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Meta-ethics AO1
question of what goodness is.
1: Whether goodness exists in reality or not (moral realism vs moral anti-realism)
2: What the meaning of the word ‘good’ is (cognitivism vs non-cognitivism)
Naturalism – (realist & cognitivist)
values can be defined in terms of natural property in the worl and application to absolutism (right and wrong)
Bentham claims goodness = pleasure.
Utilitarianism is a form of meta-ethical naturalism
Goodness is real because pleasure is real (moral realism)
“Hitler was wrong”, we are expressing our belief that Hitler’s actions failed to maximise pleasure
ethical language is cognitive
common sense- synderesis natural law- see what works in the world (pragmatism)
bradley and foot- is naturalistic ethics- society class tells you
strengths and weaknesses and eval of naturalism
moostrengths
Bentham/Mill argues:
P1. It is human nature to find pleasure good
C1. Pleasure is good and we ought to maximise pleasure.
weaknesses
Naturalistic fallacy - Hume’s is-ought gap – attacks the realism and cognitivism of Naturalism- MOORE coined 20th century- turned natural into ethics- not in books should be burnt
Factual is-statements do not entail moral ought-statements
breastfeeding, euthanise old lady example
Naturalistic Fallacy: It is a mistake to assume that what is natural (e.g., pleasure) is automatically good.
moore- open q arg goodness= pleasure, open q with many other q’s - too much pleasure could be bad - is pleasure always good- spoilt children- pain isnt always bad soul making etc
moore- unanalysable- horses (can be broken down) and yellow (doesnt have characteristics) cant break down the good - moore
is there a god- natural law
evaluation
human flourishing defends
Anscombe argues that “Ought” really functions like the word “need”
Foot concludes there is “no difficulty” in deriving ought from is
action good or bad, we refer to its enabling or disabling of flourishing
need certain things in order to flourish, to live well. This is a fact, from which can be derived oughts
attfield- perhaps we havent find right definition of good- could be naturalistic but unsure
MacIntyre proposes a return to Aristotelian ethics, where moral concepts are rooted in human practices and purposes.
In this view, "ought" is grounded in "is"—facts about human nature and flourishing.
This reconnection offers a solution to moral relativism and nihilism in modern society.
Intuitionism
G. E. Moore rejected Naturalism using two key arguments:- natural fallacy, open q, unanalysbale
Moore's conclusion: Goodness is a non-natural property—it cannot be defined in terms of anything physical or natural..
Moral intuition: We have a mental ability called intuition that allows us to directly apprehend moral truths without reasoning or calculation.
Intuitionism:
Claims we know whether ethical propositions are true or false through intuition.
Is a cognitivist theory because moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false.
Ross- posits that we have self-evident, "prima facie" duties, which are conditional and can be overridden by other duties, rather than absolute rules, and that moral truths are objective and knowable through intuition
Pritchard- moral obligations are known directly through intuition, not through reasoning or empirical evidence, and that the concept of "ought" is indefinable and irreducible
strength, weakness, evaluation
strength
cross-cultural moral agreement on a core set of moral codes
intuitive sense of what is right/wrong
dont face same issues as naturalism ie naturalistic fallacy- intuition- open q arg- doesnt need a god
Counterargument (Mackie's View)
Mackie cites descriptive moral relativism: there is widespread moral disagreement across cultures.
While this doesn't prove moral anti-realism, it supports it via abductive reasoning.
Intuitionists say one side in a moral dispute might have the "right" intuition.
Mackie argues it’s simpler to explain differing intuitions as products of social conditioning.
Therefore, we are justified in believing anti-realism—there are no objective moral properties.
Evaluation / Strengthening Mackie's View
Cross-cultural moral agreement may result from evolutionary pressures and practical social needs.
Societies must prohibit killing/stealing to function—no need for non-natural moral properties.
A simpler explanation is that moral relativism is true, not moral realism.
Emotivism
Ayer - verificationist
vienna circle, humes fork
the belief that ethical terms evince approval or disapproval and its application to relativism
boo hurrah theory
stevenson another emotivist- moral judgments primarily express emotions and aim to influence others' attitudes, rather than stating objective facts
P1. Only desires are motivating, not beliefs.
P2. Ethical language involves motivation
C1. So, ethical language expresses desires
Ayer concludes ethical language just expresses emotions
question is on realism/anti-realism, use the moral nihilism section- strengths weak
Moral Nihilism and Anti-Realism (Ayer’s View)
Moral nihilism: the view that morality is meaningless or pointless.
Concern: if widely accepted, it could lead people to abandon moral behavior and laws.
Anti-realism, like Ayer’s emotivism, seems to lead toward nihilism.
Ayer claims there is no objective right or wrong—we can only express approval/disapproval.
Example: Ayer says we can dislike Hitler’s actions, but not say they were objectively wrong.
Ayer’s theory was popular until WWII and the Holocaust, which led philosophers like Philippa Foot to question its validity.
Foot suggested that such moral anti-realism may have contributed to the atrocities.
Evaluation and Response
The nihilism objection alone doesn’t prove Ayer wrong—it assumes moral realism is true (begs the question).
Ayer would argue that Foot's reaction to the Holocaust was emotional, fitting his emotivist view.
To refute Ayer, one must demonstrate that morality is actually real, not just undesirable if false.
Foot’s Critique and Moral Realism
Foot's deeper critique: the fact-value (is/ought) separation is the real mistake.
She argues values are a kind of fact, which can be verified through experience (a posteriori).
Therefore, Hume’s fork and Ayer’s verification principle wrongly exclude moral knowledge.
Viewing the Holocaust, Foot wasn’t just reacting emotionally—she was recognizing a factual disabling of human flourishing.
Thus, moral realism is true: values are part of the world and verifiable, making anti-realism false.
Nihilism highlights anti-realism’s flaw, not because it’s horrifying, but because it's based on a mistaken metaphysical divide.
question is on cognitive vs non-cognitive, use the ‘moral disagreement’ section- strengths weaknesses
strengths
Moore criticises non-cognitivism, because he noted that ethical language seems to involve features that require more than emotion
moral reasoning, persuading, disagreeing
‘Boo to stealing’ cannot be said to disagree with ‘hurrah to stealing’.
P1. emotions cannot disagree
P2. ethical language involves disagreement
C1. Ethical language cannot reduce to the expression of emotion.
Ayer’s non-cognitivism seems to be false
weakness- counter prescriptivism HARE
we prescribe it universally
ethics reduces to universal commands
We can’t reason/disagree/persuade about emotions, but we can with prescription
So ethical language reducing to prescriptions makes more sense
evaluation
Mackie’s error theory
Mackie accepts that we have feelings about ethics, but he argues we also have beliefs about it
Example: A bioweapons scientist questioning their work isn’t just asking how they feel or what they can universalize—they seek to know if it’s truly right or wrong.
This shows people treat morality as though it refers to objective facts.
believe that right and wrong are real, that they exist
ethical language is cognitive
Children believe santa exists – they express beliefs about santa. There is no santa, but santa-language still expresses beliefs
conclude that ethical language expresses cognitive beliefs which are all false