chapter 9

oh my god my exam is literally next month i'm so cooked.

actus reas

criminal act; conduct that the law prohibits or absence of conduct that the law requires

attempt to commit a crime

act goes beyond mere preparation to commit a crime; not completed

conspiracy

crime involving two or more person who agree to commit a crime or agree to plan crime

crime

act violates the criminal law

criminal law

list of crimes promulgated by the state, including the mental states required for particular crimes (ex. specific intent and premeditation)

deterrence

theory in criminal law holding that the purpose of the sanctions imposed by law is to avoid or keepcriminal conduct from occurring rather than simply punish those who commit crimes

felony-murder rule

allows conviction of murder when someone is killed during the commission of a felony; premeditation need not be proven

general intent

requires merely that the actor intended a harmful act, not necessarily the specific result of the action.

• requires that the actor intended the precise result of a harmful act

mala in se

“Wrong in and of itself”

crimes that are morally wrong

mala prohibita

“prohibited wrongs”

crimes that are not inherently evil (regulatory crimes)

mens rea

criminal intent

murder

wrongful killing of another human being w/ malice aforethought (premeditation)

public defender’s office

government agency that provides criminal defense services to indigents

punishment (retribution)

primary goal of criminal law: punishing a person for criminal conduct.

Other theories regarding treatment of criminals are deterrence of crime; incapacitation, which consists of removing the criminal from society through incarceration; and rehabilitation, in which the criminal is helped toward a productive role in society

rape

common law = forcible sexual intercourse by a man on a woman against her will. 

• modern statutory rape = consent is irrelevant because of the status or mental state of victim

• modern law - variety of sexual assaults

specific intent

requires that the actor have intended the precise result of a harmful act.

• requires merely that the actor intended a harmful act, not necessarily the specific result of the action

strict criminal liability

attaches to a few crimes that may be proven w/ out proving itnent;

• principle, largely applied to product liability, which creates liability w/ out proof of fault

• virtually interchangeable w/ absolute liabilty

voluntary

When used in reference to criminal law = act of free will

different from its use in contract law, where coercion may negate voluntariness. In criminal law, acts are not voluntary when they occur during sleep, unconsciousness, or hypnosis or by reflex or convulsion

Criminal Law in Practice

• defense atttorneys = sole practitioners or small firms where staff is not cost efficient

• gov employs lawyers and paralegals in prosecutor offices and public defenders offices

• gov agencies have positions in which legal training and skills are useful

Condemnation of heinous acts against a person

• crimes against person

  • murder, rape, etc.

definition of criminal law

• no adequate substantive definition of crime

• American legal system: line has been drawn between acts regulated by criminal law process and those for which redress is sought through civil law process

  • (depends on whether punishment/compensation sought)

definition of criminal law part 2

• may be defined as list of crimes promulgated by state

• essentially arbitrary in the sense that state may penalize conduct that was formerly not criminal and may decriminalize conduct hat was formerly criminal. 

definition of criminal law part 3

• may be practically defined by concentrating on procedural distinctions

  • defined as “wrong against society”

• means to redress that wrong are monopolized by the state, and the prosecutor represents the people of the state

• system evolved to put the redress of criminal conduct wholly in the hands, so we have created agencies of police, prosecutors, and judges to accomplish the task

The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee v. Jenna M. Christopherson, Appellant

Jenna Christopherson, a minor, gave beer to another minor who later died in a car accident. The Illinois Supreme Court held that minors can be charged under the statute prohibiting delivery of alcohol to minors because the law applies to “any person,” regardless of age.

Court Reasoning (PSIA v. JMCA)

The court provided several key reasons why the statute applies to minors as well as adults:

• Plain Language of the Statute:

  • Section 6-16(a)(iii) states that “no person shall sell, give, or deliver alcoholic liquor to a person under 21.”

  • The term “person” is not qualified by age, and the court found this wording clear and unambiguous—it includes all individuals, minors and adults alike.

• Legislative Intent:

  • The legislature’s overall goal in section 6-16 is to keep alcohol out of the hands of minors and intoxicated persons.

  • Applying the statute only to adults would undermine that goal, since the harm of minors distributing alcohol to other minors is the same as when adults do so.

• Comprehensive Nature of the Statute:

  • The court noted that section 6-16 covers many different scenarios to prevent alcohol abuse, including:

    • prohibiting licensees from serving minors,

    • prohibiting parents from allowing minors to drink at home,

    • prohibiting fake IDs, and

    • prohibiting possession of alcohol on school property.

  • This broad approach shows the legislature intended to regulate everyone’s conduct related to minors and alcohol, not just adults.

• Use of Age Limits Elsewhere in the Statute:

  • When the legislature intended to limit an offense to adults, it explicitly used age-specific language (e.g., “at least 21 years of age” or “under 21 years of age”).

  • Because no age limit follows “no person” in subsection (a)(iii), the court inferred that the legislature deliberately chose to make the rule apply universally.

• Public Safety and Policy Considerations:

  • The court emphasized that the danger is the same whether alcohol is provided by an adult or another minor.

  • Exempting minors from liability would lead to absurd results—a 20-year-old could not be charged for giving beer to a 16-year-old, even though both are legally prohibited from drinking.

Result (PSIA v. JMCA)

Minors may be prosecuted for unlawfully delivering alcoholic liquor to another minor under section 6-16(a)(iii).

1. Do you think that Christopherson would have been charged with a crime had the person to whom she furnished the beer not died?

Yes, she still could have been charged. The offense is complete when alcohol is delivered to a minor, regardless of the outcome. The death likely made the case more serious and prompted prosecution, but the statute criminalizes the act itself, not just the harm that follows.

2. Why would Christopherson think that the statute did not apply to her?

She likely believed the law only applied to adults legally allowed to possess alcohol, since minors are already prohibited from possessing or purchasing alcohol. Christopherson probably assumed that as a minor, she could not be guilty of “delivering” alcohol she wasn’t legally allowed to have in the first place.

Crime and Morality

“you can’t legislate morality”

• false lmao

• this is what criminal law does

• immorality cannot be eliminated simply by passing criminal laws

Crime and Morality part 2

• crime = wrong against society is to assert subject action = immoral

  • might merely be wrong against a person and of little consequence to the public

• certain offenses are universally condemned; certain ones have widespread disagreement

• social mores change, law will change

• criminal law = societal values; lawmakers control and regulate conduct they consider politically undesirable

Mala in Se v. Mala Prohibita

Mala in se is inherently wrong

• driving while intoxicated

Mala prohibita isn’t wrong, but penalized by law

• driving w/ expired automobile registration

Mala in Se v. Mala Prohibita Part 2

• confusion is exacerbated by rules penalizing offenses that are not criminal

  • parking violations may no longer be misdemeanor

civil penalty

• not a misdemeanor, but close to it

• late fee = civil penalty

• not labeled criminal; looks like a wrong and certainly not private

  • tort and covered by compensation law

Note on the Model Penal Code

American Law institute publishes Model Penal Code

• additional attempt to encourage uniformity in state law

• declares more consistent and coherent statement of criminal law

  • no official standing in state law that departs from it

Note on the Model Penal Code Part 2

Restatement of contracts and the Restatement of Torts is responsible for Model Penal Code

• encourage uniformity in state law

• some areas present a bewildering assortment of treatments among the states; often a leader in these areas rather than merely a restatement of law

state law = hodgepodge

• attempts more consistent and coherent statement of criminal law; has no official standing and is not authoritative when state law departs or varies from it

  • most modern statement of American criminal law available and so is occasionally referred to here

fault

• a part of public wrongs and private wrongs (crimes v. torts)

• criminal law, element of intent to do wrong >> tort or contract law

  • primarily concerned w/ punishment/retribution of criminal and deterrence of crime

fault part 2

Anglo-American law aims at punishing those who deserve it

• traditionally, two components have been required to hold a person responsible for a crime: criminal act and intent

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Aaron Michael Heineman, AKA Aaron Heinman, Defendant-Appellant

Aaron Heineman sent a series of white-supremacist emails to a university professor, with the final one containing graphic threats of violence. He was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for transmitting an interstate threat, but the Tenth Circuit reversed his conviction, holding that the government must prove the defendant intended to instill fear in the recipient for speech to qualify as a “true threat” unprotected by the First Amendment.

Court Reasoning (US v. H)

• Statutory Interpretation and First Amendment Context:

  • Section 875(c) does not explicitly mention intent, but because it criminalizes speech, the court held it must be read in light of First Amendment protections.

  • The court noted that not all threatening or offensive speech is criminal—only “true threats” fall outside constitutional protection.

• Reliance on Virginia v. Black (2003):

  • The Supreme Court in Black defined “true threats” as statements where “the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence.”

  • The Tenth Circuit interpreted this to mean that the speaker must intend the recipient to feel threatened, not merely intend to send threatening words.

  • The court emphasized that intimidation, as discussed in Black, is a type of true threat that requires intent to cause fear of bodily harm or death.

• Application to Heineman’s Case:

  • Heineman had Asperger’s Disorder, which could impair his understanding of how others interpret his words.

  • Therefore, without proof that he subjectively intended to cause fear, convicting him would criminalize protected expression under the First Amendment.

  • The court concluded that the district court erred in not requiring proof of intent to instill fear and thus reversed the conviction.

• Constitutional Principle:

  • Criminal liability under § 875(c) requires both an objective element (a reasonable person would perceive the message as threatening) and a subjective element (the defendant meant it to be threatening).

  • This dual requirement protects against punishing speech that was offensive or disturbing but not intended as a real threat.

Result (US v. H)

The Tenth Circuit reversed Heineman’s conviction and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether he intended the email to be threatening. The court held that a conviction under § 875(c) requires proof that the defendant intended to instill fear in the recipient.

1. Would you feel threatened if you had received the poem via email?

Yes. The poem contains explicit violent imagery and direct references to killing and mutilation, which would reasonably make anyone fear for their safety and the safety of their family. Even though it was written as a “poem,” its language and tone convey a real, personal threat.

2. What are the similarities and differences between the facts in Black and Heineman?

• Similarities:

  • Both involve expression that could be interpreted as threatening and raise questions about the limits of First Amendment protection.

  • Both required the courts to decide whether the defendants intended to intimidate or instill fear.

• Differences:

  • In Black, the conduct involved symbolic expression (cross burning) with potential racial intimidation; in Heineman, it was written communication via email.

  • Black involved a state statute on cross burning; Heineman involved a federal statute on interstate threats.

  • The Black defendants’ conduct was public and visible to others, while Heineman’s email was a direct personal threat to one recipient.

3. Are you convinced by this court’s interpretation of Black that Heineman could only be convicted if he intended to instill fear?

Yes. The interpretation aligns with the First Amendment’s protection of free expression, ensuring that criminal penalties apply only when a person subjectively means to threaten another, not when their words are misinterpreted or poorly phrased. This safeguard prevents the punishment of offensive but nonthreatening speech.
However, one might argue that the objective impact on the victim—not just the defendant’s intent—should matter more, since the harm from fear is real regardless of intent.

Criminal act and criminal intent

To find person guilty, there must be a criminal act/actus reus

• law prohibits or absence of conduct that law requires

must be criminal intent (mens rea)

Criminal charges

1. A prostitute, knowing that she has AIDS, continues to ply her trade and is charged with attempted murder.

2. Four seamen adrift in a lifeboat for twenty days decide that one of them must be sacrificed and eaten in order to save the rest. A young cabin boy in weakened condition is killed and eaten. The others are charged with murder.

3. A parent who belongs to a religious sect that believes that physical illness must be cured by prayer and faith refuses medical aid for a child suffering from leukemia. When the child dies, the parent is charged with manslaughter.

4. A young woman is kidnapped by a revolutionary gang, put in a closet for several weeks, and occasionally raped by her kidnappers. For several months she is subjected to political indoctrination and finally agrees to participate in a bank robbery with her abductors to get funds to further their revolutionary cause. When finally found, she is charged with bank robbery.

5. A man meets a young woman in a bar; when asked by the bartender for identification proving her age, she shows a driver’s license and is served a beer. She states to the man that she is 20, and he believes it. Later they go to his apartment and have sexual relations. He is later charged with the crime of statutory rape, “sexual relations with a person under the age of 18.”

6. A woman believes her husband to be dead and remarries. When her first husband reappears, she is charged with bigamy.

7. A man picks up the wrong suitcase at an airport, believing it to be his, but later discovers his mistake and returns the suitcase. He is charged with theft.

8. A physician assists a terminally ill person to commit suicide by preparing and providing the means to end her life in a painless and comfortable way. The physician is charged with murder.

9. A game warden makes an image of a deer and puts it in the woods. When hunters shoot at the deer, the game warden arrests them for hunting deer out of season.

10. A man shoots a person intending to kill him. It later turns out that the victim was already dead, although the shooting would have killed him if he had still been alive. The shooter is charged with homicide.

Criminal Act

Early English Law

• most crimes treated in courts as common law crimes

• wrongs against persons and property were widely shared and understood

• courts turned to religious and customary values to define misconduct

Today

• what should be prohibited and what should not is not clear

• most crimes are statutory

  • many derive from old common law crimes

• most do not allow conviction for common law

• judges are not supposed to impose their perception; must find accused’s conduct falls clearly within criminal statute

Actus reus requirements

• must be voluntary

• seem to be a feature of mental state of the accused

• part of criminal intent

criminal act part 2

thoughts alone are not criminal; act must occur

• speech is protected by 1st amendment; speech is conduct and sometimes constitutes a crime

• inciting to riot or promoting conspiracy

failure to act = actus reus in cases which law imposes duty to act

• criminal act is shown by physical evidence; presents far fewer problems than criminal intent

• mental state must be inferred from circumstances of events of crime

general intent expanded

Actor intended a harmful act, not specific result

• traditional form of mens rea

• actor had intended harmful act; not a specific result to be intended

• reckless and negligent acts with conscious disregard of substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm

specific intent expanded

The actor intended precise result of harmful act

• statutes are most easily satisfied when the defendant intended the precise results of the wrongful act

• naturally assert lack of intent/knowledge; courts and juries are disinclined to accept such assertions

• the defendant knew or intended the result

  • most reliable witness

• statements are highly unreliable because self-interest = distortion of truth

specific intent expanded part 2

• complexity of human psyche = legal concept become more and more difficult

• research means little to the jury

strict liability

eliminates the prosecution’s burden of proving mens rea or shifts to the defendant the burden of proving innocent motive.

United States v. Jewell (9th Cir. 1976)

Charles Jewell was convicted for knowingly transporting marijuana across the U.S.–Mexico border. The drugs were hidden in a secret compartment of his car. Jewell claimed he did not actually know about the marijuana, but the trial judge instructed the jury that “deliberate ignorance” — purposely avoiding the truth — could count as knowledge. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge are equally culpable under the law.

Court Reasoning (US v. J)

• Equal Culpability of Deliberate Ignorance:

  • The court reasoned that a defendant who consciously avoids learning the truth is just as blameworthy as one who knows the fact directly.

  • In drug smuggling, deliberately “looking the other way” allows criminals to insulate themselves from liability — something Congress did not intend.

• Textual and Common-Sense Definition of “Knowingly”:

  • The term “knowingly” in common understanding includes awareness of a high probability of a fact’s existence.

  • Therefore, actual positive knowledge is not required if the defendant suspected the truth but chose to ignore confirming it.

• Policy Rationale — Preventing Willful Blindness as a Defense:

  • The court emphasized that allowing defendants to escape conviction through studied ignorance would create a loophole for smugglers and traffickers.

  • “Holding that ‘knowingly’ requires positive knowledge would make deliberate ignorance a defense,” which would frustrate the purpose of the drug laws.

• Jury Instruction Justified:

  • The “conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth” instruction properly reflected the idea that intentional avoidance satisfies the knowledge element.

  • The instruction allowed conviction if the jury found Jewell was aware of a strong likelihood of drugs and chose not to investigate further.

Result (US v. J)

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Jewell’s conviction.

Rule: A defendant acts “knowingly” if he is aware of a high probability of a fact’s existence and deliberately avoids confirming it — deliberate ignorance is legally equivalent to actual knowledge.

Justice Kennedy’s Dissent (Summary)

The dissent argued that the jury instruction was defective because it:

1. Omitted the “high probability” requirement — Jewell could not be culpable unless he was aware of facts suggesting a strong likelihood of drugs.

2. Ignored actual belief in innocence — if Jewell genuinely believed no drugs were present, he should not be convicted.

3. Allowed conviction despite true ignorance, which undermines the statutory requirement of knowledge.

1. Why did the majority not adopt the dissent’s approach?

• The majority believed that requiring proof of actual knowledge would make deliberate ignorance an easy loophole for traffickers.

• They reasoned that willful blindness equals knowledge, since a person who avoids confirming what they strongly suspect is just as morally and legally responsible.

• The majority prioritized practical enforcement of drug laws over a narrow philosophical definition of “knowledge.”

2. Does the dissent’s approval of Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) imply that “true ignorance…cannot provide a basis for criminal liability”?

• Yes. The dissent’s use of §2.02(7) shows that liability only exists when a person is aware of a high probability that the fact exists and does not actually believe otherwise.

• Therefore, if Jewell truly believed there were no drugs, even if that belief was unreasonable, he lacked the required mental state and could not be convicted.

• True ignorance, even if careless, is not the same as deliberate avoidance and cannot satisfy the knowledge requirement.

3. Is it unethical for the attorney to guide Jewell to base his defense on “lack of knowledge”? Argue both sides.

• Yes, unethical:

  • If the attorney knows Jewell deliberately avoided the truth, claiming “lack of knowledge” would be misleading and contrary to the duty of candor to the court.

  • It would encourage willful deception, using ignorance as a false defense.

• No, not unethical:

  • The defense attorney’s job is to ensure the government meets its burden of proof — if the prosecution can’t prove actual knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt, the defense is legitimate.

  • A lawyer may ethically argue that the client lacked the mental state required by law, even if the evidence suggests willful blindness.

4. Is subjective knowledge always arguable? Does deliberate ignorance solve the philosophical problem of knowledge?

• Yes, subjective knowledge is always arguable, since it involves what someone thought or believed internally.

• The deliberate ignorance doctrine helps resolve this problem by focusing on conduct rather than pure mental state — if a person intentionally avoids the truth, the law treats that as knowledge.

• It bridges the gap between actual knowledge and intentional avoidance, preventing defendants from exploiting the gray area between the two.

5. Does the rule in Jewell accord with the principle of strict construction of criminal statutes?

• No. Strict construction (the rule of lenity) requires that criminal laws be interpreted narrowly in favor of defendants when ambiguous.

• By expanding “knowledge” to include deliberate ignorance, the Jewell rule broadens criminal liability, arguably conflicting with this principle.

• The court prioritized policy goals (drug enforcement) over strict textual interpretation.

6. Do you think the jury would have found differently if instructed as the dissent suggested?

• Possibly yes.

  • Under the dissent’s version, the jury would need to find that Jewell was aware of a high probability of the drugs and did not actually believe otherwise.

  • Since Jewell claimed he didn’t actually know or believe drugs were present, the jury might have had reasonable doubt and acquitted him.

• The dissent’s approach would make conviction harder, requiring clearer proof of subjective awareness rather than mere suspicion.

intent

knowledge the accused must have

Criminal intent and specific criimes

• Nature and degree of criminal intent required varies from crime to crime

  • crimes involving theft = intent to deprive someone permanently of property

• crime against property are usually economically motivated

premeditation or malice prepense

malice aforethought

• requirement: removes from this most heinous of crimes homicides that are accidental but blameworthy

• those occurring in a moment of passion/anger

• murder requires some reflection about what one is doing/sufficient time between the beginning of the act and its completion to provide an opportunity to desist from following through

murder cases

• present distorted picture of the criminal law

• requirement of evil intent; availability of the death penalty upon conviction

• propriety of conduct by police and prosecution and conduct of trial are scrutinized to a degree unusual in other cases

Case Summary — Porras v. State, 761 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. 2014)

Louis Alberto Porras was convicted of murder and firearm offenses for ambushing and fatally shooting Jameelah Qureshi, the mother of a girl with whom he had an illegal sexual relationship. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that a witness can be impeached by proof of a prior felony conviction. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding that although the omission was an error, it was harmless and did not affect the verdict.

Court Reasoning (P v. S)

• Evidence Supported Conviction:

  • The prosecution presented strong circumstantial and direct evidence of guilt — including Porras’s motive, eyewitness testimony, and physical evidence tying him to the crime.

  • His plan to disguise himself and plant false “Crime Stoppers” calls showed a calculated effort to mislead investigators, supporting premeditation.

• Error in Jury Instructions (Acknowledged):

  • The trial court failed to instruct the jury that witnesses could be impeached by proof of prior felony convictions, even if those felonies did not involve dishonesty.

  • This was a legal error since two prosecution witnesses had prior felonies.

• Error Was Harmless (Reasoning for Affirmance):

  • The witnesses with prior felonies were not critical to the State’s case. Their testimony was not central to proving guilt.

  • The key evidence came from eyewitness Amanda Dove and corroborating witness Sherwanda Smith, both of whom the jury found credible.

  • The trial court still gave a general credibility instruction, allowing jurors to evaluate each witness’s believability based on demeanor, motive, consistency, and plausibility.

  • Given the strength of the evidence, it was “highly probable” that the missing instruction did not affect the outcome.

Result (P v. S)

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Porras’s conviction, holding that the failure to give the impeachment instruction was harmless error because the evidence against Porras was overwhelming and the impeachable witnesses were not key to the verdict.

1. What was the circumstantial evidence that convinced the jury that Porras was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?

• Porras was seen fleeing the crime scene in a truck matching his own.

• He was dressed as a woman to conceal his identity, showing planning.

• Police found handwritten scripts in his home designed to fake a female caller’s confession — showing an attempt to cover up his guilt.

• His continued obsession with Qureshi’s daughter and threats from Qureshi provided a strong motive.

• Eyewitness testimony (Dove and Smith) corroborated these facts, linking him directly to the shooting.

2. What were the factors showing the jury that the killing was premeditated?

• Porras disguised himself as a woman before the ambush.

• He brought two loaded guns and waited for Qureshi to arrive — showing planning and intent.

• The scripts prepared to mislead police after the murder demonstrated forethought and consciousness of guilt.

• The large number of shots fired (at least thirteen wounds) indicated a deliberate and determined intent to kill.

3. Why did the opinion state that the two witnesses with prior felony convictions were not critical?

• Their testimony did not provide the key evidence linking Porras to the murder.

• The most persuasive evidence came from Amanda Dove (eyewitness) and Sherwanda Smith (corroborating witness), who confirmed Porras’s actions and motive.

• Even if the jury had doubted the felon witnesses, the remaining evidence would still overwhelmingly support conviction.

4. Does the court make sense in its decision that the failure to give the impeachment charge was not prejudicial error?

Yes.

• The jury received other credibility instructions, which allowed them to consider witness bias, interest, and truthfulness.

• The overall evidence against Porras — motive, eyewitness accounts, and incriminating documents — was so strong that the missing instruction likely did not change the verdict.

• Since appellate courts only reverse when an error probably affected the outcome, the Supreme Court reasonably found this one harmless.

Forcible rape

• most serious of sex crimes

• at present, little uniformity in terminology or definition among states w/ regard to sex crimes

• compounded by nonconsensual elements. Defendant’s mental state and victim’s are an issue

statutory rape

• victim is underage and consented to the sexual act or relation

consent under duress

• not a consent answer

  • man hold woman at knife point; says yes? = nonconsensual

victim-oriented services

• victims have been questioned regarding prior sexual encounters

  • curtailed by law because of questionable relevance

  • factual issue - victim actually consented or not

• fought antifemale stereotypes on traditionally male-dominated law enforcement

• offers have been sensitized, rape counselors are called

Conspiracy expanded

presents problems w/ both mens rea and actus reus

• addresses planning of crime > actual commission

• agreement to commit crime and an overt act in furtherance

affirmative defense

renunciation of criminal purpose, typically an overt act that prevents the crime from occurring

conspiracy expanded part 2

use of racketeer influenced and corrupt organization act (RICO)

• designed to be used against organized crime and corrupt later

• RICO IS APPLIED IN WHITE-COLLAR CRIME WHERE racketeering is given a broad interpretation

attempt expanded

attempt = crime that failed

legal v. factual impossibilty

1. intended act is not criminal, there can be no criminal liability for an attempt to commit act. = legal impossibility

2. if tended substantive crime is impossible of accomplishment because of physical impossibility that’s unknown, elements of criminal attempt are present. = factual impossibility

Strict Liability expanded

• Mens rea imposes burden on prosecution to show that defendant = evil intent

• legislatures have sometimes imposed strict criminal liability

  • eliminates burden of proving mens rea or shifting to defendant the burden of proving innocent motive

Edmundo Oliveras v. State of Nevada

Oliveras was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, first-degree murder with a deadly weapon, and robbery with a deadly weapon. The Nevada Supreme Court upheld his conviction, finding that there was sufficient evidence to support all charges and no errors in the jury instructions regarding robbery, coconspirator statements, or the presumption of innocence.

Court of Reasoning (EO v. SN)

• Sufficiency of Evidence

  • Evidence showed Oliveras went with Zambada and Mendez-Rodriguez, carried a shotgun, and knew someone was going to be killed.

  • After Zambada shot Mendez-Rodriguez, Oliveras helped hide the weapon, took money, and hid the victim’s belongings in his apartment.

  • His actions and admissions allowed a jury to reasonably infer that he agreed to the murder, aided in it, and participated in the robbery.

• Jury Instructions on Robbery

  • Oliveras argued robbery was a specific intent crime, requiring proof of intent to steal.

  • The court disagreed, explaining that the legislature defined robbery as a general intent offense, and the statute’s wording was not ambiguous, so the rule of lenity didn’t apply.

  • The court cited Sheriff v. Luqman, emphasizing that defining crimes is the legislature’s power, not the court’s.

  • Robbery doesn’t transform into a specific intent crime just because it’s used for felony murder; the felonious intent from the underlying felony supplies the malicious intent needed for murder (State v. Contreras, Nay v. State).

• Coconspirator Statement Instruction

  • Oliveras objected to a jury instruction mentioning the “slight evidence” standard.

  • The court found no abuse of discretion — the instruction correctly described the evidentiary rule for admitting coconspirator statements (NRS 51.035(3)(e)).

  • The instruction did not lower the burden of proof, and the jury was clearly told the State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

• Presumption of Innocence Instruction

  • Oliveras claimed the court didn’t define which elements were “material.”

  • The court rejected this, noting that the instructions correctly stated the law and other instructions listed the elements of each offense.

  • The jury was presumed to follow the instructions properly, ensuring fairness (Allred v. State).

Result (EO v. SN)

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that:

• There was sufficient evidence for all charges,

• Robbery is a general intent crime,

• The jury instructions were proper, and

• The State met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

1. What facts show the agreement and the overt act necessary for the conspiracy conviction?

• Oliveras agreed with Zambada to commit the murder (he admitted knowing they planned to kill someone).

• The overt acts included bringing and hiding the shotgun, accompanying Zambada to the scene, and fleeing together after the shooting.

2. Why was Oliveras arguing that robbery was a specific intent crime?

• He argued robbery required intent to steal, meaning a specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of property.

• If robbery were a specific intent crime, he could argue that the jury needed proof of that mental state, possibly weakening the felony-murder charge.

3. According to case law quoted in the opinion, what was the purpose of the felony-murder rule?

The purpose is “to deter dangerous conduct by punishing as first-degree murder a homicide resulting from dangerous conduct in the perpetration of a felony, even if the defendant did not intend to kill” (Nay v. State).

strict liability part 2

traditional strict liability = statutory rape

growth of liability = regulatory statutes

• justified when a class of persons, such as young, seem to warrant special protection

• regulatory law is silent about intent; courts how inclination to interpret legislative acts

Insanity Defense expanded

Criminal defendant may plead “not guilty by reason of insanity”

• acknowledges commission of criminal act but negates criminal intent because of defendant’s insanity

basis for defense is to hold accountable for crimes only those persons who freely chose to commit crime

Insanity Defense expanded 2

insanity defense = involuntary act or absence of criminal intent

• difference lies in acknowledging insanity; results in commitment to mental institution if insanity is proven

• sanity and insanity cannot be drawn w/ accuracy; law requires that the line be drawn

Insanity Defense expanded 3

• M’naghten: suffered delusions that prime minister was out to get him

  • shot and killed the secrertary

• public outrage - insanity defense

• right-wrong est: whether accused suffered from a defect 

• physchology and psychiatry have shown that we are much less in control of minds and actions than formerly believed

im going insane part 4

usually involve several highly parid expert witnesses

• prosecution witnesses testify defendant is sane, defense claims otherwise

• media coverage might make one believe defense is common, thought it’s rare to plead not guilty by reason of insanity

• success of insanity is rarer; defendant has burden to prove insanity at time crime was committed

  • tied to defendant’s state of mind

Case Summary — Lennie Lane III v. John Ballot (Estate of Annie Ballot), Supreme Court of Alaska (2014)

Lennie Lane appealed a civil judgment holding him liable for assaulting and raping Annie Ballot. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment against Lane, holding that his criminal conviction—though “guilty but mentally ill” and pending appeal—conclusively established his civil liability under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Court Reasoning (LLIII v. JB)

• Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion)

  • A criminal conviction can serve as conclusive proof of the facts necessarily determined in a later civil suit based on the same events.

  • Lane’s criminal convictions for sexual assault, assault, and evidence tampering arose from the same conduct described in the civil complaint.

  • His attorney stipulated to the fact of conviction, so the conviction was not genuinely disputed.

  • Even though his conviction was under appeal, the court noted Lane could later move to vacate the civil judgment if his criminal conviction was overturned.

• “Guilty but Mentally Ill” vs. “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity”

  • The court distinguished between the two mental state verdicts:

    • Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI): The defendant knew what he was doing but lacked the full capacity to appreciate wrongfulness or control his actions.

    • Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI): The defendant was unable to understand the nature or quality of his actions.

  • Under Alaska Statutes:

    • AS 12.47.030(a): GBMI defendants remain criminally responsible.

    • AS 12.47.010(a): NGRI defendants are acquitted and not held responsible.

  • The jury’s GBMI verdict proved Lane knowingly raped and assaulted Ballot, even if his mental illness affected his understanding of wrongfulness.

• Application to Civil Liability

  • The criminal verdict established beyond a reasonable doubt that Lane committed intentional and reckless acts, satisfying the elements for civil assault, battery, and sexual assault.

  • Since the same conduct formed the basis of the civil claim, collateral estoppel barred relitigation of those facts.

Result (LLIII v. JB)

The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for Ballot’s estate, ruling that:

• The fact of conviction was undisputed.

• Collateral estoppel properly applied even with a pending appeal.

• A “guilty but mentally ill” verdict does not relieve criminal responsibility, and thus establishes civil liability as well.

1. How does the court distinguish a guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict from a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity acquittal?

• A GBMI verdict means the defendant understood his actions but either didn’t know they were wrong or couldn’t control them.

• A NGRI acquittal means the defendant didn’t understand what he was doing at all due to severe mental disease or defect.

• The key difference: GBMI = criminally responsible, NGRI = not responsible.

2. Why should a mentally ill defendant be punished but someone who is adjudicated insane not be punished?

• A GBMI defendant still has some awareness or control, meaning their conduct still involves moral and legal blameworthiness.

• An NGRI defendant lacks the mental capacity to form intent or understand their actions, so punishment would serve no purpose under law or justice.

3. Does it make sense that Lane’s criminal conviction made him liable in tort?

• Yes — civil law seeks to compensate victims for harm caused by another’s intentional or reckless acts.

• Lane’s criminal conviction already proved those acts beyond a reasonable doubt, so it’s logical that he’s civilly responsible for damages arising from the same conduct.