Civil Wars and Ethnic Conflicts Final

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30 Terms

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Civil war

A violent conflict within a state between a government and one or more organized non-state groups, aiming to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies. Must meet a certain threshold of battle deaths (often greater than either 1,000 or 25 per year).

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Greed vs. grievance (opportunity vs. motive)

Two main frameworks for explaining conflict: Grievance suggests conflict stems from ethnic, religious, or political injustices (motive). Greed suggests conflict stems from the opportunity to profit from war, often through lootable resources or weak state capacity (opportunity).Two main frameworks for explaining conflict: Grievance suggests conflict stems from ethnic, religious, or political injustices (motive). Greed suggests conflict stems from the opportunity to profit from war, often through lootable resources or weak state capacity (opportunity).

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Lootable resources

Natural resources that are easily exploitable and tradable, often on the black market, which can finance rebel groups (e.g., diamonds, timber, narcotics, or alluvial gold).

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Horizontal inequalities

Inequalities that exist between culturally defined groups (e.g., ethnic or religious groups) rather than between individuals or classes. These can be economic, social, or political.

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Ethnicity

A social identity category based on real or perceived common descent, history, culture, or religion. It is typically a fluid, socially constructed identity (constructivist view), but it can be rigid (primordialist view).

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Responsibility to Protect

A global political commitment endorsed by all UN member states in 2005. It states that sovereignty is not a right, but a responsibility. If a state fails to protect its own population from four specific crimes (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity), the international community has the responsibility to protect these people.

Provides a normative and political justification for external intervention (military or non-military) into a sovereign state experiencing mass atrocities, shifting the focus from "right to intervene" to "responsibility to protect."

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Logics of military intervention

The various strategic and normative reasons why an external state might intervene in a civil war: Geographic proximity (fear of spillover), material self-interest (protecting resources or trade), ethnic ties (domestic political pressure or solidarity), and geopolitical (balancing power, competition with rivals).

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Five challenges of rebel organization (Weinstein 2007)

The hurdles any insurgent group must overcome to survive and succeed: Recruitment (getting members), Control (maintaining discipline), Governance (administering territory), Violence (using force effectively), and Resilience (surviving setbacks).

Provides a framework for analyzing the strategic choices and variations among rebel groups (e.g., economic vs. social endowments lead to different organizational styles and violence patterns).

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Economic endowments vs. social endowments

Two types of resources available to rebel groups. Economic endowments are financeable resources (like lootable resources) that require little cohesion to obtain. Social endowments are non-financeable resources (like social networks, legitimacy, and trust) typically derived from a supportive community.

According to Weinstein, this dichotomy explains rebel group variation. Groups relying on economic endowments often exhibit undisciplined violence, while those with social endowments tend toward more selective violence to maintain community support.

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Bargaining theory of war

The argument that war is essentially a failure of negotiation. Rational actors should always prefer a negotiated settlement over the costly gamble of war, so war only occurs when a deal cannot be struck, typically due to private information (about military strength), commitment problems, or indivisibility (of the object in dispute).

It explains the onset and duration of civil war. The presence of internal power shifts or difficulty in verifying disarmament creates commitment problems that prolong fighting.

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Civilian targeting

The intentional use of violence against non-combatants: Selective violence (aimed at specific individuals/groups), Collective violence (aimed at a whole community), Indiscriminate violence (randomly aimed at a population).

Reveals the strategic logic of warring parties. Selective violence can be for intelligence gathering or control, while collective/indiscriminate violence can be used for ethnic cleansing, retaliation, or coercion.

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Genocide, ethnic cleansing

Genocide: Acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group (as defined by the UN Genocide Convention). Ethnic Cleansing: The forced removal of an unwanted ethnic group from a territory by a hostile group to make it ethnically homogenous.

Both represent the most extreme form of violence and often signify the failure of the international community to uphold R2P. They are deliberate, strategic choices aimed at fundamentally restructuring the demographic landscape.

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Credible commitment problem (for civil wars, see Walter 1997)

The inability of warring parties to credibly promise to abide by a peace agreement after fighting ceases. This is acute in civil wars because there is no external sovereign to enforce the deal, and once a group disarms, it becomes vulnerable to attack from the newly empowered former enemy.

The critical barrier to settling civil wars. If both sides fear betrayal, they will choose to fight on rather than accept a risky peace, even if a negotiated settlement is preferred.

Implications:

  1. Non-military intervention by a third party doesn't help. Sending unarmed observers or peacekeepers doesn't make a bargain credible. You must actually send a military force that will stay in the country long enough for domestic institutions to be created, and a national army to be developed.

  2. Multilateral interventions are less likely to work as well as unilateral intervention since states gain an incentive to freeride if the going gets tough. There must be political will.

  3. It isn't necessary good to immediately disarm both sides. Allowing both sides to keep observable military equipment for a little while can help maintain cooperation.

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Mediations

Permissive third-party engagement with multiple disputants in a peace process.

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Time inconsistency problems (Beardsley 2008)

agreement made in the short-term, but over time actors become dissatisfied that the agreement is not reflective of future preferences. In civil wars, a government might promise peace in the short-term to get a rebel group to disarm, but then renege on that promise once the group is militarily weak.

Similar to the credible commitment problem, it highlights why peace deals are fragile. The timing of the deviation is key; the incentive to defect only materializes after the other side has made itself vulnerable.

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DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration)

The process by which ex-combatants are disarmed, officially removed from their fighting units, and helped to re-enter civilian life.

A crucial, practical post-conflict step. Its success is vital for security and stability, as failed DDR leads to an "arsenal of the unemployed" who can easily remobilize and reignite the conflict.

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Peacekeeping

Deployment of international military, police, and civilian personnel, usually authorized by the UN, to help implement peace agreements, monitor ceasefires, protect civilians, and assist with DDR and elections.

A key role for the international community. It directly addresses the credible commitment problem by serving as a third-party guarantor or enforcement mechanism, making disarming a safer choice.

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Transitional Justice mechanisms (David 2017)

The different goals/mechanisms used by societies to address past abuses: Reparatory justice (compensation/restitution to victims), Retributive justice (punishment/prosecution of perpetrators), Reconciliatory justice (fostering social harmony, e.g., Truth Commissions), Revelatory justice (establishing the historical truth).

5 interventions/types

  1. Truth commissions

  2. Criminal trials

  3. Lustration and personnel reform

  4. Reparation

  5. Apologies

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Syria (context and definitions of civil war)

3 Conflicts and players here

  1. Assad vs. rebels

  2. Battle against ISIL

  3. Turkey vs. the Kurds

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Sri Lanka (civil war onset)

Players

  1. State (Sinhalese majority)

  2. Rebels (LTTE tamil tigers)

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Bosnia (Ethnicity and identity)

Players

  1. Bosnian Serbs (Republika Srpska)

  2. Bosnian Croats

  3. Bosnian Muslims (Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herz.)

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Lebanon (intervention)

Players

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Peru (rebel group dynamics)

Players

  1. Government (Peruvian state)

  2. Rebels (Shining path)

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Columbia (violence against civilians)

Players

  1. Government (Columbian state)

  2. Rebels (FARC, ELN)

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Cambodia (genocide and ethnic cleansing)

Players

  1. Government/perpetrators (Khmer Rouge/Pol Pot)

  2. Victims (intellectuals, ethnic minorities, anyone tied to former regime)

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Rwanda (genocide and ethnic cleansing)

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Uganda (termination)

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Northern Ireland (mediation and diplomatic intervention)

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Liberia (post-conflict)

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South Africa (transitional justice)