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pd on substance
substance in an entity, a thing, that does not depend on another entity for its continued existence
it has ‘ontological independence’
substances are what posses properties and persist through changes in properties
property dualism
there is just one sort of substance, physical substance
but at least some mental properties are a fundamentally new kind of property that are not fixed by physical properties
(phenomenal consciousness, qualia)
pd on physical properties
some properties of consciousness are not ontologically dependent on physical properties
natural laws correlate the mental with physical, but it is metaphysically possible for these correlations to be different
chalmers on consciousness
not the same thing as the mind
can be unconscious mental states
subjective quality of experience, what it is like
distinguished from the ability to report on feelings and control
two concepts of mind
phenomenal: subjective quality of experience, first person
psychological: what the mind does, how we explain behaviour, third person
phenomenal cannot be reduced to psychological
easy problem of consciousness
how could a physical system have psychological properties?
no threat to physicalism
hard problem
how could a physical system have phenomenal properties?
a physical explanation can only explain physical structure (constitution) and function, but not explain phenomenal consciousness
so, property dualism
Obj. mental causation
do mental properties have causal powers? (eg thoughts causing bodily movements)
Obj. science
if mental properties cause physical effects, this is incompatible with science esp. neuroscience