be acquainted with them

• the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life (ie as involving causal connections, both psychological and psycho-physical)

eg. desire to eat chocolate causes physical change - walking to cupboard and other mental states such as the sensation of eating chocolate

we talk about why we do things very often citing the mental states as our reasons: why did. you come here today? because i wanted to be here - the mental state is invoked to talk about bodily behaviour

epiphenominalists do not believe the mental to cause anything so they should answer with facts about their body etc.

the challenge posed by natural selection/evolution

• darwin’s theory of evolution and natural selection: throusands of genetic veriations randomly occur, and the ones that best aid our survival continue through natural selection as the creatures who are best genetically suited to their environments are able to live longer and reproduce more so more creatures end up with those traits as you go down generations

• so taken this - the traits that evolve over time are ones that causally contribute to the survival and reproduction of the creature

• we can assume that mental props incl qualia evolved

• but how if they are irrelevant to how we survive and reproduce

• even more when we consider how most of usewould see fear - mental state- as playing a role in us runnig away from a threat - evolutionary advantage of fear

• RESPONSE
  - natural selection more complex than this

• lots of traits are byproducts of traits that do contribute to advantages, rather than themselves contributing to evolution

• polar bears have thick warm coats to help them survive in the arctic. a thick coat is a heavy coat but the heaviness itself (the byproduct of the useful thickness) is not advantagous in itself

• similarly there are brain processes which make a diff to how the creature behaves that are importantto sirvival

• consciousness is a byproduct of these processes

zombies argument for property dualism

P1) The actual world (probably) cannot contain beings which are physically identical to us but which lack consciousness – i.e., philosophical zombies are physically impossible;

P2) If there is at least one possible world which is physically identical to ours and contains philosophical zombies, or physically identical to ours and lacks consciousness altogether - i.e., is a zombie world -, consciousness in the actual world (or any world in which consciousness exists) cannot be anything physical, and so must be something non-physical;

P3) Philosophical zombies/a zombie world are conceivable; therefore:

C1) There is at least one such possible world - i.e., philosophical zombies/a zombie world are metaphysically possible; therefore:

C2) Consciousness in the actual world (or any world in which consciousness exists) is non-physical; therefore:

C) (Property) dualism is true.

what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about natural worls

• Who cares, that is, if there is at least one possible world which is physically identical to ours and contains philosophical zombies, or physically identical to ours and lacks consciousness altogether - i.e., is a zombie world?  The fact that philosophical zombies are not physically possible – i.e., are not possible in the actual world, with its laws of nature, suffices to show that dualism is false in the actual world, and that's all that physicalists need to show, in order to show that physicalism is actually true

• BUT
  If we look again at the Philosophical Zombies Argument, we will see that, regardless of the (probable) physical impossibility of zombies, it concludes, in effect, that physicalism about consciousness/the mental is necessarily false, so that dualism about consciousness/the mental is necessarily true. But on what grounds?

zombies are inconcievable

physicalist:

The reason zombies seem conceivable is because we’re labouring under a false illusion that qualia are these spooky non-physical things. Once we understand that qualia are, in fact, just physical things, then it becomes inconceivable to imagine a physically identical being that lacks these physical features. Imagining a philosophical zombie would be like saying “imagine something that is physically identical but that isn’t physically identical” – it would be a contradiction, and contradictions aren’t conceivable. It would be like trying to imagine a married bachelor or a triangle with 4 sides.

BEGS THE QUESTION - attempts to refute the argument that mental states are not physical but already assumes that in the premise

also, question that there is a possible world where the laws of nature are identical to ours (explain) to allow human beings to evolve as we have and behave precisely as we (and mindlessly talk, form relationships, create, fight and do all the things we do) , but also different enough so that the zombies lack consciousness. But is it concievable that it is possible for beings that lack any consciousness thoughts, feelings etc. to evolve to behave exactly as we do?

Well, if it is inconceivable that all human beings are philosophical zombies, why is it conceivable that any human being is a philosophical zombie?

means the dualist needs an a priori example that science will never show that consciousness is physical

what is concievable may not be metaphysically possible

concievable = logically possible, but this does not suffice for metaphysical possibility - there is more to meatphyscial possibility than logical possibility as it has to do not just with logic, but laws of nature

may be possible for a mad scientist to make a zombie, and if that is possible then there is at least one possible world in which there is at least one philosophical zombie

but the metaphysical possibility of philosophical zombies requires there is at least one possible world where they can occur naturally

not possible because:

(a) the laws of nature were sufficiently like the laws of nature in the actual world (i.e., our world) to permit the evolution and existence of human beings which were physiologically and behavioural exactly like human beings in the actual world, and

(b) the laws of nature were sufficiently unlike the laws of nature in the actual world (i.e., our world) to permit the evolution and existence of philosophical zombies.

this is not possible so they are not metaphysically possible. this is because such a world would have to have identical laws of nature to ours to permit philosophical zombies to evolve exactly how we have. but if the laws of nature are exactly as they are in our world, and philo zombs are not possible in our world, then philosophical zombies (that are exactly like us physically and behaviourally but lack consciousness) could not possibly exist in that world. so so they are not metaphysically possible

knowledge /mary

• leading neuroscientist on colour who has never left the completely monochrome room she has grown up in, though she knows exactly what goes through a person’s brain when they see ac certain colour

• when she first sees colour she acquires new knowledge since she gains an understanding of the qualia associated with colour - even as an expert on the neuroscience of colour she only understands colour fully after experiencing colour herself

• thus there are non physical facts about colour perception, therefore there are non-physical facts about consciousness in general

ability knowledge response for mary

• mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge

• When she sees red. Green, blue, etc. for the first time, Mary doesn’t acquire any new propositional knowledge – i.e. she doesn’t learn any new facts.  Rather, she acquires new abilities, e.g. she can now sort ripe from unripe tomatoes, stop at red traffic signals, tell what colour someone’s hat is, etc., without scanning anyone’s brain

• RESPONSE: surely she does learn new facts - what it is like to see reed, blue, indigo etc. and she learns facts about what it is like for others to see

•   If, as physicalists/materialists maintain, the mental is physical, Mary ought to be able to acquire these abilities just in virtue of her acquiring full knowledge of all of the physical facts about brains, etc.  The fact that she cannot – that, clearly, her complete scientific mastery is insufficient for her possession of these abilities – proves that there is something more to the mental than the physical.  Physicalism is false.

new knowledge/old fact response

does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain aqaintance knowledge. When she sees red. Green, blue, etc. for the first time, Mary doesn’t acquire any new propositional knowledge – i.e. she doesn’t learn any new facts.  Rather, she becomes acquainted with something – namely, the qualia of colour experience – with which she was unacquainted previously.

BUT

SAME AS BEFORE

• Alternatively, one might say that even if the objection is correct, and Mary does not acquire any new propositional knowledge but becomes acquainted with qualia instead, she does so because something becomes available to her – namely, the qualia of colour experience – which was clearly not available, and could not have become available, if she’d just carried on scanning brains (or observing behaviour, or whatever), and that this is enough to show that physicalism is false.