The Establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC)

China before World War II - 1900-1939

• Xinhai revolution, 1911

After a long period of decline in the 19th century, the Xinhai revolution of 1911 destroyed the government and deposed the 6 year-old emperor, Henry Pu Yi

• Shanghai Massacre, 1927

The Chinese National Party or Guomindang (GMD) leader Chiang Kai-shek began his Extermination and Annihilation Campaigns against the Communists

• Organic Law, 1928

After the defeat of the warlords, 1921-28, GMD leader Chiang Kai-shek passed the Organic Law, which gave him dictatorial power as Chairman of the Nationalist Government of China

• The Long March, 1934-35

• Sino-Japanese War, 1937

The GMD government

• Founded by Sun Yat-Sen, 1912

The GMD (sometimes KMT: Kuomintang) was formed as a nationalist movement to end the anarchy after 1911

• Led by Chiang Kai-shek, 1925-75

After the death of Sun Yat-Sen, Chiang Kai-shek took over leadership of the GMD

• War against the warlords, 1921-28

At first, the GMD allied with the Communist Party of China (CCP) to destroy the power of the local warlords who had seized power in the anarchy after 1911

• Nationalist and Republican

The GMD wanted the unity of China under a centralised government, without an emperor

• Gentry and merchants

The GMD was supported mainly by the middle class

The Communist Party before 1945

• Jiangxi Soviet, 1931

Rejecting Soviet Communism, which said that the Revolution would be made by the proletariat in the towns, the CCP set up the Jiangxi Soviet in the countryside in 1931

• The Long March, 1934-35

Trapped by GMD forces, the CCP accepted the advice of German military adviser Otto Braun, and broke out and (with massive losses) transferred to Yenan

• Zunyi Conference, 1935

At the Zunyi Conference, 1935, the CCP rejected the Soviet advisers, who returned home. At this conference, Mao Zedong established himself as leader of the CCP

• Communist and anti-imperialist

The CCP wanted a communist government that would drive out China’s invaders

• Supported by the peasants

Unlike Soviet communism, which said that the Revolution would be made by the proletariat in the towns, the CCP looked to the peasants in the countryside

The Long March, 1934-35: causes

• GMD Encirclement campaign, 1933-34

After his first four annihilation campaigns failed, Chiang Kai-shek – on the advice of GMD General Leu Wei-yuan – instead encircled the Communists in Jiangxi, seeking to starve them rather than defeat them in battle

• Hans von Seeckt

A German general advising Chiang Kai-shek, Seeckt advanced slowly, building trenches and blockhouses as he went; by contrast, the Communists preferred frontal assault - in a year, they lost 50% of their territory and 60,000 soldiers dead

• Otto Braun

Facing defeat, Otto Braun, the German-born Russian agent advising the Communists, advised a breakout to go and join the Communist Second army in Hunan

• Mo Xiong

In August 1934, Mo Xiong, a Communist spy in Chiang Kai-shek’s HQ, sent word that the GMD were planning a major attack on Ruijin, the Communist’s HQ in Jiangxi, making a breakout essential

• General Chen Jitang

Chen was a warlord, an ally of the GMD, who was guarding the south-west border of the GMD cordon. However, he did not want to lose his army in a battle, and the Communists negotiated safe passage and broke out

The Long March, 1934-35

• Xiang River, 30 Nov 1934

The CCP successfully broke out in October 1934, with 86,000 troops and 11,000 officials, but were attacked by the GMD; 40-50,000 Communists were killed or deserted (leading to the fall of Braun at the Zunyi Conference)

• Luding Bridge, 29 May 1935

The heroic crossing, led by a suicide mission of 22 soldiers, of a burning suspension bridge across the Dadu river; many historians believe this incident was exaggerated (or even completely made up) for propaganda purposes

• Zhang and the Fourth Army, Jun 1935

Mao’s 1st army joined up with Zhang’s 4th Army, which had advanced from Sichuan; the 4th Army was 18pt r, and Zhang tried to take control. However, he quarrelled with Mao, left and went south, where his army was destroyed

• Jade Dragon Snow Mountains, Jul 1935

Mao marched north over the mountains; the army was caught in ‘a terrible hailstorm’ and many solders died of the ‘dreadful cold’

• Zoige Marshlands, Aug 1935

A vast grasslands area; the Communists were led by a local guide, many still sank and died in the ‘bottomless pools of mud’

The Long March: Results

• Recuperation at Yenan

Although the army had been reduced from 100,000 to 20,000, the communists survived and, safe in the north, were able to rebuild and strengthen their forces

• Mao became leader and legend

At the Zunyi Conference, 1935, the CCP rejected the Soviet advisers, who returned home. During the March, Mao Zedong established himself as unquestioned leader of the CCP – he became ‘a living legend’

• Manifesto, Propaganda and Seeding-machine

In Dec 1935 Mao declared that the Long March was a ‘manifesto’ (proving the heroism of the Red Army), a ‘propaganda force’ (showing the communism was the road to freedom) and a ‘seeding-machine’ (spreading the idea of communism)

• Eight Points of Attention

Mao won the support of the peasants by issuing rules that the army had to treat civilians with respect; although this was partly propaganda, and there is evidence that the communists blackmailed, stole from and the people

• Guerrilla tactics

The experience battle-hardened the Red Army, increased its morale, and helped Mao to develop the guerrilla tactics which would eventually defeat the Japanese and the GMD (and the American in Vietnam)

Sino-Japanese War, 1937

Having successfully annexed Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese invaded China in 1937 once again, the GMD and the Communists co-operated to face China’s common enemy.

These Japanese conquests owed much to iron and steel imported from the US. The US sympathised with China and attempted to halt the conquests by placing economic sanctions on Japan and giving secret military and economic aid to Chiang.

Resentment at these sanctions was a major reason behind the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour that brought the US into WW2 and made Chiang and the US wartime allies.

US involvement with Chiang Kai-shek and China

The US found Chiang an irritating ally because the GMD - CCP hostility weakened the Chinese war efforts against Japan. Although Roosevelt publicly maintained that China was a vital ally, aid to Chiang was in reality low on the list of the US military priorities. Chiang complained that the Americans gave him insufficient aid and treated him badly. US mistreatment was evidenced by Roosevelt’s willingness to hand over Chinese territories to Stalin at Yalta without any consultation with Chiang.

While some American observers in China were optimistic about Chiang’s capabilities, others were highly critical and more impressed by the Communists.

The US and the Chinese civil war, 1945-9

After the defeat of Japan, the struggle between the Nationalists and Communists escalated into a full scale civil war. Initially, the US continued financial and military aid to Chiang. 2 months after the Japanese surrender Truman gave Chiang money and US Marines, ostensibly to transport GMD troops to take Japanese surrender, but in reality to prevent CCP gains in northern China.

In late 1945, the Truman administration seemed on the brink of large-scale military intervention in China, but the State Department strongly opposed the idea and the American public would not have approved any reversal of the ongoing demobilisation of American troops.

The State Department believed areas such as Western Europe, the Middle East and Japan were far more important than China, but the Republican outcry about abandoning Chiang led to the lifting of the arms embargo in May 1947 and the sale of military equipment to him at a 90% discount.

When Mao won, Chiang and the remnants of his Nationalist forces fled to the island of Taiwan.

Reasons for the fall of China to Communism in 1949

• The Japanese invasion

• The Communist appeal to the peasantry

• Chiang’s loss of middle-class support

• The differing military strategies and performances of the GMD and the CCP

• The leadership of Mao Zedong

The Japanese invasion

The Japanese distracted Chiang: they cost him many of his best troops and much of his money, and they enabled the CCP to establish itself more fully in the countryside.

The Japanese damaged Chiang’s reputation as a nationalist leader who could defend China. His refusal to co-operate with the CCP when China was in mortal danger during the war against Japan made him look less patriotic than Mao

Communist appeal to the peasantry

Mao came from peasant stock and understood the peasantry in a way that middle-class Chiang never did. Many of the poorer peasants were forced to give between 50% and 80% of their crops as rent and were chronically in debt. The Communist emphasis on the equal distribution of wealth naturally held great appeal to China’s poor.

Chiang’s loss of middle-class support

Once in power the GMD lost its revolutionary dynamism and employed many of the corrupt bureaucrats who had served previous unpopular regimes.

The GMD secret police were repressive and Chiang reneged on promises of democratic government.

It was perhaps Chiang’s unsuccessful economic policy that most cost the GMD middle- and upper-class support. The printing of vast quantities of banknotes fuelled hyperinflation. Chiang made no attempt to stabilise the currency, and as a result cities had different exchange rates.

Chiang’s army

• It was riddled with corruption, so much that it provoked a rebellion in Taiwan in 1947. Chiang’s officers sold food on the black market, leaving the ordinary soldiers underfed.

• During war, Chiang lost hundreds of thousands of men through death and desertion. Some GMD units had to tie up their soldiers overnight to stop them going home or joining the Communists.

• Chiang’s conscription policies hit the peasantry hardest and encouraged many to switch allegiance to the CCP.

• Morale was low by the final phase of the war in 1949.

Chiang’s strategy and generals

Chiang made frequent, crucial strategic errors. After 1946, he concentrated too many of his troops in the battle for Manchuria, without first gaining control of the parts of northern and central China that lay between Manchuria and GMD-held southern China. When Chiang’s generals warned him about such dangers he refused to listen.

The Communist military performance

Mao’s ‘Eight Rules of Conduct’ ensured that the Communist soldiers had: Communist soldiers were told to help the villagers, to pay for what they damaged, not to molest women, and not to dig latrines near homes..

The Communist knew better than to try to resist the Japanese head-on, relying for the most part on guerrilla warfare. They lost fewer men than the GMD. Mao repeatedly used the effective strategy of withdrawal, enticing the enemy into over-extension of its forces in hasty and ill-judged pursuit.

Mao’s leadership

Probably the main reason why the Communists won the Chinese civil war was because of Mao

• Won more supporters than Chiang through his social and economic policies

• Was more flexible than Chiang, adjusting his land reform policies in order to maximise support

• Played more effectively upon Chinese nationalism than Chiang

• Had a superior military strategy and trusted able generals such as Lin Bao

• Seemed far more democratic than Chiang in his willingness to participate in coalitions and to listen to the people.